AN INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PUBLIC SERVICE REFORMS

A Case Study of Civic Engagement in Water and Sanitation in Tanzania

Jamal Babu Msami

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Dedication

I dedicate this book to my beloved parents, Babu Msami and Sharifa Massawe; my darling wife, Leila Babu; my lovely children Imran and Aleena; my adoring sisters Sheila and Umi; and to the memory of my beloved uncle, Issa Munisi, may you Rest in Peace.

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Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AJHSR	Annual Joint Health Sector Review
BRN	Big Results Now Initiative
CE	Civic Engagement
CBO	Community Based Organisations
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
COWSO	Community Owned Water Supply Organisation
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSC	Client Service Charters
CSRP	Civil Service Reform Programme
DAWASCO	Dar Es Salaam Water Supply Company
DbyD	Decentralisation by Devolution
DDC	District Development Committees
ESAs	External Support Agencies
EWURA	Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority
EWURA CCC	Energy and Water Utilities' Regulatory Authority Consumer Consultative Council
FFYP	First Five-Year Development Plan of 1964-9
FYP	Five Year Development Plan
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoT	Government of Tanzania
GWP	Global Water Partnership
HI	Historical Institutionalism
HRM	Human Resources Management
HSSP	Health Sector Strategic Plan
IDA	International Development Assistance
IDRB	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IWRM	Integrated Water Resource Management
JUWATA	Jumuiya Ya Wafanyakazi Tanzania
LART	Loans and Advances Realisation Trust
LLGA	Lower Local Government Authority
LGA	Local Government Authority
LGRP	Local Government Reform Policy
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme
LSRP	Legal Sector Reforms Programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MKUKUTA	Mkakati Wa Kupunguza Umasikini and Kukuza Uchumi Tanzania
MMAM	Mpango Wa Maendeleo Ya Afya Ya Msingi
MOHSW	Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
MOWI	Ministry of Water and Irrigation
MP	Member of Parliament
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework

NAWAPO	National Water and Sanitation Policy
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NEC	National Executive Committee
NECTA	National Examinations Council of Tanzania
NEMC	National Environment Management Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPES	National Poverty Eradication Strategy
NPM	New Public Management
NSC	National Sanitation Campaign
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
NWSDP	National Water Sector Development Programme
NWSDS	National Water Sector Development Strategy
NUTA	National Union of Tanganyikan Workers
NUWA	National Urban Water Authority
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OGL	Open General Licence
O&OD	Opportunities and Obstacles to Development
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
TASAF	Tanzania Social Action Fund
TCF	Tanzania Consumer Forum
TCU	Tanzania Commission for Universities
TUCTA	Trade Union Congress of Tanzania
TYL	TANU Youth League
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
PDB	President's Delivery Bureau
PFMRP	Public Financial Management Reforms Programme
PO PSM	President's Office Public Service Management
PO RALG	President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Governments
PMO RALG	Prime Minister's Office, Regional Administration and Local Governments
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSP	Private Sector Participation
PSR	Public Service Reforms
PSRP	Public Service Reform Programme
PSRS	Public Service Recruitment Secretariat
R&AWG	Research and Analysis Technical Working Group
RWS	Rural Water Supply
RWSP	Rural Water Supply Programme
SCOPO	Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SFYP	Second Five Year Development Plan of 1969-74
TAG	Tanzania Advisory Group

TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TaWaSaNet	Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network
TDV	Tanzania Development Vision, 2025
TFL	Tanganyika Federation of Labour
TShs	Tanzania Shillings
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nation Conference on Environment and Development
UNCHE	United Nations Conference on Human Environment
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
UWSAs	Urban Water Supply Authorities
UWSS	Urban Water Supply and Sewerage
US$	United States Dollars
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VDC	Village Development Committees
VIP	Very Improved Pit Latrine
VoP	Views of The People Survey
WB	The World Bank
WCA	Water Consumer's Association
WHO	World Health Organisation
WRM	Water Resources Management
WSP	Water and Sanitation Program
WSS	Water Supply and Sewerage
WSSA	Water Supply and Sanitation Act
WUA	Water Users Association
WWC	World Water Council

CHAPTER ONE

Abstract

This research examines the role of civic engagement in the evolving systems for providing water and sanitation in Tanzania. This issue is timely because after more than a decade of implementing civic engagement reforms, little is known on how the public participates in the formulation of the reforms and in implementation processes; on the influence, if any, of the community on service provision. This study adopts a case study of water and sanitation in the Kawe local authority area in Kinondoni, Tanzania. It draws on the literatures on public service reforms, civic engagement and historical institutionalism to provide an in-depth, qualitative, rich discussion of public service reforms, civic engagement and the interactions between civic and organisational actors in defining the provision of water and sanitation services in the case study area. The fieldwork research was conducted between March and July 2014. It adopts an explanatory qualitative case study design. Findings reveal that, overall, civic engagement is constrained by rule ambiguities in the institutional frameworks and processes in water and sanitation in Tanzania. These, in turn, produce mixed effects in how civic engagement influences service provision in water and sanitation. The prevalence of rule ambiguities suggests that not enough collective attention has been paid to the conditions required to make civic engagement or wider reforms in water and sanitation more effective. This study makes a contribution to the public service reforms and civic engagement literature by analysing the political and practical complexities underpinning the implementation of civic engagement reforms. The overall recommendation of the study is that policy stakeholders, particularly the state, need to review the institutions for civic engagement in a bid to resolve these ambiguities through improved specificity, clarity and resources that will improve the attainment of common objectives in water and sanitation.

Keywords: Public service reforms, civic engagement, water and sanitation, institutional structures, rule ambiguities, service provision, Tanzania.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

The aim of this study is to examine the role of Civic Engagement (CE) in the evolving systems for providing water and sanitation (hereinafter WATSAN) in Tanzania. CE relates to the ability of citizens to influence the development and quality of policy and its delivery through active interactions with other governance stakeholders. The inclusion of CE in policy design is often based on its normative appeal — as something that ought to be strengthened for moral reasons—and its practical relevance as a governance mechanism for producing effective and equitable outcomes

(Barnes et al., 2014). The normative appeal of CE manifests from its creation of "mutually advantageous interactions and synergy in which the strengths of one partner balance the weaknesses of the others" (Schubeler, 1996, p. 48). That is, by working collaboratively, civically engaged actors should be able to obtain results that would not be possible independently. Such normative values are consonant with the public service improvement literature's concept of partnerships that promotes multi-actor arrangements with the capability to "solve problems that cannot be solved or solved easily by single organisations" (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003, p. 4).

These premises continue to underpin perceptions about the utility of CE in public services and contributed to its integration into policy reform initiatives. Indeed, CE is now a standard feature of many headline policy prescriptions and service reforms toolkits (Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Bovaird, 2007; Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012). This is best exemplified by its underwriting of various international development objectives not least the United Nations' 16th sustainable development goal: To promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. (United Nations, 2015, p. 14)

However, the extent to which CE harnesses multi-actor synergies in policy delivery remains under-theorised and under-examined (Barnes and Brown, 2011). Little is known at the detailed empirical level of how citizens and state actors engage in the production and delivery of social services. Despite this, some attempts have been made to explain the effects of CE on policy delivery using related concepts such as partnerships and co-production (Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012; Cooper et al., 2006; Joshi and Moore, 2004). Analyses have framed CE as a series of regular and long-term voluntary relationships based on partnerships between governments and citizens in which the two actors contribute substantial resources to facilitate the provision of public goods and services. Such attempts have explored both the rationale (for example, of civic engagement's response to deficiencies in the capacities of collaborating partners (Fung, 2006)) and implications for governance (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Cooksey and Kikula, 2004; Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001).

Despite such attempts, there is little empirical explication of how CE affects policy delivery. Indeed, explanations of the policy effects of CE based on the concept of partnerships have come under scrutiny over their theoretical and empirical generalizability. First, the utility of partnerships in policy has largely been derived from the public service improvement literature. This has in turn been premised on assumptions about what works in private companies and implies a successful transition of ideas and practices to the public sector (Fledderus et al., 2014). One the one hand, such assumptions may be relevant if public organisations behave like their private counterparts– which might be true in some Western contexts where public services are influenced by the New Public Service Management

doctrine (NPM), e.g. in the OECD countries. On the other hand, such assumptions may be seriously challenged in the diverse environments in which public institutions such as those in the global South operate. Second, while the concept of CE is ubiquitous in the design and implementation of policy across the globe, the explanatory literature on public service improvement and empirical investigations predominantly focuses on the developed world (Ashworth et al., 2010). It could thus be argued that little is known of the transferability of these ideas to developing countries like Tanzania beside their theoretical promises.

This research responds to these gaps in our understanding of how CE reforms influence policy delivery. It does so by addressing two issues: *first*, by examining the institutional framework for civic engagement, and *second,* by examining the influence of CE on service provision. Two research objectives and two research questions guide this study:

Table 1.1: The Research Purpose

Objective 1	**To examine the institutional framework for CE in WATSAN.**
Research Question 1:	*How do institutional structure and processes influence CE in WATSAN?*
Objective 2	To examine the influence of CE in the provision of WATSAN.
Research Question 2:	*How does CE influence service provision in WATSAN?*

Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) provides a useful case study to our analysis of the institutional structures and processes for civic engagement. In examining civic engagement, this study focuses on interactions between citizens and formal institutions and examines the influence of CE on service provision. Analysis focuses on the period 2002-2013. This period is characterised by implementation of service reforms in WATSAN in Tanzania that have actively pursued CE as a mechanism for policy delivery.

In light of the above objectives, research questions and assumptions, the overall aim of this research is to examine the role of CE in the evolving systems for providing WATSAN in Tanzania. This is done by focusing on how citizens interact with institutions governing CE reforms in WATSAN. The empirical component of this study is divided into three parts. Part I

(chapter 4) examines the influence of history on current CE institutions in WATSAN. The study employs a process tracing approach within the framework of historical institutionalism (HI) to examine the influence of past behaviours and power structures on institutional structures, including informal ones. Part II (chapter 5) examines the institutional structures and processes influencing CE. This is done by exploring the different institutional carriers used to structure CE in WATSAN. Part III (Chapter 6) examines the how CE reforms influence service provision in WATSAN. This is done by exploring how the institutional properties of ambiguity, power and agency shape the influence of CE on WATSAN service delivery. The three parts complement each other in helping us understand the role of CE in the evolving systems for providing WATSAN in Tanzania.

1.2 Background

There are general assumptions about how public service reforms (PSRs) as a management toolkit can be implemented globally — for example the infusion of market principles in public services through privatisation, deregulation, and the promotion of competition; democratisation, modernisation, and formalisation of government processes (Andrews, 2013). These assumptions relate to the kinds of capacities and structures that states and organisations have to enact and implement such reforms. However, such assumptions should not be taken for granted particularly in the global South where such capacities might be lacking or where the complexities of such structures need to be accounted for.

Public institutions in the developing world are generally characterized by deficiencies in their capacities and structures to deliver policy (Bunse and Fritz, 2012; Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002). These often confound their ability to deliver public services with adverse consequences on resident communities at large. This failure of public institutions has contributed to pronounced economic and social inequalities in the developing world such as poverty, illiteracy, gender disparities, incidences of preventable diseases etc. For example, the latest instalment of the World Development Indicators estimates that around three quarters of the poorest people in the world (people living on less than $1.25 a day) lives in the developing regions of South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2016c). Many other development indicators in the developing world shares this bleak observation.

Capacity deficiencies have nonetheless helped integrate the developing world with the global order. Integration has occurred as countries and institutions have sought to collectively address shared problems. This has materialised through, among others, a diffusion of practices and paradigms including international development assistance as well as increased alignment of political, economic ideology and systems (globalisation) (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2010; Karyeija, 2012). Shared concerns such as financial difficulties (for example, difficulties resulting from small

economic bases and/or socio-political strife) have further strengthened integration through joint re-evaluations of the role of public organisations across the globe (Andrews, 2013). These have highlighted, among other things, deficiencies in the utilisation of public resources. Increasingly, there has been a "borrowing" of ideas for public management from private enterprises (Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002).

The borrowing of ideas from private enterprises has, in turn, challenged the legitimacy and effectiveness of traditional forms of public administration involving hierarchy, authority, command and control (Boyne et al., 2010). The transfer of ideas from the private to the public realms has benefitted from the hegemony of the neo-liberal doctrine, advanced by the increased role of financial capital in defining policy globally. This has witnessed a diffusion of changes in public service organisations through *inter alia* increased policy advocacy, lesson drawing, imitation between polities, and the recognition of the role of individual actors (champions) of change (Common, 1998; Dunleavy, 1986). Collectively these changes have been variously been referred to as Public Sector/Service Reforms (PSR).

PSR have typically involved an array of measures aimed at promoting efficiency and effectiveness in public institutions. These measures have included regulation, innovation, human resource management practices, decentralisation etc. Efficiency and effectiveness respectively relate to the utilisation of available resources and the use of such resources to produce final outcomes. Literature posits that these can be attained by reorganising and reconfiguring the processes and functions of public services and responsible organisations (Fakir, 2007; Jessop, 1994; Rhodes, 1994). Globally, reforms have been implemented in different public sectors to varying extents with different results both within and across sectors and countries of focus.

This study examines one type of PSR in public policy delivery, civic engagement (CE). CE is selected as the main focus of the study because of its normative and practical ideals that have underwritten many of the other contemporary reform measures and their desired outcomes. On the one hand, CE's normative ideology argues for the "creation of an association of equal participants, with common interests, who agree to approximate a condition of equal burden, equal benefit, and the responsibilities and liabilities inherent" (Barnes and Brown, 2011, p. 174) in policy delivery. This resonates with improvements in public services to make them more inclusive and equitable. Thus, examining CE can be tantamount to an implicit examination of the concepts of plurality and distributive justice that underpin most contemporary public reforms.

On the other hand, the practical ideals of CE highlight the inseparability of policy delivery from governance. In essence, this is to acknowledge the roles and responsibilities of multiple stakeholders including the state, ordinary citizens, voluntary associations defining the governance landscape. This eclectic composition consists of relationships among actors

that require understanding in examining the influence they exert on policy delivery. This perspective suggests that policy delivery is both an activity and a product of the relationships between governing actors.

This study conceptualizes CE as a deliberate expansion of the participatory base in a public process designed to deliver collective outcomes through exploitation of diverse resources of participants. CE is one of the many levers used for addressing deficiencies in the public sector (Fung, 2006). It is used to account for shortfalls in public purpose, competence, resources, knowledge or elicit compliance and cooperation. CE in public policy helps assert the legitimacy of knowledge claims of ordinary people, redefining "expertise" that provide greater space for the experiences of those whose lives social policy affects (Gaventa, 1993).

A local authority area in Tanzania, Kawe Mzimuni in Kinondoni, provides the case study area for this study. The country is chosen principally for two reasons: it is a low-income developing country, and it has strong institutional commitment to PSRs and in particular partnerships in service provision such as CE (Teskey and Hooper, 1999; URT, 1991, 2002). This is demonstrated by its relative long history (spanning more than three decades) of implementing PSRs despite attaining mixed reform results. In response to sustained deteriorations in public services and revenue capacity in the late 1980s, Tanzania introduced a suite of PSRs including CE to a host of social sectors. Of these, only water and sanitation (WATSAN) has endured the longest implementation timeframe. This provides an interesting starting point in understanding how the various institutions and structures have influenced CE and managed to survive changes in the wider political environment. Context and Problem Statement

Globally, and specifically in Tanzania, policy delivery (for example, the provision of WATSAN) has traditionally been the preserve of public authorities. This monopoly of function has, however, come under considerable challenges in recent times. Over the past century, the world's population has tripled and its water consumption has increased six folds (UN-Water, 2018). Freshwater supplies have declined as a result of variations in precipitation and runoffs caused by climate variability, and contamination of sources due to improper sanitation, both undesirable by-products of increased human activities. There have been tensions within and across countries over WATSAN's access and use. At present, some 3.6 billion people are already living in potential water-scarce areas, with the figure projected to increase to some 4.8 – 5.7 billion by 2050 (UN-Water, 2018).. Increases in water use have put considerable strain on the ability of public institutions to respond effectively.

Public institutions have attempted to respond to these challenges with a series of measures aimed at improving public service performance mostly in the form of service reforms. These have among others included changes to organisational strategies and mechanisms. Ideas have been borrowed from private management to boost the efficiency and effectiveness of

public institutions using measures such as regulation, privatisation, cost recovery, strategic planning, and partnerships (Boyne et al., 2010). These measures have constituted most reform packages that have been widely adopted by countries across the world.

Internationally, efforts to influence WATSAN policies have been coordinated by various organs of the United Nations' (UN). Organs involved in these efforts include the:

- World Commission on Environment and Development popularly known as the Brundtland Commission which introduced the concept of sustainable development, a mechanism that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (United Nations, 1987, p. 23);
- International Conference on Environment and Development, popularly known as the Dublin Conference, which among others recommended a participatory approach to water development and management (essentially civic engagement), and the recognition of water as an economic good (Biswas et al., 1997);
- United Nations' Conferences on Environment and Development (conducted in 1992, 2002 and 2012);
- UN's Sustainable Development Summit which committed member states to improving the participation of local communities in the management of water and sanitation policies through goal number 6 which aims to ensure access to water and sanitation for all(United Nations, 2015).

Policy reforms in WATSAN in Tanzania have mirrored reforms witnessed in the global stage. Institutional content and processes have incorporated global principles and ideals. This has occurred through the ratification of international WATSAN codes and adaptation of international best practices. For example, there has been a revision of policy governing WATSAN to advocate for increased CE in provision, cost recovery, decentralisation of management functions, and a plan of action for integrated resource management (Doering, 2005; URT, 2002).

Administratively, prior to 1991, the government had been the sole actor in policy formulation and service provision in WATSAN in Tanzania. The involvement of the government had brought mixed results. On a positive note, public sanitation health campaigns such as the high profile *Mtu ni Afya*, succeeded in mobilising widespread construction of basic household latrines, which led to a relatively higher rates of coverage of such facilities compared with the situation elsewhere in the developing world (Water and Sanitation Program, 2011). On the other hand, free provision of water contributed to capital constraints and poor maintenance of infrastructure; inadequate planning further undermined expansion of service coverage.

Chronic underinvestment and short-term planning became symbolic features of public service in the sector during this period (Doering, 2005; Sokile et al., 2002). It is estimated that the cost of inadequate WATSAN in Tanzania during this time accounted for at least 1% of GDP (World Bank, 2012a). At present, it is estimated that the country loses about 0.3% of its GDP due to poor sanitation (Kumar, 2015).

Collectively influenced by the *Dublin* Conference, a decade long recession in the 1980s, and growing demand for WATSAN services, Tanzania began to explore sector reforms in WATSAN in earnest in 1991. The expansion of the participatory base has featured heavily in Tanzania's WATSAN reform toolkit. Widened participation has sought to pool resources to tackle high capital costs in the expansion of access, environmental sustainability of ecosystems, and mitigating adverse hydrological risks such as floods and droughts, and distributional equity (URT, 1991, 2002). The promise has been that improved WATSAN services would yield benefits spanning a panoply of social and economic spheres, from reductions in health risks and associated opportunity costs to improvements in productivity and returns to labour.

Yet, despite two full decades of reforms in WATSAN, there is mixed evidence of changes in policy delivery. On the one hand, regulatory frameworks (statutory laws, policies, and strategies) and institutions have been put in place. For example, there have been two new water policies, legislations on WATSAN (addressing water and sanitation health), numerous policy implementation strategies and programmes, and legislation for independent regulation. On the other hand, performance indicators related to coverage and utilisation of services show modest improvements in water supply and stagnations in sanitation. Between 1990 and 2012, sanitation coverage remained the same at around a quarter of the population while the overall coverage and capacity utilisation of available water supplies increased from 56% to 65% (NBS, 2014; URT, 2012ca; Water and Sanitation Program, 2011).

These mixed reform outcomes are indicative of a phenomenon recently referred to as *signalling* (Andrews, 2013, pp. 28-9). Signalling occurs when reforms are adopted principally to improve short-term external perceptions of government effectiveness (usually aimed at seeking financial support and political legitimacy, rather than improving long term results). From the perspective of reforms, the promotion of CE in the WATSAN remains notable for the absence of tangible policy targets which have affected how the public is engaged, resource allocation, performance monitoring and evaluation (URT, 2012ca). Along with wider reforms' performance, measures to broaden CE in WATSAN have also demonstrated mixed results. While CE in the forms of memberships in voluntary association and attendance of community meetings has been high, opinion surveys indicate that public satisfaction with the government's handling of WATSAN has

declined from 46% in 2002 to 34% in 2012 (for details see Figure 1.1below).



Figure 1.1: CE and public satisfaction with WATSAN in Tanzania

Source: Afrobarometer Surveys (2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012)

Some sources,(for example,URT (2012c)a, have associated such outcomes with the drying-off of water sources resulting from a drought in 2008/9 and a discontinuation of quick-win projects. Others sources, on the other hand, (for example van den Berg et al. (2009) contend that reforms are undermined by failures to establish a common understanding of engagement, definition of roles and responsibilities among actors, coordination of efforts, and the availability of necessary financial and technical resources.

1.3 The Research Process and Importance of the Study

A research process is a pathway that starts with an idea or a question employing a quantitative or qualitative method (or sometimes both, mixed methods) and it ends with a product, which is the research findings. The

study adopts an explanatory case study design to seek a deeper understanding of the institutional structures and processes influencing CE in WATSAN in Tanzania. The study employs an explanatory qualitative design in enquiry. The study is based on a purposive—snowball sampling of a range of key actors working in WATSAN in Tanzania. More specifically, data for the study were collected from central and local government actors, civil society organisations, development partners, regulatory and service providers, and domestic service users. A bulk of the data were collected through open-ended qualitative interviews conducted with these actors. The data were then transcribed, coded and analysed. That was followed by interpretation of results.

This study contributes to the discourse on PSRs by providing rich contextual data and testing some theoretical assumptions in the context of Tanzania that provide a deeper understanding of the institutional content and context necessary for successful implementation of PSRs in Tanzania. In specific terms, this study aspires to make a unique contribution to the following key areas:

a) to the PSRs literature by exploring the role of the historical antecedents in shaping the contextual environment for PSRs in Tanzania;

b) To the PSR literature and literature on historical institutions (HI) by adopting a sociological understanding of PSRs that caters for the presence of the informal (both normative and cultural cognitive) components of institutions;

c) To the PSR literature and literature on CE by exploring CE reforms as a process, thus focusing on how reform actors engage with formal and informal rules to attain reform objectives. This provides a deeper understanding of the political and practical

d) Complexities involved in the administration of CE.

The exploration of these issues will help us improve our knowledge about the political and practical complexities involved in the implementation of CE reforms in WATSAN, and will eventually improve our understanding about PSRs in WATSAN in Tanzania and similar contexts elsewhere. Findings from this research will also be of use for policymakers, practitioners and researchers at large.

1.4 Structure of the Book

In order to achieve the research aim and objectives, this book is structured as follows. Chapter Two gives an overview of the existing PSRs and CE literatures, and provides the theoretical directions for this research. In the main, the chapter presents an overview of PSRs, provides a brief overview of the existing CE literature, and concentrates on the rationale and utility of CE. The chapter then concludes with a conceptual framework for organising the research findings. Presented in Chapter Three are the design,

nature and structure of the research process. The chapter discusses the research strategy (i.e. the selection of research methods, sampling technique, the data collection process, and the analysis process).

In Chapter Four, detailed findings are structured and organised in light of each research objective. The Chapter also presents documentary analysis of the evolution of Tanzania's public service reforms in WATSAN. This historical context informs the examination of the institutional structures and processes for CE in WATSAN. This historical perspective complements the interrogation of research objectives 1 and 2. Grounded in research objective one, Chapter Five examines the institutional structure and processes influencing civic engagement in WATSAN. The chapter builds on the historical foundations from the preceding chapter to explore how rule ambiguities shape the institutionalisation of civic engagement in a reform environment. Grounded in research objective 2, Chapter Six examines the influence of CE in service provision in WATSAN. The chapter consolidates the empirical and theoretical foundations of its predecessors in highlighting the payoffs from the application of institutional rules on civic engagement. Collectively, these three chapters complement each other in providing a rich account of the role of civic engagement in WATSAN.

All three analytical chapters (4, 5 and 6) have concluding sections at the end. The concluding sections provide a summary of the discussion and link the main findings of the chapters to relevant research questions. Finally, chapter 7 sets out the conclusions of this research and the contribution that it makes to the PSRs, CE and historical institutional analysis literature. The chapter presents key findings in relation to the research contributions to literature and theory and concludes by suggesting policy implications and their feasibility, and avenues for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter seeks to develop a theoretical basis for understanding the institutional framework for civic engagement and the influence of civic engagement (CE) on WATSAN service provision. Throughout this study, institutions are understood to refer to formal organisations and rules, customary practices and compliance procedures that enable and constrain interactions between individuals in a polity (Hall, 1992; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Public service reforms (PSRs) that underpin the adoption of CE are discussed in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 interrogates the literature on CE and its utility in PSR. Section 2.3 explores the influences of CE on service delivery. Finally, section 2.4 combines the reviewed theoretical insights into a conceptual framework for organising the findings of this study.

2.1 Public Service Reforms

PSRs correspond to changes in institutional arrangements and practices aimed at improving the performance of public services (Prasad, 2007; Teskey and Hooper, 1999). They do so by enhancing the capacity, efficiency, integrity, or responsiveness of the functions of public institutions. Performance relates to "perceptions of actual and desired standards of public services"(Boyne, 2003, p. 223). Desired standards of performance reflect normative aspirations of what public services ought to be and/or how they ought to be delivered. These are constructed (socially and/or objectively) based on rational calculations and forecasts (Kravchuk and Schack, 1996), actual observations (Bana and Shitindi, 2009), as well as lesson drawing and imitation (Bana and Ngware, 2006; Common, 1998). Standards provide the public service with incentives for their attainment (Andrews, 2013), and act as benchmarks (hypothetical or otherwise) against which performance is monitored and evaluated. In so doing, standards structure performance regimes (Talbot, 2010), albeit by prescribing minimum rather than maximum requirements. Performance regimes relate to institutional context and nature of organisational conduct in which public actors (individuals or composite) operate (Talbot, 2010). One important dimension of PSRs is to seek to enshrine these standards and expectations in public institutions.

Public institutions refer to any entities that influence the execution of public functions (World Bank, 2000). Public institutions include formal organisations and regulatory means (for example policy, laws, strategies) that serve to effect outcomes in a variety of public sectors and systems such as economies, social, legal, and administrative matters. However, this understanding of institutions limits the focus to formal organisations, and offers precious few insights into the actual practices and representations

(some of which maybe informal) that constitute the delivery of public services.

PSRs are enacted in response to, or to pre-empt deficiencies (actual, imagined or politically expedient) in the performance of public institutions (Andrews, 2013). The different ways in which deficiencies are conceived in part reflect the difficulties associated with measuring or assessing public service performance (Talbot, 2010). Performance is often measurable (either objectively or subjectively) and is manifested in three key dimensions (Boyne et al., 2010): outcomes, outputs and processes.

- Outcomes: Outcomes are predicated on the assumption that public services exist to serve long term goals. In this dimension, improvements in performance are made if an intervention (a policy, programme, project, law etc.) leads to the more satisfactory attainment of the service's defined goals within a reasonable time frame. In the case of WATSAN, for instance, a typical service goal might be to raise a community's sanitation standards, in which instances of improvement may then be evaluated on the basis of community's indicators of waterborne morbidity and mortality.
- Outputs: Outputs include tangible changes in a service's quality, quantity, or efficiency of provision. In WATSAN, for instance, output measures may range from the number of functioning water-points in a locality and the volume of sewage processed within a specific timeframe, to the monthly frequency of waste collection from households.
- Processes: Processes include the internal processes and practices of service providers. Changes in public services are as much a result of capital inputs as they are of the mechanisms used to procure them. This dimension of performance is often exercised by regulatory agencies whose work is based on normative assumptions regarding the application of procedure (including the definition and set of benchmarks or standards). "There is typically a right way of doing things and … the adoption of best practice leads to improvement in outputs and outcomes" (Boyne et al., 2010, p.4).

However, attempts to measure performance can be flawed and distortionary (Pollitt, 2013; Schiavo-Campo and McFerson, 2014) with reference to the salience of the dimension of focus, the complexity of the public service, nature of services etc.

PSRs often target multiple dimensions of public service performance, and employ an array of tools (levers or mechanisms) to help fulfil their mission(s) from regulation and strategic planning to innovation and partnerships. Each of these contributes differently to public services. Regulation, for instance, may help by defining rights and standards thereby shaping the conduct of actors in service (Martin, 2010). While Strategic Planning may provide clarity regarding directions of desired change and

linkages between goals, targets, and resources (Boyne, 2010), innovation may introduce procedures that modify practices in the service (Walker, 2010). Irrespective of their form or nature, PSR strategies seek to change two major features of public institutions: their functions and roles in society (what they do), and modalities thereof (how functions and roles are carried out) (Therkildsen, 2008).

2.1.1 The Motivation for Reforms

SRs are motivated by rational and isomorphic reasons (Ashworth et al., 2009). Rational change is one primarily concerned with substantive improvements in institutional performance, for example the effectiveness or efficiency of service delivery. This often headlines the enactment of PSRs (Boyne et al., 2010). The assumption that PSRs result in improved public service performance provides the theoretical base for this study (URT, 2002). The literature suggests limited evidence of both the appetite for and actual evidence of performance improvements as a result of PSRs (Peters and Pierre, 2016; Pollitt, 2015). PSRs are inherently political. They are informed by and involve the (re)distribution of political rents such as power and authority (Pierson, 2015). That makes them susceptible to manipulation and contestations affecting how they are applied in practice (Durant, 2008; Pollitt, 2013).

Isomorphism refers to changes that produce institutions with similar or acceptable characteristics to other constructs (logics or actors) within the greater institutional field/environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell, 2007). It occurs when PSR actors are primarily driven by the need for greater conformity to expectations held by others rather than improved performance, even though the two may not be mutually exclusive. Ashworth et al. (2009) contend that conformity enhances the legitimacy of an institution within its environment by making it less different from others. Legitimate institutions in turn enjoy greater support from the institutional environment, and as a consequence, tend to be more stable and effective. For example, most democratic policies are formulated in a fairly standard manner which involves consultations with political actors, standardised language, and formats. Such procedures are helpful in garnering acceptance from political backers. The likelihood of isomorphic change is positively conditioned by how dependent an individual institution is on its external field/environment (Andrews, 2013).

Isomorphic PSRs are often the result of three composite mechanisms: coercive, mimetic, and normative (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Coercive pressures commonly include force, persuasions, or invitations to engage in collusive behaviour. They constitute the most overt and direct forms of isomorphic pressures and are evident in most contemporary policy practices such as international laws, good/standard practices, policies, and treaties. Examples of coercive mechanisms include the codifying of civic engagement in the laws and practices governing WATSAN. Mimicry, the second mechanism, is commonly applied to address uncertainty within a

field particularly in situations when there is a lack of clarity between institutional practices and outcomes. It focuses on the influence of desirable practices in shaping expectations about the merits of institutional change. In the context of this study, mimetic forces may include the very adoption of civic engagement as an instrument of policy delivery. Ashworth et al. (2009) associate mimetic pressures with the diffusion of various public service improvement practices not supported by clear empirical evidence of their effectiveness. Normative mechanisms capture the influence of externally legitimated groups such as professional communities and standards on the appropriateness of institutions (Delbridge and Edwards, 2008; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These depend on the legitimacy of formal education and cognitive bases as well as the presumed integrity of professional associations in defining and upholding desired ethos of institutions. Examples of normative forces in the context of this study include the recruitment of professionally trained community development officers to oversee civic engagement in WATSAN and the application of regulatory standards in service.

2.1.2 How Public Service Reforms Occur

PSRs are inherently stimulus driven and they are motivated by factors and contexts external or internal to their domain of focus. This study finds sociological theories of knowledge, agency and structure relevant to the institutional analysis of reforms. A number of authors (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 1984) contend that, over time, institutional change (and hence PSRs) occurs as a result of actions of individuals and organisations This is because institutions are social constructs that "owe their survival to relatively self-activating processes" (Jepperson, 1991, p. 145) which depend on the active involvement of institutional actors.

