

## **RESEARCH ON POVERTY ALLEVIATION (REPOA)**

The Research on poverty Alleviation (REPOA) is a not-for-profit Non-Governmental Organisation registered in Tanzania in November, 1994. Its overall objective is to deepen the understanding of causes, extent, nature, rate of change and means of combating poverty in Tanzania. The specific objectives focus on development of local research capacity, development of poverty research network, enhancing stakeholders' knowledge of poverty issues, contributing to policy and forging linkages between research(ers) and users.

Since its establishment REPOA has been generously supported by the Netherlands Government.

REPOA RESEARCH REPORTS contain the edited and externally reviewed results of research financed by REPOA.

REPOA SPECIAL PAPERS contain the edited findings of commissioned studies in furtherance of REPOA's programmes for research, training and capacity building.

It is REPOA's policy that authors of Research Reports and special Papers are free to use material contained therein in other publications with REPOA's acknowledgement. Views expressed in the Research Reports and Special Paper are those of the authors alone and should not be attributed to REPOA.

Further information concerning REPOA can be obtained by writing to :  
Research on Poverty Alleviation.  
P. O. Box 33223, Dar es salaam, Tanzania.

**Tel:** 255-22-2700083; 0811 326 064

**Fax:** 255-51-75738

**Email:** [repa@twiga.com](mailto:repa@twiga.com)  
[repa@africaonline.co.tz](mailto:repa@africaonline.co.tz)

ISSN 0856-41821



## **YOUTH MIGRATION AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION: A CASE STUDY OF PETTY TRADERS (WAMACHINGA) IN DAR ES SALAAM**

Athumani J. Liviga  
Rugatiri D. K. Mekacha

**RESEARCH ON POVERTY ALLEVIATION**

**Research Report No. 98.5**

**YOUTH MIGRATION AND POVERTY LLEVIATION:  
A CASE STUDY OF PETTY TRADERS  
(WAMACHINGA) IN DAR ES SALAAM**

Athumani J. Liviga and Rugatiri D.K. Mekacha  
University of Dares Salaam

Research Report No. 98.5

Published by: Research on Poverty  
Alleviation P.O. Box 33223  
Dar es Salaam

Printed by: Kitabu Commercial  
Printers P.O. Box 78495  
Dar es Salaam

© REPOA, 1998

ISSN 0856-41821

## Table of Contents

	<b>Page</b>
<b>1.0 Background to the Study</b>	<b>1</b>
The Problem	1
Objectives of the Study	1
Study Questions	1
Hypotheses	2
<b>2.0 Literature Review and the Conceptual Framework</b>	<b>4</b>
Conceiving Poverty	4
Migration	4
Who are the Wamachinga	7
Theoretical Framework	9
<b>3.0 Research Methodology</b>	<b>12</b>
Research Approach	12
Methods of data/information gathering	12
The sampling design	13
Data analysis techniques	13
<b>4.0 Analysis and Discussion of the Results:Out-migration</b>	<b>15</b>
Introduction	15
A potrait of respondents	15
Socio-economic and cultural situation of out-migration areas	18
The family	21
Newala	21
Motivations for out-migration	26
<b>5.0 Analysis and Discussion of the Results:In-migration</b>	<b>30</b>
Introduction	30
Why Dar es Salaam	30
Date of Arrival	30
Activities Undertaken	31
Problems, Successes and Failures	35
Wamachinga and the State	37
<b>6.0 Conclusions and Emerging Policy Implications</b>	<b>40</b>
Perceiving rural-urban youth migration	40
Rural poverty and out-migration	41
Social services and out-migration	42
Wamachinga and the State	42
References	44

## ***Abstract***

*This study begins with a proposition that there is a link between poverty, migration and policy. Its purpose is therefore to study and understand the phenomenon of rural-urban youth migration by focusing on mobile and stationary petty-traders in Dor es Salaam popularly known as "wamachinga".*

*The study approaches the "machinga" culture in a generic way by investigating both causes and effects of youth migration, positive and negative effects of the culture to both in-migration and the out-migration areas, and relates the culture with matters of policy formulation and implementation in relation to both rural and urban development.*

*The study argues that decision to migrate is not voluntary. It is influenced by problems experienced at home and for "wamachinga" it is a combination of difficult economic conditions and poor returns from agriculture as well as lack of alternative, non-agricultural employment. This fact is complicated by specific policies pursued by the state in rural development in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. It's also argued that rural-urban youth migration has negative impact in both out-migration and the in-migration areas. And in that regard the "wamachinga" phenomenon ought to be perceived as a national problem, with both macro and micro-level dimensions.*

*The study suggests therefore that a lasting solution to the rural-urban youth migration can only be one which has a national character, addressing both the macro and micro-level dimensions. It is proposed also that the government must review its policies with the view of re-emphasizing rural development.*

## **1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY**

### **1.1 The Problem**

In Tanzania, as elsewhere in the Third World rural-urban migration is not only self-reinforcing but it is also selective. It attracts, in the main, the age cohorts of the population which are the most active in production and reproduction. This, as Fridlay and Fridlay (1987: 61) put it, amounts to "redistributing the economically most productive and demographically most fertile elements of the population. This operates to the cumulative detriment of regions of out-migration". The areas of in-migration do not necessarily benefit from the migrations either. They may experience problems of squatter settlements, overcrowding, poor sanitation, increased crime rates, unemployment and underemployment, inadequate social services and popular pressures on political systems. The immigrants too may experience problems of settlement, numerous social and psychological problems as well as problems of economic survival.

### **1.2 Objectives of the study**

This research sought to study and understand the phenomenon of rural-urban youth migration. At the general level, the study sought to investigate whether or not rural-urban migration is linked to the poverty prevailing in both out-migration areas, mainly rural, as well as in-migration areas, which is mainly urban. The assumption is that poverty is both a cause and result of rural-urban youth migration. The study focused on the youth, who happen to be the most productive and reproductive members of the society. In particular, the study sought to relate poverty and youth migration to the petty traders known as "*WamachingeT*" with a view to identifying possible solutions which will feed into policy formulations pertaining to out-migration and in-migration areas and the youth migrants themselves.

The study focused on mobile as well as stationary (road side) petty-traders in Dar es Salaam popularly known as "*wamachinga*," who since about 1990, have become the most conspicuous symbols of rural-urban youth migration and economic liberalization; a focus of the media, administrative and political attention; victims of policy inconsistencies, political and economic misconceptions and administrative and police harassment. This study is an initial attempt to open up avenues for the understanding of the link between poverty, migration and policy.

### **1.3 Study Questions**

Omari (1994) suggests that the *machiriga* "culture" could be approached in a variety of ways. One way is to investigate the extent to which income generated from the *machinga* petty trading contributes to household economy. In fact this was the aim of Mbilinyi and Omari's (1996) study, namely "to establish the contribution the migrants make to the rural families and households ... in relation to the poverty alleviation process"(p. 8). Thus, while acknowledging that "in any type of

migration there are two basic areas involved: the area of origin and the destination the area dealt with is that of the migrants origin"(p.11). The current study proposes to deal with both in-and-out-migration areas. Another way to approach the *machinga* culture is to relate it to gender-based social division of labour, i.e. to investigate why it is male youths who engage in *machinga* petty trade while women engage in "mama ntilie" food-stall businesses. A third way in which the *machinga* culture could be approached is to relate it to government policies pertaining to youth employment, industrial development and production.

Such studies require basic data on the basis of which specific dimensions of *machinga* culture could be approached. Thus, this study is intended -to provide such basic data. Like Mbilinyi and Omari (1996), this study proposes to relate the *machinga* culture to both migration and poverty. But it proposes to approach the *machinga* culture in a more generic way. Firstly, it investigates both the causes and the effects of youth migration. Secondly, it attempts to investigate both the positive and negative effects of the culture to both the in-migration and the out-migration areas. Thirdly, it relates the culture with matters of policy formulation and implementation pertaining to both rural and urban development. The study therefore attempts to answer the following questions.

- Where do the youth migrate from?
- What are the push factors influencing out-migration?
- What are the pull factors influencing in-migration?
- How and under what circumstances do the migrants make a living in the city?
- Does the government perceive rural-urban youth migration as a problem? If it does, what has the government done to cope with the migrations?
- What effects do migrations have to the out-migration areas and the in-migration areas?

At the general level, the answers to these questions will go a long way to show how the rural-urban interconnectedness perpetuates poverty in the Third World. Specifically, however, the answers to these questions will help to show the success or failure of the current policies, if any, on rural development and its implementation. They will also help to alert planners and policy makers on the repercussions on agriculture and rural development of the ever increasing rural-urban manpower drain.

#### **1.4 Hypotheses**

This study is premised on the general assumption that poverty is both a result and a cause of poverty to the out-migration areas, to the in-migration areas and to the migrants. Specifically, it is hypothesised that:

- Youths migrate mainly from areas which experience either acute problems of underdevelopment such as parts of the southern regions of Mtwara and Lindi or acute problems of land shortage such as parts of Morogoro and Kilimanjaro regions.

- The push factors favouring youth migrations include low incomes, lack and inaccessibility of social services, land shortage, poor transport to and from the areas, unemployment and underemployment and a host of other socio-cultural factors.
- The pull factors include the prospects for a better living, prospects for employment and self-employment, and availability of, and the perceived accessibility to better social services.
- To make a living the youth migrants rely on dependence, engage in petty trading as the only alternative available rather than out of choice.
- There is lack of a coherent policy on how to deal with youth migrants. While the government is at a loss as to what it should do to stop out-migrations in the source areas, in the city it views them generally as a nuisance, trouble makers and potential criminals to be dealt with sternly by use of its repressive organs.
- While the out-migration regions experience reduced productivity and hence development and a slowed population growth, the regions of in-migration have to contend with increased problems of unemployment and underemployment, increased crime rates, problems of housing, sanitation and increased demand for social services and popular pressure on the political system.



## **2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

### **2.1 Conceiving poverty**

It is not difficult to identify the poor. Studies, such as Omara-Ojungu (1992) and Deng (1996), to name but two, have identified the criteria which can facilitate the identification of the poor. These include very low and uncertain incomes, limited salaried employment opportunities, lack of means of capital accumulation, very poor living conditions, restricted access to formal education, poor social, health and nutrition conditions and very distant proximity to the processes and centres of decision making.

The definition of poverty is, however, a matter of considerable controversy, as it is defined differently by different scholars. The differences partly revolve around the perspective one takes. According to Mbughuni (1994), one may take the global, the continental, the national, the regional or the individual perspective. The differences' revolve also around differences of academic fields from which poverty is approached. Poverty is conceived by development economists mainly on the basis of the indices with which it could be measured. According to Semboja (1994) these include the headcount index, the poverty measure gap, the Sen index, the Ahluwalia-Chenery index, and the social indicators index. These, with the possible exception of the last one, point to a quantitative conception of poverty. Sociologists, on the other hand, define poverty from the viewpoint of social organisation. Accordingly, poverty is perceived on the basis of indices which define the social status of a person or a group of people relative to the others or other social groups and social organisation of the respective community (Omari, 1994). To these, political scientists add the extent to which a person or group of people are likely to influence the processes of policy formulation and implementation. Hence, poverty is conceived as a category of power relations, that is, the extent to which the poor are deprived of power and the extent to which they interact with the centres and processes of power.

These conceptions complement each other and point to the fact that poverty is a gradient or relative rather than a categorical or absolute concept -not to be confused with the contrast between relative and absolute poverty in sociology (Cooksey, 1994; Omari, 1994). They also show that poverty could be conceived quantitatively and/or qualitatively. Further, they indicate that as a social phenomenon poverty is not only multidimensional but also dynamic both in its causes and effects (Cooksey, 1994). Among the many dimensions of poverty this study concentrates on youth rural-urban migration.

