The Instrumental versus the Symbolic:

Investigating Members' Participation in Civil Society Networks in Tanzania

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Abbreviations

CBO: Community-Based Organisation

CSO: Civil Society Organisation

FBO: Faith Based Organisation

INGO: International Non-Government Organisation

MKUKUTA: *Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini Tanzania*

NSGRP: National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

PEDP: Primary Education Development Plan

SEDP: Secondary Education Development Plan

TANGO: Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations

TEN/MET: Tanzania Education Network / *Mtandao wa Elimu Tanzania*

TZS: Tanzanian Shillings

Executive Summary

Background

Civil society organisations (CSO) can provide a conduit through which the voices of citizens are able to reach and influence high-level policy dialogue and debate. But is this happening in practise? This study set out to examine how effectively and meaningfully CSO member organisations are participating in two civil society networks in Tanzania, and to assess - in turn - how effective those networks are at influencing national policies and agendas.

The main incentive for a CSO to join a network is the opportunity to achieve a goal that it could not otherwise reach on its own, and network governance styles are undoubtedly influenced by the perceived optimal way to do that. Some believe that network goals will be most expediently reached through meaningful participation, extensive consultation, goal driven agendas, as well as nuanced representation of the plurality of members' views at high-level fora (**instrumental participation**). Others believe that their goals will be more quickly or easily reached by aggregating and distilling their members' views – and linking them to those pursuing similar agendas outside the network – to create one strong advocacy base and position (**symbolic participation**).

The Selected Networks

This study set out to examine two national networks that epitomised the two styles of participation, to see what could be learnt of their behaviour and effectiveness. The team selected:
*   The Tanzania Education Network/*Mtandao wa Elimu Tanzania* (TEN/MET) as an example of instrumental participation;

*   The Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (TANGO) as an example of symbolic representation.

Study Methodology

The study set out to gather information on key aspects of network governance and member participation in both organisations, gathering quantitative and qualitative primary data from three geographical zones in which the networks were working. In total, 120 CSOs were part of the study (60 from each organisation). Study questions were selected on the basis of the research team's understanding of social network analysis and drew upon theories of social identity, resource dependency, and social capital.

Findings and Analysis

The study found that:
*   Members of TEN/MET were more likely to attend network meetings, more likely to be consulted in key decision-making processes, and more likely to pay their membership fees.

*   Payment of annual subscription fee was the major form of participation in both organisations, while consultation was the least common form.

*   The key factor in determining participation in both organisations was effective information sharing. In TEN/MET, tolerance for divergence views during advocacy campaigns was also a predictor of member participation.

*   In neither organisation were the other factors reviewed (members' identities, size, locational differences, trust, problem-solving, or frictions) predictors of members' participation.

Conclusion

The study found that TEN/MET members participate more actively and instrumentally than members from TANGO, and are having more success advocating with - and influencing - Government. TEN/MET has been able to affect educational policies despite institutional challenges, and has been acknowledged by the Government to be a trusted partner in shaping national educational policy. These results confirm Houtzager and Lavalle's theory (2009) that networks that are close to their members and open to participation are more likely to contribute to effective political representation than those that are distant and hermetic. TEN/MET's genuine and meaningful level of participation appears to have been brought about in part by good governance structures, defined roles, and effective earmarking of funding for participatory activities.

Policy Recommendations

As a result of their findings, the study team recommends that:
- Network secretariats should emulate TEN/MET's governance structures and funding incentives.

- Effective information sharing should be a priority of all networks. Secretariats should consider the needs of small rural CSOs when packaging information.

- Civil society donors should develop network assessment criteria (to involve member organisations in advocacy planning), and tie those criteria to funding.

- Government ministries, departments and agencies should put in place clear rules to fully and transparently involve civil society networks in policy processes and dialogue.

- The National Council of NGOs (NACONGO) should create an online forum for sharing network experiences, successes, challenges and best participation practices.

- Members of civil society networks should choose among themselves how and who should represent them in policy dialogues.

- Network secretariats should establish clear rules to ensure a fair balance of power and influence between different members.

1 Background: A Short History of CSOs in Tanzania

Tanzania entered independence in 1961 with a vibrant civil society (Ngware, 1997). CSOs had played a major role in the country's bid for independence, but by 1965 they had been absorbed – along with the trade unions – into the ruling party, following Tanzania's transition to a one-party state. As civil society became more tightly constrained and centrally controlled, CSOs found it increasingly difficult to operate independently (McQuinn, 2011).

Tanzania's one-party political system bureaucratised politics, which in time eroded popular enthusiasm and initiative, and stunted the development and growth of an autonomous civil society (Ngware, 1997). A series of natural and man-made disasters in the 1970s (including the collapse of the East African Community, the global oil shock, and Idi Amin's invasion of Kagera) led Tanzania to the edge of bankruptcy and its people into poverty.

The government entered the 1980s with little choice, therefore, but to start instituting economic, social and political reforms and, by the end of the decade, neo-liberal economic policies had begun to pave the way for the creation of CSOs with very different trajectories. Following the transition to a democratic multi-party state in 1992, CSOs were granted more freedom, and the new donor-driven policy agenda revitalised their roles as stimulators, constitutors and cementers of an active and varied civil society (McQuinn, 2011). Since then, CSOs have proliferated, with governance ideals being increasingly embraced.

As the number of CSOs increased, so too did the number of umbrella organisations – or CSO networks – seeking to coordinate or shape their work (Tripp, 2004). It is worth highlighting that CSOs started to join networks before the reintroduction of multiparty politics.[1] From 1992, networks rapidly proliferated, with the creation of the Tanzania Smallholder Farmers Groups Network in 1993, the Feminist Activist Coalition in 1996, the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development in 1998, and TEN/MET in 1999. Since the Millennium, numerous new national networks have been set up[2] and notable CSO networks have also appeared at the district and regional level.[3]

The proliferation of networks in the last decade is partly a result of the National Non-Government Organisation (NGO) Policy (2001), which cleared up registration confusion, consolidated procedures, and created a new institutional framework for collaboration (Lange et al., 2000). This in turn allowed the space for CSOs to acquire new knowledge and information through experience sharing, and thus empower themselves (Chaligha, 2007).

The National NGO Act No. 24 of 2002 legally recognised NGOs for the very first time, although neither it, nor the amended act of 2005, recognised other CSOs such as trade unions, or community or faith-based organisations. In fact, the majority of Tanzanian CSOs are still regulated by the Societies Ordinance, legislation inherited from the colonial era (Chaligha, 2007).[4] CSOs have continued to

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1   Indeed the oldest network – the Tanzania Council for Social Development - started in 1965 as a quasi-government organisation known as the National Council on Social Welfare Services, before it was joined by a second network – TANGO - in the late 1980s. The development of CSOs was not just a response to changes taking place in the country but an attempt - by those who had the potential - to independently participate in the nation's development (Ndumbaro and Kiondo, 2007).

2   The Federation of Community Forest Conservation Network in Tanzania (2000), the NGO Policy Forum (2003), the Tanzania Aids Forum (2006), the Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network (2008), the Tanzania Anti Corruption Network (2009), and the Tanzania Land Alliance (2010), to name just a few.

3   At a regional level, examples include the Union of NGOs in Morogoro, the Arusha NGOs Network, and the Mbeya NGO Network. At the district level, examples are Njombe District NGOs and the Kibaha Network of Civil Society.