Public service institutions are subject to both exogenous and endogenous pressures for change (Delbridge and Edwards, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2008). Exogenous pressures are pressures external to the institution which undermine existing institutional logics and create uncertainty (Meyer et al., 1990). Their principal focus is on structure: the regulative, normative and cultural cognitive constructs that shape interactions (see Box 2.1, below). Exogenous factors also create conditions ripe for abrupt shifts in structures, similar to what various authors refer to as "critical junctures" (Capoccia, 2015, 2016; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007), in which dominant practices are exposed to competing logics or unfavourable conditions. These challenge the validity of the dominant taken for granted practices that structure interactions thereby destabilising their authority and legitimacy among institutional actors. In other words, shocks have the potential to alter the rules of the game.

Box 2.1: The Structure of Public Institutions

Sociologist William Richard Scott argues that public institutions are embedded in their social environment with profound consequences on their composition (2013a). Social embeddedness incorporates normative and cultural-cognitive elements to the regulative structures of public institutions. These elements encapsulate various codified and non-codified mechanisms that inform and elicit conformity in society.

Cultural cognitive measures, for example, structure the modes of communications among individuals (Powell, 2007; Scott, 2013a). They are typically reflected in ideologies and scripts that underpin social groups and beliefs such as religion, nationality, and language (Andrews, 2013). These provide a template for interpreting the institutional environment, as well as receiving, processing and giving meaning to information.

Normative elements, on the other hand, include norms and values inherent in an individual's society. These elements define and set the parameters of social appropriateness and acceptability. Normative elements influence the behaviour of individuals by evoking feelings of honour or shame in response to the course of action pursued or contemplated, relative to established social values. Normative elements exert an intrinsic effect on individuals.

Collectively, these elements are the logics that structure behaviour and performance of public institutions (Scott, 2013a). That is, a law or policy on its own is not an institution. Their institutional value is derived from the collective influence of the different effects they have on the behaviour of an individual. Therefore, for a law or a policy to be an institution, an operational platform made up of normative and cultural-cognitive elements must exist to allow regulative devices to operate. This would typically entail moral and social codes on the appropriateness of the subject matter being addressed by the law or policy for example, the acceptance that a certain course of action is right or wrong and the volition by relevant actors to uphold the law or policy.

Exogenous shocks range from externally imposed or imported interpretive frames (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)(social, technological, and regulatory revolutions)(Greenwood et al., 2002) to economic crises and diffusion of ideology (Andrews, 2013). As highlighted in Chapter One, the diffuse influence of exogenous sources on WATSAN institutions in Tanzania, for example, includes international conventions such as the Dublin Principles.

Endogenous analyses of PSRs focus on the role of compliance and agency in explaining institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Compliance refers to the increased compatibility of institutions with their environmental characteristics (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Agency relates to attempts by individuals to "create, transform, or disrupt institutions" (Lawrence, 2008, p. 181). Compliance entails the adherence of

conduct by individual actors to institutional structures (both formal and informal). However, compliance is not a guaranteed trait of institutional actors as public service institutions consist of unevenly empowered actors (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Power relates to the capability to exercise agency based on command of the requisite resources. Power shapes the preferences and motivations of actors (Pierson, 2004, 2015). Differently motivated actors respond differently to the same institutional rules (Sheingate, 2010). This variability of actors' responses can undermine the validity of existing institutional rules. This may, in fact, have a domino effect on the behaviour of other actors, further entrenching ambiguity in the way rules are supposed to be implemented.

Public institutions are "fraught with tensions because they inevitably raise resource considerations and invariably have distributional consequences" (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 8). The distributional consequences of public institutions manifest from their empowering and constraining functions which alter the range of alternative preferences available to actors (Leblebici et al., 1991). Public institutions distribute resources to meet a finite set of preferences, often prescribed in their budgets or implementation plans. Public resources are often limited, exemplified by budgetary caps in spending. Consequently, distribution tends to be made on increasingly diminishing basis because of the multiplicity of actors with claims on the same resources. This is a source of tensions because it provides different actors with different incentives in interactions. Institutional tensions occur when actors attempt to act rationally and maximise their gains from interactions. The fact that there will be winners and losers incentivizes social actors to exercise the power differentially available to them. Actors then behave strategically in ways that benefit them individually, either in consolidation or in redressing the status quo. This can lead to institutional ambiguity where actors interpret and implement the same institutional rules differently relative to their diverse behavioural strategies. This further exacerbates tensions within institutions as divergent action leads to conflict over scarce institutional resources (Leblebici et al., 1991).

The coexistence of winners and losers within existing institutions suggests that PSRs involving institutional changes are not straightforward. Actors who benefit from existing institutional arrangements maybe less inclined to change the status quo than those marginalised. As noted by Oliver (1992), divergent preferences expose the weaknesses of distributive structures eroding the legitimacy of extant institutional logics. This in turn creates spaces for PSR as institutional actors become receptive to alternative institutional logics. Alternative institutional logics can involve either new institutional logics (for example new rules, practices, or even actors) or different interpretations of existing logics (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). PSR logics may themselves also be the product of tensions resulting from the imbalance of power (and distribution of resources). They may be the unintended outcome of conflict among groups or the result of ambiguous

compromises among actors that coordinate the construction of alternative (new) institutional logics irrespective of their preferences (Palier, 2005).

The extent to which exogenous or endogenous factors are able to influence PSRs depends on four main characteristics of public institutions (drawing on Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, pp. 11-14): a) rule precision, b) cognitive limits of institutional actors, c) implicit social embeddedness of institutions, and d) dichotomy of institutional actors. These characteristics affect how public institutions distribute resources (and power) with consequences on agency. Given below is a brief description of the four characteristics:

a) Rule precision refers to the observation that institutional rules can never be precise enough to address the complexities of all possible real-world simulations and that creates space for agency and creativity. Rule ambiguity facilitates their exploitation by self-interested institutional actors in ways that distort the allocation of power by public institutions. For example, ambiguity over the principle of cost-sharing may create uncertainty over fairness, expectations of quality, and even identity of public services;

b) Cognitive limits of institutional actors indicate that public servants are only human and often encounter difficulties in processing information and anticipate all possible future situations to which present rules would be applied.

c) Social embeddedness of institutions is a view that demonstrates public institutions are replete with divergent understandings of rules and (assumptions thereof) which affect how they interact with actors. For example, the issue of variable lengths of sentences by magistrates for similar crimes may affect evaluation of the judiciary by multiple constituencies.

d) The characteristics of dichotomy of institutional actors imply that rules are often implemented by actors other than their designers and this exacerbates the implementation gap. For example, the separation of the bureaucracy from policy making may result in outcomes incongruent with the original policy intentions.

Faced with pressure to reform, actors in public institutions behave strategically relative to perceptions of the effect of reforms on their preferences. Actors may exercise agency in one of the following ways: acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy, or manipulate (for details see Table 2.1, below).

Table 2.1: Strategic responses to reform pressure

Form of action	Tactics	Examples
Acquiesce	Habit	Unconscious adherence to requirements and content of reforms
	Imitate	Conscious and unconscious copying of acceptable or best practices
	Comply	Conscious adoption of or conformity with reforms
Compromise	Balance	Accommodation of reforms with extant logics in search of parity
	Pacify	Partial conformity with reforms
	Bargain	Negotiations over features of reforms
Avoid	Conceal	Disguise non-conformity
	Buffer	Partial revision of conduct to deflect reform pressure
	Escape	Changing goals, activities or domains. Includes relinquishing of power
Defy	Dismiss	Implicit ignorance of reforms
	Challenge	Contesting the contents and requirements of reform elements
	Attack	Explicitly confront sources of reforms or pressures thereof
Manipulate	Co-opt	Exploitative importation of influential reform constituents
	Influence	Strategic reinterpretation and enactment of reforms
	Control	Exercise of power and dominance over reform process

Source: Adapted from Oliver (1991). This framework has been extensively applied over the years to examine agentic responses to institutional action and change in a variety of settings. For more recent demonstrations see: Zhu's examination of network participation and local support for US health reforms (Zhu, 2016), Auld and Cashore's (2013) assessment of non-state market driven governance in the Canadian export industry, Batley and Rose's (2011) analysis of collaboration between state and non-state service providers in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, Cristofoli et.al's (2011) examination of the roles of external endorsement and leadership in Italy's civil service reforms; Ashworth (2009) assessment of institutional conformity in public organisations in England etc.

The type of agency exercised by institutional actors may lead to externalities which introduce third party actors to the institution further distorting the balance of power. Such exercise, may for example, involve petitioning of changes to institutional arrangements by pressure groups which create roles for the state or fifth column in enforcing or changing the status quo. The activities of individuals and organisations in reforms amount to what several authors refer to as *institutional entrepreneurship*(Battilana, 2006; Beckert, 1999; DiMaggio, 1988; Leca et al., 2008). DiMaggio(1988) defines institutional entrepreneurship as the process through which actors with an interest in particular institutional arrangements mobilise resources to create new institutions or transform existing ones.

The success of PSRs depends among other factors, on the relative influence(Lawrence, 2008) and legitimacy(Andrews, 2013) of institutional actions and the actors carrying them out. Influence in this instance facilitates the procurement of a course of action that would have not been possible in the absence of reforms (Clegg, 1989). Influence can be exercised in a variety of ways including negotiations, exchanges, rational persuasion, and ingratiation (Clegg, 1989; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Institutions deposit distinctive advantages on some individuals and deny them to others, establishing contexts and arenas for influence. Influence can thus help mobilise resistance or support to reforms through exploitation of the very power asymmetries that give rise to them. Similarly, institutional definitions of, and restrictions on what is legitimate or not reinforce power asymmetries in society. For example, the apportioning of powers related to the maintenance of social order to state apparatuses provides demarcations for the roles and responsibilities of various social actors and the appropriateness of their actions.

The legitimacy of PSRs may create openings for the participation of actors beyond the immediate public service (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Known as *boundary spanners* (Peters, 2013; Williams, 2012), these actors facilitate interactions by coordinating actions that face opposition from more powerful institutional actors. These actors are commonly found on the periphery of interacting institutions or inhabiting different institutions within the same institutional environment. Such actors are less embedded and constrained by extant institutional logics than others (Andrews, 2013). These actors may contribute to change by forming coalitions with institutional entrepreneurs through the provision of both material and cognitive resources, as well as conferring legitimacy to their actions. Collectively, these change actors exert pressure on existing institutional arrangements (including actors indifferent or opposed to change) to engage with alternative logics. Boundary spanners facilitate change by: being open to exposure to alternative logics; interrogating the legitimacy of status quo vis-à-vis the proposed alternatives and communicating alternative logics with other institutional actors.

2.1.3 Forms of Public Service Reforms

PSRs are the resulting equilibria of the multiple responses, influences and resources expended by institutional actors. While on the surface, PSRs are defined by impressive labels connoting change, underneath PSRs, much like the public institutions they seek to change, often reflect "political legacies of concrete historical struggles" (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 7). That is, they consist of the relative contributions of—and occasionally conflict among—the differentially motivated actors. Thus, while the adoption of PSR reflects the influence and legitimacy of the winning coalition, their actual content may also be informed by the strategic responses of the losing coalition as per Table 2.1, above. Mahoney and Thelen (2010, pp. 15-6) distil that sources of institutional changes can be of four types known as displacement, layering, drift and conversion, which are described below briefly.

- Displacement involves the complete removal of extant public institutions and their replacement with new ones;
- Layering has to do with introduction of new logics alongside or on top of existing ones. For example, amendments and revisions to policies, laws, organisations etc.;
- Drift relates to changes in the impact of existing public institutions owing to changes in the environment, often due to institutional slippage. May occur as the result of successful challenges to reforms through avoid or defy which while maintains the status-quo fails to uphold its integrity or legitimacy, and;
- Conversion involves changes in the interpretation of existing logics as a result of strategic redeployment. Each type of change is representative of the inherent power of institutional entrepreneurs.

Displacement is the most preferred mode of change for actors marginalised by extant logics (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Attempts to displace dominant logics often face strong challenges from dominant and powerful actors because of their likely distributional consequences. Therefore, these often rely on the catalytic effects of external jolts which delegitimises extant logics and/or coalitions among weak marginal actors (including boundary spanners). On the other hand, layering is most common when entrepreneurs lack the capacity to actually change extant logics and instead work within the existing institutions. Layering occurs when defenders of the status quo are able to preserve the extant logics but at the same time are unable to prevent the introduction of parallel structures, amendments or modifications (see Falleti, 2010). Drift, the third type of change, is associated with instances in which institutional actors choose not to respond to changes in their environment which subsequently affects the impact of extant logics (see Onoma, 2010). Finally, conversion occurs when institutional actors exploit ambiguities in the gap between rule design and implementation to transform institutional goals, functions, and

purposes (see Sheingate, 2010). Conversion is the result of creative (re)interpretation of rules that alters their impact without affecting their literal form.

In light of the literature reviewed above, this study acknowledges that the capacity for CE maybe influenced by the complex relationship between public service institutions, actors and their interests. Elements of this relationship analysed above, for example institutional characteristics, entrepreneurship, strategic responses and source of institutional outcomes, will be employed to examine the institutional framework for CE and the latter's influence on service delivery.

2.2 Civic Engagement

This study is premised on the understanding of civic engagement (CE) as a feature (element or tool) of public service reforms (URT, 2002). As noted in Chapter One, CE is defined as a deliberate expansion of the participatory base in a public process designed to deliver collective outcomes through exploitation of diverse resources of participants. That is done in recognition of Grindle and Thomas (1991) assertion that CE acts as a medium that exposes "policy spaces" to alternative understandings of policy issues, actors and with it alterative solutions. This occurs as CE extends the policy realm to qualitatively diverse actors hitherto excluded from policy circles. The key contribution of CE to policy lies in the tapestry of the different resources (informational, material, and social as well as others) that multiple actors summon in response to a policy issue. Yet, because of the very diversity of polity, particularly with respect to individuals' interests and resources or a lack of thereof, CE often inevitably involves contestations about the location and distribution of power in polity (Cornwall et al., 2011; Miraftab, 2004). Power relates to the capability to exercise agency based on command of the requisite resources (Ibid p.19). Consequently, considerations of power (and distribution thereof) are central to how CE facilitates the inclusion or exclusion of populations in polity.

The adoption of CE in most public service reforms (PSR) stems from its use as a means for achieving empowerment and efficiency in policy (Dagnino, 2007), which complements the latter's agenda. The normative complementarity (and appeal) of CE in reforms is two-fold. Firstly, as a tool of empowerment, CE helps distribute resources and responsibilities to community actors on the periphery of policy circles (Cornwall et al., 2011; Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001). Secondly, the emphasis on cost reduction driven by the infusion of NPM's principles in most reform processes gives primacy to CE as tool of efficiency. This is based on assumptions of having perfect information about the needs and wants of policy stakeholders, to coordinate the allocation of resources and efforts accordingly. CE helps tailor services and efforts to local circumstances that over the long term leads to more efficient use of resources—produces more results per unit expended. The efficiency dimension of CE sees it as a short-term investment in return for substantial long-term gains. The promotion of

efficiency gains through CE has been criticised by some for reinforcing power cleavages within polity. Critics such as Dill (2009) and Needham (2008), for example, observe that efficiency considerations of CE affect the relationship between users and public services. Attempts to use CE to reduce costs, transforms service users from citizens to consumers. These subsequently affect: i) social solidarity—as concerns for individual benefits (preferences) assume primacy over collective objectives (see also, World Bank, 2003); ii) equitable distribution of services as efficiency concerns elevate the role of the market which then limits the inclusion of civil actors in service to those with the most knowledge or materially wealthy at the expense of the poor or illiterate.

CE's ability to mobilise civic actors can provide economic and organisational savings to policymakers (Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012; Bovaird, 2007; Joshi and Moore, 2004). Cornwall (2002) suggests that there are two main ways in which the mobilisation of actors for CE occurs by invitation or invention (or self/organic).

i. CE by invitation

This occurs when powerful external actors (for example, state authorities, supra national organisations, international non-governmental organisations) define and extend the application of rules of CE to previously excluded community actors (Cornwall, 2002). These rules prescribe the eligibility of who participates and when; how they participate; the scope of one's participation and ultimately, the collective outcome sought from CE. Such rules are tantamount to personal spaces into which community actors are "invited" to enter by virtue of meeting the criteria or objectives set and sought by these external proprietors. Some scholars (for example, Cornwall and Gaventa (2001); Gaventa (1993) associate this form of CE with historical organisation of polity that bequeaths some actors at the expense of others. Invited CE spaces are perhaps some of the most recognisable avenues for inclusion, materialising in various guises including governance boards, service oversight committees, scheduled meetings. Their popularity in practice lies with their relative ease of setup, legal legitimacy, and potential for preservation of existing power structures (Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall and Coelho, 2007; Cornwall et al., 2011).

Invited mobilisation is seen as a straightforward mode of engagement as it is based on assumptions of organisers having sufficient resources—material and non-material (including the ability to enforce legal rules on CE)—to facilitate CE (Miraftab, 2004). The lack of locally defined rules often renders invited CE immutable and that adversely affects perceptions about the latter. For some (for (example, Dagnino (2007);Miraftab (2004), invited CE is synonymous with tokenistic (Arnstein, 1969) and other forms of nominal (White, 1996) engagement, existing to serve individual

or group purposes rather local common objectives. Yet, others such as Cornwall (2002) and Cornwall and Coelho (2007) contend that invited CE can be utilised as a springboard by community and other marginalised actors to attain outcomes beyond those stated in their invitation scripts. For these authors, the mere availability of legitimated platforms of engagement is demonstrative of the preparedness of powerful elite to countenance changes to extant power structures. Consequently, they assert that the onus is on the invited participants to turn invited CE spaces into "sites of radical possibilities" (Cornwall, 2002, p. 3)—i.e. to leverage their engagement to meet their desired needs. Recent advances in institutional change theory (Hacker et al., 2015; Gingrich, 2015) offer insights on how invited actors can change CE infrastructures not of their own making for purposes of their own.

ii. CE through the invention of space

This relates to self-mobilisation of civic actors in pursuit of a collective objective on the basis of shared commonalities (Cornwall, 2002). Self-mobilisation is generally considered the epitome of civic engagement because actor interactions are assumed to be defined, set and enforced by free-willed individuals rather than the influence of external actors (White, 1996). The absence of external actors in invented CE enables civil actors to act on own interests leading to outcomes that are better equipped to challenge dominant power structures in a polity than in invited CE (Miraftab, 2004). As civil actors exercise independence in their desires to engage, CE of such type is said to occur organically (Cornwall, 2002). Yet, the very commonalities—for example ideology, policy issues, identity—around which self-mobilising actors converge, constraints and enables their behaviours. Institutional theory suggests that common identities are themselves not value free (Schmidt, 2011; Scott, 2013b). They carry ideas, values and ideals that are reflective of the characteristics of wider institutional environments within polity that may include non-civil actors.

The normative promise of CE renders its utility relevant to several of the PSR strategies mentioned on Table 2.1 above. In addition, CE can exist as a standalone reform strategy because of its potential as a platform for synergistic exploitation of resources and virtues of other PSR tools. For example, by empowering the citizenry, CE can influence strategic planning, innovation and regulation.

As a mechanism of PSR, CE encapsulates several activities involving the citizenry aimed at realising the goals of reforms. In other words, CE mirrors the exercise of agency among actors making up and affected by public service institutions. The agency of individuals can partly be thought of in terms of their motivations to engage with others. Agency can be

explained in terms of an actor's: a) general incentives (Olson, 1965; Pattie et al., 2003), b) social capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993, 2000); and c) civic voluntarism (Awortwi, 2012; Pattie et al., 2003). These factors influence decision making with consequences for the type of agency (see Table 2.1, above) and subsequently outcomes (payoffs) from engaging in PSRs. Given below is brief descriptions of these three factors (general incentives, social capital and civic voluntarism):

a) General incentives relate to a rational choice analysis of individual behaviour. It argues that decision making about CE depends on its relative costs and benefits, which in turn embody individual expressive attachments and social norms (i.e. the appraisal of costs and benefits from the perspective of the individual decision maker, which depends on these institutional/social factors). Rational actors therefore rely on well-defined incentives for decision making. CE is more likely when actors: feel the benefits outweigh the costs; have a greater feeling of attachment to a group or cause being pursued (a sense of moral duty); and enjoy a shared understanding of CE with those around them. The general/rational incentives model emphasizes on the elevated role of an individual in collective decision making. While this is plausible, general application of rational reasoning is, however, built on a set of profound assumptions which discount the effects of: bounded rationality. In other words, the ability of individuals to make optimal decisions is limited by the information they have, their cognitive limitations, and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision (see Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002; Simon, 1991). Temporal behavioural consistency (also known as dynamic inconsistency) also contends that a decision maker's preferences change over time in such a way that a preference at one point in time is inconsistent with a preference at another point in time (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977).

b) Social capital emphasises the role of relationships among individuals forming a collective network/group. Putnam (2000) argues that CE is underpinned by inherent linkages between individuals which allow them to define and locate their own preferences in a manner consistent with the common attributes of those they associate with. Social capital is collectively used to describe the processes and products of change in the relations among individuals which influence actions and behaviour (Coleman, 1988). It is generally associated with the structure of relations among actors (Coleman, 1988), connections and networks among organisations and individuals (Kapucu, 2011) which are self-replicating and consist of shared trust, norms and values (Hyman, 2002; Kahne et al., 2006). Trust acts as an incentive in identifying common ground and attracting involvement in matters previously external to an individual. It provides guarantees that efforts exerted

by anyone individual will be matched by another individual in the group. In the process, free riding is eliminated and any adverse outcomes such as sanctions and reprisals will be shared equally by all in the group.

c) Civic voluntarism underscores the importance of resources in CE (Pattie et al., 2003). Resources include time (including the scheduling CE activities) and perceived ability (power) to influence outcomes as well as mobilise support. An individual's propensity to engage in collective action increases with their personal income or wealth, education and social class (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). Similarly, (Awortwi (2012))demonstrates the positive contribution of wealth indicators such as household incomes and housing status on community action and management.

Institutional perspectives risk being relatively structural and deterministic (Schmidt, 2011). This analysis explores the theories above to explain the determinants of CE that provide a more flexible micro-level explanation for observed behaviours of actors in the PSR process.

2.3 The Influence of Civic Engagement on Service Delivery

The large and growing literature on CE explores many effects of the concept on service delivery. This study builds on the perverse confluence of CE (Dagnino, 2007). Exploring the concept, Cornwall (2008) alludes to two ways in which CE is used to promote efficiency and empowerment in policy by enhancing the institutional capacity to deliver services, and by improving accountability of institutional actors (both providers and consumers). Institutional capacity and accountability are closely related concepts and they are discussed in detail below.

2.3.1 Institutional Capacity

Institutional capacity refers to the ability of institutional actors to apply and implement policy within the spaces and over populations they legitimately govern (Vom Hau, 2012). The literature on institutional capacity is often dominated by discussions about the capabilities of the state given its historical dominance over policy. The importance of institutional capacity to PSRs is framed by the salience of interactions between institutional actors it constructs, manages, and maintains (Soifer and vom Hau, 2008). These interactions in turn give rise to institutional feedbacks which define roles, powers and indeed the legitimacy (support) of reforms. The capacity of any single actor can vary within a polity with consequences on its interactions with others, and depending on its position/power, institutional outcomes (Herbst, 2014). This study focuses on capacity of state actors in WATSAN given their relative ownership of the resources necessary for policy delivery.

States with the capacity to enforce the rule of law, set clear rules of engagement for civil society and promote sound public policy have proven

to supply an appropriate environment for civic engagement (Reuben, 2003). A clarity of institutional rules on CE creates socially conscious citizens who increase the supply of alternative rulers and lower the costs of political participation (Dagnino, 2007). As they become more empowered through learning and engage in repeated interactions with the state or mobilisation of resources, citizens exercise agency. Similarly, reciprocal measures from the state are required for the partnerships that are forged in the process to endure. The role of CE in augmenting state capacity can range from cost sharing in service provision and wilful compliance with policy and legislation, to holding the administrative bureaucracy accountable (Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). These provide incentives for policymakers to commit close to the socially optimal level of spending on public services (Lake and Baum, 2001).

The level and strength of civic engagement is central to influencing state capacity. Weak civic engagement may serve to strengthen policy apathy, which in turn reduces direct political competition for policy makers and in the process removes incentives for socially optimal decision making. Hanson (2014)Ineffective civic engagement may make policymakers, argues Hanson, not accountable to those who need services the most, thereby only serving to weaken the lines of social accountability (2014). The inability of policymakers to ensure effective delivery of public services can have adverse consequences on their incentives. As argued in Keefer (2008), particularistic policies may arise in such scenarios where policymakers cannot make credible promises. For civic engagement to promote improvements in social services, citizens must be able to observe the effects of the incumbent's policy decisions and act in ways that communicate the potential consequences of deviant behaviours.

Research on civic engagement and state capacity principally focuses on democratic political engagement (BÄCk and Hadenius, 2008; Vom Hau, 2012; Hanson, 2014). In such cases however, avenues for engagement outside the political arena are mostly limited through a combination of the periodicity of elections; constitutional provisions for recall of elected officials; and increasing voter apathy (largely in the developed world). Thus, little is known of how civic engagement affects the capacity of the state in the delivery of social services. Cognizant of this lacuna, the present study hopes to fill this gap by examining how civic engagement influences the state's institutional capacity and service delivery.

2.3.2 Accountability

Accountability in public institutions can be thought of as the extent to which institutional actors are responsive to the legitimate interests of those affected by organisational decisions, actions, and practices (Considine, 2002). Responsiveness includes the duty of care, the exercise of authority, conformity with ethics, standards, and expectations in the delivery of services. Responsiveness has also to do with the preparedness by decision making actors to justify their conduct and accept sanctions when such

justification is found lacking (World Bank, 2003). Cornwall (2008a) argues that civic engagement facilitates social accountability— the involvement of the citizenry in the monitoring and oversight of public policies. This occurs as increased interaction between institutional actors opens channels of communications, which allow expressions of public opinion on the way services are delivered, and institutional feedback on delivery (including requirements for resource contribution and compliance to institutional logics on service delivery).

Accountability can either be horizontal or vertical (Considine, 2002). Horizontal accountability occurs when the powers of oversight are distributed among collaborators, partners, co-producers of public services (Howard and Phillips, 2012, p. 4). Traditionally, horizontal accountability entails interpersonal or inter-institutional relationships. These facilitate sharing of mutual goals and a coalescing of interests among diverse actors. These, in turn, catalyse conformity with collective behaviour. This typically occurs through self-regulation of sectors and institutions, mutual communication, professional and other collective institutional logics that promote conformity. Vertical accountability appeals to the normative virtues of democracy which ascribe the powers of agency to social actors in determining how public institutions operate (Cornwall et al., 2011). In the absence of hierarchy, vertical accountability relies on partnerships such as ones promoted by civic engagement to function. The idea is that citizens can exercise agency directly in their dealings with public service providers through various forms of strategic responses (see Oliver (1991)). Citizens exercising of their agency are often based on their assessment of payoffs relative to prevalent logics (for example, expectations, desires or statutory prescriptions. Such responses often materialise as voice and/or the adoption of actions or behaviours that are either resistant to or supportive of institutional payoffs (Hirschman, 1970; World Bank, 2003). Civic exercise of accountability is often exemplified by popular advocacy, protests, consumer surveys, expenditure tracking, complaints, and other service-oriented action by interest groups.

Recent literature on institutional accountability suggests the presence of multiple types of accountability relationships involving different actors (Jacobs and Schillemans, 2016). These relationships reflect the principal-agent interactions that characterise institutionalised service delivery (Levy and Walton, 2013). Further, as institutions are "fraught with tensions" (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 8) as a result of their (re)distributive properties, such interactions are informed by heterogeneities among institutional actors (for example resource endowments). These affect preferences which in turn affect the practical application of rules relative to their regulative or normative prescriptions. This consequently affects the influence of reforms on service delivery.

The effectiveness of accountability relationships may be conditioned by the properties and structure of the very public institutions they target. The 2004

World Development Report cautions on the potential limits of civic engagement in procuring accountability relationships (World Bank, 2003). It warns that power asymmetries in public service institutions may render partnerships susceptible to predation (World Bank, 2003). According this report, such relationships may manifest through coercion and other manipulative interactions which enable opportunistic exploitation of supervisory agency beyond the collective purpose by other institutional actors, for example, providers, politicians, or even influential members of society (both individuals and groups).

There is comparatively little qualitative empirical research on institutional accountability despite growing accounts of the outcomes of accountability oriented service reforms (Tembo, 2013; World Bank, 2015a). This study responds to this gap by focusing on the accountability effects of civic engagement.

2.4 Selecting the Conceptual Framework

The large and growing PSR literature often focuses on the evaluation of reforms relative to some quantifiable benchmarks. Much is known about which strategies work (and under what conditions) and their relative contributions to performance outcomes (Andrews, 2013; Bunse and Fritz, 2012; Fritz, 2015). The theoretical and empirical evidence for some strategies, such as strategic planning and regulation, is generally strong if not complete (Ashworth et al., 2010). There are, however, significant lacunae in the theory and practice of how some strategies such as CE are adopted and used by public service stakeholders, their distributional consequences, and how they influence the attainment of PSR goals. These deficiencies are not helped by the *sui generis* nature of such strategies, conditioned as they are by the political and/or managerial contexts that influence their design and application (Prasad, 2007). Not only do such contexts confound the validity of existing theories, they also affect the testing/measurement of empirical results from the PSR process (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2015; Pollitt, 2013). Such observations are also applicable to our case study and provide the motivation for our research problem. Strategies are often specific to particular sectors and embedded in much larger performance regimes (Talbot, 2010) that encapsulate other strategies or wider scopes of action. Thus, the meaning and intent of superficially similar strategies may vary from one policy domain to the next. Similar to PSRs (Durant, 2008; Pollitt, 2013), strategies are occasionally deployed without much consideration for how they will be implemented. It could be argued that our understanding of global CE reforms in WATSAN has not progressed further since Biswas's observations:

> While everyone agrees that public participation is both essential and desirable, the problem remains that we simply do not [know how] …the public at large participate[s] meaningfully in water policy formulation and implementation processes.… Considering the

> multitude of stakeholders involved, how can their activities to reach the shared goals of the agreed policy be co-ordinated? Who could be entrusted to co-ordinate all the activities…What type of sanctions can be considered if any specific stakeholder does not carry out the activities properly and promptly, as had been agreed to earlier? Solutions to all these difficult questions need to be found.(Biswas, 2001, pp. 494-5)

This book responds to this acknowledged gap in literature, by examining WATSAN's contemporary institutional structures and processes for civic engagement. This research focuses on exploring the techniques and methodologies for CE in Tanzania. The study employs an explanatory qualitative case study design. This provides an in-depth, qualitative, rich description of PSRs, CE and the interactions between civic and organisational actors defining the provision of WATSAN services. The adoption of a historical institutionalist perspective further helps provide a deeper understanding of the political and practical complexities involved in administration of PSRs, CE and WATSAN in Tanzania in general.

2.4.1 A Policy Perspective on Civic Engagement

Formal attempts to reform the public service involve designs for altering the content and delivery of policy. Reforms can focus on policy instruments (i.e. the various mechanisms used to produce outcomes (John, 2012) and/or actors, ideas, and structures that interact to devise and implement policy in response to contextual concerns or policy problems (Howlett et al., 2009). Policy actors originate from both the domestic and international environments and include both state and societal actors. These are responsible for the vitality of policy. They operate by intentionally raising and appraising contextual issues, making decisions about possible courses of action, and implementing them (Cairney, 2012). Ideas, on the other hand, relate to the beliefs and accumulated knowledge that enable actors to understand their contextual settings and with it the policy choices they make (Cairney, 2012). Ideas can include perceptions that are common and collectively shared, as well as particularistic and self-interested views on policy contexts and appropriate policy actions. Public policy is derived from interactions between policy actors on the basis of their ideas. These interactions are buttressed by the set of social and political structures that "set the rules" of engagement and provide a *modus operandi* for the formulation and implementation of subsequent outcomes (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 48). Examination of CE, therefore, entails an analysis of the relevant policy with all its nuts and bolts(Cairney, 2012; Howlett et al., 2009).