### **2.2 Migration**

The number of people living and working in the cities in the world is rapidly increasing. Whereas only one in eight people lived in an urban area at the turn of the century, about half the world's

population will live in urban settlements at the end of the century (Gugler, 1988). Two thirds of these 3 billion urban dwellers will be in the Third World, where urban population grows at three times the rate of growth of the general population (Gugler, 1988; Mabogunje, 1991; United Nations, 1987). In 1975 the level of urbanisation was 61% in Latin America and 25% in Africa and South Asia (Fridlay and Fridlay, 1987). But, according to Gugler (1988), there is evidence of a slow down in Latin America. In Africa, where according to Fridlay and Fridlay (1987) the urbanisation rate is fastest, 42% of the total population will live in urban areas by the year 2000. At that time seventeen of the twenty-three largest metropolitan areas, with populations over ten million, will be in the Third World (United Nations, 1987).

Indeed the rapid urbanisation has been a result of the general population growth and of a process of urbanising the rural areas, especially in the industrialised nations. But urbanisation is mainly a result of massive redistribution of population from rural areas to urban centres. This is said to be the outcome of a general and universal development process as a result of which there is a rapid reduction of the number of people earning a living from agriculture and the increase in the proportion of people earning a living from industrial and service activities (Fridlay and Fridlay, 1987).

However, in the Third World, population distribution has occurred also because of reasons external to their economics. The economies in these societies have faced stimulation to large scale rural-urban migration which can be traced back to colonial contacts. Prior to the colonisation of Africa, for instance, population movements were associated with warfare, natural calamities and the search for fertile new settlements. But these were essentially rural-rural migrations. The development of export economy and the emphasis on urban sector development, in the colonial era, resulted in the movement of labour to the plantations, mainly sisal, cotton and coffee through the *Wanala* and *Manamba* systems, to the mines and to the service sectors of the urban centres. According to Mabogunje (1991), from 1950 to 1970, while the total population in Africa increased by 57%, that of the urban areas increased by 151%. By the year 1990 the population of the cities not only doubled but the proportion living in the cities of a million or more increased from just over 30% to about 40% of the total population (Mabogunje, 1991).

In colonial Tanganyika, areas where cash crops were not introduced such as Kigoma, Rukwa and Makete, became sources of migratory labour. The cash crop plantation and small scale production areas such as Mwanza, Shinyanga, Mbeya, Kilimanjaro, Tanga, Kagera, and Coastal areas needed labour not only for the production of the cash crops but also for the production and supply of foodstuffs. Other areas such as parts of Iringa and Mara regions served as sources of military labour. Consequently, considerable spatial inequity in both the growth of the population, the growth of the sectors of the economy and the benefits of such growth was created in favour of

plantation and urban areas -md to the disadvantage of areas from where labour was recruited (Lwoga, 1985; Mbonile, 1993; Mlay, 1977).

At independence, the development pattern and the spatial structure of the economy inherited from the colonial administrators was continued resulting into intensified focus on small number of cities. In terms of population the attraction to the more "developed" urban centres from poorer and less developed areas was strengthened. Thus, increasingly migration was, and still is occurring not just from the rural areas to urban centres, but also from smaller towns to bigger cities.

As a result, according to Mosha (1993: 129), the Tanzania urban population grew from 183,862 (2.8% of total population) in 1948 to 685,547 in 1967 and to 1,664,079 (10.6% of total population) in 1978. Whereas the population growth rate for urban centres for the 1957-1967 intercensal period was 6.5%, it was 8.4% for the 1978-1988 period. Dar es Salaam accounts for the lions share of both urban population and urban population growth rate, especially since 1948. Between 1900 and 1948 the population in Dar es Salaam increased from about 20,000 to about 70,000, an annual growth rate of 3% (Mosha, 1993: 131). Furthermore, drawn from Lugalla *et al.* (1994) the population growth in the city of Dar es Salaam, covering an area of 1393 sq. km., is shown in Table las follows:

**Table 1: Dar es Salaam City Population Growth**

Year	Population	Annual Growth (%)
1948	69,277	
1948-1957	128,742	7.1
1957-1967	222,821	7.8
1967-1978	757,346	9.7
1978-1988	1,300,000	5.6

Currently the city of Dar es Salaam is estimated to have well over 2.5 million inhabitants. Whereas population in Tanzania doubles in every twenty years (United Nations Secretariat, 1993:5), that in Dar es Salaam doubles in ten years only. Thus, the population growth rate in Dar es Salaam is by far much higher than the national and world population growth rates. Throughout the 1978-1988 decade Dar es Salaam alone accounted for almost 34% of the urban population in

the country. The city thus accommodates over a third of all urban dwellers in the country. A study of the 1967 census show that 65.7% of all urban dwellers in mainland Tanzania were not born in the towns (Mosha, 1993), and according to O'Connor (1983) only 26% and 32% of the total populations of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam respectively were born in the cities. These were mainly young children. Thus, the rapid increase of the populations of the cities is mainly accounted for by migrations.

According to Mabogunje (1970) migration in the Third World reflect the complex and changing interaction of a variety offerees such as individual human personality, as well as influences of the social, physical and technological environment. The perception 'to earn a higher wage, or to achieve a more desirable lifestyle in urban areas is likely to attract migrants from rural areas. Positive information about urban opportunities becomes not only a catalyst for further migrations, but also allows the earlier migrants to play host to fresh migrants. In this process especially due to remittance of money, the migration process becomes self-reinforcing, resulting in even more migrations. Gugler (1988) calls this century "the century of urban transition." Due to the fundamental and qualitative effects the urban transition is likely to have on the current and the future generations, he compares urban transition to the domestication of plants and animals ten thousand years ago that made sedentary life possible. The sheer number of people involved and the pace at which it is taking place is without precedent in human history.

Urbanisation in the industrialised countries is a logical result of a development process due to the mechanisation of agriculture on the one hand and the development of the industrial and service sectors on the other, and is sustainable. In the Third World on the other hand this is not the case as there are difficulties which are compounded by poverty. Our contention is that migration is a social rather than a purely economic phenomenon and that it is both a cause and a result of poverty. Further, we hope to confirm the recent social theory (Braudel, 1982; Soja, 1989; Pred, 1990), that space is socially constructed and that migration is not only mobility on space (a change in ones place of domicile), but is also an attempt to effect mobility on social relations (an attempt to redefine ones position in social relations).

### **2.3 Who are the *Wamachinga* ?**

Rural-urban migration in Tanzania can be traced back to the early colonial period, at the time when the economic and administrative engagement of the colonial government favoured the creation of a rural-urban dichotomy (Luoga, 1985; Mbonile, 1993; 1994; 1995a; 1995b; Mlay, 1977), as it is essentially a result of economic development differentials of a region or country (Mabogunje, 1970, Mlay, 1977, Mbonile, 1995b). But, beginning the early 1990s, the influx of youth from rural areas into the primate city of Dar es Salaam and the economic, social and political impact they have had is unprecedented.

This wave of migration took place at the time when, on the one hand, the rural populations were beginning to experience severe economic and social hardships resulting from the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) adopted by the government at macro-level, and on the other hand, the predominance of trade liberalization which promoted the growth of trade especially in Dar es Salaam and opened up chances for self employment at its distribution end (Mbonile, 1995a). It was also at the time when there was more emphasis on urban based development which put emphasis on the market economy, privatization and private investment.

The significant rural-urban youth migrants of the 1990s in Dar es Salaam, are predominantly male youths who engage themselves in what has come to be known as the *informal* economy (see URT, 1991), or the second economy (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990). The particular form of informal economy they are engaged in is conventionally referred to as *petty* trading (see URT, 1991, for other categories). The so called *wamachinga* petty traders roam about the streets selling a variety of items ranging from second hand clothes to new manufactured household supplies. This study focuses on this group of petty traders.

Although, these youths "constitute a small sub-sector in the informal economy" (Schulz, 1996: 10), they have become very conspicuous, epitomizing all that, in the official perception, is bad about the economy (Schulz, 1996). They may have perfected the distribution system, availing at any time, second hand clothes and different household supplies to customers wherever they may be, but, since they roam about the streets and display their goods along pavements, often blocking the streets, *wamachinga* petty traders are considered to be a menace to both pedestrian and motor traffic. They may have swelled the ranks of potential cheap labourers, thereby cheapening unskilled labour. But, since they roam about, *wamachinga* are perceived as a threat to the tranquility and security of the streets and living neighbourhoods, "their goods only a decoy for criminal intentions" (Schulz, 1996: 10). They are potential voters and could be wooed to vote for a party. They are potential tax payers if they could be made to pay. But since they are politically "unpredictable" and do defy over-regulation they are a threat to law and order, a source of untidiness, and tax evaders etc.

It is this contradictory perception of *wamachinga* which seems to define their relationship with the state. While on the one hand certain sections of the state, particularly, the Vice President and the Minister for Youth and Social Welfare, would want to accommodate, but regulate and control their activities, the Prime Minister and the Dar es Salaam City authorities treat them essentially as intruders who can and should be forced out of the city "to where they came from". It seems that it is the prejudicial perception which has prevailed. This perception is socially reproduced through discourse and has culminated into the label *wamachinga*, a locative or ethnic covert expression of the "negative-other" implyingly opposed to the positive self-

presentation. The fact that they have specific origins other than Dar es Salaam, they are different in culture, mentality and norms and can therefore be sent back.

It is not known exactly how they came to be referred to as *wamachinga*. Schulz (1996: 10) is of the view that it is "the media (which) created a word for them, *machinga*, that the politicians and bureaucrats were quick to adopt". That "the majority of these young men (are) from southern regions of Tanzania" (Mbilinyi and Omari, 1996: 6), is a common belief. For, it is thought that "*Machinga* refers to a tribe in the South of Tanzania" (Schulz, 1996: 10). Indeed, there is a parliamentary constituency in Lindi region known as Mchinga (not *machinga*). In one of the languages spoken in Mtwara and Lindi, the hilly parts of the village are referred to as "kumachinga." However, there is neither a tribe nor a place called Machinga except that it is a relational category.

## **2.4 Theoretical framework**

Three approaches have generally dominated the subject of rural-urban migration viz.: the push-pull theory, the quantitative theory and the dependency approach. Common to these three approaches is the fact that migration to urban areas has been viewed in terms of economic determinants. Anthropologists and sociologists have tended to favour the push-pull theory whereas, economists and to a certain extent political scientists have used the dependency model. Advocates of the dependency model problematize the migration issue within the broader development of the underdevelopment theory.

The push-pull theory states that migrants are forced to leave rural areas because of economic hardships and are pulled by the attraction of urban life. It insists on sociological and economic incentives. According to Mutton (1973: 103) the leading magnetic forces which pull migrants to the city include "social and psychological factors, relative aspirations, individual motivation, initiative, opportunity to escape from obligations and conflicts at home, and bright neon lights and other urban attractions

The quantitative approach, basically developed by economists, aims at defining the conditions for full employment and is a derivative of a dual economy model: traditional and modern. The approach assumes a direct connection between migration and spatial income differentials. It postulates that the continued rural-urban migration is a rational economic decision despite the high levels of urban unemployment. Rural-urban earning differential is sufficient to induce migration. Within this context, and referring to Tanzania, Sabot (1979: 60) has argued that:

In 1970 the difference between non-agricultural wage employment and agricultural self-employment was approximately three times what it had been in 1958. The been in 1958. The

widening difference between agricultural self-employment and urban wage employment is consistent with a view of the income increase in urban migration as determined primarily by economic factors.

Similar views are held by other observers (cf. Elkan, 1960; Bairoch, 1973; Berry, 1983; Cooker, 1983, among others). The dependency approach explains rural-urban migration as a function of a complex web of interacting elements concerned not only with why people migrate but also with all the implications and ramifications of the process. Migration, according to this approach results from a series of adjustments between rural control sub-systems based on kinship, overpopulation and environmental deterioration and one connected to residential and occupational incentives. The stimulus to migrate varies according to dynamic factors such as skill differentiation and status advancement.