4   Other non-profit organisations can be formed and managed through a Board of Trustees (registered under the Trustees' Incorporation Act, Cap.318), or by the directors of a limited company (registered under the Companies Act, No.12 of 2002). See Makaramba, 2007, for more information.

become a part of networks, despite these legal anomalies, protected in part by the Constitution[5], which guarantees the freedom to form or join associations and organisations (Makaramba, 2007). In summary, the strengthening of CSOs and their networks has been strongly influenced and affected by economic and political events in the country since independence.

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5   On the mainland, this is governed by the 1977 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, and on the islands by the Constitution of Zanzibar of 1984.

2 Participation: The Instrumental versus the Symbolic

It is widely accepted that participation is an important part of good governance. But what is participation, and how effectively is it being practised in civil society networks in Tanzania? Words are nebulous and definitions – especially about such important concepts as 'civil society' 'networks' and 'participation' – have been widely debated. An overview of these theoretical discussions can be found in annex 1. For the purpose of this study, 'participation' in network activities is defined and measured according to certain practical criteria (see section 4) with two distinct styles of participation defined:

1. 'Instrumental participation', where participation is an instrumental (active) part of a network's decision-making processes;
2. 'Symbolic participation' where participation is only a symbolic (passive) part of their work.

These distinctions are based on Max Weber's typology of social action (Weber, 1978, in Bekkers et al., 2008). Other sociologists – most notably White (1992) and Granovetter (1978 & 1983) – have also considered the same dichotomy from the social network perspective. We will look in more detail now about what these terms mean in theory and reality.

1. Instrumental Participation in CSO networks

Instrumental participation is usually consultative, purposeful, functional and representative. Although it may be difficult to fit the priorities of every individual CSO into a common network agenda and plan, consensus is reached wherever possible (The Alliance, 2002). Instrumental networks are able to represent the breadth of their members' interests (Halpin, 2006), the diversity of their views, and are an effective means by which people can express their own interests (Malena, 2009; White, 1996).

Networks that practice instrumental representation often display the following characteristics:

- They have pre-determined common goals or objectives (Boyce and Lysack, 2000).

- Members are incentivised to participate in order to achieve these goals.

- Members collectively strategise on how best to achieve their goals, and agree on concrete steps to reach them.

- Members are used as instruments to execute the network's agreed programme activities.

- Members are consulted – and asked to provide inputs into – important network decisions (priorities, budgets, advocacy strategies).

- Members often take the lead in raising public awareness of priority concerns, reviewing and critiquing proposed policies, or advocating for new policies or programmes (Malena, 2009).

- Members are able to influence public policy, and articulate the voices of their constituencies through their active role in public hearings, policy dialogues, participatory budgeting, sector and public expenditure reviews.

- The network secretariat is trusted to articulate the opinions and positions of its members and to push forward their agreed agenda (not impose its own agenda, or the agenda of others).

CSO networks – in Tanzania as elsewhere – provide a conduit through which the voices of citizens can reach high-level policy dialogue and debates. At its best, through instrumental participation, CSO members influence the agenda of a network, which in turn influences government. Effective networks and effective instrumental participation can thus create a strong link between citizens and

their governments, ensuring the active influence of citizens in policy decisions and making poverty interventions more effective and responsive to citizens' needs.

2.   Symbolic Participation in CSO networks

Many network secretariats claiming to represent the views of their collective members in policy dialogues are in fact engaging in what Houtzager and Lavalle (2009) call 'assumed representation'. In such cases, they may – consciously or not, and explicitly or not – be representing only a particular value or segment of their organisation.[6] Poor governance (inadequate information sharing, lack of discussions and consensus etc.) as well as democracy deficits can result in a misrepresentation of members interests to Government, a flaw that can seriously compromise the quality and effectiveness of public policymaking and service delivery (Malena, 2009).

The World Bank's central justification for civil society participation is one of instrumentality: i.e. it asserts that participation is important since it allows citizens' voices to be heard in policy dialogue and ultimately leads to more effective poverty-reducing policies (Nelson, 2002). However, for many CSOs, participation is symbolic, rather than instrumental.[7] Networks that practice symbolic participation often have the following characteristics:

- They don't seek to represent their members so much as use their members for solidarity purposes, i.e. to legitimise the network and bolster certain advocacy positions.

- The secretariat's chosen advocacy positions may be influenced by organisations and individuals outside the network (sometimes even more – than those within).

- The leadership may claim to speak for a wider group than it actually does, and may not fully represent the diversity of its members' views.

- Members are utilised to bring the weight of numbers to high-level bargaining tables, rather than to provide inputs and ideas (Halpin, 2006).

- They may bring limited benefits to paying members, with real changes rarely visible or resulting (Herzberg, 2011). Members may not even expect to receive benefits from the network's engagement with the government.

- Participation is physical but essentially cosmetic.[8]

- Meaningful participation may be considered impossible or unnecessary to the real needs of the network, which may be to legitimise a wider advocacy position or provide a firm political base for a national policy.[9]

- The support of poor, excluded or minority groups may not be considered necessary (Nelson, 2002).

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6   For example, civil society networks may represent some of the poorest segments of society, but are often managed by the middle-class, who may have a different set of poverty reduction priorities, views and assumptions.

7   See, for example, Nelsonís account of civil society participation in the formulation and implementation of national poverty reduction strategies.

8   E.g. networks secretariats may appear to share knowledge with members or obtain their views, but the information gained from such exchanges will not be taken into high-level fora or used to advocate for concrete changes.

9   In general, symbolic participation often serves to strengthen people's belief in the legitimacy of the government and may include saluting the flag and singing the national anthem (Gregson, 1997). Extrapolating this to the network level, symbolic participation may make member organisations feel the power and legitimacy of their network, and therefore encourage them to continue paying subscription charges.

- They may be more likely to accept top-down plans and proposals (Coelho, Kamath, and Vijaybaskar, 2011).

3.   Which is Better? Symbolic or Instrumental Participation?

According to Isset (2005), the main incentive for CSOs to join networks is the opportunity to achieve goals that they could not achieve alone. Network governance styles are undoubtedly influenced by the perceived optimal way to achieve a certain goal (Liebler and Ferri, 2004).[10] Some believe that is best done through meaningful participation, extensive consultation, goal driven agendas, as well as nuanced representation of the plurality of their members' views at high-level fora (instrumental participation). Others believe that their goals will be more quickly or easily reached by aggregating and distilling their members' views – and linking them to those pursuing similar agendas outside the network – to create one strong advocacy base and position (symbolic participation). Both have a place and a role and a value. Although development agencies often push for participation to be instrumental, symbolic participation can provide important broad-based opportunities for information exchange and experience sharing.

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10 Both styles of governance may develop as a result of planning, deliberation, consideration, and conscious choice, but in some cases the choice may be unconscious or unplanned. In other cases, there may also be deliberately duplicity – e.g. paying lip service to the views of their members in order to obtain subscription fees, but rarely choosing to represent views outside the hegemony of the secretariat.

3 TEN/MET and TANGO: The Chosen CSO Networks

This study sought to look at two national networks that epitomised the two styles of participation:

• **TEN/MET** pursues programme-based advocacy, and was selected as an example of **instrumental** participation.

• **TANGO** pursues issue-based advocacy, and was selected as an example of **symbolic** representation.

Table 1 compares the key characteristics of the two organisations. Membership of both is voluntary.