This study examines the role of civic engagement in the evolving systems for providing WATSAN in Tanzania. While doing this, the study is mindful of Klein's and Marmor's advice of "*trying to capture the intentions of the authors of the drama, the techniques of the actors, and the workings of the stage machinery*" (Klein and Marmor, 2006, p. 893, my italics). This

involves explaining how policy actors, ideas, and structures for CE interact within WATSAN policy. Incorporating these multiple components in a cogent analysis requires some organisation. Policy scholarship suggests organisation can be achieved by adopting and refining the conceptual perspective used in inquiry (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014). Perspectives provide broad understandings of the nature of the inquiry, identifying features of the policy components in need of attention. Refinement of conceptual perspectives refers to the specification of how policy components interact to produce outcomes. John (2012) identifies five broad conceptual perspectives for organising policy scholarship: a) institutional, b) groups and network, c) exogenous, d) rational and, e) ideational. John's (2012) five perspectives are briefly discussed below:

a) Institutional conceptualisations of policy scholarship emphasise the influence of policy structures (Howlett et al., 2009), ideas, interests, the norms and habits of policy contexts on the behaviour of actors. This perspective argues that policy structures can also be the product of the bargaining activities of individuals but ultimately serve to constrain their behaviour.

b) Groups and network focus on the influence of relationships (formal and informal) between policy actors on decision making. This approach accounts for the variation in the relationships between policy actors and is useful for understanding differences in decision making within policy sectors. It is, however, criticised for its failure to account for the formation of such associations and why they change (John, 2012).

c) Exogenous scholarship focuses on the influence of factors external to the immediate policy environment (for example, stability and change in economic and social relationships, on decision-making). This perspective is often critiqued for its neglect of the importance of political autonomy in politics, and the reduction of complex policy choices to wide-ranging forces(John, 2012, p. 98).

d) Rational accounts of policy explain the behaviour of individual policy actors within the context of institutions, group associations, and external socioeconomic. This perspective focuses on micro-level examinations of the preferences and choices of individual actors in decision making. This approach is, however, undermined by the assumptions it makes about the immutability of preferences available to policy actors. In other words, the rational account provides a cogent explanation of what "policy actors do once the decision makers know what they want … but is silent on why decision makers select a particular course of action in the first place" (John, 2012, p. 120).

e) Ideational perspectives give primacy to the intentions and beliefs of actors in the decisions they make. Ideas and interests are recursively

related. Ideas constitute interests while interests imbue ideas with meaning and practical relevance which helps their adoption in the policy process. However, ideas are inherently malleable and can refer to almost any mental activity or thought process which diminishes their utility in explaining the rate with which policy changes.

The above perspectives provide broad cognitive frames for assessing policies which are often inherently descriptive. The breadth of their conceptual scope constrains their ability to provide deductive and inferential accounts of how policy actors interact with their ideas and structures. Their refinement removes such abstraction allowing for a systematic exploration and explanation of relationships in policy. Three conceptual levels are often employed to lend depth to the above perspectives (Koontz, 2006): frameworks, theories, and models.

- Frameworks structure and organise enquiry by specifying the general sets of variables of interests and relationships thereof. Frameworks direct policy scholars to critical features of the policy context —its social and physical landscapes (Schlager, 2007). This provides an intellectual scaffolding for identifying what theories are relevant to assessing a particular constituent of the policy process (i.e. actors, decisions, ideas, and the external environment) but do not provide explanations for, or predictions of, behaviour and outcomes. Frameworks accommodate the use of multiple theories whose appropriateness depends on the particular phenomena studied. For example, institutions as a framework may incorporate theories as diverse as rational choice, social capital, and path-dependency in explaining decision making among policy actors.
- Theories provide and explain causal links between observed or modelled phenomena (Schlager, 2007). Theories place values on variables identified as of interest in frameworks; posit relationships between such variables; and make predictions about likely outcomes by describing patterns for interpreting data and understanding their significance (Donovan and Hoover, 2014). Different theories lend themselves useful to different circumstances. For example, the partnership theory of public management is applicable where multiple individuals work together in pursuit of common or mutual public goals.
- Models test theories by assigning values to variables and conditions of operations and exploring the outcomes produced (Schlager, 2007). Models, notes Schlager, are the most specific and precise of the three conceptual levels of analysis. They are deductive in nature and they comprise internal logic linking theory and observed outcomes. Results obtained from testing model may be further used to revise existing theories or develop new ones. However, this is not often the norm in policy scholarship (Schlager, 2007).

On the basis of the above features of policy scholarships, several analytical theories and frameworks have been considered for this research. The analytical theories considered include: institutional frameworks; Policy diffusion models; the multiple streams framework; the Punctuated Equilibrium theory; the advocacy coalition framework; the institutional analysis and development framework; and the Social Construction and Policy Design Framework. And presented in Table 2.2 below is a summary of the different theories and frameworks of public policy analysis considered for this research.

Table 2.2: Theories and frameworks of policy analysis

Theory/framework/model	Brief description/underlying assumptions
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS *Public policy as the outcome of institutional dynamics. Includes Old Institutionalism, and New Institutionalism frameworks such as Elinor Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (1986,1991)*	Institutional frameworks focus on the constraining influence of formal (e.g., rules, laws, practices) and informal (e.g. norms, beliefs, customs etc.) structures on the decision-making behaviour of policy actors. According to institutional model, policy is authoritatively determined, implemented, and enforced by the machinery of government (executive, legislative, and judicial). One prominent derivative is Elinor Ostrom's (1986; 1991) Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. The IAD utilises rational choice theory to understand the policy process by outlining a systematic approach for analysing institutions that govern action and outcomes within collective action arrangements.
POLICY DIFFUSION MODELS *Spatial scale comparison of policy adoption*	Developed by (Berry and Berry (1990), 2007)) to account for the movement of policies across state spatial scales. It posits that there are four mechanisms through which policy is transferred: learning, competition, imitation, and coercion. Diffusion models have, however, been criticised for lacking clear causal mechanism explaining policy diffusion and adoption (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014; Schlager, 2007)
MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK	It is derived from John Kingdon's classical text, *Agendas, alternatives and public policies*(1984). It argues that policy making is

The role of ideas in policy making (Ideas-based approach)	the result of interaction between three separate and independent streams: problem, politics and policy. The problem stream comprises issues and concerns that policy makers and citizens want to address. The politics stream consists of the national political environment inclusive of public opinion and institutions. The policy stream consists of ideas and solutions waiting to be implemented. Policy making occurs when a policy entrepreneur facilitates the convergence of these three streams.
PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM THEORY *Explaining stable and dynamics in public policy-making (Institutional and Exogenous approach)*	Developed by(Baumgartner and Jones (1991), 1993), 2009)), it focuses on information processing, attention and policy choice by governments. It views information as signals from the external environment and information processing as comprising the collection, assembly, interpretation, and prioritising of those signals (Nowlin, 2011). It posits that policymaking is characterised by two major periods: long periods of policy stasis and short periods of large-scale policy change
ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK *The role of beliefs in policy process (Ideas-based approach)*	Proposed by Sabatier (1988), and formalised by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), and still later clarified by Sabatier and Weible (2007), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) focuses on actors with similar policy beliefs forming coalitions which compete with other coalitions in subsystems. It focuses on relatively open subsystems with a wide range of actors. ACF suggests that the best way to understand the policy process is to focus on a process driven by actors promoting their 'beliefs'. Actors hold beliefs and are motivated to translate those beliefs into policies before their opponents can do the same. Beliefs are the 'glue' that binds actors together in advocacy coalitions.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND POLICY DESIGN FRAMEWORK	Developed by (Schneider and Ingram (1993), 1997) and Ingram et al. (2007), social construction and policy design framework has a dual focus on policy: how attitudes regarding

The role of perceptions and attitudes on policy	the target population of a policy influence the type of policy adopted; and how policy impacts the way target populations are viewed. It argues that policy change occurs in two ways: through a mobilisation of support or opposition of extant policies, for example disproportionate distribution of benefits; and path dependency.

Source: Compiled from various sources by the Author

The different mechanisms of policy inquiry, above, are underpinned by different ontological perspectives some of which are less applicable to this study. This study adopts an institutional perspective to inquiry which is explained in detail below.

2.4.2 Theoretical Directions: Institutional Perspective and Framework

To examine the institutional framework for civic engagement in WATSAN in Tanzania (*objective 1*), an institutional perspective and framework are adopted. An institutional perspective is found relevant because the focus here is on an element of policy (civic engagement) that occurs firmly within political organisations with links between decision makers, ordinary citizens, and organisations (both state and non-state) concerned with the wider public policy (WATSAN). An institutional perspective allows an examination of the rules (formal and informal) that facilitate coordination and effective decision making with respect to civic engagement. In addition to being an element of policy, civic engagement entails collective action i.e. action taken by a group of individuals whose goal is to enhance their collective wellbeing and achieve a common objective (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Ostrom, 1990, 2004). Consequently, institutions do "not only establish a general framework within which decisions are made but also play a critical role in defining the strategies of individuals and groups as those political actors search for receptive decision makers and decision making venues" (Schlager, 2007, p. 307). Institutions affect the strategies and venues of individuals in collective action settings in two ways: first, they provide the context within which interactions occur thereby affecting the scope and nature of agency; and secondly, they determine the social roles of individuals which affects their choices and collective-action capabilities (Schlager, 2007).

Further, an institutional perspective provides flexibility in the examination of civic engagement because it offers no explicit explanation for the conduct of policy actors (John, 2012). An institutional perspective is essentially a framework that is capable of accommodating multiple theories better suited to account for the behaviour of policy actors and the rationale of policy decisions. This benefits the public policy scholarship of civic engagement in three broad ways. First, it provides assurances against assumptions that a particular explanation is the only valid one. Secondly, it

allows the exploration of comparative advantages of various plausible theories in different settings. And thirdly, the exposure of the researcher and enquiry to multiple theories promotes critical reflections and sensitivity on the validity of assumptions underlying any single explication (Cairney, 2012; following Sabatier, 2007). A balanced exploration of the adopted perspective is provided below.

2.4.3 Institutional Structure and Processes Influencing Civic Engagement

2.4.3.1 Institutionalism and institutional analysis

Several theoretical strands have attempted to explain the concept of institutions over time. These include: Old Institutionalism, Behaviouralism, and New Institutionalism. These strands are distinguishable by their underlying frameworks of analysis and, to a lesser degree, the chronology of their dominance. Insights from these strands have a fractal character (Falleti and Mahoney, 2015), that has seen them embedded in others as the institutional literature has evolved. This has provided a platform against which the features and meaning of institutions have been constructed and reconfigured as their conceptual convergence and consolidation has occurred (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013).

Understandings of institutions prior to the second half of the 20th century were principally influenced by the prevailing loci of formal political power, the state (Rhodes, 1995). Referred to now as Old Institutionalism, these early conceptions of institutions were mainly normative and focused on political and administrative structures (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). They were devoid of considerations for the relational aspects of formal structures (governments) and failed to account for variability of performance in intra governmental structures. Such shortcomings gave rise to the micro analysis of individual components of governments particularly their behaviours and actions.

Behaviouralism emerged in the post war era and attempted to explain human behaviour and political power through a society centred approach. This new theoretical posture argued that institutions were aggregate features of individual human behaviours. Individuals were embedded in society which influenced their behaviours and the distribution of political powers (Rhodes, 1995). Embeddedness refers to the degree of integration between an individual and their surroundings. However, March and Olsen (1984) contend that the ability of Behaviouralism to explain institutional outcomes is constrained by its overreliance on the behaviour of atomistic individuals, and "utilitarian" focus on institutional action. March and Olsen argue that Behaviouralism is 'utilitarian' in that it perceives action "as the product of calculated self-interest rather than the product of actors responding to obligations and duties" (1984, p. 735).

As the latter decades of the 20th century approached, neither Old Institutionalism nor Behaviouralism had managed to provide a cogent

theory of institutions and their role in influencing outcomes in public policy(Bell, 2002). Their frames of reference were, in different ways, too narrow to explain relationships between individuals and formal structures of the state. A broader conceptual framework called New Institutionalism emerged in the early 1980s which responded to:

- the increase in the influence and complexity of social, political, and economic organisations on collective life (March and Olsen, 1984); and
- the impact of organisational changes of the state in response to systemic shocks that had undermined its existence and challenged extant political power dynamics (Bell, 2002), for example economic crises of the 1970s, and the subsequent restructuring of the state.

This new approach built on the initial perspectives of rational choice and positivism, advanced by Behaviouralism.

New Institutionalism employs a pluralistic and malleable approach to institutions. It sees institutions as being both formal and informal, and existing in an environment consisting of other institutions—its institutional environment. Within this environment, institutions influence each other with consequences on their respective outcomes. This approach varies from its predecessors because of its consideration of intermediate institutions in explaining systemic differences in institutional outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). New Institutionalism contends that institutions exist in various forms such as codified rules, ideologies, scripts, rational myths, knowledge legitimated by the institutional environment, and conventions (Powell, 2007). Institutions entice actors to behave in certain ways and adopt certain courses of action in decision making situations. They do so by coordinating flows of information that influence behaviours and choices, reduce uncertainty, provide incentives, and distribute resources.

There are four major analytical approaches or schools of thought within New Institutionalism identified as: Constructivist or Discursive, Rational choice. And a brief description of these approaches is offered below:

a) Constructivist or Discursive approach focuses on the role of discourse in which actors engage in the process of generating, deliberating, and/or legitimising ideas about political action in institutional context according to a logic of communications (Schmidt, 2011; see also Cairney, 2012; Hay, 2006).

b) Rational choice approach views institutions as human constructed entities that coordinate the flow of information to extrinsically limit the choices of self-interested individuals (Hall and Taylor, 1996; see also Ostrom, 1991; Williamson, 1981, 1985);

c) Sociological approach views institutions as comprising regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that distribute resources and information which impact behaviours of satisficing actors (Scott, 2013a); and

d) Historical institutionalism approach prioritises how state, societal factors, and history influence the extent to which individual actors define their interests and shape their interactions with others (Thelen and Mahoney, 2015; see also Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).

What is clear from this brief exploration of New Institutionalism is that the concept of institutions is broad and relatively adaptable. This, however, can cloud its application in analysis. Hollingsworth (2000) proposes a conceptual map for understanding the breadth of institutional analyses as shown in Table 2.3 below:

Table2.3 Components of institutional analysis

	Component	Meaning	Examples
1.	Institutions	Codified rules, ideologies, scripts, rational myths, knowledge legitimated by the institutional environment, conventions etc.(Powell, 2007)	Laws, rules, norms, values, shared understandings
2.	Institutional arrangements	Socially constructed amalgamations of rules for coordinating different actors	markets, states, corporate hierarchies, networks, associations, communities
3.	Institutional sectors	Social organisations of institutional actors according to functions performed	financial system, social systems—education, health, WATSAN, etc. system of education, business system, system of research
4.	Institutional Actors	Both individual and composite entities capable of utilising information in	Human beings, organisations

	Component	Meaning	Examples
		interactions with other institutional components	
5.	Outputs and Performance	Information and artefactual feedback from the interactions of the various institutional components	statutes; administrative decisions, the nature, quantity and the quality of industrial products; sectoral and societal performance

Source: Adapted from Hollingsworth (2000, p. 601)

The institutional components in Table 2.3 interact in various ways to coordinate the flow of information that entices actors to behave in certain ways and adopt certain courses of action in decision making situations. Analysis of institutions can either focus on individual components or their combinations.

This study is informed by the combined effects of the above components. It is worth noting that CE is an instrument of public policy embedded within a larger environment that is the public service. This provides the institutional landscape in this analysis. This landscape is envisioned to encompass several institutional arrangements that include the state, communities and corporate hierarchies. WATSAN provides the institutional sector within which CE occurs. Organisational and community actors are this study's units of analysis, and subsequently assume the role of institutional actors by virtue of their functions in CE. Finally, output and performance represent how CE is structured by sector specific statutes and administrative procedures which coordinate the flow of information about it.

2.4.3.2 Historical institutional analysis

This study adopts a historical institutional (HI) perspective in examining the role of civic engagement in WATSAN. This adoption is informed by: first, the flexibility offered by the historical approach explained by its expansive conceptualisation of institutions; second, the HI's demonstrated empirical application in explaining complex institutional contexts; third, HI's acknowledgement of causal complexity; and fourth, HI's contention that individuals' preferences are not fixed *ex ante* but shaped by both institutions and their interactions. This analytical perspective is examined in detail below.

2.4.3.3 Features of Historical Institutions

HI combines sociological accounts of institutions (see Box 2.1) with effects of temporal sequences (history) to explain interactions among the various components of analysis (see Table 2.3). HI posits that institutions include not just structures (the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive features) but also processes which arise as the result of interactions between actors (Hall, 2010; Scott, 2013). Actors exercise agency to engage in various forms of institutional entrepreneurship which transform institutions and preserve knowledge that informs future interactions. These interactions possess the potential to affect the distribution of power between interacting agents. This occurs in two ways. Firstly, institutional structures define the context and environments occupied by individuals. These environments also asymmetrically apportion powers of agency to different actors. Secondly, the distribution of power within institutions conditions individuals' responsibilities and relationships with each other. This has implications for their relative position within an institutional sector and their interests.

2.4.3.3.1 Institutional History

As Marx noted,

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted by the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. Marx (1852/2006, p. 1)

HI places a significant emphasis on the agency of individuals to create and transform institutions. It draws on Marx's assertions of agency being informed and shaped by events of the past. Agency or indeed behaviours are not *tabula rasa;* they build on (pre)existing experiences and knowledge from their environments and beyond which affects institutional design. History activates institutional memory by enabling access to repositories of information and knowledge. Lowndes and McCaughie (2013) contend that institutional actors interact with history by remembering, borrowing, sharing and forgetting information to inform decision making. The reproduction of institutional behaviours by path dependency (see below) owes much to the influence of history in the design of institutional structures. The ability to borrow and share historical precedents imbues institutions with characteristics not too dissimilar to those of the past or extant in other domains.

Analyses of institutional history involve the systematic identification of causal mechanisms that along with broader generalisations—both

elementary associations and inferences (Mahoney, 2012)— accurately depict institutional features at points in time (Collier, 2011).

Analyses then proceed by tracing the processes through which causal mechanisms explain historical contexts. Process tracing focuses on three key features of institutional history (events, sequences, processes) (Falleti and Mahoney, 2015) that are briefly described below are exemplified in detail by the analysis in Chapter Four .

a) Events are institutional interactions and outcomes occurring at certain points in time and in specific geographical domains. Examples include changes to business/economic or political cycles such as economic crises, democratic shifts etc.

b) Sequences are a chronological ordering of historical events in a given context. Sequences involve the identification of initial, end and intervening events that collectively explain institutional outcomes. Sequences are constructed, often using inductive logic, to explain diverse outcomes including institutional changes, displacement and reproduction.

c) Processes is a type of a sequence consisting of closely related events. For example, one could trace the evolution of the UN's current sustainable development goals through a sequence of historical events that include similarly related or contributing events such their predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and multiple international conferences and fora on development.

As institutional outcomes can be broad, process tracing involves focusing on specific features or outcomes to guide the analysis. Chapter Four focuses on the process of evolving public service reforms in WATSAN in Tanzania to provide context for subsequent historical institutional analyses of the structure and processes in Chapters Five and Six respectively.

2.4.3.3.2 Institutional Structure

The structure of historical institutions consists of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements, as well as institutional carriers. For a definition of these elements see Box 2.1, on p.18, above. These elements are underpinned by different assumptions of their effects, and employ different mechanisms and indicators to structure interactions among actors (see Scott (2013a) for an elaborate disambiguation of these elements). Institutional carriers refer to the conduits that transport institutions (including ideas) and preferences through time and space (Scott, 2013b). These include: symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and Artefacts.

a) Symbolic systems are the various representations (or forms) in which institutional elements are coded and conveyed. Examples include rules, laws, values, and social categories.

b) Relational systems are the interpersonal and interorganisational relationships that result from regular interactions. Examples include governance systems, professional regimes, cultural identities.

c) Routines have to do with regular behaviours and actions informed by tacit knowledge held and conveyed by institutional actors. Examples include protocols, jobs, roles, scripts.

d) Artefacts include materials created by human actors to facilitate their activities. Examples include work plans, budgets.

Carriers facilitate institutions by informing and being informed by the interactions of their actors. In the context of the public service, for instance, its symbolic systems of laws and policies provide general guidelines and directions on how the institution functions. Its relational systems such its professional bureaucracy further underscore what it does. Its routines, such as specific jobs, inform how to engage with it. Finally, its artefacts such as work plans, provide a description of what it is capable of. To date, a large body of the literature on HI focuses on symbolic and relational carriers (Scott, 2013b).

Analytically, HI differs from rational choice and sociological institutionalism with respect to the following institutional features: power asymmetries (Hall and Taylor, 1996), and causal complexity (Bell, 2002; Ikenberry, 1988).

By constraining and enabling certain behaviours, institutions distribute power unevenly across social groups, privileging some and undermining others (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Power, in the relational sense, is an effect of social relations that allow individuals to exert influence on the beliefs and behaviours of others (Clegg et al., 2006). Power asymmetries affect the agency of individual actors relative to the course of action pursued. Powerful actors possess veto capabilities (Tsebelis, 2002) that enable them to strategically defy or manipulate (see Table 2.1, above) others and dictate the agenda of interactions. Veto powers are, however, not transferable across institutions or domains (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). For example, an absolute monarch may enjoy unrestricted political power in one country but not in another. By being able to dictate the agenda, veto powers can be catalytic in the preservation or transformation of an institution. Veto powers may also arise by coordinating the mobilisation of sufficiently powerful coalition of non-veto players to pursue a common strategy.

HI emphasises multiplicity in the analysis of institutions. That is, individuals and institutions exist in complex environments with others in which individual institutions are nested within other broader institutions (Hall, 1992; Ikenberry, 1988). To illustrate, think of electoral democracy as an institution which consists of: diverse actors with diverse functions such as voters, electoral bodies, legislative assemblies, politicians, civil servants, etc.; formal governing rules and norms influencing electoral choices, behaviour etc. Electoral democracy itself tends to operate within multiple

and complex environments such as politics or states, which may themselves be classified as supra institutions. Further, supra institutions may consist of other nested institutions for example the economy, social sectors etc. in addition to electoral democracy. Such classification and decomposition are ad hoc with respect to the institutional unit of analysis. These surrounding environments encapsulate diverse but connected networks of actors (individuals or groups), practices, and scripts that define the context within which an institution exists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such environments represent the parameters in which institutional actors operate. They consist of the boundaries, institutional logics (i.e. regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive), other actors, and processes of action (Scott, 2013a).

The influence of nested environments on institutional outcomes is known as causal complexity (Ikenberry, 1988, p. 225). Causal complexity occurs when institutional environments and history inform actors' preferences, their compliance to rules and interactions with others. Causal complexity often leads to highly endogenous preferences. That is, in addition to affecting institutions, institutional environments may also directly affect the individual behaviour and strategies of institutional actors. In the example just provided, such an effect may manifest in structures or outcomes in other competing institutions, for example economic performance or the behaviour of civil servants, affecting electoral choices of individuals. This demonstrates that intermediate institutions may not necessarily be the only causal force of institutional outcomes. Indeed, their very existence, direction, and distributive mechanisms are often reflective of the effects of other institutions (Bedock, 2014; Delbridge and Edwards, 2013).

One much emphasized determinant of causal complexity is the concept of path dependency (Bell, 2002; Ikenberry, 1988; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). HI postulates that institutions are path dependent. That is, institutions inherit features of their historical pasts which mediate the effects of their operations. Institutions create historical paths in two major ways. First, through the survival of dominant state capacities and policy legacies over time (Weir and Skocpol, 1985). And secondly, institutions can incentivise societal forces to coalesce around certain interests and identities (Pierson, 1993). Once created, institutional paths endure and are reproduced by institutional actors relative to their perceived utility (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

As historical institutions are redistributive in nature, path dependency also affects the distribution of power in institutions. Pierson (2015) proposes five ways in which historical events enhance the distribution of power, briefly discussed below:

i. Past distributions of power influence the transfer of resources in future interactions. Actors privileged by past institutions carry their existing endowments of power into the future.

ii. Outcomes from past interactions influence the flow of resources in future ones. By identifying the location of power, past interactions influence future decision making by incentivising actors to imitate the behaviours of past beneficiaries thereby informing the mobilisation of action.

iii. History informs about the relative strength of actors, both winners and losers. This affects future decision making by encouraging coalition formation, defections and subdual of past losers.

iv. History allows powerful actors (winners) to dictate the agenda thereby altering the political and social discourse.

v. History induces investment in behaviours which alter actors' calculations about what is profitable, desirable or appropriate.

Institutional paths may be broken or disrupted by large abrupt changes called critical junctures, as well as by incremental endogenous contributions. Critical junctures often occur as a result of exogenous factors external to the institutional arena (Capoccia, 2016), for example economic or geopolitical crises. Critical junctures create "branching points" (Krasner, 1984; cited Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 942) by relaxing the constraining effects of institutional structures, allowing powerful actors to alter the path of historical development. Not all critical junctures result in institutional changes (Capoccia, 2015; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). Critical junctures may fail to incentivise entrepreneurship among powerful actors. HI emphasises the cognitive reflexivity of institutional actors that enables them to interpret information. In the event of a "near miss" critical juncture, reflexivity allows institutional actors to learn, which may influence their future preferences and interactions in a manner that *reequilibrates* an institution.

2.4.3.3.3 Institutional Processes

Whereas structures represent the qualitative state of historical institutions (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996), the mechanisms through which structures are formed and altered define HI processes. Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 72) contend that "institutionalisation occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors" (1966, p. 72). Habitualized actions relate to easily invoked, widely adopted behaviours that define interactions within the dominant framework of interest. Reciprocal typification relates to shared understandings and acceptance of habitualized behaviours among different categories of actors. Institutional processes explain how and why actors engage in reciprocal typifications (specifically the strategic responses of actors). Processes also inform us about the sustainability of institutions—their maintenance and diffusion by the various carriers, see p.22 above). There are three major types of institutional process (Scott, 2013):

a) Increasing returns or positive feedback: Increasing returns occur when actors interact to create or sustain institutions on the basis of the incentives derived from it. These incentives may accrue as benefits for complying with institutional rules, or the costs of behaving differently. Feedback effects accrue over time, informed by knowledge of incentives in past interactions. Indeed, path-dependent effects are often argued to occur because of the positive benefits of historically locked-in behaviours which incentivise reflexive actors to persist with them. Institutional processes of this kind endure because of: i) high sunk costs incurred by actors, such that the cost of investing in alternative behaviours is often prohibitively high; ii) learning effects, wherein reflexive actors are less inclined to behave otherwise, having invested time and effort in learning existing practices; iii) coordination effects, the collective benefits of mobilising others to do the same; and iv) adaptive expectations, as new or other institutional actors are likely to imitate institutionally legitimate practices.

b) Increasing commitments*:* Actors are more likely to behave in a similar manner if they share the same norms, values and cultural identities. This is similar to the way in which social capital influences CE, as discussed earlier.

c) Increasing objectification: Actors are more likely to coordinate if there is a common understanding (consensus) of the meaning of institutional structures: what they are, why they exist and how they affect actors. Consensus about structures spreads ideas about behaviours which help cement their invocation as taken for granted artefacts (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).

The above processes influence institutionalisation in diffuse ways. Increasing returns processes are often evident in highly formalised regulative elements of institutions such as laws and policies. Such structures enjoy a high degree of precision and well-defined costs and benefits of complying with them. Because of the influence of history, increasing returns processes often lead to outcomes that are multiple, inflexible (locked-in), unlikely and potentially inefficient (Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2000). Increasing commitments and objectification processes generally impact the less visible normative and cultural-cognitive structures of institutions. Because of their less formalised nature, these tend to be more difficult to observe (Thelen, 2004). These processes can interact and reinforce each other in a manner similar to the behaviour of different structures of institutions.

2.4.4 Critique of the Historical Institutionalist Approach

HI emerged in the 1980s and has since then grown in prominence as a framework for examining complex and uncertain political events, sequences and processes (Hall, 2010; Thelen, 1999). Its emphasis on deep

(and often, comparative) contextual analyses has given impetus to the revival and development of methods such as process tracing (Falleti and Mahoney, 2015; Thelen and Mahoney, 2015). Similarly, its acknowledgement of power asymmetries within a polity has given HI an explanatory edge over the structural determinism of abstract pluralist approaches, for example functionalist and systems-theories (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Nonetheless, HI, as an approach to policy analysis, has attracted some criticism. Perhaps the most notable criticisms relate to its emphasis on structures and processes at the expense of their micro foundation (Schmidt, 2011); and its limited explanation of causal processes (Raadschelders, 1998 cited in Kay, 2005; Radaelli et al., 2012) .

The basic contention is that the HI approach lacks a robust theoretical underpinning (Schmidt, 2011) that accounts for how actors relate to institutions. It relies heavily on an inductive approach that precludes the development and testing of a priori theories and hypotheses about outcomes. This makes HI "inelegant and atheoretical" (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 12) and unable to account for "current and future phenomena" (Kay, 2005, p. 561). However, there is value in the deep inductive analyses of HI, which lucidly accommodate the dynamic relationship between institutions, actors and interests. These provide a rich context to the distorting effects of political processes—or the "mobilisation of bias" (Immergut, 2006, p. 246). According to some critics, historical institutionalism's emphasis on punctuated equilibrium approaches to explain institutional effects lacks the requisite theoretical foundations for inquiry and leads to conjectures rather than causal explanations (Radaelli et al., 2012). Falleti and Mahoney (2015) acknowledge this criticism and contend that both theories and hypotheses can be developed and specified if analysts view institutions as products of concrete temporal processes rather than static structures. By factoring in the effects of time (and/or history), recent advances in HI have challenged punctuated equilibrium views of institutions. These have focused on the view that even in periods of stability, institutions tend to be characterised by continued contestations and renegotiations by actors which shape institutional outcomes(Thelen, 2004).

Yet, despite the reservations of some scholars, in the last two decades, the literature on HI has shown an impressive growth. Pierson and Skocpol (2002) have, for example, provided theoretical and empirical arguments for how power explains institutional outcomes and their micro foundations. Streeck and Thelen (2005), on their part, have proposed a typology of institutional behaviours beyond stability (static theorisation). Mahoney and Thelen (2010) have further built on these foundations by exploring the role of ambiguity, agency and power in explaining institutional outcomes. Similarly, Hall (2010) has demonstrated the framework's adaptability to sociological and rational choice accounts in exploring innovative ways to account for institutional effects. This recent literature has also supplemented the initial focus on critical junctures/exogenous factors in

shaping aggregate development with a focus on endogenous change. This is important because the critical junctures approach puts the major 'explanatory' factors outside the explanation. In other words, the early criticism of HI was that it was good at explaining continuity (path dependency/lock in) despite failing to advance change. The endogenous change literature is an important move beyond that.

This study builds on these recent developments in HI by extending the domain of the HI framework's application to a context laden with latent political dynamism. Deficiencies of HI particularly in accounting for the micro behaviours of institutional entrepreneurs are compensated by exploring the theories of general incentives, social capital and civic voluntarism as shown earlier in this chapter to explain preference formation with respect to CE. Further, the study also focuses on the two other sociological elements of institutional structures (see Box 2.1) as opposed HI's oft interest in regulative elements alone. A summary account of the HI features considered by the study is provided below.

2.4.5 A Summary of the Conceptual Framework for the Research

This study adopts a historical institutionalist (HI) perspective to examine the role of civic engagement (CE) in the evolving systems for providing WATSAN. Such a perspective builds on the study's understanding of civic engagement (CE) as a feature of public service reforms (PSRs) in Tanzania. HI's emphasis on explaining contemporary outcomes, based on how institutional actors and structures interact together and with past processes (history), promises to address three demonstrable gaps in literature:

- From the PSR literature, the extent to which history (the type and form of past institutional changes) shapes the behaviours of reform actors and outcomes remains under-theorised (Andrews, 2013; Streeck, 2015). By exploring the historical underpinnings of present-day CE and public service reforms, the study hopes to provide theoretically plausible explanations of the behaviours of actors and draw contextual inferences on the long-term success of reforms.
- PSRs are often designed to influence the more relatively visible structural elements of public institutions (for example, laws, legislation and organisations) (Andrews, 2013). The adoption of HI extends our understanding of institutions beyond the formal realm by considering the norms and beliefs accompanying reforms. In effect, this explicitly endorses Scott's (2013a) assertion that institutions do not exist in a vacuum. That is, PSRs need also to heed not only past historical constructs but also the contextually relevant elements of institutions. The study's exploration of the normative and cultural cognitive elements of public service institutions will further contribute to this under-theorised and under-researched area.

- Owing to the inherent focus of PSRs on laws and regulations (whose introduction is often swift), Bezes and Lodge (2015) contend that analyses of reforms are often devoid of explanations of the process of reform. Therefore, little is known of how reforms evolve, survive or reproduce. Biswas's (2001) assessment of the lack of rich contextual data on participatory reforms in global WATSAN policies is a case in point. The adoption of a HI perspective binds the study to conceptualise CE reforms as both an outcome and a process. This allows the study to contribute to the PSR and WATSAN literature by providing a deeper understanding of the political and practical complexities involved in the administration of CE. Such an approach will also help minimise what Immergut (2006)refers to as the "mobilisation of bias" problem —i.e. the loss of contextual causality that arises from adopting a static view of institutions and/or events.