However, and according to Temu and Swai (1981: 165), "this approach is silent on globalization of capitalist relations of production which operate to underdevelop third world countries". Others who subscribe to this approach and argue that migration results from a rationalisation of a situation basically defined by factors beyond the migrants' control include Amin and Forde (1974), Meillasoux (1968), Chambers (1983), Piven and Cloward (1971) and Egero (1987).

It is thus clear that the thrust of the dependency approach is to emphasise the exploitation, resource transfer and impoverishment of rural areas. Migrants are therefore lured to cities by fanciful and largely erroneous ideas about urban opportunities and urban life. There are also multiple cultural facets of an economic 'interpretation of urban-rural interrelationships that are connected to rural poverty engendered by underdevelopment. The urban-rural network of interdependence emphasise the attachment of migrants to the countryside. Since, as Mbonile (1995b: 39) writes "it is the spatial and socio-economic dimensions which encourage migration", rural-urban migration depend on the ecology, the national economy and the international market. Significantly, the countryside is the locus of reproduction for capitalist production in the city. The continued migration to the city is therefore a response to the dependence induced in rural areas by penetration of capitalism. The problem is that capitalism does not revolutionise the relations of production, rather, it articulates with pre-capitalist modes of production, sapping their autonomy without taking over the burden of supporting those who depend on them, i.e. the rural population.

Like all development theories, the three approaches have taken an economic interpretation with more emphasis on technological and structural aspects in the examination of processes in general and rural-urban migration in particular. They have, also gravitated around what Bhaskar (1993: 3) has called "poles of crude polarity between individualism and collectivism". There is no attempt

to grapple with the relationship between social structures and human agency, which is based on a transformational conception of social activity which avoids both voluntarism and reification (Bhaskar, 1993).

In cognisance of strengths and weaknesses of the three approaches, this study intends to consider the rural-urban youth migration from the viewpoint of social-economic and political relations. The main concern is the persistent relations between individuals (and groups) on the one hand, and with interrelationships between such relations and the nature and the products of such relations on the other. Society is thus viewed in general and processes (e.g. youth migration) in particular from a relational point of view. This approach entails seeing collective phenomena as primarily expressions of enduring relationships. Such a conception entails also a transformational model of social activity with emphasis on the question of change and history

Given such a premise this study will further be guided by the idea that development in general and rural development in particular can best be viewed from the point of view of relations among people. Youth migration and poverty alleviation is approached by adopting the transformational model and looking at the relations among the people, and the people and the state and how their differences and contradictions are treated and/or resolved. This approach is intended to link the question of youth migration, poverty and the whole question of restructuring social relations.

The basic assumption here is that it is difficult to examine developmental issues outside the struggles for democracy and human rights and the process of transformation of the state at least in-so-far as policy development strategy is concerned. Therefore, to correctly appraise a social situation, it is necessary to move away from the over used concept of economic growth as development to that which takes into consideration two points: First, the satisfaction of human needs of the majority, i.e. the marginalized, oppressed and exploited, focusing around the question of eradication (and not alleviation) of poverty. Secondly, integrated economic activities which ensure a self-centred process of capital accumulation, i.e. a social project which focuses on the question of redressing imbalances, inequalities, oppressive and exploitative relations.

Fundamentally, what is suggested here is a need to "research on the various aspects of the *Wamachinga* (the youth petty traders in DSM). Within this framework, the relationships such as contradictory, antagonistic and complementary between various forms of capital accumulation, agriculture, population, migration (and patterns), poverty, popular participation (and social and political self-organization), the state and environment need to be reappraised.



### **3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Research approach**

Both poverty and migration are multidimensional phenomena. The way they relate is also multidimensional. To understand their relationship this study adopts a multidimensional approach and uses a combination of three research approaches. The first is a comparative approach both in spatial and time dimensions. Various out-migration areas are compared to determine the differences in the reasons why the youths migrate. The purpose is to test the hypothesis that youth migrants from the southern areas migrate essentially because of poverty while youth migrants from other areas migrate mainly because of land shortage. The comparative approach is also used to test the hypothesis that there are differences of availability (though not necessarily accessibility) of social amenities and opportunities for self advancement between the city and the areas of out-migration. Further, a comparative approach is used to prove or disapprove the contention that the current wave of youth migrations from the southern regions is, in the history of independent Tanzania, without precedent both in volume and pace.

The second research approach is the descriptive one which sought to describe the social economic conditions of both the regions of out-migrations and regions of in-migration and also to describe the conditions under which the youth-migrants live and work. Since, all these need to be put into their proper historical, socio-economic and political contexts, the study also use the analytical approach.

#### **3.2 Methods of data/information gathering**

Researchers subscribe to the view that "on poverty, the only true experts are the poor" (Burning, 1990:149). It therefore entailed taking the perspective of the poor in addressing the issue of poverty (Wamba dia Wamba, 1993). In this study therefore, the poor were consulted in gathering information about themselves, inspecting their living and working conditions, observing the way they undertake their activities and assessing their successes and failures in addressing the issue of poverty.

##### **(a) Sample (social) survey**

This study identified and made a sample survey by physically visiting the main places of origin of the petty traders. The purpose was, in this case, to observe and analyse the economic, social, political and cultural conditions which may have "pushed" the youths out of their places of origin. The area of out-migration visited in this regard was identified on the basis of the responses to the

interview/questionnaires. On the basis of a pilot study conducted earlier, Newala District, in Mtwara Region was visited.

The places where the youths live and work in the city were also visited in order to observe and analyse their living and working conditions, know their activities and assess their success and/or failures. The areas visited were Manzese, Oysterbay/Msasani, Kariakoo, Temeke and Ubungo. These are considered, on the basis of observation, to have the major concentrations of the machinga activities.

### **(b) Archival research**

It was necessary to consult archival material in order to put this study in its proper historical context, thus most documents on rural-urban migrations were consulted. The archival materials were intended to show the extent to which the current wave of rural-urban migration is unique. Further, the archival materials were also expected to show how the problem of rural-urban migration was dealt with and to assess the impact of the past policy formulations.

### **(c) Interviews and questionnaires**

These were the main methods of data/information gathering. The interviews and questionnaires were designed in such a way as to allow researchers to collect information about the out-migration areas, the youth migrants, the in-migration areas, and the policies, their implementation and their effects.

## **3.3 The sampling design**

The exact number of petty traders in Dar es Salaam is not known but can be divided into two major categories, namely those who are stationary with permanent kiosks or market stalls and those who move around carrying their merchandise. In the circumstances and given the nature of the study 250 petty traders were interviewed, half from each category.

To get the 125 respondents from the category of stationary petty traders, we used a three stage stratified sample. The primary sampling units were clusters, that is the five sample areas in Dar es Salaam considered to be the centers of petty trading activities, namely Manzese, Oysterbay/Msasani, Kariakoo, Temeke and Ubungo. The number of traders sampled in each of these clusters is shown in Table 2.

**Table 2: Sampled Petty Traders**

<b>Area</b>	<b>Number of Traders</b>	<b>Traders Interviewed</b>
Manzese	246	50
Kariakoo	156	50
Msasani/Oysterbay	72	50
Ubungo	162	50
Temeke	117	50
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>753</b>	<b>250</b>

The secondary sampling units were blocks of petty trading activities such as streets or market stalls. The tertiary sampling units consisted of a list of all traders in one block. From the list interviewees were picked by using a systematic sampling e.g. picking every third listed trader.

For the category of mobile petty traders we used the purposive (judgement) sampling technique. This involved interviewing every mobile petty trader who was willing to participate in the study, until the required number 125 was attained. To avoid interviewing one person more than once we carried out the interviews in the five areas simultaneously. From the 250 respondents, thirty were chosen for an in-depth and detailed study.

### **3.4 Data analysis techniques**

The data collected falls under two main categories, namely nominal and ordinal which called for both qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques. The process involved analysing frequencies, calculating ratios, percentages, all of which were cross tabulated. Cross tabulated frequencies were tested for independence, i.e. identifying the dependent and independent variables, using the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS).

## **4.0 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS: OUT-MIGRATION**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The analysis is done on the basis of the portrait of the respondents, socio-economic conditions, and respondents perception of the socio-economic conditions. The portrait of the respondents is a portrayal of the respondents social background. The criteria used in understanding the social background of the respondents are place of origin, age, education, gender, marital status, religion, previous occupation-and place of domicile in Dar es Salaam. The socio-economic conditions obtaining in the out-migration areas are those narrated by the respondents themselves and as observed by the researchers. The respondents perception of the socio-economic conditions obtaining in their places of origin involve conditions which may have influenced their decision to migrate as well as the reasons which in their view motivated them to move.

### **4.2A portrait of the respondents**

There are two reasons for making a portrayal of the respondents. It assists in the definition of the "*wamachinga*". This information elaborates on whether the *wamachinga* phenomenon is a preserve of a particular social class; whether indeed *wamachinga* hail from one area and whether their migration is u function of the socio-economic and/or cultural conditions^of their place of origin. Furthermore, it will enable researchers to know the kind of businesses "*wamachinga*" engage themselves in and why. Knowledge of these two aspects of the *wamachinga* will provide good pointers to the success or failure of policies pertaining to youths in out-migration areas and influence the formulation of better policies for both out-migration and in-mieration areas.

#### **(a) Place of origin**

In a sample of 250, fourty six respondents (8.4%) come from Mtwara Region; 38 respondents or 15.2% come from Morogoro region; 35 respondents or 14% come from Coast Region; and 27 or 10.8% come from Tanga Region. The other regions from where significant numbers of *wamachinga* in Dar es Salaam come from are, in a descending order, Kilimanjaro (8.4%), Lindi (8.0%), Dodoma (4.4%), Mbeya (4.4%), Ruvuma (4.4%), Iringa (3.2%), Singida (1.6%), Mara (1.2%), Tabora (1.2%), Kigoma (0.8%), Iringa (0.8%), and Arusha, Dar es Salaam and Kagera

These results confirm the common belief that the *wamachinga* are *predominantly immigrants* to the city. But, contrary to popular belief, the *wamachinga* do not come from the southern regions of Mtwara and Lindi only. Indeed, Mtwara leads the rest of the regions, but Lindi is a distant sixth.<sup>15</sup>

Further, the total number of *wamachmga* hailing from other regions outnumber by far those coming from the southern regions of Mtwara and Lindi.

The results further show that of the 46 who report that they come from Mtwara, 30 report that they come from the former district of Newala, now (since 1996) split into Newala and Tandahimba districts. This is to say that even those coming from Mtwara do not come from all over the region. Rather *they come from specific districts and wards*. The same can be said of those coming from Morogoro Region. Of the 38 who come from Morogoro Region, 20 come from Matombo and Mgeta in Morogoro Rural district.

**(b) Age, sex, religion, and marital status**

The results show that the majority of the *wamachinga* are young people. As shown in Table 3, two hundred and two (80.8%) of the 250 respondents are aged below 30, while 245 (98%) are below the age of 40. The majority of the respondents, " 175 (70.0%) are aged between 20 and 29 years.

**Table 3: Age**

Age	Frequency	%
15-19	27	10.8
20-29	175	70.0
30-39		17.2
40-49		1.6
50-59	1	0.4
Over 60	0	0.0
Total	250	100

Of the 250 sampled respondents 243 (97.2%) were male. The dominance of the male respondents is, in our view, as a result of the selection we made of the sampled activities as well as the areas covered (see chapter 2). All the female respondents were newspaper vendors. We are aware, however, that women dominate in open "mama ntilie" food stall businesses.