Table 1: TANGO and TEN/MET: Comparative Characteristics

Characteristics	TANGO	TEN/MET
Establishment	1988	1999
Member Identities	Sectoral	Cross-sectoral
Scope	National	National
Top Governance Organ	General Assembly	Annual General Meeting
Leadership	Executive Committee	Board of Directors
Management	Executive Director	National Coordinator
Staff	Full time	Full time
Office	Rented	Rented
Source of Funds	Donors/members	Donors/members

Source: Focal Group Discussions and Author's Observations

1. About TANGO

History and background overview
TANGO is the largest NGO umbrella organisation in the country. It was founded in 1988 by 22 NGOs, and now has a membership of more than 500. The majority are regional or district organisations with approximately 50 members. Those wishing to become members of TANGO are required to pay an annual subscription of 30,000 Tanzanian shillings (TZS). In return, TANGO grants them priority access to meetings, seminars, training programs, workshops, and other capacity building activities. There have been fluctuations in the strength of TANGO's membership over the years, with some members dropping out of active participation and other increasing their level of participation.

Role of the secretariat
The TANGO secretariat has several agreed functions. It is asked by its members to coordinate and represent them; to build their organisational capacity; to serve as a platform for information exchange; and to lobby and advocate on issues that will enable members' work.

Vision, aims and goals
TANGO's vision is to help create a strong, vibrant society in Tanzania, in which NGOs are able to take an active, effective role in promote people-centred development. TANGO specifically aims to advance development initiatives that promote justice, peace, good governance, human rights, gender equality and equity, as well as sustainable human development. TANGO continues to work towards its original goal of unifying the country's NGO sector, as well as creating an enabling environment for their work.

Staff and governance structure

The TANGO Secretariat has ten fulltime staff working in inter-connected departments. The Executive Director is responsible for supervising and overseeing overall implementation and reports to the Executive Committee (which is democratically elected by all members during a General Assembly held every three years).

Objectives

TANGO implements its overall Strategic Plan as well as Annual Plans through three objectives: (1) Capacity Building; (2) Policy Engagement and Advocacy; and (3) Information and Communication. TANGO tries to achieve these objectives by training NGOs at a management level, mobilising resources, analysing policy, developing advocacy skills, and packaging information.

Visibility and Key Successes to Date

TANGO has been active in coordinating civil society inputs into the country's last two poverty reduction strategies,[11] and still occasionally conducts advocacy campaigns. However, it is far less active than it was a decade ago, when its secretariat led the campaign against the draconian provisions of the NGO Bill 2002, and later pushed for the amendment of the NGO Act in 2005. Today, the organisation appears to come together only occasionally to support important issues. However, it has some successes in bringing multiple partners together to create a broad based support for its issues, and has also supported the setting up of CSO networks on a regional and district level. (Its work is discussed in more detail in section 5.)

2. About TEN/MET

History and background overview

TEN/MET is a national umbrella network working in the field of education. It was founded in 1999 by 39 NGOs, and currently has around 270 members across the country. These includes national and International Non Government Organisations (INGOs), Faith Based Organisation (FBOs), and Community Based Organisations (CBOs). Initially, housed in Arusha in the offices of the NGO *Maarifa ni Ufunguo*, the organisation moved to Dar es Salaam in 2002 to establish its own independent premises and staff. Annual subscription fees are on a sliding scale, with INGOs paying TZS 230,000/=; national NGOs paying TZS 115,000/=; regional NGOs paying TZS 60,000/=; and district NGOs and CBOs paying TZS 25,000/=.

Core Values and Aims

TEN/MET lays out its commitment to strong collaboration with the government in its core values, and practically pursues that goal through close work with the ministries that are responsible for making policy and coordinating primary education across the country, in particular, the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, and the Prime Minister's Office – Regional Administrations and Local Governments. The core aim of its work is to link civil society actors (CBOs, FBOs, and NGOs); to articulate their concerns with an informed collective voice; to influence policy; and to support community initiatives which advocate for the right to quality basic education for all in Tanzania.

Programmes

In its current Strategic Plan (2007-2011), TEN/MET carries out its work through four main programmes, working in: (1) Communication, Information Sharing and Networking; (2) Policy Analysis, Lobbying and Advocacy; (3) Capacity Development; and (4) Governance and Organisational Development.

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11 Known respectively as the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) of 2005-10) and *Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini Tanzania* (MKUKUTA) of 2010-15.

TEN/MET is essentially an advocacy-oriented network, but also has members working in service delivery.

Visibility and Key Successes to Date

TEN/MET, runs programme-based advocacy activities, with its agreed activities defined in annual work plans. It actively coordinates the voices of its members into high-level poverty, educational and policy fora; is a key player in reviews of national educational policy and programmes; and a member of several national education committees, where critical issues – of enrolment, expansion, quality, finance, resource allocation etc.– are deliberated (Mnjagila, 2004). The government has acknowledged that its engagement with TEN/MET helped spark the debate on the role of CSOs, has influenced the piloting and expansion of key Government programmes, provided useful inputs in the development of both the primary and secondary education development plans (PEDP and SEDP), and strengthened its capacity on a number of key issues. (TEN/MET'S work is discussed in more detail in section 5.)

4 Study Methodology

Overview

Social network analysis is a method that assigns values (percentages of responses etc.) to norms of trust and reciprocity between social actors. According to Howard (2002), these values can be determined through close-ended questions that distil social relationships to corresponding values (Gurza, Castello, and Bichir, 2008).

For the purposes of this study, social network analysis involved identifying the connections between the member organisations of both networks – outlining who knows whom within each network and the nature of these connections (Schneider, 2006). Social network information was then collected through structured questionnaires using close-ended questions to map out the strength of association between individuals, member organisations and other groups.

Sampling Procedure and Data Collection

Both TANGO and TEN/MET are national networks, with members scattered across the country. The members of each network were grouped by the research team into seven key geographical clusters:

1. The Eastern Zone (Dar es Salaam, the Coast and Morogoro);
2. The Northern Zone (Tanga, Kilimanjaro and Arusha);
3. The Southern Highlands Zone (Iringa, Mbeya, Rukwa and Ruvuma);
4. The Southern Zone (Lindi and Mtwara);
5. The Central Zone (Dodoma and Singida);
6. The Western Zone (Tabora and Kigoma); and
7. The Lake Zone (Shinyanga, Mwanza, Mara and Kagera).

The study chose to focus on three special zones: the Eastern Zone (where both organisations have their headquarters); and the Northern, and the Southern Highlands zone (where there are a great number of CSOs, and networks are entrusted with representing many CSOs in their policy dialogues with Government).

Data collection

The survey team sought to obtain both quantitative and qualitative primary data from the three special focus zones:

- **Quantitative** data was collected through structured social network analysis questionnaires.
- **Qualitative** data was collected through focal group discussions and semi-structured interviews with key informants.

Focus of survey

The study gathered information on four key aspects of networks and member participation (summarised in box 1 below. The full research questionnaire can be found in annex 2.) All the study questions were selected on the basis of the research team's understanding of Social Identity, Resource Dependency, and Social Capital theory (please see box 2 for more detail).

Sampling: As mentioned previously, TANGO has around 500 NGO members, and TEN/MET some 270. Eliminating duplicates (i.e. organisations that are part of both networks), the research team randomly selected 20 member organisations from each zone in each network. This methodology ensured that 40 CSOs from each cluster (eastern, northern and Southern) were sampled, or 120 CSOs in total. Of the total sampled, 60 were members of TANGO and 60 of TEN/MET. The types of CSOs sampled can be seen in the table below.