The characteristics drawn from the literature on different features of historical institutions are summarised in Table 2.4 below. This framework is used to examine the role of civic engagement in WATSAN in Tanzania. The framework presents three related features of historical institutions, which vary in their effects on civic engagement from abstract to specific: history, structure, and processes. Findings are allocated to particular aspects within this framework, depending on whether they relate primarily to institutional history, structure or processes and then how these findings correspond with the specific objectives of the study.

Table 2.4: Framework of Analysis

Feature of historical institutions	Components of historical institutions explored	Chapter Section	Intended contribution to analysis	Research objective fulfilled
Process tracing of WATSAN Public Service Reforms in Tanzania	Power and Agency	4.2	Establishment of path-dependent historical antecedents of existing CE institutions in WATSAN.	**Objective 1:** To examine the institutional framework for CE in service provision.
	Institutional layering and entrepreneurship	4.3		**Objective 2:** To examine the influence of CE on service delivery.
	Institutional tensions, strategic responses and coalition formation	4.4		
Institutional Structures	Regulative Elements	5.2	Identification and examination of how reform logics interact with institutional actors.	**Objective 1:** To examine the institutional framework for CE in service provision.
	Normative Elements	5.3		
	Cultural-Cognitive Elements	5.4		
Institutional Processes	Ambiguity, power and agency	6.2, 6.3 and 6.4	Exploration of how once established, CE institutions impact the strategies of actors and their outcomes.	**Objective 2:** To examine the influence of CE on service delivery.

Source: Author's, based on collated accounts of historical institutionalism

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The overall aim of this research is to examine the role of CE in the evolving systems for providing water and sanitation (WATSAN) in Tanzania. The study focuses on interactions between citizens and formal institutions in the sector; and examines the influence of CE on service delivery in WATSAN. This study is guided by two research questions:

Table 3.1: The research purpose (revisited)

1) *How do institutional structures and processes influence civic engagement in WATSAN?*
2) *How does civic engagement influence service provision in WATSAN?*

An explanatory qualitative case study design was adopted to obtain and interpret information necessary to answer the research questions. This design offered an interpretivist account of civic engagement and its institutional environment through the eyes of research participants. This provided a deeper understanding of the institutional structures and processes for civic engagement, and how the interactions between organisations, community and their resources contributed in the various ways WATSAN services were delivered in the case study area.

The complex nature of the components of the study necessitated organising the research process into two distinct phases: preparatory and analysis (McNabb, 2008). The preparatory phase included an array of techniques and procedures to establish the purpose, planning for the data gathering process, as well as entry and immersion into the field environment. Analysis involved cognitive decoding (objectification) of information and knowledge accessed during the preparatory stage.

3.1.1 A Case Study Design

This study adopts a case study design because its priority is an in-depth exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). While employing a case study design, the study was mindful of the following benefits of the case study: (a) it enables to cover contextual conditions, in that it investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; (b) it deals with a distinctive situation in which there are more variables of interest than data points; and (c) the types of research questions posed require case studies to provide the needed answers. In a word, a case study facilitates the identification of

'how' or 'why' some institutional structures and processes have worked (or have not worked).

Civic engagement provides the case in this thesis. This decision is informed by Hollingsworth's (2000) configuration of the components of institutional analysis in which civic engagement constitutes an institutional output/process. Adoption of a case study design allows the inquiry to maximise what can be learnt about the phenomena in question considering the time constraints (Stake, 1995). On a more general level, while proposing the case study design, the study sought: to explain the causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for a survey and too difficult to allow for an experimental strategy; (b) to describe an intervention in the management of water supply and sanitation and the real-life context in which it has occurred; and (c) explore the outcome of the intervention because the intervention has no clear, single set of outcomes (Tellis, 1997b; Yin, 2009). On top of that, the adoption of a case study design provides an opportunity for a comprehensive understanding of cultural systems of action (sets of interrelated activities engaged in by WATSAN's institutional actors) and possesses the potential for developing critical thinking (Tellis, 1997a).

As pointed out earlier, the two research questions guiding the study are:

1) *How do institutional structures and processes influence civic engagement in WATSAN*?
2) *How does civic engagement influence service provision in WATSAN?*

Both questions are explanatory in nature (their focus of enquiry is on the "how", indicating the need for an in-depth examination of concepts) as they deal with operational links that need to be traced over time (Yin, 2009, p. 9). The institutional literature posits that institutional outcomes are influenced by rules, resources and relations between actors that give rise to social structures (Scott, 2013b). These in essence define the context in which civic engagement occurs (Yin, 2009). Rules refer to constructs that influence and guide behaviour, action and outcomes (Ostrom, et al., 1994, 2007). Rules can either be formal or informal. Formal rules include laws, policies and regulations while informal rules reflect norms or reciprocity and community based cultural exchange (Scott, 2013a). Resources relate to the material and human endowments that constitute an actor's ability to exercise control and agency (power). Relations are essentially the patterned activities of actors that produce and sustain social structures. The adoption of a case study design allows in-depth description and an analysis of these institutional features.

As indicated in the introductory chapter, a local authority area in Tanzania, Kawe ward in Kinondoni Municipal Council provides the case study area for this study and the subsection below provides a brief background of the study area.

3.1.1.1 A brief profile of the case study area: About Kawe ward

Kawe is one of the 20 administrative wards making up Kinondoni Municipal Council, which is a largely affluent municipality in Tanzania's commercial capital, Dar es Salaam. The ward is located in northeast of the Kinondoni Municipality (see Figure 3.1 below). It is bordered by Goba ward to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east and Kimara ward to the West. In the South, it is bordered by Mikocheni, Kijitonyama and Ubungo Wards. The ward consists of six smaller administrative units (sub wards), one of which is the case study area, Kawe Mzimuni.

Figure 3.1: A map of Kawe Ward in Kinondoni Municipality
Source: Adopted from Kinondoni Municipal Council (2016, p. i)

Census projections estimate that some 85,253 people in 21,313 households currently live in Kawe(NBS and OCGS, 2016), up from a count of 67,115 out of 16,779 households in 2012 (NBS and OCGS, 2013). Census records suggest that the ward's population has been growing at an annual rate of

4.9% since 2002. High fertility, mortality and migration rates have led to a sharp increase in population density from 2,870 at the start of WATSAN policy implementation in 2002 to 4,330 (see Table A.1 in Appendix 1.4) at the end of the policy cycle. Despite high demographic pressures, fertility(the main determinant of population growth (NBS and OCGS, 2013)) is lower in Kawe than elsewhere in Tanzania with the ward having some of the smallest average households sizes at 3.6 (see Table A.1 in Appendix 1.4). That is against a national average of 4.8 (NBS and OCGS, 2013). In recent years, increases in mortality and divorce rates (NBS and OCGS, 2013) have led to corresponding increases in the number of female headed households from 30.4% in 2002 (for details, see Table A.1 in Appendix 1.4). This poses long term welfare challenges as female headed households have been shown to be poorer than, and with twice as many inhabitants as male headed ones (NBS and OCGS, 2016).

Economically, only 4% (compared to 28.2 % national average) of the case study population live below the national basic need's poverty line. However, as the national poverty line is about a quarter of the internationally recognised poverty line of US$1.90 (Kilama, 2016; World Bank, 2015b), the proportion of absolute poor in the case study is four times as high as the official statistics. Further, although only 6.8% (for details, see Table A.1 in Appendix 1.4) of the working population is classified as unemployed. That is more than two-fifths of the population, which is either economically under-productive or unproductive with 21% in full time education, 15.9% in the notoriously overworked and low paid care sector and 2.3% unable to work. Of the 54% in full time employment, 12.1% work in manufacturing, 11.4% in trade and commerce while a further 10.7% are engaged in in raw (uncooked) food sales (NBS and OCGS, 2016). Economic activity is aided by high adult literacy rates in Kawe (97.3%) with more than three-thirds (61.4%) of the population having completed at least formal primary education (for details, see Table A.1 in Appendix 1.4).

Yet, despite relatively higher socioeconomic—for example on literacy and education, poverty and economic activities—scores than its parent municipality or indeed administrative region/province, there is little to distinguish the case study area from the latter in water and sanitation (WATSAN). Central to the poor state of WATSAN in the case study is absence of a formal drainage master plan (World Bank, 2013b).

Rationale for selecting the case study area

The local authority is chosen because of: (a) perceptions on a lower than national average incidence of civic engagement in the water sector (URT, 2012c); (b) poor coverage of water supply and sanitation services relative to coverage in other urban authorities in the country the country (NBS and ICF Macro, 2011); and (c) its adoption of civic engagement as in instrument for WATSAN policy delivery since 2002(URT, 2002, 2006a).A single case study design was utilised rather than a multiple design as there

is no intention of following up with a replication (Tellis, 1997b); and the historical institutional framework of analysis adopted is not limited to Kawe ward alone; rather, it can be applied to examine a variety of other phenomena in other geographical areas and through time.

The use of case study designs is generally subjected to three main concerns:

i. Firstly, due to their small sample and qualitative nature, case studies are associated with a lack of rigour (i.e. construct and internal validity). In defence of the approach, Yin (1989) argues that there can be general applicability depending on the set of methodological qualities of the case, and how the case is constructed. This case study satisfies three tenets of the qualitative method: describing, understanding and explaining (Tellis, 1997b) . Multiple sources of evidence were employed for triangulation purpose and to limit biases or inaccuracies in collecting and analysing data.

ii. Secondly, even though it is generally believed that case studies provide little basis for scientific generalisation, Yin (2009) contends that case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations. Besides, the case employed in this study does not represent a "sample". Instead, it creates an opportunity to expand and generalise a theory (analytic generalisation) within the case and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation) beyond the case study area. Subsequently, the adoption of a case study is therefore an appropriate approach.

iii. The third concern is that case studies can be difficult to replicate within and beyond the case (that relates to issue of reliability). This study employed a reflexive journal to document procedures undertaken in the course of the study. The journal resembles a diary in its use of regular entries on methodological decisions and their reasons; logistics of the study; personal reflections on what is happening; and descriptive notes of events such as interviews, chance encounters and observation were recorded. In essence, the reflexive journal helped collate the case study protocol and ensured that robust social science techniques were employed.

3.2 Research Methods

Two major forms of qualitative methods were employed by the study: document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The utility and merits (and demerits) of these forms are explored in detail below.

3.2.1 Document Analysis

The use of document analysis refers to the identification, examination, interpretation and use of information presented in standardised artefacts (Wolff, 2004) in either printed or electronic form. Adoption of a historical institutionalist framework for the study placed substantial weight on non-observable knowledge of events, actors and sequences that had transpired

in WATSAN's institutional environment. These necessitated the use of document analysis to inform our contextual understanding. To determine on the relevance of documents examined, the research employed Scott's (1990, p. 6) four-point criteria: authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. Documents gathered were checked for their authenticity to establish whether they reflected primary or secondary accounts of events. Tertiary sources (Flick, 2009), for example the university's library catalogue, were employed as sources to find other documents relevant to the study. The tertiary sources employed consist of in-built quality control mechanisms that helped verify the authenticity of documents gathered.

Secondary documents analysed by the study had undergone some form of peer review, as part of formal publication process. That was done to with the aim of verifying the contents' accuracy, detecting incidence of errors and omission as well as examining the general reliability of authors (Flick, 2009). The study utilises knowledge from the researcher's grounding in policy research in assessing how well documents gathered reflect its content, their representativeness.

Document analysis provided the study with contextual information about legislation and statistical evidence on civic engagement, institutional structures, processes, and the provision of WATSAN. Examples of documents analysed include:

- Policy documents, for example:
    - the 2002 water policy (URT, 2002);
    - the ten year development strategy (URT, 2005b); the twenty year sector development programme (URT, 2006b);
    - public expenditure reviews for the sector (URT, 2012a; World Bank, 2010; van den Berg et al., 2009);
    - the local government reform programme (World Bank, 2016a; URT, 2009b, 2006a, 1999, 1998, 1996);
    - the 30 year national development vision (URT, 2009c);
    - poverty reduction strategy papers (World Bank, 2015b; URT, 2012c);
    - the five year development plan (URT, 2012e),
- Sector evaluation reports, for example:
    - the 2009 legislation on water (URT, 2009g), and
    - research reports (Doering, 2005; Monstadt and Schramm, 2017; Mwakalila, 2007; Noel et al., 2008; Pigeon, 2012; Rasmussen and Reinholdt, 2009; Sokile et al., 2002; van Koppen et al., 2004; World Bank, 2012; Water and Sanitation Program, 2011);

- Evaluation reports (EWURA, 2014a, b; URT, 2013, 2014);
- Civic engagement manuals (URT, 2007b, 2010);
- The constitution (URT, 1977);
- Theses (Conrad, 2015; Samike, 2009);
- Conference proceedings and speeches (Sokile et al., 2005; URT, 2012d, b; URT and World Bank, 2012; van Koppen et al., 2004).

Analytical codes developed in the preparatory phase of the study provided an initial deductive framework of analysis for documents gathered. These streamlined the search for information, analysis, and exploration of links with other data collection methods. This framework was continually updated through the course of the study as new and alternative discoveries were made.

3.2.2 Semi structured interviews

Despite the existence of other types of interviews (Berg, 2009), the explanatory nature of this case study called for the use of semi-structured interviews to collect the requisite qualitative data—Epistemological assumptions about the study led to emphasis on the uniqueness of interviewees' points of view. Research built on Bryman (2012) to meet these demands by using qualitative interviews. The examination of institutional structures, processes and their influences on a relatively current policy subject promised some political and personally sensitive challenges. By their very design, institutions tend to be inherently political as they involve multiple actors, exchanges of resources, and distributional consequences (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). These properties ruled out considerations for other methods of collection—for example, surveys and focus groups as the research focused more on an intensive examination of individual experiences with CE rather than testing theories or generating group associations. In-depth semi- structured interviews with individual participants were organized around a set of predetermined open-ended questions. This allowed for broad and deep exploration of subject matters (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006).

Open ended questions allow interviewees' the opportunity to expand their responses and interviewers greater degrees of freedom to probe far beyond answers to prepared questions (Bryman, 2012). To facilitate the capture of the data sought, the researcher heeded Bryman's (2012) advice for prior familiarisation with the setting in interviewees' live, work, or engage in the topic of interest. This, of course, followed the study's ethics protocol and was only done upon securing the participants' informed consent.

Despite the flexibility semi-structured interviews offer, both DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree (2006) and Bryman (2012) warn of the pitfalls that may arise as a result of the relative informality of this technique. These include: the relevance of responses to questions with interviewees liable to

veering off-course; and information overflow due to probing. Collectively, these can impose significant time (and even material resource) and costs on the study. Practice, skill and experience are often necessary to circumvent these. Consequently, fieldwork was preceded by an extensive pilot of the research instruments (in a different location) to assess the relevance of its content and inform the researcher's context and fieldwork expectations. Piloting led to the adoption of audio recording—on consent of participants—as an auxilliary instrument of capture to note-taking.

3.2.2.1 Expert Interviewing

Institutions operate by affecting how actors interact with one another. The multiplicity of actors and their organisational ties inherent in the case study provided potentially rich repositories of infromation and data. This required specific refinements to the semi-structured interviews to unlock this potential. Hence, the study explored expert interviews with organisational actors wherein their unique professional functions, experiences and knowledge (Bogner et al., 2009) superseded the weight of their personal identities. Experts interviewed included specialised personnel, bureaucratic and political elites, and senior representatives of organisations. Their respective authority placed substantial constraints on the researcher's time, skills and organisation. Challenges were encountered in scheduling interviews, conducting face-to-face interviews, as well as managing the interviews and timeplan. Table 3.2, below, provides a cross section of the distribution of the study's respondents.

Table 3.2: Distribution of qualitative sample

Stratum	Sub Stratum	Number of respondents	Proportion of Overall Sample
Organisations	State	5	15 %
	Quasi-state	4	12 %
	Non-state	1	3 %
	International	2	6 %
	Sub Total	**12**	**35 %**
Community	Water Users' Committee	4	12 %
	Ordinary residents	18	53 %

Stratum	Sub Stratum	Number of respondents	Proportion of Overall Sample
	Sub Total	**22**	**65 %**
	Total	**34**	**100 %**

Source: Authors' Own

As a whole, 34 respondents took part in the study. That included: 5 government officials (three state and two local officials); seven organisational actors from composite group of service providers, interest groups including political actors and advocacy groups, and donors; and 22 community actors in the case study area.

3.2.2.2 Formulation of Interview Schedules

Three interview guides/schedules were used to collect primary data in Tanzania (for details , please *see Appendix 1.2).* The breadth and depth of the schedules provided a congent structure capable of facilitating comparability and triangulation with secondary sources (both document and quantitaive). Similarly, the scope was flexible enough to support auxilliary avenues of enquiry during fieldwork.

3.2.2.3 Piloting

Interview schedules were piloted with a mirror sub sample of respondents at a neutral location once their content had been finalized and translated. To ensure the equivalence of meaning during translation, a two-step process was adopted. First the instruments which were originally prepared in English were translated by the researcher. That was followed by a back-translation of the instruments to English by an independent translator proficient in both English and Swahili, the official national language in Tanzania. The pilot test of the three interview schedules took place in Kisarawe, a rural locality, some fifty kilometres from the case study area. Basically, the pilot test aimed at establishing the clarity and comprehensibility of questions; the flow of interviews, and the contextual relevance and applicability of questions. The pilot also served as a platform for "cognitive interviewing"(Neuman, 2013, p. 358), as participants were encouraged to think aloud and asked about their thought processes in an effort to improve the interview schedules. The pilot served three purposes: It provided an indication of content areas that needed improvements; it gave indications of the probable conceptual understanding of the target population; and it offered indications of likely interview dynamics including the duration. A total of 7 participants (2 organisational and 5 community members) took part in the pilot. The pilot enabled the researcher to make some minor revisions on the translation, wording and quantity of questions in the interview schedule. However, a decision was

made, based on concerns for contextual variances, not to include pilot data in the overall research process.

3.2.2.4 Sampling

This research used purposive sampling to select participants for qualitative interviews. Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling procedure involving a non-random selection of subjects from a population based on defined characteristics of subjects which facilitate the answering of research questions (Patton, 1990b). Purposive sampling entails strategic decision making about the target population. This requires the researcher to have a comprehensive understanding of the research objectives and parameters of the study population. Given the study's aim to examine the role of CE in the evolving systems for WATSAN, focus had to be on a sample consisting of specific (limited number of) individuals carrying the most relevant information thereof. Further, there was a need to provide a meaningful representation of actors in WATSAN, owing to the adoption of a case study design. These two considerations nullified the appropriateness of other types of sampling techniques. Measures were taken to avoid selectivity biases that usually occur when non-probability samples are selected by virtue of their relative accessibility (Bryman, 2012). Hence, a stratification of the purposive sample was done in an effort to "capture major variations in the sample rather identify a common core" (Patton, 1990a, p. 174). There were two major strata in this study: organisations and community. The organisations' sample was further stratified to separate state, non-state, quasi-state, and international organisations.

To facilitate multi-stage stratification, an identification of all groups of actors in WATSAN was first made using document analysis of the institutional map in the sector (see figure 3.2 below). This was followed by a selection of institutional actors in the relevant strata. Within the organisations' sub strata, decisions on who to interview was made on the basis of actors' expertise and the positions they have in their respective organisations. The intention was to capitalise on their capacities as repositories of "practical insider knowledge" and "surrogates" of the policy community (Bogner et al., 2009, p. 2). Sampling actors within the community stratum sought to incorporate its inherent diversity as much as possible. Community interviews were conducted on the basis of: demographic characteristics of sex, age; sources and forms of WATSAN services and; membership of community water users' management committee—a legally recognised local self-help group. The resulting sample allowed a logical representation of institutions involved in WATSAN based on its logical representation of the sector framework in Tanzania.



Figure 3.2: The qualitative sample space

Source: Adopted from URT (2006b, p. 58)

3.2.2.5 Selection of institutional actors (respondents)

A total of 12 organisational actors were selected for this study based on the professional functions (legislative, financing and, regulatory or advocacy). This study selected its sample size based on three major factors: saturation, population heterogeneity, and the breadth and depth of questions. Regarding saturation, the researcher was mindful of Bryman's (2012) contention that sample sizes should be adequate to allow theoretical saturation so that no new theoretical insights can be derived from the data. This ensures that a sample provides relevant answers to questions posed. The concept of saturation can also be expanded to include the ability of a

sample to reflect the amount of variability in the study population, which may again be influenced by the study's theoretical underpinnings and questions. Further, the study settled on a qualitative sample size capable of accommodating the breadth and depth of the research questions.

3.2.2.6 Defining institutional actors

Like other key social sectors in Tanzania, WATSAN is still being coordinated from a predominantly top-down perspective. As shown in the institutional map given above, three key ministries (water, health, and local governments) were selected for the state organisations sub stratum. One local authority (Kinondoni Municipal Council, the administrative centre of the case study area) was selected. The Ministry of Water remains in charge of policy formulation, legislation, capacity building and technical support in the sector. The Ministry of Health collaborates with other stakeholders in the design, implementation and evaluation of sanitation concerns in the sector. The Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local Governments (moved to the President's Office since November 2015), coordinates functions of all local and lower level authorities in Tanzania, and it is therefore in charge of the administrative, fiscal and political devolution process in the country. Local authorities in Tanzania are responsible for local development planning and public service provision, and they are therefore key implementers of national policies and legislation in water.

Because of specified functions as per the WATSAN policy (URT, 2002), local councillors were included as part of the state machinery. Local councillors play a crucial role in linking the state and the citizenry. In addition to being in charge of law making, they provide a voice for the vast majority of Tanzanians in development debates at various levels. They are democratically elected and often campaign on specific local development issues such as water. Existing WATSAN legislation promotes increased involvement of non-state actors in WATSAN. A number of independent state agencies and private organisations have since become active in the sector dealing with water management and supply, sanitation, and institutional capacity building. These include quasi autonomous and private organisations involved with advocacy as well as regulatory and consumer protection institutions. Two advocacy groups (the UK's Water Aid; and a local group named Haki Maji) are recognized in this study. Water Aid has been working in Tanzania for over three decades in areas of service provision, capacity building, institutional support, and policy advocacy. It has provided over 75,000 people with safe water and a further 247,000 with improved sanitation (WaterAid, 2013). Similarly, the study sampled recognized the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority's Consumer Consultative Council (EWURA CCC). Further, the study sampled two quasi autonomous state organisations that dominate service provision. The organizations are: DAWASCO (an urban water authority, UWA) and the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF).

Finally, the study sampled one international donor, the World Bank, which is also involved in policy matters on the basis of its long-term engagement in WATSAN. WATSAN obtained more than half of its capital expenditure for the first phase of the urban water supply and sanitation project between 2005 and 2010 from the World Bank. The Bank also plays an active role in various other capital development and sanitation initiatives in the country. Figure 3.3 below summarises the operational focus of the various organisational sub strata.



Figure 3.3: Operational focus of sampled organisations

Source: Author

The WATSAN institutional map (Figure 3.2) recognizes the role of community groups such as users' committees in conflict resolution, crisis management and resource allocation. Consequently, the community stratum featured representatives of the local water users' management committee, and ordinary residents of the case study area. A demographics outline of the sampled community stratum is summarised in Table 3.3 below:

Table 3.3: Characteristics of the Community Stratum

	Community Demographics	Number of respondents	Proportion of Purposive Sample
	Sex	Raw Count	Frequency, %
	Male	14	64
	Female	8	36
Total		**22**	**100**
	Age		
	Young Adults (18-34 years)	3	14
	Lower Middle-Aged Adults (35-44 years)	3	14
	Middle Aged Adults (45-54 years)	8	36
	Upper Middle-Aged Adults (55-64 years)	6	27
	The Elderly (65 years and above)	2	9
Total		**22**	**100**

Source: Author

3.3 Analysis

Qualitative data collected from the field was transcribed, coded and analysed. Analysis was informed by the identification of themes inspired by Ritchie and Lewis's (2003)*Framework Method* for a systematic and flexible approach to analysis. The Framework relates to a method of bite-sizing qualitative data into matrix from which interpretive concepts or propositions can be deduced (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Adoption of the Framework was influenced by its ability to categorise and organise unwieldy qualitative information in a manner that would facilitate its integration with the quantitative component of the study (Gale et al., 2013). Application of the Framework followed a three-step process (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The first process began with data management, in which raw data were reviewed, labelled, tagged and coded as described in open and axial coding. That was followed by generation of descriptive accounts of data wherein data were ordered, selectively coded with codes reviewed and refined. The process ends with data exploration wherein abstract codes were refined, distilled and explanations sought.

Development of a thematic matrix for the study involved a thorough and repeated reading of the transcripts, reflexive journal, as well as a repeated listening of the audio recordings that made up the data. This process focused on identifying repetitions, similarities and differences in the respondents' accounts of civic engagement. At each step of the *Framework,* sentences and paragraphs sharing: linguistic connections, oft repetitions and contrasting accounts, were written down manually in the transcripts' margins. These were then examined in close detail to establish their connections to parts of the thematic structure. No attempts to paraphrase or alter transcribed texts in any way were made during the process.

The study used the NVivo software to keep track of relevant themes and sub-themes. This facilitated the generation of thematic tree maps that helped rationalise the researcher's conceptual interpretation of linkages in the data. These were then examined against theoretical accounts of institutionalism to further understand and explain the phenomena presented by the data.

CHAPTER 4

A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SERVICE REFORMS IN WATSAN IN TANZANIA

As pointed out earlier, the major aim of this research is to examine the role of civic engagement (CE) in the evolving systems for providing water and sanitation (WATSAN) in Tanzania. Presented in Chapter 4, the first part of the result section, are findings and discussions related to the study's first research objective which seeks to examine the institutional framework for CE in WATSAN. In so doing, it gives emphasis to the influence of historical antecedents in defining and shaping institutional structures and reforms for CE. More specifically, in what follows, it is attempted to answer research question 1: How do institutional structure and processes influence CE in WATSAN?

To answer this research question, this chapter adopts a process tracing approach within the framework of historical institutionalism (HI). Three main historical processes, a timely ordered collection of closely related events (Falleti and Mahoney, 2015), are identified by the study. The historical processes are then used to describe and explain how key actors exercised agency to influence the current institutional structures for CE. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents an introduction to public service reforms in WATSAN in Tanzania. This will help highlight the key characteristics of reforms, elaborated further by the three historical processes that gave rise to reforms. Section 4.2 explores the first of these three historical processes. The section explores the notions of agency and power to chart the evolution of modern-day CE reforms to the state's attempts to penetrate society and consolidate its rule. Section 4.3 builds on this and extends the analysis by describing how attempts to consolidate institutional power, paradoxically opened up opportunities for change. Section 4.4 explores how powerful actors influenced the type and timing of PSR reforms in WATSAN. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes by summarising insights from the analyses of historical sequences.

4.1 Introduction

The last few decades have witnessed considerable changes to the WATSAN sector in Tanzania. For the first time, there has been a specialisation of functions with the introduction of two formal water and three sanitation health policies (URT, 2002; URT and World Bank, 2012). These have ushered in performance targets, adopted "international best practices," and introduced an array of other measures aimed at improving service delivery. Examples include the extensive use of strategic planning, promotion of collaboration, efficiency related measures such as cost recovery, civic engagement (CE) etc. Reforms have also seen the creation

of de-jure independent and specialised organisational agencies to administer them (URT, 2014) . At the output end, reforms have also succeeded to expand access to water to some 88% of urban and 57% of rural residents, from 66% and 53% respectively in 2002-2012 (URT, 2014).

Yet, the introduction of PSR reforms in WATSAN has been slow and arduous. Prior to 1993, the administration of WATSAN services in Tanzania was heavily centralised and riddled with all the common malaise of a bloated bureaucracy. The public sector accounted for some 75% of all formal salaried employment (Hammouya, 1999; World Bank, 1989). The payroll was defined by inordinately high levels of employment of particularly unskilled personnel, disproportionately low and inequitable compensation, informal and often non-meritocratic management practices (Rugumyamheto, 1998). The public sector was deployed as a vehicle of patronage in the production and distribution of economic rents (Bryceson, 1993; Hyden, 2005). It provided guarantees of employment, unethically, used to cultivate and sustain social, economic, and political networks. There was a heavy centralisation of decision making within the line ministries with local authorities and other organisations of the public service criminally underemployed.

At the output end, poignantly, there was stagnation and declines in the levels of public services. In WATSAN for example, in 1990 national access to basic sanitation and potable water stood at 24% and 56% respectively (URT, 1991). The situation in the education sector was also quite alarming. For instance, primary school enrolment, which had risen to 96% of the relevant age group in 1980, fell to 76% in 1985, and 68% in 1995 (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Basic Social Indicators, 1960-95

Year	Basic Education,	Basic Health		Basic Sanitation	
	Gross enrolment	Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)	Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	Improved water source (% of population with access)
1960		144	244		
1965		137	232		
1970	34	128	216		
1975	53	118	198		

Year	Basic Education,	Basic Health		Basic Sanitation	
	Gross enrolment	Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)	Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	Improved water source (% of population with access)
1980	96	109	181		
1985	76	106	176		
1990	69	100	165	7	54
1995	68	96	158	8	54

Source:(World Bank, 2015c)

Through a gradual analysis of the underlying characteristics of the political context, institutions involved, and the agency of key reform actors (institutional entrepreneurship), this chapter locates the introduction of CE reforms in WATSAN within the wider context of public sector reforms (PSRs) in Tanzania. Historical analysis suggests that the introduction of PSRs in WATSAN in Tanzania appears to have occurred in three distinct time periods. The first was driven by the immediate realities of independence and demands of self-rule that led to attempts to consolidate party rule, 1961-80. The second arose from an institutional impasse due to internal debate on how to respond to debilitating effects of an economic crisis, 1981-90. The third was necessitated by a reversal of course following prolonged periods of economic malaise and changes to dominant global development paradigms, from 1991 to 2002.

4.2 Penetrating Society and Consolidating State Rule: 1961-80

Historically, one of the most glaring aspects of WATSAN in Tanzania has been the inherent weakness of its regulative institutions. This is, perhaps, better exemplified by the absence of formal policy guidelines for both water and sanitation prior to 1990 (URT, 1990, 1991). The absence reflected, in part, the emphasis on centralisation of government function in the post-independence period. This saw key functional aspects such as social and development planning, delegated to a specialised ministerial entity. Similarly, the absence can be explained by the heightened role played by the ruling party, first by TANU and later by CCM, in structuring policy and priorities. The party saw the public service as an avenue for the projection and reproduction of power. Based on its ideational political and developmental doctrine, *Ujamaa* (a form of African Socialism), the party

consolidated its monopoly of polity by expanding the public service. *Ujamaa* provided the medium for coordinating the organisation and functions of other institutional components (i.e. market, hierarchy, communities, state, networks, and association) in Tanzania. *Ujamaa* amounted to what Hollingsworth refers to as a "dominant institutional arrangement" (2000, pp. 605-6).

The party endeavoured to stifle differentiation of development focus for fear of creating competition for scarce resources and political exploitation, anathematic to its Fabian Socialist ambitions of a cohesive society (Kiondo, 1989). Instead, WATSAN and other social sectors were collectively viewed as vital components of the party-state drive for welfare development (Nyerere, 1967a, b, 1973, 1977; URT, 1969). Some sectoral distinctions did exist, however, between 1961 and 1990. The distinctions were mainly apparent in the form of organisational structures such as ministries, departments, and agencies (along with their financial plans). They were involved in the provision of social services. Despite this, the absence of formal and specific institutions for WATSAN undermined the rational preparation and implementation of sector specific projects and programmes (URT, 1990).

The state, particularly between 1961 and 1990, exercised substantial control of other coordinating modes in society, influencing the role of the public service. The post-independence period (from 1961) saw an expansion of the public service (both parastatal and civil service) as the ruling party, using the state as a medium, consolidated its reach in the economic and political spheres of life. This was accomplished using two major instruments, discussed in detail below:

i. Politics— using mainly the 1967 manifesto for African Socialism, the *Arusha Declaration*; and

ii. Development plans.

These two instruments complemented one another. On the one hand, the plans served as technocratic blueprints for development. On the other hand, the manifesto provided the ideological undercurrent of state-ownership of capital and emphasis on central planning. The design of these institutions was informed by challenges to the state and party's political authority in the early 1960s. These occurred in the form of mass industrial actions and a failed mutiny by the military that re-equilibrated (Capoccia, 2015) political orthodoxy in the country. These dynamics are examined in detail below.