Further, 165 (66% ) of all the respondents were moslems; 84 (33.6%) were Christians and only 1 (0.4%) was a follower of a traditional religion. 98 (39%) were married while the majority, that is, 152 (60.8%) were not married. The majority of those who claimed that they were married (98%) stayed with their families, normally only wife and children, in Dar es Salaam. On average each married person had four dependants.

(c) **Education, skill and previous employment**

The results showed that the majority of *wamachinga*, 230 (92.0%) were those with primary level education (up to seven years of schooling) while 16 (6.4%) had ordinary level secondary education (up to 11 years of schooling). Only 4 (1.6%) didn't attend any formal school.

**Table 4: Education**

Level of Education	Frequency	%
No formal education	4	1.6
Primary level (=Class Seven)	230	92.0
Secondary level (=Form Four)	16	6.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>100</b>

None of the respondents claimed, to have been trained in any skill. The majority of the respondents (90%) did not have formal employment prior to engaging themselves in petty trading. About 46% of those who were previously employed claimed that they were engaged in the public sector, and 44% were employed in the private sector. The salaries received for those employed in the public and private sectors did not differ much. 68% of them received salaries not exceeding Tsh 10,000 and 32% received more than that amount. None of them however received more than Tsh. 16,000 per month. This may be because all were employed as unskilled labourers.

The overall pattern that emerges about the *wamachinga* is that they are a "cohort-specific rural-urban migrants" (Becker and Grewe, 1996), in relation to such social indicators as age, education, sex, religion, marital status, and previous working experience.

**Box 1: A typical *machinga* (Interview in Temeke, 6<sup>th</sup> November 1996)**

I am 26 years old, moslem and married with two young children. I come from Mahuta in Newala. I come from a large family. My father and mother divorced when I was in class six. Both my parents have since remarried, my father is married to three wives and the present husband of my mother has two more wives. I am the only child to my mother and father. But I share the father with six brothers and five sisters. I share the mother with a brother and two sisters. Life became very difficult for me when my parents divorced. I was put in the care of one of my stepmothers. I finished class seven with a lot of difficulty as both my father and stepmother cared the least for me. I was made to fend for myself since then. I never went to a secondary school and never received any form of training.

After primary school I worked for my father, tending his cashewnut trees, but was never given anything besides food and shelter. I decided to try my luck in Dar es Salaam. That was in 1992. I accompanied a friend who had a relative in Dar es Salaam, himself a successful *machinga*. We put up at my friend's relative, selling second hand cloths for him for six months in return for shelter and food. Finally, he gave us a bunch of second hand clothes to begin our own business. I don't regret having migrated. I manage my life and that of my family well. Whenever I can, I send money home to help mother. I plan to go back and settle at home when I have made enough money. I plan to buy a farm for myself.

### **4.3 Socio-economic and cultural situation of the out-migration areas.**

In order to know why the youths migrate into the city, it was considered imperative to understand how they perceive the socio-economic and cultural conditions of the places they come from. The respondents were asked a number of questions which provided clues on how they perceive their backgrounds, and hence, motivations for their decision to migrate. The questions were of three main categories. The first category of questions was intended to gauge the respondent's perception of the economic conditions of their places of origin. These included the economic activities at their places of origin, availability of good arable land, opportunities for non-agricultural employment, the activities they were engaged in at home and the average income earned from those activities.

The second category of questions was intended to gauge the respondents' perception of the availability and accessibility of the social services. These include opportunities for schooling both at primary school level and above, availability of health care services such as dispensaries, health centres and hospitals and the reliability of the various means of communication. The third category of questions was about the family. This category of questions was included because the family is considered to be not only the unit of reproduction but is also the primary unit of production and distribution of wealth. It is, therefore, the unit through which the social responsibility of the welfare of the youth is exercised. Aid, as Mbonile (1995: 2) writes

"household [family] composition and division of labour are ... important factors which determine the participation of a household in migration."

**(a) Economic activities**

The majority of the respondents, 76.1%, cited peasant farming, that is farming for subsistence, as the main economic activity taking place at the places of origin. Other activities mentioned include pastoralism (11.8%), fishing (10.2%), and mining (1.9%).

**Table 5: Economic activity at place of origin**

Activity	frequency	%
Peasant Farming	245	76.1
Pastoralism	38	11.8
Fishing	0	10.2
Mining	0	1.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>322*</b>	<b>100</b>

\* Total exceeds 250 because of multiple answers

An overwhelming majority, 93.2%, mentioned peasant farming as the main economic activity they were engaged in prior to migrating to Dar es Salaam. All these, without exception, stated that they were assisting their parents on family plots and did not have farms of their own. 3.2% stated that they were self employed either as tailors, petty retail traders, etc. 1.2% of the respondents reported that they had salaried employment. It is clear, therefore, that *the economic activity which loses its labour to the wamachinga phenomenon is predominantly peasant farming.*

**Table 6: Occupation prior to migration**

Occupation	Frequency	%
Farming	233	93.2
Teaching	6	2.4
Fishing	-	1.2
Self-employed	4	1.6
Wage employee	4	1.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>100</b>

For those who were involved in farming prior to migration, a follow-up question required them to state the amount of money they earned from the sale of agricultural products. 45% didn't give any response. This is not surprising, for many did participate only as part of family labour and were not involved in decision making on matters related to finances. 17.6% reported that their families



earned not more than Tshs 49,000 per annum. 12.8% reported that their families earned between Tsh 50,000 and Tshs 90,000 per annum. 19.6% reported that their families earned between Tsh 100,000 and Tshs 149,000. Only 5.2% reported that their families earned more than Tshs 150,000. but none reported that their families earned more than Tshs 200,000 per annum. This is to say that most of the youth migrants involved in petty trading in Dar es Salaam are those who come from families which earn relatively poorly from agriculture.

Poor earnings from agriculture could have been a result of poor harvest and/or low crop prices. Whereas 54.4% of these respondents reported that the low incomes from agriculture were a result of poor harvest, 44.8% of them could not explain the source of low incomes from agriculture. As for the prices of agricultural products, only 3.2% thought that the prices of the agricultural products were high enough. 52% of them considered the prices to be too low to enable them earn enough money. But 44.8% could not determine whether the prices were low or not.

Poor earnings from agriculture could also have been a result of insufficient arable land. When asked whether they thought the land their families have was sufficient, 58% reported that they did not consider land to be insufficient, 40% considered arable land in their places of origin to be scarce, and 2% were undecided. Interestingly, it is mainly those who come from the major areas of out migration, namely Newala, Morogoro rural and Kilimanjaro who report that there was insufficient arable land in their places of origin.

It was assumed that if incomes drawn from agriculture were low, youths would have been attracted to alternative employment where it is available. The respondents were, therefore, asked to state whether there was non-agricultural employment opportunities available in their places of origin. 1.6% reported availability of non-agricultural employment opportunities in their places of origin, 6% did not know but, the majority, 96% reported that there were none. This implies that the *wamachinga*, in the main, are youths with a poor peasant background, who consider the incomes drawn from agriculture to be low, essentially because of poor harvest and low crop prices. Further, they perceive their places of origin to have insufficient arable land and limited alternative employment opportunities.

#### **(b) Availability and accessibility of social services**

The *Wamachinga* perceive their areas of origin as places which are generally deprived of sufficient and accessible social services. On availability and functioning of facilities for the provision of drinking water, 64.8% of the respondents reported that such services were not available at all, 33.6% said the services were available and 1.6% did not know. On availability and functioning of facilities for the supply of electricity, 81.2% of the respondents reported that such services were not available, whereas 17.2% said the services were available.

Whereas 72.4% of the respondents reported that health facilities, such as dispensaries, clinics and health centres were available, about all of them, 95% reported that the facilities were not functioning properly as neither medicines nor qualified personnel were available. On whether through available transport, their places of origin were accessible from district, regional and national headquarters, almost all respondents reported that communication within the districts was not so much of a problem compared to communication to regional and national headquarters which pose the greatest challenge especially during the rainy seasons.

#### **4.4. The family**

The family as the primary unit of production and distribution of wealth is also responsible for organising labour and its fruits. It is also the unit through which the social responsibility of the welfare of the youth is exercised. If the labour demanded of the youth by the family exceeds the capability, the rewards of labour are not commensurate to the labour expended and the family does not assure the welfare and the future prudence of the youths, then it is likely that the youth may consider physical departure as an alternative.

The size of the family is critical in fulfilling these responsibilities. In response to the size of the families they come from, 78.8% of the respondents stated that they come from families with 6 to 16 members, while 16.8% said they come from families with less than 6 members and 2% come from families with more than 16 members. It is clear, therefore, that most *wamachinga* come from fairly large families.

Researchers visited Newala District in an attempt to see whether the perceptions of *wamachinga* can be corroborated by facts. The results are reported below.

#### **4.5 Newala District**

##### ***Administration and politics***

Newala District in Mtwara Region is located at the south-eastern corner of the country and covers an area of 4,020 square kilometres. The whole district sits at the top of the Makonde Plateau, between 1000 and 1500 meters above sea level, rising from the east to the west. The plateau is bordered by very steep escarpments on all sides. Administratively, the district is divided into six divisions: Newala, Kitangali, Chilangala, Mahuta, Namikupa and Liteho, with a total of 38 wards and 234 villages. In 1995/6 a new district, Tandahimba, was carved out of Newala (in this study though Newala district includes Tandahimba). The district, with three parliamentary constituencies, is predominantly inhabited by people of the Wamakonde ethnic community, who

also spread into the neighbouring districts of Mtwara, Masasi, Lindi and Nachingwea as well as into neighbouring Mozambique.

### ***Population and Culture***

According to the 1988 population census, Newala had a population of 307,998 people, 141,896 male and 166,102 female. Being a traditional out-migration district, Newala may be losing more males than females in this process. In comparison to the 1978 population census, Newala had only 600 more people in 1988, implying that it had a growth rate of only 0.02% over a period of 10 years. The growth rate for Mtwara Region was 1.4%, while the national growth rate stood at 2.8%. This may be a further indication that Newala is traditionally an out-migration area.

### ***Economic Activities***

The main economic activity in Newala is peasant farming. Out of the total land mass of 402,000 hectares, the district has approximately 257,000 hectares of arable land which receives good rainfall. Of these, 185,500 hectares are under cultivation, a little more than half a hectare per capita. The main crops are cashewnut and cassava. The former serves as a cash crop and the latter as both a food and cash crop. Other crops such as rice, millet, maize and some legume are also grown, mostly for home consumption although occasionally they are sold. The production figures for the leading cash and food crops in Newala are as shown in Table 7.

**Table 7: Cash and Food Crop Production in Newala 1990-1996**

Year	Cashewnuts (Tons)	Cassava (Tons)
1990/1	7,885	126,500
1991/2	11,985	120,070
1992/3	7,030	144,100
1993/4	11,984	83,360
1994/5	13,754	164,346
1995/6	18,000	144,750

*Source: Economic and Planning Department, Newala District Council, 1996.*

Estimates from the district agricultural office shows that the production levels barely suffice the needs and any slight change of weather results in famine. Two divisions, Chilangala and Liteho are not as fertile as the other divisions and apart from cassava, no cash crop is cultivated. Thus, both the people and the cash crop production are concentrated in the remaining four divisions, putting considerable pressure on the land available. Of the 30 youth migrants in Dar es Salaam from Newala, 28 come from the four divisions.

Newala town is the administrative and trading centre of the district. There are also small scale enterprises and wood carving, a famous Wamakonde skill world-wide. But the town has no industry or factory of any kind. Except for petty trading which caters for a very small and largely poor market and employment in the formal (government) service sector, there are virtually no non-agricultural employment opportunities. Of the 30 families visited in Newala, only 5 had one other member employed in the government service sector as teachers, nurses and health officers. Only one of the 30 families visited reported earning more than Tshs 100,000 per annum from the sale of cashewnuts. The rest reported earning between Tshs 50,000 and 90,000. These facts confirmed what had been reported by the *wamachinga* in Dar es Salaam.