Table 2:   Types of CSOs Participating in the Study

Organisation	Frequency	%
INGO	3	2.5
NGO	112	93.3
CBO	3	2.5
FBO	2	1.7
Total	**120**	**100.0**

Source: Survey data

Discussions and interviews

Key informant interviews took place with the board members and/or chairpersons of both networks, whilst CSO programme officers were invited to the focal group discussions. The information gleaned from discussions and interviews was used to develop case studies. Focal group discussions began on the subjects of the research questionnaire and evolved according to the inputs of participants.

Reliability and Validity

To avoid transcription errors, as suggested by Kalla (2006), data collection and reporting formats were linked to the structured questionnaire. Factor analysis (KMO test = 0.623) and reliability analysis (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.757) indicate that the scale of network participation (the level of participation of the CSO in the network) is sufficiently constructed. Participation in network meetings, consultation in decision-making processes, and payment of membership fees all measure the same underlying construct. The qualitative data (collected from semi-structured interviews and focal group discussions) was triangulated with other secondary resources for cross-validation. This was followed by data interpretation and verification before the write up of the draft report.

**Box 2:   Study Criteria and their relation to Social Capital and Resource
              Dependency Theories**

1.   Participation in Network Activities
    Attending Meetings: For a group to be effective, affiliated members generally need to be physically present for group sessions (Paquin, Miles, and Kivlighan, 2011) in order to discuss problems, set goals, and make decisions on future action (Walz et al., 1993, in Sonnentag and Volmer, 2009). In their study of multi-stakeholder groups, however, Truex and Søreide (2010) found that although some members regularly attend network meetings in order to represent their institution, many others do not prioritise network attendance and only participate on an ad hoc basis. This research suggests that social identity theory may throw a light on determining whether members' participation in networks is instrumental or symbolic.

    Consultation with members: Truex and Søreide (2010) observed that even when all members are clearly committed to implementation, they must still be able to reach consensus on important decisions and work effectively as an organisation. Network secretariats should have important decisions approved by their members. A Board of Directors is formed in order to govern the network on behalf of all its members, and it is logical, therefore, that the Board should consult their members before making important network decisions. Friction is likely to occur if members are not consulted (Catlaw, 2009), and this may erode inter-organisational trust within networks (trust being a key element of social capital).

    Payments of membership fees: Revenues from membership fees often provide organisation's core operational budgets (Rutasitara and Ngowi, 2007). The proportional contribution of member organisations to network finances is an important determinant of their inclusion in network activities. By implication, the allegiance of the network secretariat can be shifted from member organisations with limited financial resources to members who contribute large amounts. This means resource dependency theory can shed a light on the influence and the participation of member organisations in networks.

2.   Shared Interest Among Network Members
    Tolerance: Stakeholders in a network may have very different interests and perspectives, and exert conflicting pressures on bridging organisations (Brown, 1993). CSO networks can be dominated by higher income groups, who act to secure their own interests

and may be unwilling to confront the Government or donors in order to push forward the interests of other members (van Lerberghe and Ferrinho, 2002). In this respect, tolerating other members' positions during advocacy campaigns is important for increased members' participation.

Frictions: When social capital is high, member organisations tend to be cohesive and to obey orders from the top. As acceptance of decisions increases, teams are better able to build, maintain unity and coalesce (Tekleab, Quigley, and Tesluk, 2011). On the other hand, when social capital is low, frictions among members are likely to occur and effect participation in the network. Overcoming friction is thus an important step towards increasing participation.

Joint Problem Solving: Joint problem solving enables the team to focus attention and effort on the problems facing the networks, and to acquire and exchange the information needed to accomplish their task (Sonnentag and Volmer, 2009). When CSO members are engaged in joint problem solving, they are also more likely to increase their network participation.

3:   Heterogeneous/Homogenous Factors
Members Identities: Social identify research suggests that it is easier to ensure participation when CSOs in a network are homogenised for example by sharing an identity, purpose, objective or even challenge (Ashman, Brown, and Zwick 1998; Dorado, Giles, Jr and Welch, 2009). If stakeholders have different values, unequal power structures, or conflicts of interest, the challenges of bringing them together can be substantial (Brown, 1993). Thus, the identity of each member (its vision, mission etc.) can significantly determine the participation of member organisations.

Size of the organisation: Resource dependency theory suggests that the size of a member organisation is likely to influence participation. Each party in a network is dependent on resources controlled by another party (Lambright et al., 2010). While this exchange may not be symmetrical, there must be benefit for both parties involved (Isett, 2005). Coalitions, for example, often succeed because high-level professionals (lawyers, publicists, lobbyists, etc.) in large CSOs are able to bring their expertise to bear for the good of the wider network (Manor, 2004). However, this does not always empower small organisations, and the latter may feel disempowered and discouraged by the disparity of expertise and experience.

Trust: Trust among member organisations may determine the level of participation in a network. The effectiveness of inter-organisational trust in networks may facilitate collective decision-making, consultation before big network decisions and payment of membership fees. Schneider (2009) used organisational social capital to understand how established, trust based networks among tend to be more participatory**.**

Location (rural/urban): Geographical differences are likely to affect members' participation in network activities. Physical proximity and active participation constitute favourable conditions for reinforcing relations of accountability between those representing and those represented (Houtzager and Lavalle, 2009).

5 Findings and Analysis

1. Participation in Network Activities

Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which member CSOs were participating in network activities. Table 5 summarises these findings and compares the two organisations in three distinct activities. As can be seen, the study found that members of TEN/MET are more likely to attend network meetings, more likely to offer their views during consultation, and more likely also to pay their membership fees.

Table 5: Participation in Network Activities: Comparing Members in TANGO and TEN/MET

	Network	N	Mean	Std Deviation
Attendance at AGM or General Assembly	TANGO	60	1.90	1.633
	TEN/MET	60	3.35	1.482
Offering views during consultation	TANGO	60	1.47	1.408
	TEN/MET	60	2.33	1.398
Payments of membership fees	TANGO	60	1.98	0.469
	TEN/MET	60	3.92	0.462

Source: Survey data

Looking at the standard deviations (see above), TEN/MET scores are closest to mean, implying that its members are more likely to participate. These mean differences were confirmed by the results from Independent Samples T-Test, which show that TEN/MET members (N=60) score significantly higher than TANGO members on 'meeting attendance' (N=60) (*Sig. 0,000 – T-5,092*); 'members consultation' (N=60) (*Sig. 0,001 – T-3,383*); and 'payment of membership fees' (N=60) (*Sig. 0,000 – T-22,749*).

Payment of annual subscription fee was the major form of participation in both TANGO (1.98) and TEN/MET (3.92), while offering views during consultation was the least likely form of participation in both (TANGO at 1.47 and TEN/MET at 2.33).

Returns for membership fees
If network members are required to pay subscription fees, they naturally expect to receive something in return for their money. However, members of the two organisations perceived value for money very differently. A respondent from TANGO's Eastern Zone lamented: "We have paid all our fees, but we have not been invited to meetings, and the secretariat has not involved us in network activities. We are wondering now whether our TANGO membership is adding any value to our organisation." A Northern Zone respondent had a similar story and, having never been invited to attend network meetings, had stopped paying fees: "My organisation joined TANGO in 1996. We were paying fees at the beginning of each year but we received nothing in return.

We decided to continue paying fees for strategic reasons until recently when we stopped." Other members from the same zone admitted that they had not paid their membership fees for a while, and felt therefore that the TANGO management could not be solely to blame for their failure to participate in meetings.[12]

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12 The TANGO secretariat has been made aware of the discontent among its members. In a recent Southern Highlands Zone CSO workshop participants decried the poor coordination of member organisations, and asserted that there was a need for networks like TANGO to reorganise and devise more effective modalities for collaboration.