4.2.1 Politics and State Reach

The institutional environment of the public service in WATSAN reflected the state's vision of an egalitarian society enshrined by the principles of *Ujamaa* or African Socialism. In its basic form, this called for equality in the distribution of public rents, with social services such as WATSAN and

education at the forefront. In part, cognisant of the ideological and incentive cleavages within the public service, its then leader Julius Nyerere (1961-85) advanced the adoption of a Leadership Code in 1971. The code, part of a larger policy blueprint popularly known as the *Arusha Declaration*, outlined the ethical requirements expected of a public servant (Nyerere, 1967a, b). The code denounced shareholding and directorship in private enterprises, multiple salaried work, and private ownership of property for renting purposes (Nyerere, 1967b). The Leadership Code equated such behaviour with capitalist and feudalist tendencies, inimical to the state's vision of an egalitarian society. State concerns on the potential distortionary effects of the public service can, in fact, be traced back to Nyerere's speech to the parliament two years before independence:

> We draw salaries not to suit the condition of Tanganyika at all…We have huge salaries of £2,500 and £2,700 and we take them for granted in a country of mud huts… We will have to put the emphasis where that emphasis must be laid and this is raising this country, sparing every penny so that that penny produces another penny for the development of this country. (Nyerere, 1959, p.4)

The public service's institutional environment was also emboldened by the gradual permeating of the polity by the ruling party, TANU (which later changed its name to CCM from 1977) (Jennings, 2003). The quest for party dominance of the polity began immediately after 1961 when party members previously excluded from the colonial administration by virtue of their association (party membership in the civil service was forbidden by the colonial authorities in the 1940s) or the inadequacy of their qualifications, advanced claims on their share of the spoils of independence (Mlimuka and Kabudi, 1985; Shivji, 1986). With its legitimacy and support base in the grassroots movement, elements of TANU's top leadership sought to use employment in the public service to placate uneasiness within its rank and file.

Additionally , a deterioration of relations between the party and the organised labour movement strengthened the party's resolve to monopolise the exercise of authority through its control of the state (Mihyo, 1983; Mukandala, 1999). In 1962, disagreements over pay and personnel policy led to 152 incidents of industrial action costing the state 417,474 man-days (Mukandala, 1999; Shivji, 1986). The unions argued that the strikes manifested from the alleged failure of the government and TANU to:

i. reform the East African High Commission—which administered some parastatals on behalf Tanzania and her neighbours Kenya and Uganda—which it accused of bias against the Tanganyika/Tanzania workforce from which it drew only 14 percent of its workforce (ILO, 1974);

ii. expedite the indigenisation of the public service; and

iii. safeguard the autonomy of trade unions with its tabling of a parliamentary bill to regulate union funding and industrial action (Mihyo, 1983; Mukandala, 1999).

Contrary to that, TANU interpreted the strikes as a direct challenge to its authority. In the eyes of the party, if left unchecked, the strikes would undermine its legitimacy as a party "in touch" with the people and capable of addressing popular concerns (McQuinn, 2011).And through its control of both the government and parliament, TANU's reaction was thus swift. It wielded the full coercive power at its disposal by passing four pieces of legislation in 1962 which effectively abolished industrial action through leaded bureaucracy and demands for compulsory arbitration; stripped civil service leadership of union membership; and gave the state discretion over trade union finances (Mihyo, 1983; Mukandala, 1999). Further, the party closed down the space for articulation of independent ideas at the community level by mandating the conduct of development planning through the newly formed Village and District Development Committees (VDCs and DDCs, respectively) in 1962. At their inception, the Vice President Rashid Kawawa (formerly of a trade union leader) tasked VDCs with, "All development activities in their areas… [including but not limited to]…school attendance, health education, game protection, agricultural production"(Kawawa, 1963 cited by ; Jennings, 2007, pp. 78-9).

TANU populated the VDCs and DDCs with its local level chairperson and secretary, in addition to members of village councils, local cooperatives, and other locally co-opted influential members of the community (Jennings, 2007, 2003). This signalled the unofficial beginning of dual party-state employment under the infamous *KofiaMbili* system, wherein party membership became a qualification for employment in the civil service (Whitfield et al., 2015).

In January 1964, the army mutinied for five days over the slow pace of indigenisation and limited opportunities for promotion within its indigenous cadre (Gerhart, 1964). The mutiny was unsuccessful but provided a watershed moment for the state, effectively re-equilibrating its approach to reforms. The state used the mutiny as a pretext to implicate the trade union leadership with treason. The party subsequently brought the full weight of the state's coercive powers to bear on the trade unions. Utilising legislation passed two years earlier, TANU invoked the full letter of the Preventive Detention Act No. 60 to detain the trade unions' president, Victor Mkello, and 200 others (Friedland, 1969; Mukandala, 1999). TANU subsequently codified and institutionalised the doomed fate of the labour movement with the passing of the 1964 National Union of Tanganyika Workers Establishment Act. The act dissolved the trade unions and outlawed all union activity outside the newly formed and state-controlled apex organisation, the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA).

Whilst successful at signalling compliance with the state development objectives, the elaborate institutional environment for the public service

undermined institutional entrepreneurship among state employees. Demands for conformity with dominant political logics transgressed the organisational independence of the public service. Key features of organisational performance such as planning, leadership, human resources management (Boyne et al., 2010) found themselves under the combined coercive and mimetic pressures of institutional bureaucracy increasingly dictated by the party. In response to external challenges to its rule of the early 1960s, TANU moved towards *de-jure* assentation of its solitary status in Tanzanian politics.

The adoption of the *Arusha Declaration* in February 1967 further increased the party's dominance of the crucial economic sphere in Tanzania. In addition to introducing the Leadership Code discussed earlier, the manifesto called for state ownership of the major means of production. In practice, this translated to party ownership as the distinction between it and the state had become all but completely blurred. The declaration codified the politicisation of public service. Party leaders assumed joint party and government responsibilities under the *KofiaMbili* system (Whitfield et al., 2015). This saw the appointment of party officials to administrative positions in central and local governments, and damagingly, in parastatals (see Figure 4.1 below). This served to widen the ruling coalition of the party at the expense of the state.



Notes: This organisational control structure applied during the period 1969-1986. # Nyerere held positions both the state and chairman of the party. * PPOAC = Parliamentary Parastatal Organization Accounts Commit Presidential Standing Committee on Parastatal Organizations, TIIPCO = Tanzania Investment Promotions Committee, NUTA = Union of Tanzania Workers, CPMA = Committee on Parastatal Agreements, NBC = National Bank of Commerce, NPC = National Price Commission, TAC = T Corporation.

Figure 4.1: Organisational structure for the control of parastatals under *KofiaMbili*, 1969-86

Source: Skoog (2000, p. 91)

The *Arusha Declaration* had profound effects on the public service beyond its ideological influence on organisational practices. It also affected its size and qualitative composition. Within a fortnight of its adoption, a series of legislations nationalising private companies in the key economic sectors of finance, insurance, agriculture, trade etc. followed suit (Edwards, 2012). Qualitatively, the *Arusha Declaration* presented the party with an

ideological schema to justify its interference with public services. The declaration became a repository of moral legitimacy against which norms and values of public service would be constructed, monitored and evaluated. The declaration deleteriously encouraged a confluence of both rule and non-rule- based approaches by the party to influence the public service. Party leadership wielded excessive personal influence on public service employment. An assessment of personnel reforms in the public service between 1967 and 1975 concluded:

> As a result of the heavy politicized nature of the state … the process of selection and promotion of top-level technocrats … tends to be strongly influenced by factors other than sheer professional competence. [Selection] [M]ostly follows an informal pattern based on contacts and personal knowledge, considerations of political commitments, ideological orientation and patriotic pretensions weigh heavily on the government's decision.(El Namaki, 1979, p. 45)

Internal capacity constraints coupled with the strength of dominant veto players, particularly Nyerere and Kawawa—the chairman and vice respectively, allowed the party leadership to institutionalise personal whims through the formal channels of the party's decision making entity, the National Executive Committee (NEC) and subsequently parliament (Bryceson, 1993; Mlimuka and Kabudi, 1985). For example, the 1971 adoption of TANU Guidelines—known as *Mwongozo*, as government policy encouraged the formation of workers' councils—principally party branches, at the workplace under the pretext of preventing divisive managerial practices (TANU, 1971). This weakened managerial autonomy as it privileged workers with the political authority to challenge managerial decisions on account of their anti-socialist content (Skoog, 2000). In the words of a senior official in the Ministry of Water, the result was, "a gradual decline in discipline at the workplace that would outlast *Ujamaa."*

Further, with employment and spending policies increasingly dictated by the party-captured state, operational objectives bore little resemblance to strategic thinking (Bryceson, 1993; Mihyo, 1983). Consequently, there was a collapse of discipline and professionalism in the wider civil service, as managers, fearful of political recriminations, turned to apathy.

4.2.2 Development Plans and State Reach

The public service experienced its first significant expansions under the first five-year development plan of 1964-9 (hereinafter FFYP). Its objectives were pledged against the country fully meeting the public service's HRM requirements—itself a key aim of the plan (Edwards, 2012). In WATSAN, this period saw attempts by the nascent state to expand access through free provisioning in rural areas (Mashauri and Katko, 1993)and consolidate the registration of customary and traditional use rights provided for by legislation in 1959 (Lein and Tagseth, 2009). The

state emphasized the need for dispersed rural communities to cluster around recognisable geographical areas to help with service provision. This was met with muted defiance and avoidance which confounded the goals of the state. In the absence of formal platforms for enforcement and the need to cultivate legitimacy—through populism—the state found itself hamstrung over how best to implement such a drive (Jennings, 2007). Within the party machinery, there were frustrations with the rate of progress with silent debates prevalent on the use of more coercive means against the resistant public. For example, the youth wing of the party, the TANU's Youth League (TYL), volunteered the use of its members to coercively implement the government's directive (Bjerk, 2015; Brennan, 2006). Such divisions, however, failed to challenge the veto strength of the party leadership under J.K Nyerere and R. Kawawa, the secretary general. Nonetheless, partisan disagreement over the party's capture of the state—particularly the direction of policy (Samoff, 1979)—had begun to foment wider dissatisfaction over the distribution of political and economic rents that would alter the trajectory of policy for years to come.

The adoption of the *Arusha Declaration* saw an upscaling of *villagisation*—a policy aimed at cooperatively organising rural life and production and influence of the ruling party, (TANU) beyond the political sphere (Schneider, 2004, 2007). By mid-1970s, the politicisation of the bureaucracy by the *Arusha Declaration* had become a source of consternation both within elements of the party and the public service. For some in the party, the Leadership Code had constrained their personal ambitions. For these party members, access to authority was seen as a viable path to economic rents (Samoff, 1979), inadvertently helped by the promotion of the *KofiaMbili* scheme (Shivji, 1976). On the other hand, public employees objected the additional of layer of scrutiny on their behaviours for various reasons.

To reinforce institutional legitimacy, the state prioritised the closing of regulatory loopholes in the public service. In WATSAN, this included the enactment of formal legislation (but NOT policy), programmes, and projects in support of the developments plans aimed at social equality (Nyerere, 1967b, 1977). Institutional conduct in WATSAN orbited around the socialist ideology of the state. Implementation of the *Villagisation* programme led to heavy state investment to eliminate development inequalities between urban and rural areas. The biannual party conference in 1971 explicitly called on the state to prioritise resources on rural water, health and basic education services (Nyerere, 1973). Subsequently, a twenty-year rural water supply programme was launched in 1971. That was part of the country's Second Five Year Development Plan (SFYP, 1969-74) aimed at expanding free access to potable water to within 400 metres of rural households (Gondwe, 1990; Gearheart et al., 1982). Further, administrative deconcentration in 1972 increased the flow of public sector resources in WATSAN to regional administrations (*de jure* local authorities but *de facto* extensions of the central government).

In early 1973, some organisational restructuring took place within the ministry of Health leading to the creation of a specialist division for preventive services to oversee national sanitation concerns. This was followed by the launch of the hugely successful collaborative *MtuniAfya* public health campaign involving education, and higher learning authorities. A 1978 independent evaluation by USAID associated the campaign with a 60 percent improvement in community sanitary practices (Hall, 1978). However, there were imbalances between financial capacity and service demand in WATSAN. These led to inter-organisational tensions in WATSAN (Interviews). Initially, such tensions were subdued because of the highly cohesive and coercive party-state structures. The party-state adopted a carrot and stick approach to influence compliance in WATSAN in addition to its wider policy of staffing the public service with party loyalists under the *KofiaMbili* scheme. The carrot entailed patronage such as fast-tracked promotion within the service (Shivji, 1986). The stick ranged from outright dismissals and demotions (Schneider, 2004), to transfers of "troublemakers" to remote regions or technically unsuited portfolios. As one of the headline policy areas of the socialist party-state, opposing thoughts in WATSAN had to be muted as "DISCIPLINE … [HAD] TO FOLLOW DECISION[S]" (Nyerere, 1973, p. 64, capitalisation in the original).

The legislative framework in WATSAN was shored up in 1974 with the enactment of the first Water Utilisation Act. The enactment legalised the free provision of WATSAN services in rural areas and accorded mandates for the supervision of services and setting of user fees in urban areas to line ministries. Another collaborative effort, the *Food is Life* campaign, was launched in 1975 to incorporate nutrition elements in consolidation of gains from the 1973 *Mtu ni Afya.* In 1976, urban councils were restored, relocating the administration of WATSAN affairs from ministries in urban areas. It is worth noting that despite these endeavours, there was little integration between water supply and sanitation between 1961 and 1977. The sole exceptions were the inter-ministerial planning meetings for the various campaigns. In spite of these collaborative meetings, individual ministries still worked in isolation in executing their separate components.

Attempts to expand the state reach through investment in social services saw the initiation in late 1977 of a pilot projects integrating water supply and sanitation was initiated in late 1977 in the rural Southern Highlands region of Wanging'ombe, Iringa. The first phase of the project saw the extension of gravity-fed water supplies to some 80,000 villagers, and the construction of 450 (of which100 completed) VIP latrines (Gearheart et al., 1982).

Economically, however, the 1970s were a turbulent decade for Tanzania. Most of the state's social overtures to consolidate its rule were reliant on physical inputs paid for by a declining agricultural sector, which was then the primary earner of foreign currency. It borrowed to fund development

and the expansion of the public service that accompanied it. Approximately a quarter of its annual GDP was spent on capital investment in the period 1969-74. The country's development plans had not produced desired results and had in fact made the country vulnerable to business cycles as they drained its reserves of foreign currency (Coulson, 1982; Lofchie, 2014). Furthermore, the country's parastatals—introduced by the *Arusha Declaration*—imposed added constraints on already limited resources (Skoog, 2000). There was competition for scarce resources amongst the social services. That was exacerbated by the prioritisation of universal primary education under the *Arusha Declaration*'s strategy of *Education for Self-Reliance* (later refined, with equal emphasis, by another declaration in 1974). Resource scarcity further reinforced percolating tensions within the bureaucracy. These would play out in the political landscape of the era discussed in earlier.

The state's insistence on providing free water services to dispersed rural populations further constrained already stretched finances. Mashauri and Katko (1993) contend that this adversely affected the state's ability to maintain existing infrastructures. For example, in Dar es Salaam (the country's largest Metropolitan), only two of the city's 17 sewage pumping stations remained operational between 1979 and 1986 (Maskel, 1986 cited in Gondwe, 1990). Nationally, between 50 and 75 percent of water supply systems were estimated to be periodically inoperable as economic downturn led to generalised shortages of fuel, motivation and managerial capacities (Gearheart et al., 1982).

Demographics also affected the demand for already overstretched WATSAN services. Between 1970 and 1988, the population grew at an average of 3 percent per annum while the proportion of residents in urban centres doubled (World Bank, 2015c). The principle driver of urbanisation came from rural migrants, who found homes in the proliferating slums. Consequently, stagnation (and even reversals) became a feature of WATSAN outcomes. Table 4.2 below provides a summary of the major recorded events in WATSAN between 1950 and 1980.

Table 4.2: Summary of key institutional developments in WATSAN, 1950-1980

Year	Event	Description
1956	The Public Health (Sewerage and Drainage) Ordinance	Confers regulatory mandates for sanitation to the national ministry responsible for Health services.

Year	Event	Description
1959	Adoption of the nation's third Water Legislation	Revisions to 1948 Act to extend licences and mandates to Native slums in Urban Areas. Sets provisions for the registration of customary or traditional rights (Lein and Tagseth, 2009).First WATSAN national legislation to be passed by an assembly dominated by the native's Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The 1948 Act: incorporated concerns for the development of facilities for urban administrative centres; adopted cost sharing policy in capital development under the pretext of increasing civic engagement; and conferred a 1:3 division between central and local authorities respectively (URT, 2005b).
1967	*Arusha Declaration*	Nationalisation of infrastructure, utilities, and non-state schemes. Affirmation of the party's commitment to free provision of WATSAN.
1971	Proclamation of Rural Water Supply Programme (RWSP)	• A twenty-year initiative aimed at providing all rural households with free reliable access to potable water within 400 metres by 1991. • First attempt at decentralising and regularising strategic planning with the development of water master plans for all but three regions.
1972	Administrative De-concentration	Abolition of local authorities and transfer of local development planning and service delivery to regional administrations.

Year	Event	Description
1973	Launch of the *Man is Health* or *Mtu ni Afya* campaign	• A first collaborative effort involving health, rural development, and education authorities focusing on preventive (mainly sanitation) measures and maintenance of reading skills for participants in the country's 1970-75 national literacy campaign (Hall, 1978). • Disseminates: One million copies of booklets, 75,000 copies of sanitation manuals for study group leaders, and twelve weeks of 30-minute national radio broadcasts on specific diseases and related prevention (Gearheart et al., 1982). Also conducts sensitisation seminars, workshops, and conferences for service providers. Outcomes: By 1978 Coverage estimated at 2,000,000 people—more than a tenth of the entire population at the time; some 750,000 latrines were constructed, and a 60 percent community improvement in health-related practices (Hall, 1978).
1974	The *Water Utilisation (Control and Regulation) Act,* the first major legislation on WATSAN in the post-independence era	Confers legal mandates to state authorities and abolishes recognition of customary rights not yet registered.
1975	Launch of the *Food is Life* or *Chakula ni Uhai* campaign	Consolidates gains from *Mtu ni Uhai* with focus on the link between water, sanitation, and nutrition.
1976	Reintroduction of Urban Local Authorities	WATSAN responsibilities became increasingly fragmented among line

Year	Event	Description
		ministries, regional administrations, and now urban authorities
1977	UN's conference on international sustainable water resources in Mar del Plata, Argentina	• Provides a framework for the harmonisation of national water policies for "optimum utilisation . . . , maximisation of benefits . . . and the satisfaction of present and future water requirements . . ." (Biswas, 1978, p. 80). • Issues an Action Plan declaring the 1980s, *the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade.*
1978	UN's Conference on Primary Health Care in Alma-Ata, USSR (present day Almaty, Kazakhstan).	Enunciates state involvement in the prioritisation, integration, and coordination of sanitation in realisation of the adopted *Health for All* objective by the year 2000 (WHO and UNICEF, 1978).

Source: Author

4.3 Infiltrating the State and the Struggle for the Executive's Ear, 1981-90

The strive for party and state supremacy between 1961-80 had succeeded in producing agents within the ruling establishment that did not share its ideology and associated practices (Edwards, 2014), at least not with the same zeal and clarity of conviction as Nyerere. Elements of the *Arusha Declaration*. Constraints on capital ownership for political and public service leadership were, in particular, a source of latent discord within the polity (Edwards, 2012). Most affected were elites who had been exposed to Western capitalism and education; elites who had not come through the party ranks in the 1950s, and thus shared little ideological identity with its grassroots movement; and those born into relative privilege. In the 1960s, these included the TANU's Secretary General, Oscar Kambona and Chief Abdallah Fundikira, who had also served as ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Affairs (Mwakikagile, 2010). These people opposed the increased influence of informal approaches to policy that had begun to cultivate a personality cult around Nyerere. Moreover, they found uneasiness with the immediate expansion of the public service advocating for a more measured approach.

Opposition to official doctrine was, however fragmented and muted, understandably in the wake of trade unions struggles, the failed mutiny, and the need to preserve a narrative of party unity for the young nation. The strength of dominant veto players (socialist elements within the party and state) and the limited discretion in the interpretation of ideology combined to limit strategic choices of change agents. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) contend that the strength of a coalition increases the cost of acting against it, thus limiting the extent of agency. This is exactly what happened in Tanzania. Opposition to the extant institutional logics in this era was forced into submission or silent subversion as they searched for coalitional support in pursuit of their cause. The renowned Nyerere's biographer, DaudiMwakikagile (2010) argues that Kambona in particular attempted to dissuade Nyerere and Kawawa against the immediate mass adoption of the *Arusha Declaration* proposing instead a piloting of the scheme. He, however, failed and the manifesto was thus adopted in February 1967. Four months later, Kambona went on a self-imposed exile to London where he would remain for 25 years. In a Parliamentary address, Nyerere decried the subversion and its outcome in an apparent attempt to deter others:

> We are trying to build socialism… There was a certain amount of grumbling at the beginning and some MPs even suggested that the qualifications were hard on people who were just beginning to enjoy the fruits of capitalism…One MP actually left the Parliament on this issue, and one slipped out of the country partly for this reason—although on other pretexts. Incidentally, I hope it will not have escaped notice, or been forgotten, that *the one man who refused to comply with the socialist leadership qualifications was the MP who talked more about socialism and quoted more socialist textbooks than any other member of this House!*(Nyerere, 1970, pp. 6-7, my italics for emphasis)

However, as economic fortunes under socialism deteriorated in the 1970s and early 1980s, a calculating group of pro-reformers emerged seeking a redress of the situation. Like their predecessors in the 1960s, the groups were an informal network of diverse individuals in leadership positions forced to toe the ideological line contrary to their professional beliefs or actual realities. It consisted of officials in key ministries of Finance, Agriculture, Transport, Industry and Trade, the Planning Commission (although the then minister in charge was a fervent opponent of reforms), and the University of Dar es Salaam (Bigsten et al., 1999). A majority of the pro-reformers had had exposure to alternative normative logics (mostly neo liberal) through their training and/or lines of work. Their accreditations helped them converge to a set of common beliefs and logic—the correction of disequilibria in the macro-economy (Edwards, 2012). Although their focus was the macro-economy, the pro-reformers were also interested in addressing gaps and inefficiencies in public finances largely caused by the expansion of the public service.

The post-1967 expansion of the public service had produced divergent outcomes in its quality. In addition to undermining managerial and HR practices, political interference had resulted into a compression of wages, further denting morale. By 1982, the average wage in WATSAN and the wider civil service was worth only two-fifths of its 1970 value (see Figure 4.2 below).



Figure 4.2: Average Real Wages in the Civil Service, 1969-2000
Source: Valentine (2002, p. 4) Based on Data Provided by the Civil Service Department

The distortionary effects of collapsing pay and discipline had already led to pervasive moonlighting (and even "day-lighting"), fraud, and other forms of corruption (Stevens and Teggemann, 2004). Edwards (2014) observes that the expansion of the public service in the 1960s and 1970s had also resulted in the recruitment of highly trained individuals who did not identify with the dominant political ideology of the state. Shortages of qualified personnel in key leadership positions led to an uneasy acquiescent with these (would be) pro-reformers.

Prominent within the pro-reform movement were Edwin Mtei and Cleopa Msuya. Like Nyerere, both had pursued their higher education at Makerere University, an affiliate of the University of London in the 1950s. Mtei had been the founding Governor of the Central Bank (1966-74) before becoming a Minister of Finance and Planning in 1977-9. Msuya, on the other hand, was career civil servant (and later on a distinguished politician). Prior to that, he had served as a Permanent Secretary from 1964-72 (the highest ranked civil servant) in the ministries of Community Development and Culture, Land and Water Development, Economic Affairs and Planning, and later Finance. He became the Minister of Finance in 1972-5 and throughout the 1980s sandwiched by a spell as a Prime Minister in 1980-3.

Mtei and Msuya were later joined by Gilman Rutihinda, a Permanent Secretary of the Treasury in the 1980s and later Governor of the Central Bank (1989-93). These pro-reformers had also support among economists from the University of Dar es Salaam. Most of these had done their training in North America and had little ambitions for currying political favour with the status quo (Bigsten et al., 1999; Edwards, 2014).

From their positions of leadership and technical expertise, the pro-reformers exploited existing programmes or promoted new ones, guided by their relaxed stance on the socialist ideology of *Ujamaa*. The pro-reformers acted in a spirit of covert subversion. Their action was comparable to "Ideological guerrilla… whose members share beliefs about the nature of the politics and economics which differ from those belonging to the power elite*"* (Felleti, 2010, p.47).

The pro-reformers had to disguise their preference for institutional change and follow existing logics. That was because the highly restrictive environment emphasised little discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of *Ujamaa*. Further, the legacy of past open challenges to the dominant authority had encouraged path-dependent acquiescence by exposing the high cost of such action. As rightly argued by Pierson (2015), institutional challengers often behave rationally by considering the likely costs of their actions. The distributed feedback effects (for example, declining wages, morale and discipline) from *Ujamaa* had also incentivised silent agitation for change among those principally motivated by rewards that professional employment (rather than ideology) ought to have brought (Kiondo, 1989; McHenry, 1994 cited in Holtom, 2005). One of the pro-reformers early successes was their inclusion in the World Bank's sponsored mediation between Tanzania and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1980.

The pro-reformers, mainly University based *technopols* including academics like Sam Wangwe, Brian van Arkadie, and John Loxley (Edwards, 2012, 2014)were invited to form part of the technical secretariat of the *Tanzania Advisory Group (TAG)*. The TAG was an international committee of influential individuals appointed to mediate a deep discord over policies between Tanzania and the IMF in the period 1979-82. This galvanised the pro-reform movement by providing them with an identifiable and influential "epistemic network" (Holtom, 2005, p. 560). Pro-reformers subsequently utilised this platform to engage political, business, and bureaucratic elites (Lofchie, 1994; Lofchie, 2014). Such engagements still had to be disguised as intellectual seminars and informal personal conversations, despite the slight thaw in the institutional environment. There were to be more inroads for the pro-reformers when in November 1980, Cleopa Msuya was appointed Prime Minister.

By the early 1980s, adverse effects of the economic crisis began to impact on public finances. These increased the pressure for changes to the status quo. The crisis led to falling real wages, declining services and shortages of

consumer goods. In WATSAN, the crisis led to a three year freeze on development spending between 1979 and 1982 (Gearheart et al., 1982). The crisis exposed flaws in public policy, slowly undermining the legitimacy of the socialist doctrine. There were muted debates and general uneasiness with the state and party (Lofchie, 2014). Cognisant of the increasing loss of popular legitimacy, the state moved to relax some institutional constraints on policy. In 1982, on the advice of Msuya, the delivery of some social services (including WATSAN) was partially devolved to re-established local authorities (Interviews). However, the prevailing economic crisis constrained sectoral development in the 1980s. The crisis saw a three-year postponement to the start of operations for the National Urban Water Authority (NUWA), a parastatal for the provision of water supplies in urban areas, formed in 1981. NUWA was the predecessor to the current WATSAN utilities provider, the Dar es Salaam Water Supply Company (DAWASCO). Even when it did become operational, the crisis restricted the geographical coverage of NUWA to effectively to a single geographical province (region); the envisioned national coverage was practically unattainable(Gondwe, 1990).

Several authors have observed an escalation of the intellectual battle of thoughts for the executive's ear in the period 1980-1983 (Edwards, 2012; Lofchie, 2014). In academia, this saw intense debates between pro and anti-reformers for a slim-lined and profit oriented public sector. At the cabinet level, this pitted Msuya against KighomaMalima, the then influential Minister of Planning and Finance (also a 1971 summa cum laude graduate from Princeton University). Disagreements between the two political heavyweights orbited around the causes of the macroeconomic crisis and remedial measures. The pro-reform movement emphasised the influence of internal factors particularly low productivity which was argued to be a consequence of inadequate price incentives in both the productive sectors and the public service (Edwards, 2012, 2014). In contrast, anti-reformers attributed the engulfing crisis to external factors particularly the 1978-9 war with Uganda, and the global oil crisis of the 1970s. For them, further public spending would promote an improvement of the business cycle. Naturally, the anti-reform movement commanded greater influence particularly with widespread and entrenched patronage that the then extant logics provided. Public criticism of the pro-reformers was intense and often spilled into various caricatures of "imperialist puppets" (Bagachwa, 1992, p. 40). At the cabinet level, Malima accused Msuya and the pro-reformers of treachery in an audience with president Nyerere (Bigsten et al., 1999).

Despite these challenges, Msuya was instrumental in convincing Nyerere of the need for administrative restructuring of the public service. First, there was the de-jure restoration of rural authorities in 1982 (urban ones had been re-established in 1976) heralding the gradual reversal of 1972's administrative deconcentration (URT, 2008). Second, an executive commission was formed to review the role and structure of the public service in 1983 (Halfani, 1998). The commission was led by Peter Kisumo,

a lifelong friend of Msuya, who had been a minister for Regional Administration and Rural Development in the 1960s and 70s. The 1983 output of the commission, known as the Kisumo report, found inefficiencies in financial and managerial practices within the bloated public service (Lukumai, 2006). Specific recommendations (some of which were executed) included: rationalisation of the civil workforce, consolidation of ministerial duties and structures, and targeted assistance for community engagement schemes in social service provision (Lukumai, 2006). The Kisumo Commission marked a significant turning point in how the political hierarchy viewed the public service. This was translated in the 1983/4 budget which introduced user fees in health, reduced subsidies to parastatal organisations, and reduced public expenditure by 30 to 35 percent (Holtom, 2005).Notwithstanding his friendship with Msuya, Kisumo was a man of great integrity and commanded significant respect within the party.

In February 1983, Msuya was moved to the Ministry of Finance in an effort to mend relations with the IMF, which had become strained over the direction of economic policy, as the need for external assistance out of the economic downturn amplified. In the same reshuffle, Malima, Msuya's political adversary, was given a downsized portfolio at the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs. The downgrading of the pro-reform movement's most visible actor once again reminded actors of the veto capabilities of the executive and party.

Despite seeking to monopolise domestic policy, the party/state was aware of the legitimacy that came with international recognition. Between 1960 and mid-1970s, the concept and practice of *Ujamaa* positively resonated with other developmental states (for example the Scandinavian states of Sweden, Denmark and Finland) and the then World Bank president Robert McNamara. These provided assistance both financial and in-kind (mainly professionals and training opportunities) to the country. Foreign professionals in particular helped provide an objective take on *Ujamaa*. In WATSAN, foreign professionals worked alongside the ministry to push for the conventionalisation of operations through the development of a specialised formal water policy. The United Nations' Declaration of the 1980s as an International Water and Sanitation Decade (United Nations, 1987) further enhanced the legitimacy of these attempts at rule revision.

Nevertheless, there were disagreements among key WATSAN actors—between ministerial technocrats and their minister—over the pricing of services and the devolution of ministerial authority to accommodate decentralisation of services. These reflected reform dynamics in the wider public service with stasis dominating outcomes. Despite their lack of instant success, subversive actors in WATSAN had already succeeded in altering the discourse over policy. Such strategies, Pierson argues, enhance the institutional power of agents (2015). By mobilising in favour of large-scale cost sharing in WATSAN, the technocrats had predetermined the set

of policy alternatives available at any future point in time. Awareness of such alternatives would shape deliberations and inform the consequences of any action taken. However, it would take until 1991 for the country's first water policy, which introduced large scale cost sharing, to be approved. The content of this policy and subsequent discourse in WATSAN has reflected the path-dependent effects of the 1980s institutional contests.

Institutional tensions in WATSAN in the 1980s extended beyond the design of policy. Ministerial responsibility for water alone traded platforms three times between 1980 and 1987 from Water, Energy and Minerals, to Land Urban Development and Water, before gaining an independent unified ministry (Gondwe, 1990). Despite being able to charge for urban water supplies, fee collection was sporadic and incommensurate with operational costs let alone investment. In 1987, the Principal Secretary had his request for the review of volumetric fees publicly rejected by the party and parliament (Mashauri and Katko, 1993). It was clear that despite diminutions of the state's financial veto, party loyalist still courted popular legitimacy at all costs. The rejection constrained and undermined the authority of WATSAN's leading regulatory agent, as they had been led to believe to be with a chance for a fair appraisal. The failure to supplement the WATSAN budget with higher user fees contributed to the proliferation of unethical practices as employees sought to make ends meet using the only tools at their disposal, public resources.