### **Social services**

#### **Water supply**

About 277,000 people of Newala in 235 villages depend on water supplied by the government supported Makonde Water Supply Project. The project has five piped water schemes and eleven pumping and booster stations. Three of these use electricity run engines to pump water and the rest use diesel engines. People have to pay for the water services they get, something which further eats into their meager financial-resources. The Makonde Water Supply Project produces 3,040,000 litres per day, whereas the demand stands at 6,700,000 litres per day. This means that many people in Newala don't get piped water.

#### **Health services**

Newala has a district hospital with 240 beds at its headquarters, six health centres and thirty nine dispensaries spread all over. This means that there is a dispensary for every ward serving an average of six villages. However, health centres and dispensaries suffer from an acute shortage of drugs, personnel and money such that the health services are as good as non-existent. Most people have to travel to private hospitals run by religious institutions in the neighbouring districts, namely Ndanda and Masasi Hospitals in Masasi District, and Nyangao Hospital in Lindi District.

#### **Electricity supply**

Newala gets its electricity supply from a thermo power plant at Masasi, which also supplies electricity to Nachingwea district. However, electricity is available only in the district administrative headquarters, hospitals and at water pumping and booster stations and it depends on availability of fuel to run the power plant otherwise power cuts and rationing is the order of the day. For the majority of the people in Newala electricity is as good as non-existent.

## Education

Available statistics show that each village has at least one primary school. However, as the statistics in Table 8 show, between 1992 and 1995, about a third of the children of school going age did not enrol for primary school.

**Table 8: Primary School Education in Newala District 1992-1995**

Year	Eligible	Registered	%	Attendance	%
1992	68,795	43,432	63.1	40,442	9
1993	69,030	45,159	65.4	38,017	3
1994	69,150	45,255	65.4	37,895	83.7
1995	64,446	47,387	73.5	38,450	81.1

*Source: District Education Office, Newala, 1996.*

Further, about 15% of those registered actually don't attend school, and it is showing an increasing trend. There are all indications that even the quality of education obtained is far from satisfactory. In fact, a number of children are supposed to repeat some classes to try and gain something from the school system. The District Education Office revealed that in 1994 and 1995 respectively, for instance, 2680 and 2402 were to repeat their respective classes and 3526 and 2539 completed primary school without knowing even how to write and read.

**Table 9: Class Seven Examination Results, Newala District 1991-1995**

Year	Eligible	Sitting	% Not Sitting	Passing %		
1991	4692	4402	93.9	292	173	3.9
1992	4386	4146	94.5	240	179	4.3
1993	4569	4232	92.6	237	178	4.2
1994	4548	4013	88.2	148	153	3.8
1995	4332	4305	99.4	77	388	9.0

*Source: District Education Office, Newala, 1996.*

Only about 4% of those who finished primary school managed to continue with secondary education between 1991 and 1994. The percentage of primary school leavers entering secondary school nationwide, as shown in Table 10, was at that level way back in the early 1980s. In 1995 the number rose to 9%, thanks to the opening of the three private secondary schools run by Newala Development Foundation. There isn't a single government secondary school in the district. Newala Development Foundation plans to have at least a secondary school in each division, but only three are now operating. In comparison to the rest of the nation, therefore,

Newala lags behind and that means that education is becoming more and more inaccessible to the youths who are forced to look for alternative ways.

**Table 10: Number of pupils selected to join secondary school in Tanzania from among primary school leavers, 1980 - 1991**

Year	Number of Pupils sitting [1]	Pupils Selected [2]	Percentage [3] = [2]as % of [1]
1980	212536	16,098	7.5
1981	657,816	17,166	4.8
1982	410,829	17,710	4.2
1983	454,604	19,605	4.3
1984	649,560	21,322	3.4
1985	429,194	23,506	6.5
1986	380,096	27,430	7.2
1987	380,758	32,633	8.6
1988	347,978	56,464	10.6
1989	267,744	42,136	15.7
1990	306,656	47,227	15.4
1991	382,427	19,182	5.1

The average size of the 30 families visited in Newala was 12.5 which is 2.5 times higher than the national average of 5 (1988 Census). Of the 30 families visited, 9 were single-parent, female-headed families of about 6 people. They were either divorcees or widowers. The remaining except 2 were male headed polygamous families of three to five wives and between 6 and 17 children.

***The family, property relations, production, distribution and welfare***

Except for the female headed families which use land "lent" to them by their relatives, all land is owned by the male family heads. The male family heads organise production and control the products, store and market the cashwenuts and decide how the money will be expended. However, most of the production is accomplished by female and youth (both male and female) labour. Thus, the leading dimensions of differentiation are gender and gerontological. While it is the old (over 50) males who control the means of production, the production process and distribution system, it is the females of all ages and the youths who produce. This form of property relations, labour

organisation and production and distribution systems encourages both polygamy and the inclination to have more children.

These property relations, form of labour organisation and distribution system also encourage divorce. Newala District, according to a number of interviewees, has a very high divorce rate. It is estimated, by the District Welfare Officer, that on average, four in every ten children in Newala are from broken marriages and that on average, by the time a propertied male is fifty years old he will have married six times and divorced twice. Each and every male family head we visited admitted having divorced twice or thrice. They also claimed that they were custodians of all the children from their broken marriages.

Further, such property relations and forms of labour organisation and distribution system do not give the youths equitable returns of their labour, nor do they assure them of their future welfare and prudence. This is further complicated by the form of land ownership and the dynamics of property inheritance. In Newala land is ordinarily supposed to be a property of the family or clan. However, all arable land is covered by cashewnut trees, most of which were planted twenty to thirty years ago. It is the cashewnut trees which the family heads claim to own. Giving out land to other members of the family will in effect mean giving out cashewnut trees, thereby cutting down on income. This is perhaps the reason why the youths hardly consider land to be a problem.

To acquire land, youths are encouraged to buy cashewnut trees. This, in effect, means making efforts to earn money by means other than those available in Newala itself. This explains why "young men in Makonde are encouraged to fend for themselves from a very tender age" as one informant, a retired civil servant reported. Further, the *Wamakonde*, traditionally, have a matrilineal system of inheritance. It is our view that the obtaining forms of property ownership, forms of labour organisation and distribution system together with encroaching patrilineal tendencies tend to blur the system of property inheritance. Youths are no longer sure of their future welfare and prudence except by obtaining their own property and outside Newala. What all this means is that youths are pushed out of Newala as a result of the dynamics of property relations, labour organisation and the production and distribution systems.

#### **4.6 Motivations for out-migration**

##### **(a) The wider context**

The effect of certain policy decisions and the way they were implemented had some influence on the country as a whole. The first and perhaps the most important of these was the attempt made to restructure the economy and the society since 1967 with the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration. Subsequently the state achieved control of business by nationalizations of the major means of the economy and resulted in the growth of the public sector which tremendously

increased employment opportunities. The 400 plus parastatals which were established by the government provided up to 30,000 new employment opportunities annually (Mjema, 1997: 47). However, this policy at a latter stage encouraged the growth of a parallel or second or informal sector which also provided opportunities for employment.

The second was the growth of 'pole' and decentralization policies in 1969 and 1972 respectively (Mbonile, 1994). These were attempts to distribute industries and transfer planning and administrative powers nearer the people. It may be argued that these also increased in some ways employment opportunities. The third is the 1974/5 villagization programme which sought a massive realignment of village settlements, effecting reforms not only in land tenure and land use systems but also production systems. It encouraged, and in way, made easy, even if only theoretically, the provision of social services to the rural masses in a systematic way with the intent to lead to a more equitable distribution of the basic social services. The 1977 universal primary education and the 1980s rural integrated development projects are cases in point. Further, through villagization the state could easily control not only the production processes in the rural areas but also youth labour and movements.

These measures, intended to redress the rural-urban imbalances in development, ensured access to the social infrastructure to all people and reduced the rural-urban migration, were vulnerable and indeed fell victim to both external and internal socio-economic shocks. For example, the oil price crisis of 1973/4, disruption of rural production patterns by the villagization programme in 1974/5, the droughts of 1974 and 1979, the disruption of the crop marketing systems by the abolition of cooperatives and dissolution of local councils, the collapse of the East African Community in 1977 and the war against Uganda in 1979.

Stagnation of the rural economy and the deepening economic crisis in the country as a whole, resulting from these, among other, shocks forced the government to adopt a number of measures to redress the situation. Among the measures adopted include the launching of the National Economic- Survival Programme in 1981, the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1982, the introduction of trade liberalisation in 1984, and the Economic Recovery Programme in 1986. The latter culminated into full scale privatisation, support for private initiative, foreign investment and free market economy in the 1990s.

All these had tremendous effects on rural development, rural-urban youth migration. For instance, the present wave of the rural-urban youth migration coincided with the introduction of trade liberalisation. One measure introduced in the 1990s was to "roll back" the economic activities of the government and confine it to providing for the necessary infrastructure and create conducive environment for private investors. This, in effect, meant the withdrawal of government from investment, not only in the urban areas but also in the rural areas. Another measure introduced in the 1990s was the freezing of employment in the public sector and retrenchment of workers from



the public sector. As a result of such measures, while a number of previously employed people are made jobless, only about 10,000 of the 300,000 youths entering the labour market can find employment (Mjema, 1997).

**(b) Problems in out migration areas**

The respondents were asked to report problems experienced at their home places. Their responses were grouped into three general categories. The first category has to do with economic difficulties. 28.8% of the respondents mentioned such problems as "financial difficulties", "lack of employment", and "limited sources .of income". The second category were essentially problems related to agriculture. 17.2% of the respondents reported such problems as "low prices of agricultural products", "high prices of agricultural inputs" and "poor agricultural yield". The third category related to lack of adequate social services. 16.8% of the respondents mentioned lack of such social services as running water, electricity, reliable health care system, and reliable transport system. Surprisingly, only 0.8% of the respondents mentioned shortage of land as a problem experienced in their places of origin. 26.8% were undecided.

**(c) Reasons for out-migrating**

Each respondent was asked to state specifically the reasons for migration from place of origin.. As shown in Table 11, 41.2% of the respondents said they left home because of lack of alternative means, that is, non-agricultural employment while 23.2% left home because of difficult economic conditions. 16.8% moved because they were following a spouse or relative into the city, 9.6% migrated due to poor returns from farming, 4.8% left because of land shortage and 4.4% were undecided.

**Table 11: Reasons for leaving home**

Reasons	Frequency	%
Difficult economic conditions	58	23.2
Lack of employment opportunities	103	41.2
Poor returns from agriculture	24	9.6
Following a relative/friend/spouse	42	16.8
Land shortage	12	4.8
Other	11	4.4
Total	250	100

Therefore, decision to migrate is mainly influenced by the problems experienced at home, namely difficult economic conditions and poor returns from agriculture and lack of alternative, non-agricultural employment. Indeed, decision to migrate is not voluntary.

#### **4.7 The effects of youth out-migration**

The southern regions of Mtwara and Lindi have, since the colonial period, been labour reserve areas. So much so that out-migration is considered normal, especially from the government officials' perspective. Two interviewees contend that "youth migration is historical" and that "for a southerner development means going north and getting employed or becoming a trader." Although everybody agrees that the present wave of out-migration is, since independence, unprecedented the government officials do not perceive it as a problem, as yet. Rather, it is considered a blessing in disguise as "it lessens pressure on land" and "reduces the crime rate", according to the District Commissioner and the Acting District Administrative Secretary. Therefore, there is no government policy whatsoever to deal with the situation.

However, this position is not shared by the ordinary people. To them, out-migration is a temporary relief on land pressure and family incomes. However, it also has adverse effects in the long run. These include loss of the able bodied and most active members of the communities, something that is bound to effect reproduction and productivity; the strengthening of the institutions of polygamy and prostitution; the possibilities of spreading epidemics such as AIDS; and the neglect of cultural practices.