In comparison, TEN/MET produced much more value for money for its members, who were more likely to attend network meetings, more likely to be consulted in key decision-making processes and are supported to showcase their accomplishments and share their experiences (see section 5 below for more details). Members are also more likely to pay their fees on time.[13]

Does paying fees regularly lead to better network capacity? Or does proper value for money for their fees (through proper network participation and activities) encourage the timely payment of membership fees? Cause and effect are not clearly established by the study. However, the study was able to draw some conclusions about the factors that determined members' participation (see below).

2.   Key Factors Determining Members' Participation

Regression analysis shows that information sharing among network members is a strong predictor of members' participation in both TANGO and TEN/MET (Sig. 0,000 – Beta 0,592 and Sig. 0,020 – Beta 0,322 respectively). In fact, in TANGO it is a better predictor of participation than any other factor analysed by the study team (e.g. members' identities, size, locational differences, trust and tolerance, problem-solving, frictions etc.). None of the former predicts network participation in either organisation.

In TEN/MET, tolerance for divergence views during advocacy campaigns (Sig. 0,012 – Beta 0,337) is also a significant predictor of members' participation, perhaps indicating that it is a more important factor for instrumental participation than symbolic participation.

3.   TEN/MET: Key Participation Successes and Challenges to Date

Overall, the study found there was a genuine and meaningful level of participation in TEN/MET. The secretariat allocates funds in the annual budget to facilitate members' participation in network activities. This not only nurtures a sense of belonging but also ensures that members devote sufficient time to network activities. TEN/MET's also has an effective governance structure, which requires each zonal representative to collect views from their constituents before feeding them into key decision-making meetings. In addition, the secretariat has a defined role as a facilitator, fundraiser, and overseer of strategic activities, while lobbying and advocacy activities are shared between the leadership and its normal members.

TEN/MET members believe that their network is influencing education policies despite institutional challenges. Members have been actively involved in drafting their network's advocacy plan, and TEN/MET's engagement in high-level policy fora has allowed grass roots members a real opportunity to influence national education policy. Specifically TEN/MET has:

- Actively coordinated the voices of its members into high level poverty, educational and policy fora (such as in the Joint Annual Education Sector Review, and the General Budget Review Working Group that oversees MKUKUTA Cluster 2, which includes education);

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13 For example, the 2007/8 and 2008/9 reports on the Tujenge Pamoja Campaign conducted by the Unity in Diversity Foundation of Mbeya featured prominently in the July–October 2010 issue of Our Education/*Elimu Yetu* Newsletter published by TEN/MET. The reports gave an account of the kind of anachronistic and counter-productive cultural practices that are deemed to hinder progress toward national poverty reduction strategies and goals.

- Been a key player in reviews of national educational policy and programmes such as the Education Sector Development Programme, and the Primary and Secondary Education Development Programme (PEDP and SEDP respectively);

- Been a member of several national education committees where critical issues – of enrolment, expansion, quality, finance, resource allocation etc. – are deliberated (Mnjagila, 2004).[14]

- Worked closely with the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training on the Primary Education Development Programme, meeting biannually.

In short, this evidence indicates that members' participation in TEN/MET is indeed instrumental. TEN/Met has become a reliable ally of the government when it comes to the execution of education policy and strategies, and by properly taking the views of its members into policy dialogues, has created a real opportunity for national policy decisions to be responsive to the needs of the country's citizens.

Overall, TEN/MET confirms Houtzager and Lavalle's theory (2009) that networks that are close to their members and open to participation are more likely to contribute to effective political representation than those that are distant and hermetic. The Government has acknowledged that its substantial engagement with TEN/MET has helped spark the debate on the role of CSOs; influenced the piloting and expansion of key sector programmes; provided useful inputs in the development of both the primary and secondary education development plans; and strengthened its capacity on a number of issues, such as policy, curriculum development, and HIV/AIDS prevention.

Despite these positive successes, a number of key challenges still exist within the organisation.

For example, although TEN/MET's constitution states that all member organisations are to be treated equally, in most cases national and international NGOs assume more power than their regional and district counterparts. Oxfam GB Tanzania, for instance, is a founder member of TEN/MET and has also been facilitating the network to accomplish its strategic objectives. Together, they been conducting joint annual Community Practices Forums, and have held three workshops since 2008. Although generally helpful and occasionally necessary,[15] some members expressed their worries that indebtedness to a small number of powerful national and international NGOs might compromise the wider interests of the wider membership.

Further analysis shows that a few national and international NGOs are calling many of the shots in TEN/MET. For example, when *HakiElimu* (a national NGO that is both a member and a donor of TEN/MET) was banned by the government in 2005, TEN/MET advised its members to join forces, show solidarity, boycott the 2006 Education Sector Review, and petition the government's for its crackdown on their fellow member. Some affiliates, however, especially those enjoying cordial relations with the government, resisted these promptings, and were reluctance to associate themselves with the outcast organisation. The incident showed that HakiElimu's mixed roles (as both a donor and a member of the network) could sway the direction of the organisation and affect the representation of other members' interests. (NB: Disparity of size is not always a bad thing and does not always negatively affect the representation of members' interests.

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14   These include: the Education for All Implementation Follow-up Task Force, the Basic Education Development Committee, and the Education Sector Development Plan Advisory Committee, as well as the Education Sector Development Committee and its Task Force and Technical Working Groups.

15   Close collaboration between organisations of different sizes may, indeed, at times be a practical necessity since many small rural CSOs do not have the required policy analysis expertise for effective influential high-level participation.

In fact, resource dependency theory predicts that small organisations may participate more after being capacitated by the 'big guys').

"TEN/MET has had human resource constraints for a long time," another interviewee observed, "and has been dependent on a few members of the secretariat to deliver its ambitious goals. This has resulted in the lack of a succession plan and lack of room for willing members to take over some of the network tasks."

Other members opined that TEN/MET was too narrow in it focus, and was increasingly blurring the role between itself and the government: "TEN/MET behaves as if it is a government organ in charge of monitoring the delivery of education in Government schools. It has almost no interest in the issues of non-government school issues, although we have tried very hard to get it interested. Unless it makes adjustments and begins to take up our issues, we can't see this as the right umbrella organisation for us, and we will simply pull out and run on our own."

4. TANGO: Key Participation, Successes and Challenges to Date

TANGO has been active in coordinating civil society inputs into the country's last two poverty reduction strategies,[16] and still occasionally conducts advocacy campaigns. However, it is far less active and participatory than it was a decade ago. Evidence from key interviewees suggests that TANGO has not actively brought its members together in a common cause for over a decade. When action is taken, it is often driven by donor's agenda[17] so that the objective of such advocacy is in a sense already pre-determined by funders.

TANGO's failure in recent years to play an active role in identifying national advocacy issues and organising effective campaigns, has left its place open on the national stage to be filled by other more vibrant networks, including the FemAct and Policy Forum.

Evidence from focal group discussions suggests that TANGO members feel that their secretariat is weak and lacking in respect for them. Consulting members is essential for rich and full network participation, but interviewees from TANGO were in agreement that the secretariat rarely did so before making important decisions: "We used to be consulted before any big decision was made, "one South Highlands Zone responded commented. "This is no longer the case." A northern zone participant also complained about a lack of voice in network affairs: "TANGO derives its legitimacy from us. Since this is the case, shouldn't we, as members, discuss our fate in TANGO?"