As the economic downturn escalated in the 1980s, the coalitional strength of the organised veto players began to wane and that was manifested in different ways. First, president Nyerere decided against standing for re-election in 1985 and was succeeded by Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a moderate. Secondly, in 1986, Tanzania ceded to IMF's conditionalities under a stand-by agreement in return for external assistance, further tilting the balance of power. Third, the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe towards the end of the decade underscored weaknesses of the dominant Socialist logics. This further eroded the normative and cultural-cognitive legitimacy of the centralised public service. As noted by Bigsten et al. (1999), the cumulative effect of these events, particularly the status of the economy and the collapse of the USSR, eventually forced prominent anti-reformers to concede defeat and they were subsequently ousted from the Cabinet.

Therefore, from a position of relative weakness and isolation, the pro-reformers had gradually succeeded to infiltrate the state and introduce new institutional logics alongside existing ones. Unintended consequences of the expansion of the state and party had paradoxically created an opening for subversive agents through their deleterious effects on the economy. Aided by their clandestine and informal nature, pro-reformers were able to conceal their motives until such time when the conditions were ripe for agitation of a revision of rules. Further, the role played by their agent embedded in the decision-making hierarchy, Cleopa Msuya (See Bigsten et al., 1999 and Edwards, 2014), was decisive in steering the reform agenda

without alienating the powerful status-quo in a manner that would have spilled into an open conflict, which would have likely ended in defeat.

4.4 Gradual Institutional Evolution of the Public Service Machinery, 1991-2002

The gradual evolution of reforms in the public service partly reflects the change strategies deployed by the pro-reform movement. Recognition of the strategic limitations of their combined action necessitated patience and adaptation to work within the status quo to procure their desired outcomes. In a true subversive style(Schedler, 2013), the pro-reform movement bided time waiting for the opportune moment—an inflection point or a critical juncture, when institutional and environmental conditions were right for the revision of dominant logics. The economic crisis of the 1970s and 80s changed the complexity of the institutional environment and forced dominant veto players to relax enforcement of rule application that had constrained interactions including intellectual discussions on socialism and the economy as well as the growing influence of international actors through development assistance. While they waited, the pro-reformers quietly consolidated their power base by expanding their permeation of the state and party through influencing appointments of key personnel within the bureaucracy (for example, the central bank, Ministry of Finance, the University of Dar es Salaam, etc. (Kiondo, 1989)and the executive's ear (for example, the heads of executive review commissions). Additionally, they found ready-made allies in the external development agencies whose influence increased as the need for economic assistance heightened. Thus, much like the 1970s and 80s *Sanitarista* movement in Brazil's Health Care System (Falleti, 2010), Tanzanian pro-reformers exploited opportunities for change within an institutional field not of their own making.

The combined actions of the pro-reformers and the additional constraints of the precarious macro economy had set in motion path-dependent events that would challenge the legitimacy of existing institutions. In other words, there was a slow erosion of the legitimacy of extant logics as their distributive (feedback) effects adversely affected the majority, least not powerful members of the ruling class. Institutional sectors such as WATSAN experienced a diffusion of institutional layering i.e. the introduction of new rules alongside existing ones (Streeck and Thelen, 2005), which trickled-down from the rest of the public service. These sectors also saw parallel frictional dynamics between pro and anti-reform agents. The aforementioned 1987 review of service costs in WATSAN may be regarded as one among many such battles.

The uneasy settlement between the two reform protagonists resulted in institutional structures vulnerable to contradictory applications. First, there were severe legal loopholes that affected compliance and order. There were no formal sectoral policies and existing legal codes were hopelessly out-dated. A corollary of this was rule ambiguity (lack of precision) which impacted the legitimacy of formal instruments. Second, there was a severe

misalignment of regulative and the normative and cultural-cognitive logics. Coupled with economic malaise, decades of politicising the public service had eroded professionalism and ethics. This had altered the values, norms, and cognitive understandings of both service providers and users. To make matters worse, corruption was rampant and duty of care non-existent.

Yet, despite a now growing ideological coalition of the pro-reform movement, public service leadership remained resistant to change. The parastatal sector was the main source of stasis (Skoog, 2000). First, President Mwinyi even reneged on his parliamentary inaugural promise to sanction parastatal organisations that had not improved their accounting practices by 1987 (Kiondo, 1989). This seemed to embolden allies of the status quo in relation to the scope of allowed actions as it effectively signalled a reward for non-compliance. Second, and as a corollary, the divestiture of parastatals agreed under a 1986 Economic Recovery Programme faltered with only twenty such entities having been reformed by 1991 (Skoog, 2000). This had been attributed to an inability to enact requisite legislation due to a failure to reach a political consensus (Mans, 1994 cited in Edwards, 2014). Third, there was widespread tolerance of parastatal malpractices at the executive level with the extension of soft budget constraints to poor performers rather than sanctions (Edwards, 2014; Skoog, 2000).

In remedy, the pro-reformers had to rely on the coercive efforts of a powerful external ally to re-establish the compliance to the rules of engagement. The pro-reform movement secured the institutional support of the World Bank's IDA, IMF, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to provide funding for the 1991 Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) and a related piece of legislation: the 1992 Public Corporations Act. The 1992 Act had two major impacts for WATSAN. First, it declassified service delivery parastatals and incorporated them into their parent ministries. Second, the Act instituted performance contracts for managers of public utilities. World Bank (2013a) many of these performance contracts were never signed nor adhered to until the third wave of reforms in the late 2000s (World Bank, 2013a).

4.4.1 A *New Era: Mixed Reform Signals and Contradictory Reforms*

The opening up, by layering, of public service institutions from 1991 mirrored developments in other spheres of life (political, economic, and social) previously dominated by the party state. However, the very nature of the institutional changes that had procured them, left them vulnerable to instability through reversals by the still notably powerful defenders of the *ancient régime* and predation by fellow subversives or symbiotic agents seeking to exploit the letter and rule of the law. It is worth recalling that institutional layering occurs by "the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones" (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 15) , without removing or changing the impact of old ones. That is exactly what happened in Tanzania. By pointing out the flaws and adverse consequences

of *Ujamaa*, the pro-reform movement had challenged the *ancien régime's* normative and cultural-cognitive logics. When knowledge of these ideological shortcomings was shared with the public (for example through the University seminar series in the 1980s and other publications) it eroded public support for *Ujamaa*. However, in the absence of formalised rule revisions to *Ujamaa*, the *ancien régime*'s mechanisms of coercion still reigned supreme. Cognisant of this; the party state employed its last remaining card, *reform signals*, in effort to reclaim lost ground. Thus, to sustain institutional changes it remained imperative that the pro-reformers continued to engage the powerful veto actors, international donors, who could keep the remnants of the still powerful *ancien regime* in check. Two such signals are worth considering here.

The first signal was the 1991 adoption of the *Zanzibar Declaration* to succeed the *Arusha Declaration* as the ruling party's policy blueprint. The *Zanzibar Declaration* lifted controls over wealth ownership for civil servants, previously enforced by the 1971 *Mwongozo*. Having witnessed the gradual erosion of legitimacy of the CCM as a result of the economic crisis and increased patronage, Nyerere (now chairman of the country's then only political party but still as influential) called for a public debate on constitutional reforms.

The second signal was the 1992 constitutional revisions stripping CCM of political monopoly upon the recommendations of a review commission headed by the Chief Justice Francis Nyalali formed a year earlier (see Box 4.1 below). The reforms constituted a mere play for time as they called for democratic local elections in 1994 and a general election in 1995. The near immediate scheduling of elections gave the CCM a comparative advantage over newly established opposition parties. The elections pitted a political behemoth that had enjoyed the use of state resources for over 30 years with greater administrative reach in the country than the state itself. That was done against political newcomers struggling to field election candidates.

Box 4.1: Illusory reforms

The 1992 constitutional amendments were a major endorsement of the institutional subversion of the pro-reformers. Not only were they made against the wishes of an opposing parliament, but they also contradicted the actual findings of the commission in which public opinion (80 percent) had overwhelmingly indicated preference for the continuation of single party rule (Baregu, 2000). Amendments were only possible because of the insistence of the party's executive committee, heavily influenced by Nyerere. Baregu (2000) advances three propositions to explain this: One, the majoritarian preference on the single party system may in itself have been premised on preconditions for reforms. Two, the mere indication of preference (albeit by a minority) for a multiparty system could have been an early indicator of much larger but hidden preferences for change. And, thirdly, long term party dominance had made no Tanzanian under then the

age of 40 unaware of alternative political arrangements. The plausibility of these arguments notwithstanding, it remains undeniable that the decision-making authority ultimately rested on the party's executive organ which still danced to Nyerere's tune. A similar scenario had occurred in the 1960s and 1970s over compulsory *villagilisation*, when Nyerere emboldened by the existing logics of the time enforced his personal will on the party and parliament which had expressed misgivings over the policy's unpopularity (Lal, 2012; Schneider, 2004, 2007).

The above signals combined to slow the further layering of reforms in WATSAN and the wider public sector in general. This proved effective at frustrating the zeal of the powerful pro-reform veto ally, the donor community. Nonetheless, they were helpless to improve the economic fortunes of the state. By 1993, there was widespread frustration within the donor community over the stagnating pace of reforms (Edwards, 2012, 2014). There was rampant corruption particularly in the public service, aided and abated by the 1991 Zanzibar Declaration.

An evaluation of reforms by the Nordic countries rebuked the systematic sabotage that had occurred in 1990-3 (Edwards, 2012). Consequently, the UNDP delayed issuing funding for the implementation of the CSRP, designed in 1991. The UNDP would later release such funds in 1993. Relations between the government and donors became strained, further inflamed by a 1994 hostile meeting on the reforms involving the Finance Minister, Kighoma Malima(van Arkadie, 2005). There was a suspension of aid for the financial year 1994/5. A commission, headed by Gerald Helleiner (a former member of the 1980's TAG), which included other local pro-reformers such as Professors Benno Ndulu and Ibrahim Nguvuru Lipumba of the University of Dar es Salaam, was formed in 1994 to mediate between the two sides. The atmosphere was further improved with the removal of Kighoma Malima, at the behest of the World Bank (Holtom, 2005), in January 1995 from the Ministry of Finance after being implicated in a tax exemption scandal (Bigsten et al., 1999).

4.4.2 A New Era: New Public Management (NPM) in the Public Service

The weigh-in of powerful external actors (with significant financial vetoes) in the internal power contests forced a compromise between the reform protagonists. This provided space for the internalisation (i.e. by dilution as a result of balancing expectations of the opposing constituents) of NPM logics (Therkildsen, 2008). Consequently, NPM principles were layered in the two public service reform programmes of the 1990s and 2000s: the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP, 1993-1998), and the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP, 2000-2012).

4.4.2.1 The civil service reform programme

The CSRP aimed to achieve "a smaller, affordable, well compensated, efficient and effectively performing civil service"(Teskey and Hooper, 1999, p. 3). This aim was to be realised through:

i. downsizing of government operations to affordable levels;
ii. rationalisation of the public service to improve efficiency and effectiveness,
iii. development of an open, objective, and competitive pay structure; and
iv. decentralisation of executive functions to local authorities, executive agencies, NGOs and the private sector.

The CSRP had notable successes in reducing the size and cost of the public service. Between 1993 and 1998, public service employment declined by a quarter and that was attributed to privatisation, retrenchment, a moratorium on recruitment (Lukumai, 2006), and from 1997 transfers to local authorities. The nominal wage bill share of GDP increased modestly from 3.4 to 4 percent in the period 1993-99 (Kiragu and Mukandala, 2003), thanks to an expanding economy and wage increments. Pay scales were decompressed and adjusted by some 75 percent to compensate for effects of inflation. However, organisational changes were less forthcoming partly because of the deliberate veto powers of a public service clinging on to normative vestiges of a (now) bygone era, and also quantitative shortages within the pro-reform movement. The ebbing anti-reform clique managed to organise industrial actions, over pay and deteriorating work conditions, by the trade unions in January and March 1994. Measures to decentralise executive functions faltered despite the legal and functional existence of local authorities since 1982 and 1984 respectively.

The coming to power of a pro-reform executive, Benjamin Mkapa, in late 1995 shored up institutional support for reforms, which had begun to waver as the pain of employment freeze and retrenchment took hold. It signalled a change in ideology and policy direction more in tune with the pro-reform movement. Two months after being sworn-in, in January 1996, Mkapa convened a week-long workshop for all public service leadership (including the Cabinet) to emphasise his commitment to reforms (Bigsten et al., 1999). Mkapa was a seasoned veteran of the civil service having had a credible though not a spectacular career since the 1970s. Above all, Mkapa was a diplomat with more than two decades of experience in the Foreign Service as both a minister and an ambassador to Canada and the US. Prior exposure to alternative logics stood him in good stead in the demanding environment of the 1990s. As a diplomat, Mkapa had also amassed a comprehensive portfolio of international contacts. These would come in handy in repairing the relationship with donors (Lofchie, 2014; Edwards, 2014), which in turn helped steer the spread of pro-reform logics. Still,

resistance persisted against this directional shift mainly from within the party. As a result, much of the progress on reforms since 1995 has orbited around the agency of individuals of power rather than collective influence of the majority.

4.4.2.2 The public service reform programme

The CSRP was succeeded by the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) implemented in two phases, 2000-07 and 2008-12. The PSRP focused on the institutionalisation of performance management system and enhancing performance and accountability (URT, 2009e). This period saw the legalisation of many of the pro-reform initiatives through Acts of Parliament, programme designs and the establishment of implementing agencies. Key performance management features of the public service such as decentralisation, specialisation of functions (through sectoralisation of the public service), HR management, strategic planning were codified and institutionalised. The PRSP built on the CSRP's focus on internal administration of the public service. The scope of the reforms was expanded to outputs (service delivery) produced by the public service which led to the adoption of strategic instruments such as civic engagement (examined in chapters 5 and 6). Consequently, some of the achievements of the CSRP such as reductions in employment were reversed (Figure 4.3, below).



Figure 4.3: Public Sector Wage Bill, 1985-2008
Source:Nord et al. (2009, p. 25) Based on data provided by the President's Office Public Service Management/Civil Service Department and the IMF

Perhaps the most prominent features of the PSRP have been the complementarity of the Local Government (LGRP, 1999-2013), Public Financial Management (PFRMP, 1999-2010), and Legal Sector (LSRP, 1999-2011) Reform Programmes. These have facilitated the establishment of an institutional framework through legislation and policy guidelines. The LGRP has been incorporated into specific sectoral policies and plans including those in water, education, health etc. The organisation,

administration, and delivery functions for most of these sectors have subsequently been devolved and decentralised. The focus of the LGRP has been on six key areas (REPOA, 2008):

i. Governance, which has involved community awareness and participation; and the promotion of democracy, transparency, and accountability;

ii. Restructuring of service delivery units including local authorities and sectoral departments;

iii. Finances, enhancing revenue capabilities and efficiency of use;

iv. Human Resources, to improve efficiency and accountability of personnel; and

v. Legal instruments, to codify a conducive environment for effective implementation of reforms.

In WATSAN, the adoption of NPM principles had several spill-over effects. Three of these are critical for this study:

i. One, for the first time in the post-independence era, key sectoral policies in both health (sanitation) and water were adopted in 1990 and 1991, respectively, in place of centralised development plans. These policies marked an ideological change towards formal embracement of specialised fields. This has rationalised the processes of planning, implementation and evaluation (URT, 2002, 2007a). A consistent feature of individual policies since then has been the emphasis on increased collaboration with other actors in service provision.

ii. Two, there has been a gradual recognition of the economic value of WATSAN in addition to its social value. This has seen the introduction of user fees, except for a few vulnerable groups (for example the elderly, infants). A corollary of this has been increased awareness of user rights, differentiation of services offered, and exclusion. This has profoundly challenged entrenched norms on the role of the state as well as citizens' relations with it.

iii. Three, parallel reforms in the political economy of the state have increased the number of influential actors with substantial powers (not necessarily veto) in the WATSAN institutional environment. Civic actors and international donors (both bilateral and multilateral) have gradually permeated the policy space. These agents have carried with them alternative logics and challenged the position of the state with different levers (for example, financial, normative standards, political).

A consequence of the above has been an uneasy equilibrium of the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements of institutions in WATSAN. This has yielded dynamics that have affected organisational

strategies (including institutional carriers such as Civic Engagement) and environment involved in service provision. For example, unethical practices persist in WATSAN with varying consequences. In commemorating the International Water Day in March 2006, the head of the water utility provider for Dar es Salaam lamented the involvement of his own staff in 90 percent of water thefts (de Waal et al., 2008). In sanitation, the misappropriation of funds, drugs and stocks of other supplies exist alongside formal regulative institutions (Rajani et al., 2014; SIKIKA, 2013). Table 4.3 below summarizes formal institutional changes in WATSAN from the gradual layering to the reforms' conflict period of the 1990s. These developments inform much of the path-dependency that characterises current institutional structures and processes examined in chapters 5 and 6 later.

Table 4.3: Summary of policy reforms in WATSAN, 1981-2002

Year	Event	Description
1981	Establishment of National Urban Water Authority (NUWA)	A parastatal for the provision and management of water supplies in Urban Areas. Doesn't begin operations until 1984 due to a debilitating economic crisis and inadequate legal framework. Strengthens the leverage of central ministries over regional administrations in urban water supplies. Sanitation still provided by regional administrations.
1982/83	Reinstatement of local authorities	Transfer of management and delivery of services in primary education, basic healthcare, rural water supply, and district roads to local councils (World Bank, 1989).
1987	Publication of Brundtland's Commission report, *Our Common Future.*	International emphasis for sustainable development of water resources.
	Public admission of the state's growing inability to afford free provision of rural water	Minister of state confesses "The truth is the government can no longer afford the provision of water" (Rt.Hon Pius Ng'wandu in his 1987 parliametary budget speech, cited in Mashauri and Katko, 1993, p. 34).

Year	Event	Description
1990	The first National Health Sector Policy	• First formal rational plan of action. • Pledges to address WATSAN as part of primary healthcare services (URT, 1990).
1991	The first National Water Policy	• Formalises the end of free provision of WATSAN; • Announces WATSAN priorities in domestic use, food production and industries, and hydropower generation (URT, 2005b); • A review in 1993 finds the policy (URT, 2005b): o Unable to support non-state participation, o reducing civic engagement to participatory corvée, o fraught with inadequate legal and institutional framework, and o limited in scope on resources management
	Adoption of CSRP including PSRC	Implementation delayed until 1993. NUWA targeted for divestiture by PSRC.
1992	International Conference on Environment and Development (popularly known as the *Dublin Conference*)	Increases diffusion of international policy practices and agenda. Introduces the Dublin Principles: • Principle 1: Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment; • Principle 2: Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels; • Principle 3: Women play a central

Year	Event	Description
		part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water; • Principle 4: Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.
	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (popularly known as the *Rio Earth Summit*)	Establishes frameworks for action on sustainable development.
1994	Revisions to 1974 Water Utilisation Act	Stipulates sanctions for failure to comply with 1991 Water Policy.
	Start of Health Sector Reforms	• Reforms focus on cost efficiency, reflecting the wider public service's CSRP; • Increased weight to preventive health practices, including sanitation;
1997	Amendments to 1974 Water Utilisation Act	Amendments take account of 1997 Regional Administration Act which led to the disband of NUWA and formation of Urban Water Supply Authorities (UWSAs) in its place.
2000	UN's Millennium Development Summit	Establishes policy goals and targets for member countries. Goal number 7 on commits member countries to halving the proportion of populations without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
	Start of PRSP I	Review and proposal of changes to institutional frameworks in WATSAN

Year	Event	Description
2001	The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) Act	Formal establishment of a public regulator in WATSAN

Source: **Author**

4.5 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter examined the evolution of the Tanzanian public service from a centralised and monolithic structure to a decentralised one. Analysis has explored the tracing of historical process to frame the context within which CE reforms have occurred in WATSAN. With respect to research objective 1 (the examination of the institutional framework for CE), this chapter has revealed the prominence of key actors in shaping reforms, as well as limitations that have profound effects on the institutional structures for CE. Historical analysis reveals two key features of reform structures in Tanzania: institutional tensions and the importance of powerful key actors. These are used to organise the concluding comments below.

4.5.1 Institutional Tensions

PSRs in Tanzania have involved regular contestations for power among various institutional actors that have impacted their design and application. Such agentic conflicts partly account for how long it has taken to implement reforms and their relative outcomes. The organisational and relational structures of the pre-reforms public service (for example, the relative size of the public service and their path-dependent distributive support of clientelistic relationships) have been a source of substantial veto power (Tsebelis, 2002) against reform attempts. The exercise of such power became a source of increasing returns for the pre-reform structures, leading to an uneven distribution of public rents around which support against PSRs was organised. For more than three decades, increasing returns infused the PSR process with inertia (Pierson, 2003, 2004) and diluted their coalitional support. Yet, PSRs have occurred in Tanzania despite the relative strength of the opposition to them.

4.5.2 Powerful key actors

Analysis reveals that PSRs have occurred through a series of small but incremental changes by a loose coalition of actors on the periphery of the existing system. A marginal but influential subversive group of individuals (and external institutions) assumed a fundamental role in procuring these institutional changes. Reform actors were able to introduce changes akin to what Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 15) refer to as “layering” (also see Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Openings for institutional entrepreneurship

were made possible by the state's attempt to consolidate its rule in the 1960s and 70s. In doing so, the Tanzanian state indigenised, expanded, rescaled, and reoriented public administration. These endeavours led to a dilution of the political space the party-state had sought to dominate. However, institutional feedback from consolidation of state rule led to at first bargains and later challenges over rule legitimacy. This occurred as subversive agents infiltrated the state through its own expansion of the public service.

Against a strong coalition of veto players that vacillated between the party, state, and the public service itself, actors in favour of liberalisation were able to infiltrate the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, setup to advance socialist doctrine. Pro-reform actors were able to utilise this platform to incrementally pursue their own agenda. This occurred through the introduction of small or minor revisions to the existing code. The ailing national economy, of the late 1970s to early 1990s, helped conceal the ultimate objective of these changes and their agents. The economic crisis even helped the party state to rationalise the essence of some of the pro-reform agenda. Unwittingly, there was unofficial institutional support from the state, which saw the setting up of commissions of enquiry in the 1980s. Capitalising on these openings, the pro-reformers gradually pushed the system in directions consistent with their own ideology and goals. The chapter also underscores the importance of embedded actors capable of moderating and steering views from the periphery and evading attempts to scupper alternative logics. According to several authors (e.g., Bigsten et al. (1999); Edwards (2014), a highly visible and politically powerful individual called Cleopa Msuya played this balancing role from within. Although this slowed the process, it ultimately led to its triumph in the mid-1990s.

Subversion of the public service was also made possible by the party's attempts to dominate polity through its control of the state. The distributive effects of such move exemplified by the *Arusha Declaration* conspired to create openings for its infiltration by the pro-reformers. Attempts to rapidly expand the public service saw the recruitment of personnel who did not identify with the dominant ideology. Similarly, capacity building undertaken of state employees succeeded in exposing them to alternative logics (as was in the case of University academics). In addition, there were those disaffected by the principles of socialism. On the other hand, however, the penetration of society by the party also helped translate its ideology beyond its instrumental form to a popular orthodoxy. This helped construct strong cultural-cognitive and normative logics that buttressed regulative doctrine. A corollary of this was the quantitatively strong anti-reforms movement, remnants of which still exist today. Clearly, with one hand the party state had given, with the other it had taken away.

Undoubtedly, infiltration of the public service was the catalyst that unhinged the monolithic party-state leading to structural reforms. Public

service reforms in Tanzania have been the result of infiltration of both the polity and the economy by protagonists. PSRs owe a lot to the intervention of external veto players made possible by the economic crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s. The economic crisis, in turn, was the result of attempts by the party-state to construct a socialist society that expanded the public service making it costly and unproductive. The role and influence of external players, in fact, continues to be of significance today, particularly in aspects of WATSAN still affected by historical capacity challenges (Interviews). Chapter 6 explores some of these external interventions in service delivery.

The historical institutionalism perspective adopted in this chapter reveals the long run cumulative effects that seemingly minor additions and revisions of institutional logics had on the Tanzanian public service. This approach contrasts with dominant discourses which attribute reforms to the role played by short periods of significant political (Teskey and Hooper, 1999; Therkildsen, 2000) or economic changes (Halfani, 1998; Rugumyamheto, 1998), commonly referred to in the institutional literature as *critical junctures*(Hall and Taylor, 1996; Krasner, 1984; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Such narratives posit that seismic shifts in the environment external to the public service contrived to undermine the legitimacy of extant logics, paving the path for the introduction of new modes of working (Issa, 2010; Kiragu, 2002; Lukumai, 2006). These explanations emphasize the influence of the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and the subsequent adoption of New Public Management principles in 1991 (implemented from 1993) for providing the aperture that led to the relaxation of institutional and political constraints habitualised (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996) by the erstwhile public service.

In sum, most of the existing analyses of PSRs in Tanzania have predominantly focused on explanations of critical junctures which rather than initiating reforms, served to codify and institutionalise elements of the public service long set in motion by the subversive pro-reforms movement. The contrasting perspective of this chapter contributes to the literature on institutional reforms in Tanzania. Subversive reform agents were not able to mobilise powerful enough coalitions to capitalise on critical juncture moments provided by the precarious economic uncertainty of the 1980s. The (intermediate) result was, however, a "reequilibration*"* of the political landscape (Capoccia, 2015, p. 166). Silent subversion had profound longer term effects in moderating the choices and decisions of powerful veto players. Despite the reform near-misses (Capoccia, 2015; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007) of the 1980s, subversive agents were able to incrementally introduce (by concealment) investment changing preferences and revisions to the discourse in which realisations about the need for departure from the status quo prevailed.

In closing, it is worth acknowledging the considerable scale of changes to WATSAN in Tanzania in the past two decades or so. The WATSAN public service, comprising ministries, independent departments, executive agencies, public institutions (including state owned enterprises, and the then cooperatives), and local authorities (URT, 2009e; World Bank, 2013a), had been administratively rescaled to respond to growing demand for better provision of public services. Administrative rescaling has focused on *rationalisation* and *decentralisation* of the public service. On the one hand, the rationalisation of the public service has broadly entailed redefinition and rescaling of the role and functions of the government (Rugumyamheto, 1998). These have occurred in conjunction with measures to improve the management of the bureaucracy (Bana and Ngware, 2006; Issa, 2010; Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002). On the other hand, decentralisation has embraced institutional pluralism with the increased externalisation of functions and service delivery to local authorities, agencies, and the third (private) sector as concerns for operational efficiency have occupied centre stage in the public service (URT, 1996, 1998, 2008, 2009b; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). These changes have led to outcomes, for example cost sharing, that path-dependently owe their presence to the institutional conflicts of the 1980s.

One consequence of WATSAN's PSRs is that economics have undeniably become the basis against which the winning coalition draws its veto. As the layered institutional changes unravel, their feedback effects are likely to extend beyond the economic sphere. Consequently, this introduces additional variables in the struggle for institutional support and stability. In essence, these are the dynamics that typically underpin any institutional arrangement. It is, however, important to note that the stability of the revised institutional arrangement remains vulnerable to two things. One, its design that is change has occurred through layering which has *challenged rather than displaced* regulatory and normative logics of the socialist system thus leaving it open to predation. Equally vulnerable is the traditionally slow to evolve new cultural-cognitive logics, necessary to buttress the reformed structure.

The rest of this thesis teases out the inherent dynamics of sustaining these institutional changes. This is done by examining the institutional structure and processes for civic engagement, and the influence of civic engagement on service delivery.

CHAPTER 5

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN WATSAN IN TANZANIA

This chapter explores how citizens interact with institutions governing civic engagement (CE) reforms in water and sanitation (WATSAN) in Tanzania. It is to be recalled that the previous chapter adopted a process tracing approach to examine the influence of history on current CE reforms in WATSAN. Chapter 5 examines the institutional framework for CE in WATSAN (*Research Objective 1)*. Following Scott (2003, 2013b), the chapter conceptualizes CE as a medium responsible for the diffusion of public service reforms over time and space. As a medium, CE conveys information that influences rule setting, monitoring of compliance and the administration of sanctions to influence the behaviour of actors in WATSAN. Such information helps regulate the interactions of individual and composite actors necessary for the stability and reproduction including change of PSRs. Considering the carriers used to transport reform ideas and preferences and their potential influence on CE, this chapter presents findings and discussions relating to research question 1 (How do institutional structures and processes influence CE in WATSAN in Tanzania?).

Against the historical layout of institutional reforms in WATSAN in Chapter 4, this chapter maps the formal institutions for CE enacted between 2002 and 2012 (Section 5.1); examines how the formal regulatory reforms in WATSAN influence CE in Tanzania (Section 5.2); and explores the social values and norms invoked by PSRs in WATSAN to influence CE (Section 5.3).The chapter concludes by discussing how the different CE reforms carriers influence interactions between citizens and WATSAN institutions in Tanzania.

In the previous chapter, CE reforms were shown to be the result of a gradual process of incremental changes, referred to as layering by Mahoney and Thelen (2010). That challenged rather than displaced historically dominant institutions in WATSAN. The result was a coexistence of reforms with pre-reform institutions. Considering this characteristics of layered institutional changes, some authors (for example, Andrews (2013); Capoccia (2016);Thelen (2004) argue that reforms of this nature tend to be continually exposed to contestations and renegotiations because of the presence of multiple (and potentially contradictory) institutional structures governing them. Rather, than reinforce the legitimacy of reforms, these dynamics undermine their interpretation and/or enactment in practice.

To test these arguments for CE reforms in WATSAN in Tanzania, in the light of research question 1, this research explores the institutional carriers used to convey reforms across the three constitutive structures of

regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive, and the influence they exert on citizens' interactions with organisational actors.

5.1 Introduction

In this section, the study maps the formal Civic Engagement (CE) reforms enacted in WATSAN between 2002 and 2012.CE shares a common set of institutional arrangements and organisations with the rest of the WATSAN sector. This stems from the inclusion of CE as a tool for coordinating the exchange of information between communities and formal organisations (URT, 2002). As a tool for the delivery of reforms, CE is devoid of specific performance targets of its own. CE is instead coordinated around the attainment of the more tangible aspects of WATSAN services such as service delivery.

In the period of focus of 2002-2013, CE reforms in WATSAN in Tanzania were structured around three dominant arrangements that defined the institutional goals (URT, 2002). These included, the:

i. National Development Vision 2025;
ii. National Strategies for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP)—which have succeeded the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers since 2005; and
iii. Five-year Development Plan (2011-15).

These institutional configurations influenced the role that other reform coordinating modes, for example specific sector policies, programmes and strategies, played. These defined intended outcomes, set targets, and distributed implementation resources. Their structuring effects amounted to what Hollingsworth (2000, p. 605) refers to as "institutional dominance". Specific to CE in WATSAN, the overriding reform goal sought to attain "Universal access to safe water by 2025 through … empowering communities, and promotion of broad based grassroots participation in mobilisation of resources, knowledge, and experience, with a view to stimulating initiatives at all levels of the society" (URT, 2005b, p. 3). A considerable number of institutional elements and carriers exist in support of this reform goal. These include regulative (Section 5.2), normative (Section 5.3), and cultural-cognitive (Section 5.4). These are explored in detail below. Table 5.1 depicts the analytical framework for these CE institutions. Within each pillar/element and institutional carrier, the characteristics of CE (drawn from the study's data sources) are described and analysed. Institutional carriers are mediums through which institutional rules (including ideas) and preferences are communicated through time and space (Scott, 2013b).

Table 5.1: Classification of CE Institutional Structures in WATSAN

	Institutional Pillars/Elements		
Carriers	**Regulative**	**Normative**	**Cultural Cognitive**
Symbolic Systems	Rules, Laws • Sector development policies • Sector development strategies • Sector development programmes • Legal statutes	Values, Expectations, Standards. • Knowledge of rules and regulations • Checks and balances • Compliance with rules and regulations • Assuming leadership or coordinating roles (agency)	Categories, Typifications, Schema.
Relational Systems	Governance Systems, Power Systems • Formal delegation of authority • Relationships with actors in service delivery framework	The sense of duty and responsibilities associated with authority. Includes Regimes, Authority Systems • Regimes: Modes of Engagement • Training • Role of Intermediaries	Structural Isomorphism, Identities. • Relationships with agency leadership • Informality • Ownership of Process
Routines	Protocols, standard operating procedures • Complaints handling mechanism. For example, Customer hotlines, dispute resolution • Planning Meetings	Jobs, roles, obedience to duty • Awareness and other Sensitisation Campaigns • Community Welfare and Development Officers at the municipality • Community Water Services Organisations (COWSOs)	Scripts • Use of Civic Engagement to delineate parameters of conduct.
Artefacts	Objects complying with mandated specifications • Material • Pragmatic	Objects meeting conventions, standards • Sector regulator, EWURA • CSOs • Media products including TV, Radio, Pamphlets etc.	Objects possessing specific symbolic value

Source: Author's own, adapted from Scott (2013b, p. 94)

Research findings from this chapter suggest that CE reforms in WATSAN consist of ambiguities in all three institutional elements. Ambiguities are shown to emanate from a variety of sources, including historical ones. These undermine CE reforms in different ways.