## 5.0 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS: IN-MIGRATION

### 5.1 Introduction

This section describes the activities of the respondents, the reasons for migration to Dar es Salaam, the problems they face, their successes and failures as well as the impact they have had to the city of Dar es Salaam. These aspects are linked with the factors which influence in-migration.

### 5.2 Why Dar es Salaam

The phenomenon of *wamachinga* is not limited to Dar es Salaam although the phenomenon is more pronounced in the city than anywhere else, and many of *wamachinga* have Dar es Salaam as their destination. The respondents were requested to tell the reasons as to why they migrated to Dar es Salaam rather than elsewhere. 46.8% of respondents migrated to Dar es Salaam because of more "availability of social and economic opportunities for advancement" compared to other places. 34% migrated to Dar es Salaam because they "followed parents, relatives, and spouses". 15.2% of the respondents migrated to Dar es Salaam simply "to do business" because of having a very large market while 4% of the respondents migrated to Dar es Salaam because they wanted "to pursue further studies".

**Table 12: Reasons for coming to Dar es Salaam**

Reasons	frequency	%
Availability of social and economic opportunities	117	46.8
Following a parent/relative/spouse/friend	85	34.0
To do business (trading)	38	15.2
To pursue further studies	10	4.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>100</b>

The reasons given for migrating to Dar es Salaam and not elsewhere do suggest that it is this city, more than any other town in Tanzania, which offers "the best opportunities for further studies, business and social and economic advancement, factors which induce a self reinforcing process of in-migration as quite a number of migrants do follow parents, spouses and relatives.

### 5.3 Date of arrival

Most of *wamachinga* are migrants and as such were asked to report the dates of their arrival in Dar es Salaam.

**Table 13: Date of arrival**

Date of arrival	Frequency	%
Before 1975	7	2.8
1975-1980	9	3.6
1981 - 1985	27	10.8
1986- 1990	90	36.0
1991- 1995	108	43.2
1996	7	2.8
NA	2	0.8
Total	250	100

The responses as summarised in Table 13 confirm the assumption that most *wamachinga*, about 80%, arrived in Dar es Salaam in the late 1980s and early 1990s at the time when the rural populations were beginning to experience severe economic and social hardships resulting from the structural adjustment programmes; a time when trade was liberalized promoting the growth of trading activities, especially in Dar es Salaam, and opening up chances for self employment at its distribution end; and also a time when the activities which have come to be known as constituting the informal economy flourished. It was also the time when there was a shift of attention from policies which propagated rural based development to urban based development, putting emphasis on market economy, privatization and private investment.

#### 5.4 Activities undertaken

The main activities undertaken are essentially what has come to be known as petty trading. This involves the selling of either second hand clothes or manufactured goods.

**Table 14: Activities undertaken in Dar es Salaam**

Activity	Frequency	%
Selling general merchandise (new items)	140	56.0
Selling second hand clothes (mitumba)	65	26
Selling food items (food vendors)	37	14.8
Selling cooked food (Mama ntilie)	5	2.0
Others (Shoe shining, selling flowers, tree seedlings)	3	1.2
Total	250	100

As shown in Table 14, of the 250 respondents, 37 (14.8%) engaged in selling food items such as fruits and vegetables, while 5 (2%) sell prepared food, popularly known as *mama ntilie*, one did

shoe shining, one sold flowers and another sold tree seedlings. However, the majority, that is 140 (56%) were engaged in the selling of general merchandise, which are in the main new items and 65 (26%) sold second hand clothes, popularly known as *mitumba*. The petty traders selling second hand clothes and manufactured goods either displayed their goods on their hands and/or shoulders walking with them around or had makeshift "shops", displaying their goods on corridors, roads, pavements, and open spaces.

The ones who displayed their goods along the corridors, roads, pavements and open spaces were scattered all over the city, but they clustered themselves mainly around or near market places such as Kariakoo, Temeke and Ilala, along major pedestrian junctions such as the round-about junction of Samora Avenue and Maktaba Street, the junction of Morocco and Morogoro roads, at the junction of Nyerere and Mandela roads, and the junction of Morocco and Kinondoni roads and around major commuter bus stops such as Mwenge, Temeke, Magomeni and Manzese. These are places where potential customers frequent most while waiting to commute buses to/or from work or residences and would be attracted to the displayed merchandise.

Those walking with merchandise were in two groups: either visiting working places and living neighbourhoods or selling goods at traffic lights spots and recreational places such as drinking places. In both cases that is the mobile and stationary *wamachinga*, it was the case that the merchandise had been taken to where customers would normally be and not vice versa. This partially explains the failure of the City Council to initiate the allocation of special market days and places for *wamachinga*. Such action would take the customers away from the *wamachinga*.

**Box 2: A customer of a *machinga* (interview at Upanga/Bibi Titi road junction, 12 November, 1996)**

I bought a Seiko 5 watch, from that young *mmachinga* over there a week ago. At first he wanted to sell it to me at Tshs 35,000. I offered to buy it for Tsh 8,000. We bargained for quite some time. I finally bought it at Tshs 12,000. I suspect its market price could be a bit lower, but I didn't have the time to go around looking for a watch for a whole day to serve Tshs 2,000 only. I thought it was fair for him to make such a profit. After all, aren't all these young men a product of our own making? Aren't they better than the ones who break into our houses at night often killing us for just a few shillings?....

However, after two days I discovered that the watch was defective. It didn't change the dates properly. I came back to see him. That was the day before yesterday. He took the watch and promised to bring another one. He told me to come and collect it today. I didn't trust him, but I risked and gave it back. I was not too sure that I would get it back, but he assured me I would. The watch was defective anyway. Now, here we are and I have another one. This one has a black background, otherwise it is the same make and just as new. I am very thankful. I suspect he is just a sales agent of a big retailer to whom he took the defective one and got a replacement.

It is conceivable that despite most *wamachinga* claiming that the merchandise they sell is theirs, they do not own the merchandise they sell. The goods could either be for the big importers or their agents. Prices are fixed by the importers and whatever they get over and above the fixed prices serves as their profit. This explains why the range of bargain is often surprisingly very big, giving the customer the illusion that the goods are sold cheaply while allowing the *machinga* to make maximum profit. This category of *wamachinga* could also be used by the big importers to introduce new products and tastes to the relatively rich market and assist them evade taxation. But these are aspects of the *wamachinga* which fall outside the scope of our study.

Those who walk around with cheap second hand clothes and small and cheap manufactured goods in the working places and living neighbourhoods seem to be financially better off in that their rewards are bigger as they sell more items compared to those of the second category whose room for bargain is relatively limited. Although most of them (98%) claim that the goods they sell are theirs, this is very unlikely. Some are sales agents of either fellow *wamachinga* or other retailers while those displaying goods along corridors, roads and open spaces seem better off and 95% own the goods they sell. They are the ones who have been in the business longer.

On why respondents engaged themselves in petty trading rather than anything else, 62.8% confirmed that it is what they wanted to do in the first place, while 35% replied that they had no other alternative. The rest were undecided. This shows that not all *wamachinga* do petty trading because they like to. When asked as to whether they were willing to undertake paid employment if they were offered, 45% responded negatively. The reasons given were (i) that paid employment is nowadays not secure; (ii) that having no formal training they were not likely to secure good employment; (iii) that they were satisfied with what they got and (iv) that there is little or no freedom in salaried employment for one to do what one needs and one has to follow regulations always. It is contended that while the first reason arises from the experience of recent retrenchments from the formal wage sector, the second echoes the fact that most of the youths are barely, if at all, trained. The third reason reflects perceived success in petty trading on part of some respondents while the fourth reflects a perceived comparative flexibility on part petty traders in comparison to salaried wage earners.

26% replied that they were willing to undertake salaried employment if they were offered. The main reason given was that petty trading is too demanding in terms of physical energy and the returns are often not worth the trouble, 20% replied that they were willing to undertake salaried employment only if the salary paid was good enough. This reflects the fact that although the nominal wages may have been increasing, real wages have been constantly decreasing as Table I 5. based on the public sector minimum wage show.

**Table 15: Trends in the public sector minimum wages in urban Tanzania, 1980 - 1996**

Year	Nominal Minimum Wage	Real Minimum Wage
1980	480	306.30
1981	500	253.90
1982	600	236.30
1983	600	189.00
1984	810	184.40
1985	810	138.40
1986	1053	135.80
1987	1370	136.00
1988	1645	124.50
1989	2075	124.80
1990	2500	125.60
1991	3500	143.70
1992	5000	168.20
1993	5000	136.30
1994	10000	Na
1995	17500	Na
1996	30000	Na

**Source: Mjema, 1997: 43**

What all this means, as Schulz (1996: 9) writes is that:

*the people active in the informal economy are so not by choice. Their circumstances are characterised by a distinct lack of choice... very few auach value to what they are doing... the vast majority would rather be employed in the formal establishment. This is most clearly expressed in what they wish for their children...They invest in their children's education so that they may be spared a life in the informal economy (emphasis added).*

The fact that youths engage themselves in petty trading due to lack of choice is corroborated by the statistics on unemployment. According to Mjema (1997: 48) "the urban youths (15-24 year olds) ... are the most affected." The unemployed youths make up 7.2 % and 1.3% of all the unemployed persons in the urban and rural areas respectively, who are 2.2% of all Tanzanians.

Given that almost all *wamachinga* are young, lowly educated, have had neither training nor previous employment, come from very poor backgrounds, and given that in order to participate in businesses they need capital, it was interesting to know the sources of initial capital for those who claim that the business they do is theirs. 230 claimed that they were doing their own businesses.

Of these 61.2% claimed that they obtained their initial capital from relatives and friends in the form of loans, although a few said that received grants from close relatives. 15.2% of all those who claimed that they are doing their own businesses report that their initial capital was savings from the crop sales prior to coming to Dar es Salaam. 12% used money saved from previous employment whereas 6.8% used money from previous petty trading as agents of other *wamachinga*. 4.8% of the *wamachinga* report that they obtained their initial capital in terms of goods given to them by big retailers on what is popularly known as *mail kauli* basis. This is an arrangement whereby one is entrusted to take the goods on (interest free) loan basis and is expected to pay for them after selling.

### **5.5 Problems, successes and failures**

All respondents mentioned lack of or inadequate capital, lack of business premises, and harassment by the city council and police as the main problems. About 20% added insecurity of the business itself. With regard to social services, 36.8% claimed they had no access to such social services as tap water and electricity in their places of residence, 20% expressed dissatisfaction with the accommodations they had and 35.6% did not consider the food they eat as being sufficient due to financial limitations. With regard to accommodation, 78% of all respondents reported that they lived in rented rooms. Of these, 63.6% lived by themselves or with their immediate families, 22.4% stayed with their parents/relatives, while 14% were accommodated by other *wamachinga*. 15.6% of all respondents live in houses belonging to relatives, while 6.4% are silent on this.

As earlier stated the *wamachinga* engaged themselves in petty trading (i) because that was what they wanted to do in the first place and (ii) because they had no other alternative. Given that most of them come from very poor backgrounds, this implied that while some considered petty trading as a way of wealth creation, others considered it as a way of poverty alleviation, and others considered it as a means of survival.

With regard to their level of success, 2.4% did not respond to the question while 38% did not consider themselves to have been successful. This suggests that not all *wamachinga* considered themselves to have been successful in petty trading. It is possible that they considered themselves not successful because of not fulfilling their ambitions or in comparison to others. However, it is conceivable that the 38% of those who considered themselves not to have been successful could be considered to belong to the category of those who engage themselves in petty trading as a way of survival.