The TANGO secretariat does not appear to provide a unifying vision for the work of its members. Participation is rarely concerned with substantive issues, and TANGO members are much more likely to be invited to attend network events (such as festivals) than strategy meetings on how to engage with government. A participant from the Eastern Zone explained: "My organisation joined TANGO in 2008 and since then, though we have been invited to participate in festivals, commemorations and anniversaries, we have never been invited to attend network meetings."

There have also been missed opportunities to feed members opinions into national policy debates and discussions. Although TANGO actively engages its members in campaign events[18] the views

16 NSGRP of 2005-10 and MKUKUTA of 2010-15.
17 E.g. the Millennium Development Goals, or the Global Call for Action against Poverty.
18 Such as the Stand-Up and Take Action Campaign events, where CSOs get a token opportunity to issue commentaries on a number of issues, including General Budget Support, before their comments are fed back to donors and the government.

of the secretariat are the dominant ones at such events, since there are no regular mechanisms for eliciting and understanding members' opinions.

Despite these negative aspects in terms of participatory network governance, TANGO's close collaboration with organisations working outside the network has brought them a broad spectrum of allies. One TANGO commentator explained: "My organisation deals with women's empowerment and entrepreneurship, and yet collaborates with organisations working in many other sectors, such as the environment and water." In short, TANGO members may have different missions but are still able to organise a united front in order to overcome network challenges.

The study also found that TANGO members have successfully facilitated district and regional CSO networks during the past decade. The formation of these affiliate networks demonstrates that TANGO has a popular and wide support base, which can effectively be used to legitimise and bolster advocacy positions.

At its worse, however, TANGO's focus on creating solidarity and legitimising its advocacy position (rather than representing members' interests) can lead it to form coalitions with outside networks and organisations that do not necessarily reflect the wishes of its internal members. An Eastern Zone interviewee warned of the dangers of this: "It is important for all network members to reach consensus about the advocacy positions to be taken by TANGO. For example, if the secretariat were to advocate for gay rights, we could no longer be a part of the network, since such behaviours are not in-line with our values."

6 Conclusions and Recommendations

The study found that TEN/MET members participate more actively and instrumentally than members from TANGO, and are having more success advocating with - and influencing - Government. TEN/MET has been able to affect educational policies despite institutional challenges, and has been acknowledged by the Government to be a trusted partner in shaping national educational policy. These results confirm Houtzager and Lavalle's theory (2009) that networks that are close to their members and open to participation are more likely to contribute to effective political representation than those that are distant and hermetic. TEN/MET's genuine and meaningful level of participation appears to have been brought about in part by good governance structures, defined roles, and effective earmarking of funding for participatory activities.

In contrast, TANGO is far less active than it used to be and has not actively brought its members together in a common cause for over a decade. Members feel that their secretariat is weak, lacks respects for them and rarely consults them on important matters.

Effective information sharing emerged as the critical factor for encouraging participation both in a highly instrumental network like TEN/MET and a low symbolic network like TANGO. In TANGO it is actually a better predictor of participation than any other factor analysed by the study team (e.g. members' identities, size, locational differences, trust and tolerance, problem-solving, frictions etc.). Indeed none of these additional factors predicts network participation in either organisation. Tolerance for divergence views during advocacy campaigns is also a significant predictor of members' participation in TEN/MET, thought not in TANGO, perhaps indicating that it is a more important factor for instrumental than symbolic participation.[19]

The study showed that members in both organisations can collaborate together despite having different sizes and aims, and that a shared vision is critical for successful collaboration. When members don't consider networking to be beneficial, they tend to skip meetings, and make little effort – resulting in empty or reduced participation (Truex and Søreide, 2010). This may explain why so many member organisations are no longer enthusiastic about TANGO. Although knowledge and information sharing are important activities in most networks, the relationship of its members lies at the heart of network effectiveness (Liebler and Ferri, 2004). Improving relationships would be the first step towards boosting information sharing within networks and thus increasing members' participation in network activities.

Poor access to information technology was flagged as a major challenge for small and rural organisations seeking to represent their constituents in civil society networks meetings. Urban-based member organisations tend to be better informed since they have more access to information technology. They are also more likely to know the network secretariat and therefore to be granted favours in terms of appointments and invitations to attend network activities. Addressing these disparities is critical if small and medium sized CSOs in rural and isolated areas are to be kept engaged.

Disparities of power within networks have been shown to have both a positive and negative affect. At their best, large organisations within a network can capacitate smaller ones, as well as capacitate the network itself. At worst, however, national and international NGOs can assume a disproportionate amount of power and compromise the wider interests of general members. CSO networks can also be dominated by higher paying members or richer organisations, and can be compromised

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19   TEN/MET works in both advocacy and service delivery. As a result it is probably not possible for the secretariat to serve the interests of all its members in a single engagement with the government. Thus, without tolerance for diverged advocacy positions, instrumental members' participation may not be possible.

by having members with mixed roles (for example, CSOs that are both affiliates and donors to the network). Efforts to address these power dynamics are an essential part of promoting good network governance, and ensuring that the voices of the marginalised can still be heard.

As a result of these findings, it is recommended that:

- More effective network governance structures, defined roles, and financial incentives should be set up to encourage members to meet more regularly and input their views. For example, networks might emulate TEN/MET's example and (1) allocate funds in the annual budget to facilitate members' participation in network activities; (2) set up zonal representatives to collect views from their constituents and feed into network meetings or decision-making fora; (3) ensure a more clear division of roles between the secretariat and general members.

- Effective information sharing should be a priority of all networks. Secretariats should consider the needs of small rural CSOs, and others with limited infrastructure, capacity and internet connectivity, when packaging and disseminating information.

- The National Council of NGOs (NACONGO) should create an online forum for sharing experiences, successes, challenges and best practices of participation in network activities.

- Members of civil society networks should choose among themselves how and who should represent them in policy dialogues. They all need to have influence if there is to be shared ownership of decisions, and adequate representation of all interests in policy dialogue.

- The balance of power must be carefully managed between small and large CSO members within a network, to ensure that organisations that are larger, richer or more international can support – but do not drown out – the voices of those who are smaller, poorer or less used to a public stage.

- Even in sectoral, homogeneous civil society networks, members may have a different focus for their work (some, for example, may concentrate on service delivery and some on advocacy). In such cases, it is recommended that network secretariats should establish clear rules to ensure a fair balance of power and influence.

- Since raising the voices of the poor into policy dialogues is a key aim of participation, members need to be fully involved in planning their network's advocacy strategies and goals. One way to do this is to encourage CSO donors to develop network assessment criteria to ensure that member organisations are involved in advocacy planning, and tie those criteria to funding.

- Government ministries, departments and agencies should put in place clear rules to fully and transparently involve civil society networks in policy processes and dialogue. They should also support network capacity building, and monitor contributions to local planning and policy dialogues through their networks.

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Annex 1: Some Definitions

What is a 'network'? A Conceptual Framework

The word 'network' is applied to a range of phenomena with varying characteristics (Catlaw, 2009). Networks may be formed in different ways: from the bottom-up (as a collective response by individual actors); from the top-down (through institutional mandate or coercion); and through a combination of the two approaches (Isett, 2005). Network 'actors' is a term that may also be used variously – to apply to individuals, collective entities, firms, organisations, and divisions within organisations (Contractor, Wasserman, Faust, 2006).