5.2 Regulative Institutional Framework and Processes for CE

In this section, the research determines the key legal mechanisms and actors for CE in WATSAN. This helps to identify actors and activities, along with associated resources, legally sanctioned to define, interpret and coordinate the enactment of CE. Findings from this section suggest, that despite an extensive framework of legal mechanisms for CE, the legal interpretation and application of CE is rife with contradictions caused by ambiguities in the institutional framework.

The regulative institutional structures in WATSAN consist of formalised symbolic constructs, relational systems, routines, and artefacts that establish rules, surveillance mechanisms, and sanctions that structure CE. Regulative logics rely on the exercise of legal authority (often through the use or threat of sanctions (Scott, 2013a)) to enforce CE. These define the form and nature of CE; delegate authority for their enforcement to other formal actors; and compel compliance by explicitly scrutinising the behaviour of actors. As the monopoly over legal authority often reside in governments, PSRs invariably involve changes to regulative structures to provide a legal reference for manipulating desired behaviours. There have been many such changes in WATSAN in the period 2002—2012 as depicted by a mapping exercise in Table 5.2. However, this section presents discussions on only those most pertinent to actors involved in CE (based on interviews). Results suggest the conveyance of ambiguities by each institutional carrier of regulative reforms. The results are discussed in detail below, under the respective sub-headings.

Table 5.2: Regulatory reforms in WATSAN, 2002 – 2012

Year	Event	Description
2002	Adoption of the National Water Policy (NAWAPO)	• Strengthens mechanisms for community and private sector participation in water supply, • Reduces the role of central government in implementation and management of water projects
	Interim National Health Policy	• Revises 1990s sectoral objectives to reflect on-going healthcare reforms • Acknowledges role of local authorities in provision of environmental health and sanitation • Introduces client service charters, a social pact between service providers and users

Year	Event	Description
	Launch of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (RWSSP)	
2003	First Private Sector Participation in Large scale Urban Service Provision	A lease agreement for water supplies in Dar es Salaam. Agreement annulled in less than two years and service provision in Dar es Salaam renationalised
2005/6	National Water Sector Development Strategy	Strengthens previously weak institutional and legal frameworks to implement the 2002 NAWAPO. Ratified by parliament in 2008
2006/7	Launch of National Water Sector Development Programme, 2006-2025	A $1,364 million capital development programme in water
	A new Health Sector Policy	A comprehensive guideline integrating increased role of local authorities, and inter-ministerial collaboration. Policy introduces the Primary Healthcare Service Development Programme, better known known by its Kiswahili epithet and acronym, *Mpango wa Maendeleo ya Afya ya Msingi (MMAM)*. MMAM focuses on strengthening the provision of primary healthcare services including sanitation (URT, 2009a)
2008	Public Health and Environmental Management Acts	Legal mandates and sanctions for implementation of 2007 Health Sector Policy. A strategy accompanying the regulatory framework is unveiled a year later in 2009
2009	Water Resources Management, and Water Supply and Sanitation Acts	Legal frameworks for implementation of the 2002 NAWAPO
2012	National Sanitation Campaign	A three year, inter-ministerial collaborative project to improve household and primary school sanitation and hygiene practices (Kumar, 2015; URT, 2013).

Source: Author's own

5.2.1 Regulative Symbolic Systems for CE

In WATSAN, regulative symbolic systems for CE include rules and laws such as sectoral policies, strategies, implementation programmes, and legal statutes. Two regulative symbols (policies and laws and strategies/programmes) are examined here:

i) The Policy and Legislative Framework

Literature review suggests that three major national policies frame the implementation of CE in WATSAN. Provided in the Table 5.3 below is a brief summary of the three policies known as: the 1998 local government policy, the 2002 national water policy and the 2007 national health policy.

Table 5.3: The policy framework for CE in WATSAN, 1998-2012

Policy	Key Contents
The 1998 local government reform policy (URT, 1998)	Mandates local authorities to facilitate the engagement of citizens and other civil actors in decision making, planning and executing development programmes (URT,1998). The policy also confers local authorities with the responsibility for service provision by devolving political, administrative and financial powers. The policy subsequently binds organizational entities to work in close collaboration with local authorizes to work in close collaboration with local authorities in civil mobilization and local service provision.
The 2002 national water policy (URT, 2002)	Builds on the stipulation of the local government reform policy and outlines the specific roles expected of CE and relevant of community-based ownership, conflict resolution, learning, supervision and accountability (URT, 2002). The policy defines what CE means, "(the empowerment) to initiate, own and manage water schemes" (URT, 2002, P.32) and the payoffs from it "sustainable WATSAN service legally owned by communities" (URT,2002, P.32).
The 2007 national health policy (URT,2007a)	Provides the formal blueprint for CE in sanitation health. It is influence by the concept of decentralization in its consideration for the division of roles

	involving central and local government authorities. The policy accords CE a more substantial weight by specifically incorporating it in three of its nine main aims. The policy consideration CE to be an organizational strategy for: sensitizing citizen about preventable diseases (including once borne by poor sanitation), Creating awareness of mutual responsibilities and improvement of partnerships involving multiple stakeholder in service provision. Interactions between citizen and organizations in sanitation are expected to take the form of learning (through health education) and supervision (through awareness and information availability)

Source: Author's Own

It is, however, worth noticing that, in practice, interview respondents regard the policy framework as unitary and often could not in full attribute specific features of current practices to individual policies. This research was, therefore, forced to assess the influence of policy reforms as a collective. Findings suggest that policy reforms have largely empowered CE. Respondents credit the current policy framework with improving the coordination of information flows and inter-organisational functions. According to a respondent, "There is increased dialogue amongst ourselves and with the community which allows us to pool resources effectively. Decentralisation has provided us with more officials to interface with the communities" (Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Official).

However, the coordination of information has not been without problems. Decentralisation has provided local authorities with substantial discretion over aspects of reforms at the expense of other actors, for example utility providers. Another respondent, for example, decries:

> We are legally compelled to defer certain decisions, for example infrastructure works, to the Municipal Councils. This complicates our work as despite being the legal custodians of water and sanitation infrastructures, we have to consult with the Municipalities on routine matters like maintenance or where to put new pipe works. (DAWASCO Official)

Occasionally, collaborating organisations in WATSAN fail to coordinate action as a result of the bureaucracy in decision making. In some instances, these have led to unintended consequences for CE as some actors have acted alone with unilateralism leading to disturbances to communities. In this regard, a respondent has this to say,

> Recently, the municipal council decided to repair some local roads in Kawe without consulting us. The works ended up destroying water pipes and disconnecting several neighbourhoods from the service. Guess who ended up facing irate customers and meeting the repair bill? (DAWASCO Official).

`Consequences of this nature adversely affect popular perceptions about the ultimate goal of reforms—improving services. In the process, they also undermine the reputation and relationship between communities and the utility provider, as the organisation responsible for service delivery. Capelos et al. (2015) contend that negative feedback have the potential to gradually erode long term support for reforms as the cost of complying with reforms exceeds the benefits. Pierson (2015) stresses that high costs of rule compliance incentivise the search for alternative means as actors seek to rationalise their engagement with rules. Consequently, the failure to adequately coordinate collaboration in WATSAN could lead to challenges to the rules governing CE or worse, a breakdown of relations with the community.

Administrative decentralisation is not, however, the only reform feature conflicting popular endorsement of CE in WATSAN. Increased coordination of CE has raised community awareness of the roles and responsibilities of organisational actors. has increased community's expectations of improvements in service. Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that policy rollout has not been accompanied by increased improvement in the wherewithal to deliver tangible results, In the words of a PMO-RALG Official,

> It is frustrating that, at times, public accusations of not walking the talk have proven true. Policy changes have led to too many demands on already constrained councils. These days, everyone has a voice and a sense of entitlement. The wish lists [budget plans] have outgrown our resources, and we can barely manage.

Therefore, in as much as the policy framework appears precise and enabling enough, it is imbued with distributional consequences (unintended or otherwise) that are capable of affecting its normative and cognitive legitimacy. Some of these deficiencies, particularly organisational, are surviving legacies of the country's economic malaise of the 1970s and 1980s. Historically, organisational inadequacies to support collective action are not new in Tanzania. Similar capacity constraints in the 1960s and 1970s have been associated with the failure of community "self-help" schemes of the era (Jennings, 2007). Ominous to the present findings was how the state responded to demands for reciprocal action in the face of low implementation capacity. Schneider (2004) contends that the then Tanzanian state responded to demands for collective action by crowding out the space for social and political expression, which led to authoritarian statism.

Field evidence suggests potentials for path-dependent reproduction of manipulated CE. Inadequately reciprocal state capacity risks raising the cost of voluntary CE for communities—through wasted time and unfulfilled expectations—such that it restricts future decision making on CE. Indeed, for some in the community, policy reforms have had minimal impact on services and on their relations with the authorities:

> Sometimes it feels like we are reliving the past all over again. There is a lot of community enthusiasm; a lot of talk, wishes and promises but nothing happens. They (the authorities) just do what they want, so tell me, what is the point of dialogue? (Community Interview 7)

ii) Strategies and Programmes

Regulative symbolic systems for CE also include strategies and programmes in WATSAN. These are formal "how menus" that operationalise laws and policies. They define benchmarks and set performance targets. Sector specific regulative symbols include the National Water Sector Development Strategy (NWSDS) (URT, 2005b) and the Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) (URT, 2009a). The strategies are, however, short on specificity, and rich on grand pronouncements and visions. For example, the NWSDS calls for awareness raising, the establishment of community water management entities and other CE support mechanisms, without clarifying what roles to be played and by whom. In practice, this provides space for creative reinterpretation by organisational actors on how to engage with communities. According to an Official from the Ministry of Water and Irrigation "[In absence of clarity] we use a several engagement tools such as short plays, cultural dances, public community meetings, and if finances allow, organise topic specific seminars."

The relative discretion in rule interpretation and enactment afforded to practitioners belies the emphasis on rule precision characteristic of formal structures. Institutional theory argues that discretion leaves institutions vulnerable to subversion and change in ways that compromise their long term sustainability (Hacker et al., 2015). Discretion in this instance is a product of unclear CE prescriptions advanced by the policy strategies in WATSAN. As suggested by institutional theory, unclear rules can undermine nascent institutions still in need of consolidation (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Unclear rules are both a source and an outcome of institutional ambiguity(Andrews and Mostafa, 2017). These affect the alignment of their constitutive regulative, normative and cognitive elements of reforms. Such risks are more pronounced in environments (institutional fields) with multiply coexisting rules. This is indeed the case in WATSAN since public service reforms did not displace the then established rules in Tanzania.

The absence of clarity in this instance shifts the burden of upholding institutional stability on veto players who benefit from CE due to increasing

returns and/or commitments (Scott, 2013d). It is only through the intervention of such actors that would-be change agents may fail to exploit the letter to violate the intended purpose of CE. There are several instances of rule ambiguities for CE in WATSAN.

In contrast to policy and legislation, reform strategies and programmes in WATSAN do define quantifiable performance targets and indicators in relation to CE. Such targets are, nonetheless, ambiguous. For example, on the one hand, the NWSDS seeks to promote community ownership of water supplies in rural areas, while on the other it outlines measures to curtail ownership in urban areas through realisation of the economic value of water (URT, 2005b). (The effects of these ambiguities on service provision are explored in detail in Chapter 6). Institutional literature suggests that ambiguous rules promote multiple (re)interpretation of rules leading to contradictory outcomes (Onoma, 2010). Contradictory outcomes, in turn, adversely affect the effectiveness of policy (World Bank, 2017).

Similarly, the Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) treats CE as a cross-cutting medium effecting the balance between the delivery of technical services on the one hand, and community accountability and service extension, on the other (URT, 2009a). CE is seen as a surveillance mechanism for the identification of waterborne and other sanitation diseases. CE is also a conduit for communicating with the public on preventive health matters. Parallel to this, the HSSP advocates the use of CE for the construction of primary governance structures i.e. health management committees, which play an oversight role in service delivery. The HSSP lacks specific details on how to implement CE, leaving it to the discretion of ad hoc authorities with potentials for variable interpretation. Yet, despite programmatic ambiguity as in water, sanitation officials demonstrate better clarity on how to implement reform.

> Public health sensitisation makes use of the ministry of local government's extensive institutional infrastructure on the ground. We use extension workers, ward, and village level administrative personnel to mobilise communities, educate them, and elicit useful inputs on how to align our activities with local norms and cultures. (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Official).

Agency, activities and resource distribution that perpetuate CE in WATSAN are also shaped by other formal regulative means beyond policy, legislative and programmatic constructs. These draw on legal definitions of CE to influence compliant behaviours. Like their founding rules, they do so by providing incentives (for example, resources or streams thereof) and disincentives (for example, use or threat of sanctions) to o induce behaviours favourable to the production and reproduction of CE (and other PSR conducts). Such means manifest as relations between individuals and organisations, patterned behaviours and activities, and artefacts that embody the instrumentality of regulative elements (Scott, 2013a)—that, is the creation of rules and adherence to them helps actors attain prescribed

returns or avoid sanctions. These are examined in the next sections

5.2.2 Regulative Relational Systems for CE

Based on a mapping exercise of legally defined actors in WATSAN, this section examines how three key actors (the state, utility provider, and a service regulator) that interpret and apply formal CE rules in practice. Field interviews suggest that, in practice, formal actors exploit ambiguities in the legislative framework for CE to varying effects. Relational systems refer to the regular interactions of actors with rules that allocate and legitimise roles for actors (Scott, 2013b). The PSR logics embedded in CE crosscut multiple institutional sectors involving multiple individual and composite organisations. The policy and legislative framework discussed above (section 5.2.1), affords the requisite licences, mandates, resources, and responsibilities for CE to these interpersonal and inter-organisational linkages. Using a WATSAN's regulative symbol, the sector's development strategy (NWSDS), a map of organisational actors legally sanctioned to implement reforms is identified in Figure 5.1 below. Along the service delivery chain, various institutions are shown to possess formally delegated CE duties and responsibilities to specialised departments and personnel. Three such players are considered here:

i) The Central government and local authorities—Kinondoni Municipal Council (KMC) in this case study;

ii) Service provider, DAWASCO; and

iii) Sector's regulator EWURA and its consumer protection body, the CCC.



Figure 5.1: The inter-organisational framework for CE in WATSAN, 2002-2012
Source: Adopted from URT (2005b, p. 42)

Discussing the roles played by the respective organisational actors in WATSAN, several respondents affirmed the prioritisation provided above. For example, a DAWASCO Official had this to say:

> Through its line ministries of water and health, the state remains the principal priority setting agent in WATSAN. These line ministries then collaborate with local authorities and the sector regulator before passing on the development agenda and priority to providers like us. We then use these centrally defined priorities to guide our corporate plans.

The three actors collectively provide funding, help with direct provision, and policy advocacy in WATSAN. They exercise de jure veto powers in policy as reflected by the virtue of the sector's policy and legislative framework (URT, 2005b, 2009g)

i) The state, line ministries and local authorities

The administrative framework in WATSAN devolves organisational roles and responsibilities for CE down to the local level (URT, 2009d, g). Despite de-jure decentralisation, some actors alleged de facto concentration of decision-making powers over CE and other aspects of policy in line ministers, which are mainly responsible for health and local government (see Figure 5.1, above). On condition of anonymity in ascribing his views to his organisation, one official cautioned over potential pitfalls of the status quo. "Irrespective of the plans and budgets, a minister's word can be final," warned the respondent, "…They all have constituencies [are elected MPs] so one day we could be working here, and the next there [contrary to plans]"

Such concerns are supported by a history of past of ministerial transgressions in the sector. A case in point is the ill-fated 21-month lease arrangement for the provision of water supplies in Dar es Salaam in 2003-05. Some observers (for example,de Waal et al. (2008);Pigeon (2012) associate the failure with cabinet-level political interference in circumventing the engagement of civil society in the award and termination of the attempted privatisation/lease contract. These episodes raise questions over how aligned the intentions of veto players are, relative to those of the institutions they are supposed to guide. Unsurprisingly, there are hidden concerns among some organisational actors of the commitment of a few key players to CE reforms. Field interviews suggest that in some instances these concerns adversely affect how subordinate actors operationalise CE.

At the local authority level, the legal code entrusts the mandate for CE on council executive directors. These bodies head administrative operations for local authorities. This level is where additional delegation to community development and sectoral extension officers occurs. Substantial amounts of CE occur at this level during annual development planning through variant forms of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods. Local councils collaborate with other elected and appointed officials at lower level authorities (LLGAs). These include ward councillors, ward and sub ward executive officers, and chairs of sub ward councils. Such bureaucracy provides comprehensive inter-personal and organisation linkages that enable the transmission of CE reform logics (notably consumer rights and responsibilities) as well as enhanced transparency, and occasionally accountability. The following remark by one key respondent is reflective of that trend:

> Being forced to work with local councils has been a blessing in disguise. Their reach is expansive, and they have more resources than us. This has lessened our resource burden. They have proved useful in reaching communities particularly during the current national sanitation campaign. (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Official)

However, these multiple layers of delegated authority face continued coordination challenges particularly in the exercise of authority and information sharing. LLGAs are often reluctant to enforce sanctions for non-compliance in WATSAN. "Most of them," says a respondent, "are politicians who live in the neighbourhood and have to stand for [re]elections. Sometimes, they shy away from mobilising community labour and financial contributions as they do not want to lose office" (DAWASCO Official).

Such conflicts of interests in CE often extend beyond WATSAN. A corollary of this is a deviation between rule pronouncement and enforcement that precipitates contradictory normative and cultural-cognitive logics. Perhaps what is more perplexing about such rule violation is not so much the failure by lower level agents to act, rather, the seemingly helplessness of other informed actors in accepting such behaviours. In effect, this amounts to implicit support for non-compliance of reforms. Some respondents acknowledge having to pre-emptively account for such subversion when working with LLGAs. According to one respondent, "Occasionally they [local authorities] sabotage us. Our corporate strategy allows for minor revisions to account for such setbacks…There are days when we wish we could go it alone. But such is the structure; our fate is sealed" (DAWASCO Official).

ii) The service provider, DAWASCO

As shown in Figure 5.2. below, DAWASCO comprises extensive organisational arrangements with dispersed lines of accountability. This allows separate professionals to handle different aspects of CE. For example, the Public Relations Manager handles all corporate communications at the regional and national level. This manager has both vertical and horizontal linkages within the organisation. They are often the public face of the provider on national media channels.



Figure 5.2: DAWASCO's organisational chart for civic engagement
Source: Adaptation based on interviews and the organogram from http://www.dawasco.com/org_structure.php (Accessed 28th October 2015)
Notes:

1) Organisational responsibility for Civic Engagement is denoted by dashed circles around the organogram components.

2)Acronyms in figure above stand for: CEO – Chief Executive Officer, CS – Chief Steward, PRM — Public Relations Manager, PO – Procurement Office (r), IAM – Internal Audit Management, COO – Chief Operating Officer, CCO – Chief Commercial Officer, CFO – Chief

Finance Officer, CHRO – Chief Human Resources Officer, H&S Manager – Health and Safety Manager

Area managers possess the mandate for coordinating CE at the frontline of service delivery. They supervise general operations at the provider's various zonal offices, who are twelve in total for Dar es Salaam. Because of the generic nature of their duties, they work horizontally with the Customer Services Manager who handles a team responsible for engagement with existing and prospective customers/clients. At the zonal offices, various forms of CE occur and that include bill payment, dispute and complaints resolution, general queries, and service awareness campaigns. Interactions with consumers in these areas of service constitute the bulk of daily CE activities for DAWASCO. "As a corporate provider," notes a DAWSCO official, "consumers are at the forefront of our operations and this makes engagement a natural undertaking."

The transaction-intensive nature of DAWASCO's operations accords a substantial amount of discretion to frontline personnel in CE. The World Bank (2003) describes transaction-intensive services as those that involve a substantial amount of on-the-spot decision making by front-end personnel. Indicative of that, a respondent says, "We have formal guidance but work often requires thinking on your feet. You cannot be ticking boxes all the time. Sometimes you have to be firm, others considerate even though the menu doesn't say so." (DAWASCO Official)

Discretion allows DAWASCO to exercise flexibility in its interactions with consumers, crucial for the successful reproduction of future engagement. Understandably, this is needed because of contextual differences associated with each interaction. Yet, discretion can also undermine the application of the very rules it seeks to reinforce. This can happen in two ways:

- One, even when discretion is applied to reinforce the spirit of CE, it can lead to multiple outcomes for different actors in contextually similar interactions. For example, decisions on whether or not to fast track applications for new service connections often lead to allegations of bias from customers (Organisational interviews).
- Two, the delivery of WATSAN services is often transaction-intensive. According to the World Bank (2003), such services can be difficult to monitor as providers often exercise significant discretion relative to real-time contexts facing them. Such freedom can encourage exploitation of rules to serve purposes that diminish the returns from CE. Some community actors allege to have been asked for bribes by some DAWASCO personnel even when following formal procedures. A remark below is typical of such allegation:

> Some guys at DAWASCO give you options [when applying for new service connection]. You can either wait for the official two weeks or pay *kitu kidogo* [a bribe] to get one in three days. Waiting [by following the due process] does not guarantee things. Sometimes they will turn around and say

> they have run out of flow meters and that you should wait another two weeks while they get them in stock. (Community Interview 9)

Organisationally, the terms of engagement for the service provider are defined in its corporate strategy. These terms are shared with consumers using the provider's client service charters (CSC). "The charter is a service agreement," remarks an official "outlining our roles and responsibilities to consumers. Our commitment to these, their statutory rights, mutual expectations etc" (DAWASCO Official). CSCs are legally binding, and while there are numerous instances of the provider sanctioning community actors for non-compliance, reciprocal action by the latter is yet to materialise despite DAWASCO's infringements, as shall be shown in detail later in Chapter 6.

Further, the service provider is mandated by the legislative framework to collaborate with other sectoral organisations in CE. These organisations include the sector's regulator, line ministries, local and lower level government authorities such as ward and sub ward officers, and the National Environment Management Council (NEMC) on matters related to environmental health. Despite the presence of formal rules, inter-organisational collaboration in CE remains a challenging feat. Inter-organisational friction is prevalent, and the lines of control are blurred.

In the word of a respondent, "[Despite] reforms strengthening of our ties with local authorities, we occasionally have to second-guess what LGAs do. Sometimes it is difficult to get timely or any information from them." (DAWASCO Official). Information asymmetries can affect trust among actors and undermine collaboration (Entwistle, 2010; Zhu, 2016). Rather than working towards the same goal, actors can find themselves competing or even engaging in divergent paths. Investment in such paths can confound the formation of coalitions needed to preserve PSR reforms when challenged or attacked by change actors.

iii) Service regulator and consumer protection organisations

At the intermediary level, a 2001 Act of Parliament (URT, 2001) confers the Energy and Water Utilities' Regulatory Authority Consumer Consultative Council (EWURA CCC) with the mandate for the protection of consumer interests in WATSAN. The regulator uses various platforms to engage with citizens. Interviews suggest that these include awareness roadshows, periodic feedback of public opinion through meetings with local authorities and national media, public consultation on tariff reviews, and periodic evaluations of compliance in water supplies. To pool resources, the CCC collaborates with other advocacy agents and the Civil Society through an apex organisation, the Tanzania Consumer Forum (TCF). The TCF produces a free monthly newsletter called *Sauti ya Mtumiaji* that provides feedback to address public service delivery concerns. However, the newsletter's circulation appears limited, despite

being available both electronically and in print. For example, none of the community respondents indicated awareness of the Newsletter, and although official circulation numbers are unknown, the webpage where its electronic link lies averages 30,610 visits a month (EWURA, 2016).

Subsequently, there are mixed perceptions over the effectiveness of sector regulator. On the one hand, the regulator is credited with establishing legally recognised consumer-based forums capable of engaging in informed debates with power brokers in WATSAN (Interviews). On the other hand, the regulator is also criticised for not going further in its empowerment of community voice. Occasionally, community consultations with the public watchdog are undermined by difficulties in organising such processes with technical esotericism the main barrier. According to a respondent, "When they [EWURA CCC] last came to get our views on new prices, we listened. Few spoke. I think like me, most didn't understand them. But at least they came" (Community Interview 6),

Adverse perceptions such as these do little to endear the regulator's work to the public. In response, the regulator has invested in human resources to better engage with WATSAN consumers. Among others, the regulator has a salaried standing secretariat that includes the Executive Secretary and an Advocacy Officer (Interviews), at the vanguard of CE. Interviews with the regulator also suggest the deployment of professional Community Development Officers to deal specifically with CE. This is necessary for two reasons: One, the relative technical complexities inherent in regulating WATSAN services, and; two, the change in the relationship between service providers and consumers as a result of increased market orientation of WATSAN.

> Trained experts help break down the sector's goings into bite-size pieces for public consumption, which is not easy. … [And] occasionally to emphasise abandonment of social apathy as there are no rights without mutual responsibilities particularly when one is paying for them. (EWURA CCC Official)

The use of dedicated personnel enriches engagement by reducing potential ambiguities in the interpretation of formal rules and their enactment. This helps convey common narratives and goals, necessary for the mobilisation of cognitive legitimacy, key to enhancing the contextual relevance of reforms (Andrews and Bategeka, 2013). A corollary is a coordinated institutionalisation of reforms in WATSAN as clarity over the returns, commitments and meaning of CE informs decision making.

5.2.3 Regulative Routine Systems for CE

This section examines how the day-to-day activities of key actors influence civic engagement (CE) in practice. This is done by exploring regular interactions between the formal actors identified in the previous section (5.2.2) and citizens. Findings suggest ambiguous rules of engagement affect the empowerment of citizens. Regulative routines relate to regular

behaviours and actions that reflect tacit knowledge of the regulative rules held by actors (Scott, 2013b). In WATSAN, these represent practices and behaviours (i.e., the modus operandi) by which CE is used to enhance "democracy and control of decision making" by the citizenry (URT, 1998, p. 12). Organisational interviews suggest that formal CE organisational routines in WATSAN include planning, information sharing, solicitation of material and in-kind contributions, justification of roles, social monitoring, and accountability (Figure 5.3).



Figure 5.2: Perceptions about common CE routines in WATSAN
Source: Author's own, calculations based on field data

These activities enable WATSAN authorities to interface with citizen. For example, information sharing is seen as vital for awareness raising, monitoring of compliance, and assessment of performance. These subsequently help in the reconciliation of development plans by providing a perspective of local needs vis-à-vis the availability of resources. Further, for some organisations particularly those involved in advocacy, CE is effectively their raison d'être: "Engagement strengthens the oversight role of institutions like ours. In essence it [civic engagement] provides us with a popular mandate to complement our legal mandate" (EWURA Official).

The roles played by these routines embody the logic of instrumentality associated with regulative logics. That is, they perform facilitative functions in the attainment of the PSR's grand vision of improving institutional performance in serving delivery.

Organisational routines are guided by various protocols and standard operating procedures. These include the Opportunities and Obstacles to Development (O&OD, see Box 5.1 below), periodic ad hoc meetings with other organisational actors and citizens; and client service charters—a pact with service users specifying the provider's commitments, responsibilities and service standards (examined in Section 5.2.4, later).

Box5.1: The Opportunity and Obstacles to Development (O&OD) Approach

The O&OD is a participatory approach to planning aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of development planning through CE (URT, 2007b). It is the primary planning protocol used by LGAs. It utilises a simple matrix that requires community inputs to help account a proposed plan's (URT, 2007b):

I. Specific objectives—established by reconciling a community's needs with those of the state;

II. Opportunities—the availability of material and in-kind resources, both state and community's. State resources are outlined in an accompanying guide, indicative planning figures;

III. Obstacles—constraints on the utilisation of identified resources;;

IV. Causes—reasons for the existence of obstacles

V. Interventions—remedial measures to (iv)

VI. Steps of implementation—sequencing of action to overcome causes, and

VII. Inputs—resources required for implementation of plan.

Following planning, the O&OD matrix then serves as a tool for monitoring and evaluation. It is posted on public noticeboards at the ward and sub ward authority offices. The methodology often generates much community interest at the planning phase. Along the planning cycle, popular interest subsequently wanes as the reconciliation between a community's wants and available resources is often resolved in favour of the latter. Further, despite its legal legitimacy, the breadth of bureaucracy in enforcing compliance contrives to leave many in the community helpless and frustrated.

Organisational actors hold regular ad hoc meetings to plan and review their operations. There are monthly meetings involving ministers and principal secretaries aimed at enhancing collaboration among them. There are also strategy and plan assessments between the state and development partners, the NSGRP's steering committee meetings. Further, annual sectoral reviews exist such as the Water Commemoration Week, and the Annual Joint Health Sector Review (AJHSR). Such meetings are often evaluative

and help define development agenda for forthcoming years. These meetings tend to be technical and closed to the public.

Regarding sustainability of reforms, Cornwall et al. (2011) contend that it is important that the type of CE routinely employed empowers the community in ways that facilitate regular interactions with positive feedbacks. In theory, such interactions help institutionalise reforms by inducing increased returns, commitments and objectification (Scott, 2013d) of aspects of WATSAN services beyond CE. In practice, however, routine CE practices fall short of empowerment for interactive or self-mobilised engagement. Findings reveal that routine civic engagement practices are often. And in the words of a key DAWASCO Official, it tends to be "menu-driven". As gleaned from the various interviews conducted with different respondents, such engagements often involve bureaucratic procedures, whose contents are mostly dictated by organisational actors, such as "queuing", "filling out procedural forms", "having to wait for services." In this regard, the following remark bya respondent is more expressive:

> The amount of red-tape can be off-putting. You have to fill a form for almost every complaint, dispute, query…just about everything. And then there is the waiting [for action to be taken]. Following up with DAWASCO really isn't for the faint-hearted. They really operate on a parallel universe over there, as if your fees don't mean anything. (Community Interview 3)

Thus, in practice, the excessive bureaucracy involved in engaging with some key actors frustrates the use of formal processes. While on the one hand bureaucracy can be interpreted as due diligence, on the other hand, it simply confounds the spirit of engagement. The length of the due-process often frustrates customers in need of services urgently. General dissatisfaction with the formal process affects the implicit understandings of reforms held by the general public, necessary for their popular legitimacy. Bedock (2014) and Hacker et al. (2015) contend that shared understandings that differ from pronounced intentions of rules, are a potential source of institutional ambiguity. As it has been argued all along, ambiguity in turn inspires a reinterpretation of rules that can undermine the stability of CE and wider WATSAN reforms.

As indicated below, there seem to be an unofficial endorsement of these ambiguous practices at the ministerial level:

> People generally have wild imaginations of what we can do. It is impossible to let people get everything they want, otherwise anarchy will prevail like when the country opened up [in the 1990s] We (the government) have to retain overall control of the agenda, even if this means telling the public and water authorities what can, cannot be done, and how. Of course, this has to be done gently. (Ministry of Water and Irrigation Official)

Not only do sentiments at the ministerial level contradict the spirit of civic engagement, they also contrast the de-jure premise of decentralising WATSAN services reflected in policy and legislation. These contradictions share commonalities with other decentralisation efforts in Tanzania. Key among these is the unwillingness of the central government to relinquish control over resource distribution as witnessed in financial decentralisation reforms in Tanzania(Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2006).The administrative reluctance to relinquish control over CE agenda further reinforces the ambiguity of reforms. It dilutes the shared understandings held by organisational actors over what constitutes appropriate behaviours. These in turn undermine the successful reproduction of reforms.

5.2.4 Regulative Artefacts Systems for CE

Regularity artefacts systems for CE are specification compliant tangible physical objects created by human subjects, based on formal regulatory mandates, to facilitate interactions with citizens in WATSAN (Scott, 2013b). Several regulative artefacts exist for CE owing to the multiplicity of actors in WATSAN and inherent organisational complexity. CE's regulative artefacts can be broadly categorised as material/financial and non-material.