**Box 3: Petty trading as a means of survival (Interview with a *machinga* on 18/11/1996)**

I am nineteen years old. I come from Tanga. Both my parents died when I was still very young. I was brought up by relatives. But they treated me more like a houseboy than a relative. I was not sent to school. Instead I was made to stay at home to attend to all household chores. I used to wash dishes. I used to wash clothes. I cleaned the house...I did everything. What was bad is that I was often beaten and very badly mistreated. I was not paid anything. So when a friend suggested that we run away I agreed. I stole money from my relatives and we travelled to Dar es Salaam. My friend was lucky to get employed as a houseboy by a family in Upanga. He isn't very happy, but I think he is better off.

At first I put up with a woman at Kariakoo. There were six of us. Five were Wagogo. I was the only one not coming from Dodoma. We used to sell black coffee for her. She would buy and prepare everything. We would be required to walk around and sell it. In return we were given shelter and food only. We slept crammed on the floor. Food was often very little and badly cooked. If you didn't sell enough you would be denied *food*. If you lose a cup or anything you would be denied food or even chased away.

One day I spent the money I had collected to buy myself a meal from a *mama mtilie*. In the evening I was chased away. I went back to '*kijiweni*', the place I used to sell the coffee. I explained my predicament to one of my customers. He was very sympathetic. He is the one who suggested that I try to sell second hand clothes. He gave me 2,000/- with which I bought clothes, some for myself and some for selling. This is the sixth month and here I am. Life has not changed much. I don't make any profit, all I get is spent on food. I can't afford to rent a room of my own. I sleep with my friend at the servants quarters of his employers. I don't make profit, but I have nothing else to do. Can you help me to get employment? Don't you have a friend who is looking for a *shambaboy*?

59.6% of all the respondents reported that they were successful. It is our view that while some of these engaged in petty trading as means of poverty alleviation others do so as a way of gaining wealth. Success was referred to in terms of having regular income (30.2%) having acquired the ability to start and maintain families and acquiring the ability to support their relatives at their home places. 43.6% of those who reported that they were successful considered their success in terms of having acquired the ability to afford the necessities and manage life better, and 26.2% considered themselves to have been successful because they managed their own lives without parental assistance. These are categories of *wamachinga* who engage themselves in petty trading as a means of poverty alleviation, even though they differ in the degree to which they have managed to alleviate poverty.

**Box 4: Petty trading as a means of poverty alleviation and wealth creation (interview with a *machinga*, 20/11/1996)**

I came here seven years ago from Tandahimba in Newala. I had nothing when I came. I was hired by a friend to sell some *mitumba* (second hand clothes) for him at Congo street in Kariakoo. I did that for four years. Out of that I made my own money and was able to buy my own *mitumba*. The business was then quite good, but I had a very small capital. I kept struggling. In five years I have been able to rent my own room. I am now married and am raising a family. Occasionally I send money home to help my mother.

The one I worked for in the first four years is now very well off. He also comes from Tandahimba, but he was here much earlier. He now lives in his own house. He is building another one at home. He has also diversified and is now engaged in selling food at market stalls. He is also a middleman for traders selling food from Mbeya and Iringa. His *mitumba* business is now managed by his young brothers. I hope I will also attain his successes in the near future.

On whether the *wamachinga* found migration a useful undertaking, 54% said they were satisfied, and 44.4% said they were not satisfied, while 1.6% were undecided. For the usefulness of migration to their home areas the respondents were asked to report if they maintained contact with their homes and whether they sent some remittances. From interviews we have had with *wamachinga* it is clear that most of them undertake regular contact with their relatives in their places of origin, by way of visits and other forms of communication. 12.8% reported that they didn't send money home but 85.2% claimed that they did; 58.7% of them sending less than Tshs 20,000 and the rest sending more than that but less than Tshs 30,000 per year. Given that quite a number of these reported that they were neither successful nor satisfied this may be more of an expression of a wish than a fact. It is our view, therefore, that the rural out-migration areas do not benefit much from youth migration.

## **5.6 *Wamachinga* and the state**

The government has tried to react to the *wamachinga* phenomenon in different ways. One form of reaction is characterised by skirmishes and massive clashes between the police and *wamachinga*, often resulting into destruction and displacement of millions worth of businesses. Another form is characterised by attempts to regulate them, essentially with the view of collecting taxes. Attempts have been made to allocate them specific places and days to do their businesses, all in vain. Another form, especially at election times, has been patronage, characterised by promises of allocating them with business plots and giving them soft loans and other financial assistances provided they flew the flag of the ruling party. Yet, at other times the government's reaction to *wamachinga* has been apartheid-like with threats of repatriating them

to "where they came from". It is not surprising, therefore, that *wamachinga* mention harassment from the government as one of the main problems they face.

*Wamachinga* have also reacted differently to the government's reaction. At times they make a temporal retreat (lasting from few hours up to many months) and bouncing back to business once the pressure is over. Another way has been to accept patronage of the ruling party in return for protection or cut ties with it when it no longer assures them protection. They have also tried to form organisations which would represent their interests although it has proved to be very difficult, due to the stiff and often very bitter competition with each other.

*Wamachinga* may "believe they are in the informal economy by failure, if not of their own then that of the state, or worse still that of fate", as Schulz (1996: 9) writes. But, as a result of their inability to organise themselves as a group, *wamachinga* do not perceive the state as being the cause of their day to day problems. Often they blame individuals, either within the city authorities or within the police force.

**Table 15: Is the government doing enough to help Wamachinga?**

Value label	Frequency	,%
Yes	3	1.2
No	245	98.0
No answer	2	0.8
Total	250	100

As shown in Table 15 when asked to report as to whether the government is doing enough to help them, only 1.2% of all the respondents answered positively. These are the *wamachinga* who are under the patronage of the ruling party and are members of *mashina ya wakereketwa*. 98% of the respondents reported that the government is not doing enough.

**Table 16: What the government could do to help Wamachinga?**

Value label	Frequency	%
Provide soft loans/make credit facilities accessible	94	38.4
Provide proper and permanent business premises	80	32.6
Have positive attitude/stop harassment	57	23.3
Create employment opportunities for youths	10	4.1
	4	1.6
Total	245*	100

2 of the respondents gave no answer, while 3 thought the government was doing enough.

With regards to what the government could do to help them, 38.4% mentioned that the government could either make credit facilities available or give soft loans. 32.6% thought that the government should provide proper business premises while 23.3% responded that all the government needed to do to help them was to have positive attitude to *wamachinga* and create a conducive political and social environment for them to do their business. 4.1% wanted to see the government create employment opportunities for youths, while 1.6% thought that the government would have helped them if it exempted them from paying taxes.

## **6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND EMERGING POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

### **6.1 Perceiving rural-urban youth migration**

The results obtained from this study show that *wamachinga* are predominantly immigrants to the city, drawing youth labour from peasant farming. The results further show that although some places, particularly those experiencing acute land shortage, contribute more immigrants into the city than others, the immigrants come from all over the country. This study also shows that the current wave of youth migration is taking place in the context in which particular macro-level policies such as the structural adjustment programmes, economic liberalisation and free market economy articulate with particular micro-level property relations, labour organisation, and production and distribution systems in such a way that does not favour the youths to continue staying in the rural areas. The implication of such findings is that *wamachinga* ought to be perceived as a national problem, with both macro-level and micro-level dimensions, rather than a problem of Dar es Salaam and the southern regions of Mtwara and Lindi only. A lasting solution to the problems can only be that which has a national character, addressing both the macro-level and micro-level dimensions.

One macro-level dimension of the rural-urban youth migration problem is related to the government approach to development. It would seem that the current policies of free market economy, trade liberalisation, and private investment favour the growth of urban centres, with regard to investment, trade, infrastructure, social services and employment opportunities. Further, there has been a shift of attention from policies of the 1970s which placed considerable emphasis, even if only verbally, to rural development. It is our view that while private initiative may have led to increased production levels, this has failed to translate into a qualitative improvement of the rural life and it has failed to stimulate rural development. Withdrawing government intervention in the economy, as a result of such policies, has in effect meant a complete neglect of the rural areas, especially with regard to investment, trade, infrastructure, social services and employment opportunities. This has made it extremely difficult to access state resources in the rural areas. The predominant forms of accumulation are now concentrated in the primate city of Dar es Salaam. The fact that over 75% of all taxes collected in the country are collected in Dar es Salaam could be testimony to this fact. The current wave of rural-urban migration is, in our view, testimony to the failure of private initiative to stimulate rural development.

It is strongly suggested that it was time the government reviewed its policies, where they exist, with the view of re-emphasizing rural development. Exactly how this could be done is a matter for further investigation. But one suggestion would be the improvement of the agricultural sector for the purposes of absorbing the unemployed youths. This could entail facilitating the putting of more arable land into use; facilitating the improvement of the productivity of the land

under cultivation; facilitating the improvement of marketing opportunities of the agricultural produce; facilitating the improvement of the rural infrastructure and facilitating the establishment of the agro-based small and medium scale enterprises, including, but not limited to, the processing of the agricultural products.

## **6.2 Rural poverty and out-migration**

This study has established that there is a causal-effect relationship between rural poverty and out-migration. In the rural out-migration areas all the social services are poor, earnings from agriculture are meagre, non-agricultural employment opportunities are almost non-existent. Further, while land is scarce the property relations, labour organisation and the production and distribution systems are such that they don't assure the youth of their future welfare and prudence. Consequently, peasant farming is continuously losing its most active labour force to the *wamachinga* phenomenon. It follows from this that, since agriculture contributes 40 -60% of the country's Gross Domestic Product and employs over 70% of the country's labour force (Mjema, 1997), the sector remains, for a long time to come, the realistic solution to youth unemployment. Thus, there is need to take long term measures to re-organise peasant farming with the view of improving the production levels. This will make the labour invested in peasant farming more rewarding. In the same spirit, given that improved production levels have not been translated into a qualitative improvement of the lives of the rural masses, even in the context of free market economy, the pricing procedure for agricultural products need to be regulated in a way that there will be minimum beyond which crop buyers will not be allowed to go. Further, efforts need to be made to provide the youths with the means with which to acquire their own property, especially land, without being forced to migrate. Exactly how this could be done is a subject matter for further study.

Given improved production levels in agriculture, seen in terms of improved technology which is not labour intensive, may mean that less labour is necessary in the sector and thus in the long run, it may not be possible for peasant farming to continue absorbing all the youth labour available in the rural out-migration areas. In this case, investment and development programmes need to be tailored in such a way as to address both rural poverty and youth unemployment. Further, one of the things to be considered in that regard is to address seriously spatial (especially rural/urban) imbalance on the one hand in the investment patterns with the view to improve employment opportunities, and on the other to facilitate the provision of the necessary infrastructure. Deliberate initiatives and efforts to redress such and similar imbalances, in our view, can only be undertaken by the government intervention in the rural development in general and in the rural economy in particular. Calling for state intervention in rural development should not mean that the state and the market are mutually exclusive.

### **6.3.1 Social services and out-migration**

This study has demonstrated that migration is an attempt to redress certain imbalances in social, among other, relations expressed in movement across space, which is itself socially constructed. Migration is linked to imbalances in availability and accessibility of social services, such as clean water, health services, education and electricity.

Given the nature of the study it was not possible to assess the exact extent to which the services are available and accessible. Further research need to be conducted to establish (a) the quality of social service delivery systems, (b) demand levels, available capacity and shortfall so as to develop better strategies for making the social services not only available but also accessible to the rural people. Further, it was very clear from the study that the current policy of rolling back the economic activities of the government has also resulted into some form of confusion as to who is responsible for what in rural development. There is, therefore, need to define clearly whose responsibility it is to provide the social services: the rural masses, the government, private institutions, NGOs and the relationship and coordination of all these institutions in that regard. There is also need to build capacity for monitoring efficiency and effectiveness of social services delivery systems from all these institutions.