Despite these varieties of definition, there are some generally agreed characteristics of networks (Liebler and Ferri, 2004). Catlaw (2009) provides a particularly useful conceptual specificity, by identifying the potential distinctiveness of the network form rather than elaborating a network framework or typology. (He does not, for example, merely reduce networks to another modality of organisation, or seek to explain the conditions under which some are more productive of democratic governance or legitimacy than others.)

From a purely structural perspective, however, Podolny and Page (1998) argue that the trichotomy between market, hierarchy, and network forms of organisation is a false one. They cite an example of a spot market as a population of isolates: each market actor is a node that lacks any ties to the other actors/nodes. They also cited an example of a hierarchy as a centralised network in which the vast majority of ties flow to or from one particular node.

In effect, from a structural perspective, every form of organisation is a network, and market and hierarchy are simply two manifestations of the broader type (Podolny and Page, 1998). In a pure market, they argue, relations are not enduring, but episodic, formed only for the purpose of a well-specified transfer of goods and resources, and ending after that transfer. In hierarchies, they observed that relations may endure for longer than a brief episode, but that a clearly recognised, legitimate authority must exist to resolve disputes that arise among actors.

Networks are a governance mechanism for those organisations that belong to it (Isett, 2005). When considered as a form of governance, Podolny and Page (1998) accept that the network form can be distinctly characterised. They define a network as any collection of actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organisational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange. Thus, the evolving, emerging network form is the organisation (Contractor, Wasserman, Faust, 2006).

Lambright, Mischen, and Laramee (2010) define networks as structures of interdependence involving multiple organisations. This study adopted this definition because as an NGO, the civil society network must manage the relationships between the organisation and its members, the organisation and its beneficiaries, the organisation and its donors etc. At the same time, it must maintain relationships between its member organisations (Zhiyuan, 2009).

What is 'Participation'? A Conceptual Discussion.

Meaningful participation is an important way for an organisation to achieve its vision and objectives (White, 1996).

Participation is not one thing or another, and has varied meanings and definitions, depending on the context and community in which it is discussed and assessed.

The concept has been variously described as a 'means' and an 'end', as 'essential', and as an educational and empowering process necessary to correct power imbalances between rich and poor (Jennings, 2000). The appropriate or possible breadth and depth of participation depends on specific context and circumstance (Malena, 2009). And for some participation (like other aspects of good governance) should always be a means to an end, however, rather than an end in itself (Boyce and Lysack 2000).

The concept of participation generally involves some idea that all 'stakeholders' should take part in decision-making. It has been more narrowly described as the extraction of local knowledge to design programs off site (Jennings, 2000). There is an important distinction here between popular participation and the participation of organised civil society, for with the latter important issues of accountability arise and need to be addressed if civil society actors are not also to be regarded as just another cadre of special interests (Newell and Tussie, 2006). In the network sense, participation refers to involvement by member organizations in the creation, content and conduct of a program or policy designed to save their constituents' interests.

Annex 2:   The Main Questionnaire

Introduction

My name is Kenny Manara, and I am conducting research on collective action between heterogeneous and homogeneous networks, as part of the Civil Society Research Facility-Tanzania, a mutual undertaking of REPOA (Tanzania) and the Centre for International Development Issues at Radboud University (The Netherlands). I am inviting you to participate in this project because your organisation is a member of TEN/MET or TANGO. Your responses will serve both the CSO sector and the academy in adding new knowledge. The procedure involves filling in the questionnaire.

What about confidentiality? I will do my best to keep your personal information confidential. No individual names will ever be used. Please complete the survey and give the questionnaire to Kenny Manara physically, or send via email: kennymanara@yahoo.com.

What if I have questions? This research is being conducted by me. If you have any questions, please contact me at: kennymanara@yahoo.com or 0754-272398. Or you may also contact CSRF Contact Person at REPOA Ms. Joanita Magongo: joanita@repoa.or.tz or 0763 – 177931.

Part 1:   Institutional Information
1.   Organisation Name:_____
2.   Address_____
3.   Tel/Cell No:_____   E-mail:_____
4.   Year formed:_____   5.   Year joined network_____

6.   Type of organisation
     [ ] INGO
     [ ] NGO
     [ ] CBO
     [ ] FBO
     [ ] Others, please specify_____

7.   Sector(s) covered by organisation:
     [ ] Education
     [ ] Health
     [ ] Agriculture
     [ ] Land
     [ ] Water/Environment
     [ ] Gender
     [ ] HIV/AIDS
     [ ] Others, please specify_____

8.   What type of the collective activities do you undertake in your network?
     [ ] Meetings
     [ ] Consultations on key issues
     [ ] Information sharing
     [ ] Advocacy campaigns
     [ ] Conflict management
     [ ] Problem-solving
     [ ] Others, please specify_____

9.   Has your organisation ever held a position on the Board of your network?
      [ ] Yes   [ ] No

Part 2:   Participation in network activities
10.   Does your organisation attend network meetings such as AGMs?
      [ ] Always (5)
      [ ] Almost always (4)
      [ ] Most of the times (3)
      [ ] Only some of the time (2)
      [ ] Almost never (1)
      [ ] Never (0)

11.   Does your organisation offer views to the Board before approving big decisions?
      [ ] Always (5)
      [ ] Almost always (4)
      [ ] Most of the times (3)
      [ ] Only some of the time (2)
      [ ] Almost never (1)
      [ ] Never (0)

Part 3:   Shared interests among network members
12.   Do member organisations share information?
      [ ] Always (5)
      [ ] Almost always (4)
      [ ] Most of the times (3)
      [ ] Only some of the time (2)
      [ ] Almost never (1)
      [ ] Never (0)

13.   Do you think there is tolerance on the varied members' advocacy positions?
      [ ] Agree Strongly (5)
      [ ] Agree (4)
      [ ] Agree Somewhat (3)
      [ ] Disagree Somewhat (2)
      [ ] Disagree (1)
      [ ] Disagree Strongly (0)

14.   How frequently were there frictions among members when dealing with network activities?
      [ ] Always (5)
      [ ] Almost always (4)
      [ ] Most of the times (3)
      [ ] Only some of the time (2)
      [ ] Almost never (1)
      [ ] Never (0)

15.   Do members unite in trying to solve common problems facing your network?
      [ ] Always (5)
      [ ] Almost always (4)
      [ ] Most of the times (3)

[ ] Only some of the time (2)
[ ] Almost never (1)
[ ] Never (0)

Part 4: Heterogeneous/homogeneous factors

16. What would you consider the main obstacles to collaboration in TEN/MET?
    [ ] The varied identities of member organisations (vision/mission)
    [ ] Inadequate trust among member organisations (e.g. service delivery vs advocacy)
    [ ] Locational differences of member organisations (e.g. rural vs urban)
    [ ] Different sizes of member organisations (district, regional, national and international)

Indicator 1: Organisational identity

17. Do you collaborate with member organisations with whom you differ in vision and mission?
    [ ] Always (5)
    [ ] Almost always (4)
    [ ] Most of the times (3)
    [ ] Only some of the time (2)
    [ ] Almost never (1)
    [ ] Never (0)

Indicator 2: Organisational size

18. Do you work with fellow member organisations no matter how big and small they are?
    [ ] Always (5)
    [ ] Almost always (4)
    [ ] Most of the times (3)
    [ ] Only some of the time (2)
    [ ] Almost never (1)
    [ ] Never (0)

Indicator 3: Organisational trust

19. Do you trust fellow member organisations to do what is right for the cause of the network?
    [ ] Always (5)
    [ ] Almost always (4)
    [ ] Most of the times (3)
    [ ] Only some of the time (2)
    [ ] Almost never (1)
    [ ] Never (0)

Indicator 4: Locational differences

20. Do you join forces with fellow member organisations regardless of whether they are located in rural or urban areas?
    [ ] Always (5)
    [ ] Almost always (4)
    [ ] Most of the times (3)
    [ ] Only some of the time (2)
    [ ] Almost never (1)
    [ ] Never (0)

Annex 3: Payments of Subscription Fees: Data Sheet for TEN/MET Secretariat

Do the following member organisations pay their annual subscription feeson time?

No.	Member	Always	Almost always	Most of the times	Some of the time	Almost Never	Never
	Eastern Zone						
1	Action Aid						
2	Dogodogo Centre						
3	Comprehensive Support to Persons with Disabilities (COSUPED)						
4	Environmental, Health and Entrepreneurship (EHE)						
5	Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE)						
6	Tanzania Association of Managers of Non-Governmental Schools (TAMONGSCO)						
7	The Leadership Forum						
8	Future Development Agency (FUDEA)						
9	Friends of Don Bosco (FDB)						
10	Child in the Sun Centre						
11	Chama cha Walemavu Tanzania (CHAWATA)						
12	E & D Readership and Development Agency						
13	Publishers Association of Tanzania (PATA)						
14	Social Economic and Development Foundation						
15	Campaign for Female Education Tanzania (CAMFED)						
16	Children in Crisis Africa (CICA)						
17	Galilaya Youth Organisation						
18	Childhood Development Trust Fund Network (CDTFN)						
19	Secondary Education Girls Advancement (SEGA)						
20	Safina Women Association (SAWA)						
	**Northern Zone**						
1	Arusha Disabled Women Group (ADWG)						
2	Kamamma Integrated Development Trust Fund (KAMAMMA)						
3	Matabaik Olerere Organisation (MATOLO)						
4	Momosa Arusha Organisation						
5	Monduli Women Action Trust (MOWAT)						
6	Human Right Education Trust (HUREP-TRUST)						
7	Maarifa ni Ufunguo						
8	Dinkwa Women Trust (DIWODEO)						
9	Elimu Community Light (ECOLI)						
10	Informal Sector Trust (INSERT)						
11	Kifumwa Garden						
12	Mrumate Disabled Centre						
13	INFOY						
14	Kilimanjaro Environmental Youth and HIV/AIDS Care (KEYAC)						
15	White Orange Youth (WOY)						

No.	Member	Always	Almost always	Most of the times	Some of the time	Almost Never	Never
	Northern Zone						
17	TRC Rombo						
18	Elimu kwa Jamii (ELIJA) – Manyara						
19	ALIDO – Manyara						
20	ULICT – Manyara						
	Southern Highlands Zone						
1	Mbeya Older Person Care (MOPEC)						
2	Southern Highlands Network						
3	Mbozi Ileje and Isangati Consortium (MIICO)						
4	ADP Isangati Trust Fund						
5	Ileje Rural Development Organisation (IRDTF)						
6	Unity in Diversity Foundation (UDF)						
7	CORRECT						
8	Tushiriki						
9	The Mango Tree Orphan						
10	Chunya District Education Trust (CHUDET)						
11	JUHUDI						
12	Tunduru Academic Forum (TAF)						
13	Vicoba Sustainable Development Agency (VSDA)						
14	Lumbingu Development Association (LUDEA)						
15	St. Therese Orphans Foundations						
16	Songea Children Centre for the Blind (SOCCEB)						
17	Future Hope Children Care Foundation (FHCCF)						
18	Lugarawa Trust Fund (LTF)						
19	Self Help Assistant – Ludewa						
20	FAWOPA – Mtwara						

Annex 4: Payments of Subscription Fees: Data Sheet for TANGO Secretariat

Do the following member organisations pay their annual subscription fees on time?

No:	Member	Always	Almost always	Most of the times	Some of the time	Almost Never	Never
	Eastern Zone						
1	Social Action Trust Fund (SATF)						
2	Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF)						
3	Tanzania Water and Environmental Sanitation (TWESA)						
4	Tanzania Youth Alliance (TAYOA)						
5	Tanzania Traditional Energy Development and Environment Organisation (TATEDO)						
6	National Organisation for Legal Assistance (NOLA)						
7	Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)						
8	Private Nurses and Midwives Association of Tanzania (PRINMAT)						
9	Journalist Environment Association in Tanzania (JET)						
10	Forum for Grassroot Organisations of Tanzania (FOGOTA)						
11	Tanzania Association of Women Leaders in Agriculture and Environment (TAWLAE)						
12	Tanzania Healthcare and Career Awareness Program (TAHECAP)						
13	Umoja wa Wapanda Baiskeli Tanzania (UWABA)						
14	Guluka Kwalala Youth Environmental Group						
15	Pamoja Disabled Forum						
16	Tanzania Environmental and Sanitation Conservation (TESCO) – Morogoro						
17	Morogoro Environmental Conservation Organization (MOECO)						
18	Imarika Trust Fund – Morogoro						
19	Sinai – Morogoro						
20	Wings Environment and Education Transformation Unity (WEETU) – Morogoro						
	Northern Zone						
1	PINGOs Forum						
2	Ilkisongo Pastoralist Initiatives (IPI)						
3	Access Legal Assistance and Human Rights Organisation (ALAHRO)						
4	Arusha Women Legal Aid and Human Rights Centre (AWLAHURIC)						
5	Business & Entrepreneurship Support Tanzania (BEST)						
6	Inyuat E. Maa						
7	Women Development for Science and Technology Association (WODSTA)						
8	Arusha Community Initiatives support Trust (ACCIST)						

No:	Member	Always	Almost always	Most of the times	Some of the time	Almost Never	Never
9	Women, Agricultural Development and Environmental Conservation (WADEC)						
10	Women Initiatives for the Street & Working Children Welfare (WIWOCHI) - Arusha						
11	Network Against Female Genital Mutilation (NAFGEM) - Moshi						
12	Mbulu Environmental Society (MBESO) – Manyara						
13	Christian Youth Spiritual Centre (CYSM) – Manyara						
14	Pastoralists Survival Options (NAADUTARO) – Kibaya						
15	Tanzania Women for Self Initiatives – Tanga						
16	African Women Aids Working Group (AFRIWAG) - Tanga						
17	Tanga Youth Aids and Environmental Conservation Association (TYAECA)						
18	Coast Economic and Development Association (CEDA) – Tanga						
19	Tumaini Environmental Conservation Group (TEGG) – Tanga						
20	Theo English Medium Computer Training (TEMACT) – Tanga						
	Southern Highlands Zone						
1	Maranatha Christian Centre (MCC)						
2	Ruvuma Mission to the Poor and Disabled (PADI)						
3	Self help Development Community (SEDECO)						
4	Mlete Development Association Group (MDAG)						
5	Tufae Education Aids Trust (TUFAE)						
6	Triumph Handicapped and Needy Foundation (THNF)						
7	Tunduru District Development Association (TUDIDEA)						
8	Tunduru People Living with HIV/AIDS Society						
9	ADP Mbozi						
10	Mbeya Paralegal Unit						
11	Ukwami Foundation – Mbeya						
12	Save the Women – Mbeya						
13	Yes Development						
14	Mbeya Multi Development Centre						
15	Women Solidarity						
16	Open Heart Tanzania (OHT) – Mbeya						
17	LIDA – Mbeya						
18	WCCA – Mbeya						
19	INCOMET – Iringa						
20	Help Tanzania Society – Masasi Mtwara						

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