The study has shown that most *wamachinga* are lowly educated and unskilled youths. It is also shown that some actually migrate into the city in search for further education, only to end up as *wamachinga*. This aptly demonstrates the spatial imbalances in availability, accessibility and usefulness of education. But, it also puts to question the relevancy and quality of education in preparing the youth for their future. The present curricula, it would seem to us, does not prepare youths for self employment. They don't impart skills necessary for self-employment needs except for passing examination with the view of getting formal employment. There is need to review the education system in order to make it available, accessible and more relevant to the employment, among other, needs of the youths. It is suggested that the primary school entry age be raised by legislation to 8 or 9 years or alternatively, primary school education could begin at the same age but be extended for two more years in order to give room for imparting skills relevant to the labour market without affecting what is currently taught. Both these measures will, in effect, mean that one is at least 15 or 16 years when finishing primary school education, the age at which one can be absorbed into the labour force. This requires government initiative.

### **6.4 *Wamachinga* and the state**

The contradictory and inconsistent way the government has handled the *wamachinga* phenomenon is clear testimony of the fact that it lacks a coherent and workable policy on the youth, employment and petty trading. It is also a clear testimony of its failure to adjust to its supposedly new role under free market economy and economic liberalisation, that of providing a conducive

environment for private initiatives. It may also be testimony of its failure to consider *wamachinga* petty trading as private initiative. It is suggested that the government reviews its policy on the youth, employment and petty trading, with the view of facilitating rather than hindering the youth in realising their private initiatives. In that regard it is important for the government to device a system of consulting the youth. Specifically, the government needs to device a system of assisting the youth in training and business management and device and operate a credit system that will provide them with capital, following the GTZ-SIDO initiative (see, Schulz, 1996).



## REFERENCES

- Amin, S. and D. Forde (eds.) (1974) *Modern migrations in West Africa*. Oxford: University Press.
- Bagachwa, M. S. D. (1994) Changing perceptions of poverty and emerging research issues. In: Bagachwa, M. S. D. (ed.) *Poverty alleviation in Tanzania. Recent research issues*. Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press.
- Bairoch, P. (1973) *Urban unemployment in developing countries: The nature of the problem and proposals for its solution*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- Becker and Grewe, (1996) Cohort-specific rural-urban migration in Africa. In: *Journal of African Economies* 5/2: 228-70.
- Berry, S. (1983) Work migration and class in western Nigeria," Cooper, F. (ed.), *Struggle for the city: Migrant labour, capital and the state in urban Africa*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bhaskar, R. (1993) *Reclaiming reality: A critical introduction to contemporary philosophy*. London: Verso Press.
- Braudel, F. (1982) *The perspectives of the world*. New York: Academic Press.
- Chambers, R. (1984) *Rural development: Putting the last first*. New York: Longman Inc.
- Cooksey, B. (1994) Who's poor in Tanzania? A review of recent poverty research. In: Bagachwa, M.S.D. (ed.) *Poverty alleviation in Tanzania: Recent research issues*, (pp. 57-90). Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press.
- Deng, L. A. (1996) Poverty reduction: Lessons and experiences from Sub-Saharan Africa. In: Deng, L. A. and E. N. Tjonneland (eds.) *South Africa: Wealth, poverty and reconstruction*. Center for Southern African Studies
- Durning, A.B. (1990) Ending poverty. In: Brown, L. (ed.) *State of the world*. World Watch Institute Report on Progress Towards a Sustainable Society.
- Egero, B. (1987) *Mozambique: A dream undone*. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
- Elkan, W. (1960) *Migrants and proletarians: Urban labour in the economic development of Uganda*. London: Oxford University Press.

- Fridlay, A. and A. Fridlay (1987) *Population and development in the Third World*. London: Methuen & Co.
- Gugler, J. (1988) Introduction. In: Gugler, J. (ed.) *The urbanisation of the Third World*, (pp. 1-5). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mutton, C. (1973) *Reluctant farmers? A study of unemployment and planned rural development in Uganda*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
- Lugalla, J. *et al.* (1994) "Social aspects of the management of environment pollution in Dar es Salaam". Paper presented at the Workshop on the Management of Environmental Pollution in Dares Salaam.
- Lwoga, C. M. F. (1985) Labour migration and rural development in former labour reserves in Tanzania. (Unpublished) Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge.
- Mabogunje, A. L. (1970) *Urbanisation in Nigeria*. London: University of London Press.
- .....~ (1991) A new paradigm for urban development. In: *Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics*.
- Madulu, N. F., M. J. Mbonile and H. Y. D. Kiwia (1993) Environmental impact of migration in rural Tanzania. In: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development. *Population, Environment and Development* (pp. 73-91). Dares Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam and United Nations.
- Maliyamkono, T. L. and M. S. D. Bagachwa (1990) *The Second economy in Tanzania*. London: James Currey.
- Mbilinyi, D. and C. K. Omari (1996) *Rural-urban migration and poverty alleviation in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam: DUP.
- Mbonile, M. J. (1993) Migration and structural change in Tanzania: The case of Makete district. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Liverpool.
- Mbonile, M. J. (1994) Migration and urban development in Tanzania: Internal responses to structural adjustment. In: Gould, W. T. S, and A. M. Findlay (eds.) *Population migration and the changing world order*, 249-273. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.

- , (1995a) Structural adjustment and rural development in Tanzania: The Case of Makete District. In: Simon, D., W. van Spengen, and A. Naerman (eds.) *Structurally adjusted Africa: Poverty, debt and basic needs*, 136-158. London: Pluto Press.
- , (1995b) Rural-Urban migration and the decay of plantation economy in Tanzania. *Tanzania Journal of Population Studies*, 2: 38-51.
- Mbughuni, P. (1994) Gender and poverty alleviation in Tanzania: Issues from and for research. In: Bagachwa; M.S.D. (ed.) *Poverty alleviation in Tanzania: Recent research issues* (pp. 207-248). Dar es Salaam University Press.
- Meillasoux, C. (1968) *Urbanization in an african community: Voluntary organizations in Bamako*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Mjema, G. D. (1997) Youth unemployment in Tanzania. Unpublished report. Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam.
- Mlay, W. F. I. (1977) "Rural-urban migration and rural development," *Tanzania notes and records*, 81/2: 1-15.
- Mosha, A. C. (1993) Uncontrolled urban settlements in Tanzania. In: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development. *Population, environment and development* (pp. 129-146). Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam and United Nations
- O'Connor, A. M. (1983) *The african city*. London: Hutchinson University for Africa.
- Omari, C. K. (1994) Social and cultural factors influencing poverty in Tanzania. In: Bagachwa, M.S.D. (ed.) *Poverty alleviation in Tanzania: Recent research issues* (pp. 249-270). Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press.
- Omara-Ojunga, P. H. (1992) *Resource management in developing countries*. New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc.
- Piven, F. F. and R. A. Cloward, (197!) *Regulating the poor*. New York: Random House.
- Pred, A. (1990) *Making histories and constructing human geographies: The local transformation of practice, power relations and consciousness*. San Fransisco and Oxford: Westview Press.

- Sabot, R.H. (1979) *Economic development and urban migration in Tanzania 1900-1971*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Said, E. W. (1979) *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Schulz, M. (1996) Securing the spontaneous creation of gainful employment in the informal economy through its own self-help organisations. Unpublished paper presented at the workshop on Labour Market and Employment Policy in Southern and Eastern Africa, Lusaka, June 24-28.
- Semboja, J. (1994) Poverty assessment in Tanzania: Theoretical, conceptual and methodological issues. In: Bagachwa, M.S.D. (ed.) *Poverty alleviation in Tanzania: recent research issues* (pp. 31-56). Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press.
- Soja, E. W. (1989) *Postmodern geographies: The reassertion of space in critical social theory*. London and New York: Verso
- Tripp, A. M. (1996) "Contesting the right to subsist: The urban informal economy in Tanzania" In: Swantz, M. L. and A. M. Tripp (eds.) *What went right in Tanzania: People's response to directed development* (pp 43-68). Dar es Salaam: DUP.
- United Nations, (1987) *The prospects of world urbanisation: Revised as of 1984-85*. Population Studies 101. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations Secretariat, (1993) Population, environment and development in Tanzania: An overview. In: *Population, environment and development* (pp. 1-39). Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam and United Nations.
- United Republic of Tanzania, (1991), *National informal sector survey*. Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer
- Wamba dia Wamba, E. (1994) "Poverty and political participation". Paper presented at the Conference on Insecurity and Poverty as Global Issues, Maastricht, March 1995.

## **OTHER REPOA PUBLICATIONS BOOK**

*Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: Recent Research Issues.* Dar es Salaam:  
Dar es Salaam University Press (Edited by M.S.D. Bagachwa)

### **REPOA SPECIAL PAPERS**

- REPOA Special Paper 1: Changing Perceptions of Poverty and the Emerging Research Issues (by M.S.D. Bagachwa)
- REPOA Special Paper 2: Poverty Assessment in Tanzania: Theoretical, Conceptual and Methodological Issues (by J. Semboja"<sup>1</sup>)
- REPOA Special Paper 3: Who's Poor in Tanzania? A Review of \_^cent Poverty Research (by Brian Cooksey)
- REPOA Special Paper 4: Implications of Public Policies on Poverty and Poverty Alleviation: The Case of Tanzania (by Fidelis Mtatifikolo)
- REPOA Special Paper 5: Environmental Issues and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania (by Adolfo Mascarenhas)
- REPOA Special Paper 6: The Use of Technology in Alleviating Poverty in Tanzania (by A.S. Chungu and G.R.R. Mandara)
- REPOA Special Paper 7: Gender and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: Issues from and for Research (by Patricia Mbughuni)
- REPOA Special Paper 8: Social and Cultural Factors Influencing Poverty in Tanzania (by C.K. Omari)
- REPOA Special Paper 9: Guidelines for Preparing and Assessing REPOA Research Proposals (by REPOA Secretariat and Brian Cooksey)
- REPOA Special Paper 10: An Inventory of Potential Researchers and Institutions of Relevance to Research on Poverty in Tanzania (by A.F. Lwaitama)
- REPOA Special Paper 11: A Bibliography on Poverty in Tanzania (by B. Mutagwaba)
- REPOA Special Paper 12: Some Practical Research Guidelines (by Brian Cooksey and Alfred Lokuji)
- REPOA Special Paper 13: Capacity Building for Research (by M.S.D. Bagachwa)
- REPOA Special Paper 14 : Guidelines for Monitoring and Evaluation of REPOA Activities (by A. Chungu and S. Muller-Maige)

## **REPOA RESEARCH REPORTS**

- REPOA Research Report 97.1: Poverty and the Environment: The Case of Informal Sand-Mining, Quarrying and Lime-Making Activities in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (by G. Jambiya, K. Kulindwa and H. Sosovele)
- REPOA Research Report 97.2: The Impact of Technology on Poverty Alleviation: The Case of Artisanal Mining in Tanzania (by W. Mutagwaba, R. Mwaipopo-Ako and A. Mlaki)
- REPOA Research Report 97.3: Educational Background, Training and Their Influence on Female-Operated Informal Sector Enterprises (by J. O'Riordan, F. Swai and A. Rugumyamheto)
- REPOA Research Report 98.1: The Role of Informal and Semi-formal finance in Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania: Results of a Field Study in two Regions (by A.K. Kashuliza, J.P. Hella, F.T. Magayane and Z.S.K. Mvena)
- REPOA Research Report 98.2: Poverty and Diffusion of Technological Innovations to Rural Women: The Role of Entrepreneurship (by B.D. Diyamett, R.S. Mabala and R. Mandara)
- REPOA Research Report 98.3: The Use of Labour-intensive Irrigation Technologies in Alleviating Poverty in Majengo, Mbeya Rural District (by J. Shitundu and N. Luvanga)
- REPOA Research Report 98.4: Labour Constraints, Population Dynamics and the AIDS Epidemic: The Case of Rural Bukoba District, Tanzania (by C.L. Kamuzora and S. Gwalema)