This section builds on the mapping of formal rules and actors to examine the means typically deployed by organisational actors to assist in the fulfilment of CE obligations. Such discussion is important because it informs us of the ways through which civic engagement occurs in practice. In this regard, findings of the study suggest that formal actors utilise financial and non-financial means to engage with citizens with varying consequences. Some of these means promote CE, while some discourage it. Given below is thus a detailed discussion of these issues under two major headings: material artefacts and non-material artefacts.

i) Material Artefacts

The literature indicates that material artefacts relate to financial resources expended in the implementation of CE strategies. These register in organisations' budgets; correspond to specific activities and timeframes; and are the responsibility of specific entities with legal mandates. They further include specific budgets for community development, outreach programmes, and WATSAN campaigns.

However, in practice, empirical materials gathered from a number of the interviewees conducted for this study suggest that there are no earmarked funds solely for CE. CE is treated as a crosscutting feature of organisational development expenditure. Even in individual budgetary components for outreach programmes, CE is often costed as part of overall spending requirements that include other things such as the acquisition of capital assets, for example vehicles, machinery, the hire of external consultants etc. Therefore, despite its wide recognition in other organisational regulative carriers, CE often has to compete for financial resources with other

budgetary components. Consequently, there is a lot of enforced collaboration among organisational actors to circumvent these constraints. In the words of an official, "Insufficient financial resources [for civic engagement] sometimes forces the review of work schedules and deployment of extension officers. [When this happens], we rely on local government structures and resources to minimise costs" (Ministry of Water and Irrigation Official).

The inadequacy of financial artefacts for CE has promoted other innovative solutions in addition to collaborative efforts including cost-effective media like the internet, client hotlines, and mobile financial services. Such solutions generally fall under the second category of artefacts, non-material.

ii) Non-material Artefacts

Non-material artefacts are non-finance based tangible innovations employed by WATSAN organisational actors in CE. Interviews suggest the deployment of four major pragmatic artefacts in support of CE in the period of study: a) Websites, b) Client Service Charters, c) Service Hotlines, and d) Electronic Transaction Platforms. These artefacts are examined in detail below.

a) Websites

The most common artefact is the use of organisational websites to communicate with the public. All but one of the organisational actors sampled by the study own websites. The websites display information on various matters of public interest including user rates, legislative developments, and access procedures for various WATSAN services. However, most are seldom updated (the frequency of content updates being more than three months) thus limiting their overall utility. Several community respondents confessed knowledge of the existence of organisational websites, but none had used them to engage with the authorities (Interviews). A respondent wonders, "What are the chances of getting a response from behind a computer screen, if they [DAWASCO] are constantly dragging their feet in face to face meetings?" (Community Interview 13).

The limited exploitation of potentially low-cost platforms of engagement such as websites adds to the growing list of ambiguities in the application of reforms. The scope of coverage offered by the internet should, in fact, have been realised and actively exploited by reform actors in communicating reforms. Such an oversight reflects the cognitive limitations of reform designers who failed to anticipate potential changes to the environment in which CE reforms would operate. These are all the more profound given that internet penetration in Tanzania has increased from approximately 0.22% in 2002 (ITU, 2016) to 17% and 40% by 2012 and 2016 respectively (TCRA, 2017).

b) Client Service Charters (CSCs)

CSCs are tools for performance management introduced by the public service reforms. They provide the legal basis for the existence of a service and the recognition of client. In theory, CSC are supposed to act as the terms of reference for interfacing with customers (URT, 2010). In practice, however, not many customers admit having the knowledge of the service charters, let alone their potential legal implications. Some members of the community even mistakenly equate them with receipts for payments made to the utility provider (Interviews). While others who demonstrated knowledge of them, had limited perceptions of their remit:

> I have seen one [a copy of the service charter] at their offices. It is just a list of promises. But they are of no use. They [DAWASCO] rarely honour their words, except when they are collecting money from you. They [client service charters] make for a nice decoration. (Community Interview 12).

As a consequence, few customers reference the charters when in disputes with the service provider, DAWASCO. This is unfortunate, as service disputes are often over the reliability of service and accuracy of billing information. According to interviews, DAWASCO's ability to honour its client service charter is often constrained by disruptions to its supplies. The following remarks can be more expressive:

> Dealing with disaffected customers is mostly the only thing that never changes here. Whether it is a disconnected service or disputed bills, a lot of our engagement with the public involves degrees of firefighting so to speak. Water provision is an expensive business, and when [revenue] collections are low and with little support from the government, problems are inevitable. (DAWASCO Official)

> I complain all the time because they [DAWASCO] do nothing to help. Sometimes I feel like ripping that meter of theirs off the ground and dump it at their offices. What is the point of having it when the taps are mostly dry? I don't collect odd things. (Community Interview 4)

Interviews held with various respondents generally indicate that service disruptions are often caused by ageing infrastructure, unethical practices (leading to illegal connections/diversions on the mains), and inadequate coordination with other organisational providers (for example land management, energy etc.). Consequently, complaints handling is one of DAWASCO's strategic objectives—as a rationale (input), process, and outcome of CE. In addition to supplies' disruptions, other sources of conflicts and disputes include:

- erratic record keeping resulting from an inaccurate clients' database (in part due to tempering in collaboration with by unethical employees, and prior to 2006 reliance on manual bill vouchers (also

see Pigeon, 2012));

- A largely poor client base which struggles to timely meet its financial obligations. According to an official,

  > Low consumer incomes affect how we price our services. We cannot charge the full market price for water. This adversely affects our ability to invest in infrastructure development aimed at improving the level of service. This is often a source of tension with our customers. (DAWASCO Official)

These affect the timely recovery of costs forcing the provider to impose punitive measures on clients, for example, disconnections from the mains and monetary fines. They add to ambiguities in the delivery of services, contrary to WATSAN reform goals. All these have adverse multiplier effects on the relationship between DAWASCO and the community it serves.

c) Service Hotlines

According to interviews, beginning from July 1st 2017, DAWASCO operates a free 16-hour a day (previously it was only 12 hours) and 5-days a week telephone hotline. This is intended to expand the spaces of engagement with the public by lowering the transaction cost. According to a DAWASCO official, the general premise is noble, and it was meant "to allow interactions with customers in the comfort of their own environment." Yet, in practice, a history of organisational non-response undermines the hotline's usefulness. As can be understood from the following remarks, respondents indicated a preference for face-to face meetings with DAWSCO because of the promise of action it provided:

> If you need anything done by DAWASCO you have to go directly to the top. Line operators often only tell you to wait, and sometimes you can wait until you tire without being listened to again. (Community Interview 4)

> You need a technician to fix a pipe when it breaks, not a voice over the line. To get them [technicians], you have to physically go their offices [DAWASCO]; otherwise. The voice will tell you they are out in the field when in fact they are just sipping tea. (Community Interview 2)

Adverse perceptions about the efficacy of the hotline limit the extent of its use. Respondents see the potential costs of waiting for action (which according to interviews, may or may not come) as outweighing the costs of face-to-face engagement. For others, these costs may be inhibitive enough to warrant non-engagement. This is demonstrative of further ambiguities in CE reforms. In this instance, these ambiguities stem from deviations between what service hotlines accomplish vis-à-vis their intended purpose. Other contextual ambiguities of the hotline include its hours of operation. As hotlines are often used to communicate urgent and occasionally

emergency matters for example leakages and spillages, it seems plausible that they ought to be active beyond the mere 12 hours/day or 5 days a week. This is because the need to engage with DAWASCO can arise at any time and may indeed be time specific. In the absence of such provisions, it appears that hotline may indeed be a mere illustration of reforms rather than actual practical tool for improving performance. This may also be construed as evidence of what Andrews's (2013) refers to as reform signals.

d) Electronic Transactions

DAWASCO provides customers with an opportunity to settle their bills electronically. Introduced in 2008, the arrangement caters for monetary transactions utilising the country's major mobile phone-based platforms (for example, MPESA, TigoPesa, Airtel Money, and EasyPesa), the distributed points-of-sale networks of SELCOM and MAX-MALIPO, and more traditional banking facilities. Since 2009, these have been further buttressed by the provider's assessment and issue of real-time billing information. Despite occasional challenges, these innovative artefacts have transformed and largely enhanced CE with the service provider. A client is no longer required to appear in person to settle a bill. Metered survey respondents expressed general satisfaction with the convenience afforded by these artefacts (Community Interviews). These findings are corroborated in a recent research by Krolikowski (2014) who credits the introduction of these artefacts with lowering the transaction costs of participating in the production of WATSAN. Nonetheless, the realisation of gains from electronic transactions remains constrained by the low volume of metered connections in the Kawe Mzimuni ward in Kinondoni local authority and other parts of Dar es Salaam in general. This further adds to the ambiguity of reforms.

5.2.5 Section Summary

This section has explicitly sought to answer the question, *How do institutional structures and processes influence civic engagement in WATSAN?* The focus has been on the formal regulative structures for CE in WATSAN. Evidence points to a fairly comprehensive regulative order. It consists of symbols (policy, legislation, strategies and programmes), relational systems, routines and artefacts. And it is worth noting that these carriers complement one another other. More specifically,

- Regulative symbols define CE rules and specify sanction;
- Relational systems interpret symbols to define roles and assign tasks. Characteristic of multi-actor structures, the collaboration of CE using the decentralised structures is shown to have both benefits and challenges. The struggles to maintain rule consistency to minimise ambiguities the key one to note;

- Regulative routines give "life" to rules through the daily platforms and activities to enhance CE and reforms; and
- Regulative artefacts include innovations designed to help organisational actors engage with communities. Some of these innovations (for example, service hotlines and electronic transactions) open up new and additional ways of engagement beyond traditional face-to-face contact.

Collectively, as formal elements these structures exhibit generally high levels of: a) precision, which is clarity in the definition of conduct; b) obligation—the likelihood of compliance due to scrutiny by other actors, and; c) delegation—the conferring of enforcement powers to third parties (Scott, 2013a). These features are characteristic of most PSRs, particularly ones influenced by imported logics (Andrews, 2013) such as in this case study.

Yet, as "rules can never be precise enough*"*(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 11), institutional ambiguities dominate practical applications of these reform rules. Ambiguities in rules open up space for creative agency. Some in-built regulatory ambiguities have been explored in this section along with their relative influence on civic engagement. Among others, these include path-dependent contradictions of decentralising reforms and adverse perception of innovative artefacts. The extent to which formal institutional structures influence CE is shown to depend on how they empower and constrain the ability of actors to comply with other WATSAN reforms. Nevertheless, WATSAN reforms also consist of normative and cultural-cognitive elements. Subsequently, any ambiguities in the reforms' regulative structures are also likely to influence the informal rules that structure CE. These are indeed the subject of the next sections, while the institutional influence of CE is further examined in Chapter Six.

5.3 Normative Institutional Framework and Processes for CE

This section assesses the influence of less formal institutions on CE. This is essential in explaining variations in agency among actors, particularly how the same set of rules can potentially affect different actors differently (Peters and Pierre, 2016). Analysis reflects how informal institutions interact with regulative rules about CE. This is important particularly as the relationship between the two has been demonstrated to have profound effects on institutional reforms (Andrews, 2013; Andrews, 2008).

Normative elements relate to the norms and values about CE that prescribe appropriate or desired conduct, monitor and evaluate behaviours to manipulate adherence (Scott, 2013a). Values reflect understandings about desired or preferred behaviours which benchmark assessments of conduct (Scott, 2013a). Norms define desired behaviours and infer outcomes from compliance (Scott, 2013a). Normative elements represent the effects of professional and social standards on CE related behaviours (Ashworth et al., 2009). Normative elements constitute an invaluable interface

connecting formal regulative rules to cognitive applications—interpretation and enactment. Much like their regulative counterparts, the norms and values of CE are conveyed by symbolic constructs, relational systems, routines, and artefacts. These introduce prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimensions to CE that morally endorse the validity of regulative rules. Results suggest that each institutional carrier of normative reforms consists of ambiguities that affect the norms and values held by reform actors. This is profound as the examination of the regulative rules in the previous section revealed a similar picture. The results are discussed in detail below under the respective sub-headings.

5.3.1 Normative Symbolic Systems for CE

This section examines the norms and values held by organisational and community actors about CE. This is important because these inform expectations about the behaviours of other actors in formal engagement. Findings of this study suggest that organisational and community actors expect each another to behave better than they currently do practice.

Normative symbolic systems are the values and expectations that institutional actors (organisational and community) have of CE. These systems are informed by institutional actors' perceptions of values and moral obligations in CE. These conceptions vary by type of actors and reflect among others specialised knowledge and experiences. Normative symbols belonging to two distinct groups of actors are explored here: a) formal organisations, b) the recipient community.

i) Organisational symbolic norms of CE

Organisationally, the various interviews conducted revealed that the assignment of CE mandates to specially designated officials is purposefully done to influence expectations about the importance of CE. WATSAN organisations have created specialist roles for CE, and employ personnel, with training in the specialist fields of psychology, sociology, rural development, and social work where interpersonal skills and interactions are emphasized. Findings suggest that WATSAN organisations subsequently assign semantically powerful labels to these positions (for example "community development", "community liaison", "community awareness" or "empowerment" officers). These efforts are done deliberately with a view to positively influence perceptions about employed personnel and the roles they perform. A respondent from a civil society organisation attested to the importance of labels in CE:

> Engagement is essentially about showing compassion and giving hope to the public. The people working there have to have the whole package, the title, demeanour, dress code and sometimes even be of the right sex, depending on the sensitivity of the situation. For example, I know of an organisation that renamed all its engagement roles to reflect the wording of a policy's goal they were invested in.

Efforts to cultivate a positive image with the public go hand in hand with measures to improve organisational capacities to engage. These include various on-the-job trainings through seminars, workshops, study visits, hands-on-experience practical application of knowledge, and supervision (Community Interviews). As noted by Tidemand and Sola (2010), these qualities exist in the public service— despite shortages of other specialised skills in WATSAN

In his analysis of PSRs in Tanzania, Issa (2010) also observes that civil service reforms have increased staff performance and morale by minimising turnovers. Consistent withIssa (2010), this study gave evidence to suggest that WATSAN organisations, particularly state ones treasured staff longevity as a proxy of one's competence in the role. The challenge of maintaining staff for long is observable in the following remark,

> Being the public face is not an easy feat. The public can be harsh, unreasonable and unruly even. I have seen colleagues lose it when put on the spot. So, to find someone in the same role for a number of years is definitely a testament of their capabilities. Those less able either quit or ask for transfers. (A Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Official)

Some publicly employed CE professionals interviewed had been in employment for a minimum of at least four years. Such expertise and experience are particularly relevant as organisational shortcomings in WATSAN delivery mean that CE often involves an apprehensive public. A respondent says,

> You need to be thick-skinned when you work for DAWASCO. When customers go for days without water, they can lose their civility. But you need to remain calm and have all the answers. That's one of the biggest challenges in this job. (A DAWASCO Official)

Consequently, there are also normative expectations of organisational staff in charge of CE to be skilled at persuasion and/or diffusing tensions. The certification of CE competence specialised professionals occurs at the hiring stage. Under the covenants of the 2002 Public Service Act (Bana and McCourt, 2006; URT, 2009f), this is carried out by a specialist body, the Public Service Recruitment Secretariat (PSRS) or *Tume ya Ajira* of the President's Office Public Service Management. The secretariat's vetting process involves collaboration with the National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA) and the Tanzania Commission for Universities (TCU) that verify the professional and academic credentials of prospective employees. Further, the secretariat issues regulations, standing orders (URT, 2009f), manuals (URT, 2010) and codes of conduct (URT, 2005a) which guide and stipulate the required behaviour when engaging the public. The PSRS also delegates licences and responsibilities for personnel

sanctioning to local authorities under the 2003 and 2009 Public Service Regulations and Standing Orders (URT, 2009f).

ii) Community symbolic norms of CE

At the community level, there are expectations of competence and ethical conduct from organisational actors, despite widespread misgivings over the ability of actors such as DAWASCO. However, the application of reciprocal values is somewhat selective. Instances of community members deliberately seeking to pervert the course of justice are not uncommon. Interviews suggest that these occur in collusion with some employees (active or former) of WATSAN service delivery organisations. Often, these involve attempts to evade bureaucratic procedures including the application for new service connections, illegal mains connections, tempering of flow meters, and doctoring of user bills. Such incidents often involve material or in-kind inducements of one kind or another. Protesting the practice, a resident complains:

> It is a mockery of the entire process when some people get away with bribing the officials to make things happen for them. Why are some people above the law? We all pay for water these days, so why should some get things done in half the time while the rest of us wait for days on end?" (Community Interview 3)

Perverse community norms in WATSAN are also encouraged by ambiguities in rules, particularly the opaque and unnecessarily complex administrative processes of service delivery. Ambiguities in rules often create room for exploitation by opportunistic actors who feed on information asymmetries and low awareness of consumer rights. These include the bureaucratic processes of registering a complaint or applying for metered connections, discussed above. Describing how frustrating tabling a complaint could be, a respondent says:

> You need a degree in law or administration to understand the red tape at DAWASCO. The only thing that is clear is that it costs. If you follow it, it will cost you time and money. If you don't, it will only cost you money. This alternative channel [by-passing procedures] is too lucrative, and a few officials are only too happy to prey on our helplessness." (Community Interview 6)

The practice draws parallels with what the HI literature refers to as "parasitic behaviour" (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 25), made possible by a lack of specific details on how to engage the authorities in different circumstances. The exploitation of these ambiguities by organisational actors violates the spirit (intended purpose) of CE and wider reforms in WATSAN. They convey a message of high transaction costs when one attempts to engage with the authorities, either through confusion and delays or through the additional costs of "expediting things". These undermine the moral and cultural support for reforms in WATSAN. Such practices bear resemblance to the exploitation of property rights in Kenya and Brazil that

Ato Onoma(2010) observes to have gradually reduced legal ownership of land to mere certificates. As the extortion of bribes becomes pervasive, communities become less trustful and more reluctant to deal with the authorities. Subsequently, they are more likely to resist organisational overtures, and invest in alternative means of getting services that may or may not reinforce reforms in WATSAN. It is, in fact, these very activities that adversely impact governance (Peters and Pierre, 2016) and other institutional reforms (Andrews, 2013) in contexts with inadequate monitoring of reform actors as it is the case in WATSAN in Tanzania.

Paradoxically, though, the research has revealed occasional attempts to seek legal recourse in instances where collusive practices fail. Interviews indicate a willingness on the part of community members to sue corrupt officials for "breaches of contracts" even when the exchange of bribes implicates both givers and takers under the Tanzanian Penal Code (URT, 2007c). A corollary is a CE normative framework where the boundaries of social expectations, moral conduct, and institutional obligations are muddled. This confluence of variant norms is further complicated in cases where parties to these collusive arrangements seek the mediation of intermediaries. Intermediaries often tend to be lower level authority officials possessing legal mandates conferred by the various regulative elements of CE and the popular legitimacy by virtue of their general acceptability by the community.

Occasionally and increasingly less so owing to multi-party politics, the CCM's (Tanzania's long ruling political party) local level party representatives have also assumed mediation duties between the community and WATSAN authorities. That is demonstrated in the following observation:

> Until recently, we used to make use of the CCM's experienced ten-cell leaders to sort out disagreements with DAWASCO. Every neighbourhood has one and they are essentially part of the government… because the policies we see come from their party's manifesto. Their word used to hold sway in most offices, too. Importantly, they tended to be pragmatic and approached disputes with sympathy. These just appealed to us. (Community Interview 5)

The surviving relevance of local party leaders is a reminder of the historical legacies of the *Ujamaa* era in Tanzania, when state and party structures were one and the same. These findings corroborate those by Cross (2013) who still finds an active role for local party structures in community policing in urban Tanzania, some 20 years after the decoupling of such structures from political administration. The continued relevance of the CCM's local party leadership is reflective of the failure of reforms to dislodge dominant institutional structures which is characteristic of layered changes.

The results of this study suggest that local party leaders retain some form of normative legitimacy despite being stripped of their legal relevance by legislative reforms in WATSAN. This legitimacy then informs the community's decision to engage with them. This is indeed another demonstration of the many rule ambiguities in CE in WATSAN. In this case, the source of ambiguities lies in the failure of the community to alter its conceptions of the location of institutional powers necessitated by reforms. The presence of non-legally sanctioned actors with influence on reform outcomes poses a challenge for the reform process. These provide a ready supply of alternative and non-conforming means of structuring behaviours. By turning a blind-eye to corrupt practices, their actions indirectly endorse collusive practices that adversely affect the promotion of fair conduct, one of the underlining objectives of WATSAN reforms (URT, 2002). By enabling the bypassing of procedures, intermediaries promote the existence and salience of parallel rules that undermine the stability of CE reforms. Parallel structures confound decision making by increasing the strategic options available to the community. The result can be confusion, as one is left not knowing whether to follow the formal procedures or collude to evade them (as they are then assured of outcomes through intermediaries even when their corrupt partners renege on agreements).

Intermediation often takes place in complete disregard of the illegalities of corruption, focusing instead on either "getting the wronged party's money back" or "the guilty party honouring their commitments" (Community Interviews). However, intermediaries are themselves not infallible. Some have been the subject of corruption allegations (Community Interviews). Recently, however, there have been attempts to accredit community intermediaries (Community Interviews). These include the formation and legal registration of a network entity, the Tanzania Water and Sanitation Network (TaWaSaNet), to guide and coordinate the activities of civil society intermediaries in WATSAN in 2008. In addition, accreditation entails prohibiting intermediaries from taking part in any cases involving corruption. Instead, intermediaries are required to report corruption cases to the relevant authorities (Makaramba, 2007).

5.3.2 Normative Relational Systems for CE

This section examines the influence of expectations about the role of formal actors in the interpretation and enactment of CE rules. This is important because expectations coordinate social behaviours that influence how citizens engage with organisational actors.

Normative relational systems relate to the role of inter-organisational and inter-personal relationships in the transmittance of expectations and norms about CE (Scott, 2013b). Such relationships are borne out of professional and real-life experiences, training, peer networks and patterned interactions. The relationships allow actors to define and locate their own preferences in a manner consistent with the common attributes of those they associate with.

Findings from this section suggest that there are expectations about CE and the role of actors is conditioned by the dominance of the social space by the local government system in Tanzania. Some authors (for example, Green (2014)argue that requirements to channel CE efforts through the local government system represent surviving legacies of the country's statist socialist past (see Chapter 4). These are suggestive of desires to monitor and control debates evidenced in Section 5.2 above. This dominance is explored in detail below.

Expectations about the role of local authorities in CE

The legislative component of PSRs accords and confers substantial roles and responsibilities for CE to local government authorities (URT, 2002, 2005b, 2009g). Findings of this study suggest that local authorities have embraced these powers, and are in regular engagement with the community, secondary only to the utility provider, DAWASCO (Figure 5.4)



Figure 5.3: Community perceptions about most active organisational actors in CE

Source: Author's based on fieldwork

Notes: Community Sample Size (N) is 22. DAWASCO is the state enterprise providing WATSAN in the area. TASAF state/World Bank collaboration which provides supplementary funds to social services. It is involved in several borehole constructions in Kawe Mzimuni. The Others' category includes religious leaders, popular artists, and pu health officials from the Ministry of Health.

On the basis of their legal mandates, the community and other WATSAN organisations rely on and expect local authorities to provide guidance, lead, and/or coordinate CE. These expectations are enhanced by participatory

methods employed by local authorities in planning which supersede protocols for CE by other organisational actors (Green, 2010). Although primarily a planning tool, the general success and familiarity with O&OD principles (Box 5.1) make them the de facto CE regime (Interviews). These create expectations about the form or mode of contact, schedule(s), identity of actors, etc. These in turn help establish normative relations in CE. Thus, formal participatory approaches essentially guide how organisational actors in WATSAN and other devolved social services interact with served communities.

The normative relational systems for CE therefore involve local authorities assuming coordinating roles that almost resemble leadership. Formal instances of CE involve organisations adopting O&OD protocols which can be distilled into four key composite activities (URT, 2007b):

i. Involvement of prior liaison with local authorities to explain the purpose of CE, requests for support, the design/sharing of CE strategy, schedule, and resources;

ii. Local authorities (i.e. district, ward or sub ward authorities) initiating contact with key/influential community members such as religious leaders, development committees, youth or women organisations. Depending on the type of community and/or sensitivity of the topic or schedule for CE, initial contact may involve local authority leadership conducting house visits or engaging other community mobilisers such as heads of women's groups, local representatives of political parties etc. This is the critical phase of the CE process as it involves avails of the topic, schedule, type of CE, and identity of actors involved;

iii. Provision of feedback by local authorities to organisational actors on how to proceed next; and

iv. If the success in all the above, conduct of CE. Otherwise, back to stage (i) of the process or an organisational review and/or of CE.

Diktat on who should coordinate or oversee formal CE is another example of reform ambiguity in WATSAN. The strictness with which the above protocols have to be followed is a source of consternation among some organisational actors, expressed bluntly by one civil society actor, "This is essentially a police state! There is someone listening to every word you say, who you say it to and how."

Providing local authorities with discretion over the content and audience of CE contradicts the spirit of the engagement process. It instils apprehension among actors over what they can and cannot say and who to say. As a result, formal engagement platforms such as community meetings tend to be subdued and devoid of overt criticisms of state authorities. This

undermines the utility of CE as a platform for improving WATSAN services. Participants' observations further suggest that some in the community are becoming apathetic to the formal processes, ostensibly because of the coordinated nature of the formal CE processes. In the words an official,

> Some days you can feel the appetite [for engagement] dwindling, you go to a meeting and there are only a handful there. I guess I would have done the same [as the community] in their position. (A PMO RALG Official)

Apathy is a form of conscious self-exclusion which contradicts the democratic premise of CE (Cornwall et al., 2011). Oliver (1991) contends that apathy is a strategic expression of resistance to institutional pressures. As a form of resistance, apathy normally occurs when institutional actors rationally discount their chances of influencing rule, thereby refraining from challenging them. Apathy can have a domino effect as citizens exchange information on their relative reasons (and merits) for abstaining from CE. This is likely to further erode support for reforms as actors collectively engage to search for alternatives that would improve their outcomes. In effect, this would reduce the size of the readily available pool of would-be reform defenders. Therefore, from seemingly minor (and isolated) cases of community apathy, the seeds of incremental change to the current CE reforms could be planted with consequences on the survival of reforms in their present form.

5.3.3 Normative Routines for CE

This section examines the influence of the regular activities of actors on expectations about CE. Findings suggest that a regular use of intermediaries in CE exposes the formal processes to capture, thus undermining the ability of CE to accurately represent the interests of citizens.

Normative routines are the regular activities employed by institutional actors to convey their expectations and desires about CE (Scott, 2013b). For some organisational actors such as customer service operators, these include daily attendance to community concerns, complaints, queries etc. For others like local authority officials, these include verifications and endorsements of community members' applications for new service connections, implementing formal directives, and resolving conflicts. Organisational routines help consolidate the normative legitimacy of intermediaries in CE, making them important conduits of PSR logics in WATSAN. Both organisations and the community are left with no choice but to work with, and through intermediaries such as lower local authority officials, who by virtue of their positions within the institutional environment are casually considered informal. An official capture this well, when he says:

> Communities occasionally respond better to community elders and other influential members such as religious leaders, and

> representatives of minority groups. So, we use them to educate communities on appropriate sanitation practices. (Ministry of Health Official)

However, as the earlier discussion on community symbolic norms reveals, the use of intermediaries compounds the extent of rule ambiguity in WATSAN. Intermediaries work by exploiting ambiguities in WATSAN rules to produce outcomes that would not have been possible without their involvement. In cases where their intervention is formally sanctioned, for example in the delivery of community sanitation health education, the use of intermediaries exposes reforms to potential capture. When intermediaries work alongside state officials in their formal capacities, they earn the confidence and trust of the public who see them as part of the formal authority. This enhances their influence in the community as "the go-to people to get things done" (Community Interviews).

In spite of that, intermediaries may have interests of their own, for example political ambitions, and may exploit their positions of power to advance them. In such cases, rather than helping to convey the intended message from the sanitation authorities, intermediaries may, for example choose to do so to certain groups of people but not others. Alternatively, they may consciously distort its content. Such actions may potentially promote alternative logics at the expense of PSRs while using resources conferred by PSRs. In effect, this may facilitate endogenous institutional change (Capoccia, 2016). This is indeed the message of most of the current developments in the historical institutionalism literature, where the focus is on theorising how rules influence and are influenced by agency (Capoccia, 2016; Hacker et al., 2015).

5.3.4 Normative Artefacts for CE

This section examines the influence of the resources and means used to convey WATSAN reforms on community expectations about CE. It builds on the mapping of CE's regulative institutional structures, and explores the means used by organisational actors to influence community behaviours. Findings suggest that organisational actors actively exploit community nostalgia for Tanzania's past to mobilise desirable community behaviours in WATSAN.

Normative artefacts are tangible materials created by humans to facilitate the performance of tasks that conform to societal norms and values (Scott, 2013b). There are a few organisational normative artefacts directly carrying CE logics. One such artefact, nostalgic appeals to the socialist principles of *Ujamaa*. *Ujamaa* is examined here for its ostensible contradiction of CE reforms.

Appeals to the spirit of Ujamaa

Interviews conducted with different participants indicate occasional coordinated attempts to mobilise community members by appealing to the

country's socialist past, *Ujamaa.* The attempts generally aim at evoking exalted memories of an effective and caring paternal state held in high regard by the poorest majority. Efforts typically equate CE with communitarian spirit, a cherished attribute of traditional African kinship (Lal, 2012). Organisationally, this is done to emphasise that CE is not an alien concept, rather an inherent fabric of the society necessary for its development, the "Tanzanian way of doing development" (Green, 2010, p. 1247). Organisational actors market the era as a beacon of national pride:

> Ujamaa allowed everyone to enjoy the fruits of independence. Free Tanzanians were kind, willing and motivated. Everyone wanted to help build the country, and the state embodied this. It [the state] was responsible and delivered. This notion still lingers on today and perhaps the foreseeable future. (TASAF Official)

The inclusion of such narratives in reforms imbues them with powerful social legitimacy, particularly in WATSAN where there is widespread dissatisfaction over the capacity and/or willingness of the utility company (DAWASCO) to improve service delivery. However, they are an ironic paradox. An irony, because of the narratives' deliberate ignorance of the coercion, popular resentment, and ultimate failure that characterised the latter days of *Ujamaa*(Jennings, 2003, 2007; Schneider, 2004). The apparent lapse in memory can perhaps be explained by: the relative age of respondents (most were too young to fully understand the adverse effects of *Ujamaa*); long term residence in urban areas, which experienced less coercion than rural ones (Jennings, 2007); and a nostalgic hangover that the past must have been better than the present.

Further, the appeal is paradoxical because popular participation under *Ujamaa* was effectively Top-Down (Lal, 2012; Jennings, 2007). That is contrary to the demand led intention of WATSAN's PSRs. Alternatively, the narrative may not be a paradox at all. That is because the application of CE reforms has been Top-Down themselves and that respondents may have become too used to such practices that they are incapable of conceiving alternative ways of engaging with citizens.

Independent of the context, the mere appeal to *Ujamaa* is another demonstration of ambiguities in CE reforms. The appeals are ambiguous because they convey mixed messages about the validity of reforms that have themselves been introduced to address the shortcomings of *Ujamaa.* To the public, they portray confusion over the general direction of policy. This introduces uncertainty (and even doubts) over the commitment of the state to PSRs. Uncertainty over actors and rules may affect perceptions over the preparedness of the state to enforce WATSAN. Consequently, this reduces the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool for manipulating behaviours. In turn, this incentivises non-compliance to reforms in the community—already explored in various forms, for example, collusive corruption or apathy, above. The net result is again an erosion of popular support for reforms which increases the vulnerability of reforms to change.

5.3.5 Section Summary

This section has sought to expand our understanding of how institutional structures and processes influence CE. Analysis has complemented the previous section (see 5.2) by exploring one of the two less formal institutions, normative rules. Overall, the analysis suggests the existence of ambiguities in the norms and values underpinning CE reforms. Key among these is the *prevalence of community apathy in WATSAN*. Apathy stands in contrast to the inclusive premise of CE (Cornwall et al., 2011). The analysis further shows that apathy has been the result of adverse experiences encountered by the community in its engagement with formal actors and processes in WATSAN. Engagement with the formal processes is undermined by the level of bureaucracy involved and the seeming inability of organisational providers to address community concerns about WATSAN services. Bureaucracy provides room for the exploitation of the community by unscrupulous actors, further holding CE hostage to the agency of a few key actors. The inability of organisational actors to respond effectively to community concerns undermines their credibility and reputation. As Capelos et al. (2015) contend, the loss of reputation further promotes community adversity towards organisational actors. In corroboration, findings suggest that most formal CE encounters tend to be tense.

Organisational actors have responded to the challenges of adverse reputations. They have invested in the recruitment, training and certification of personnel dedicated to CE. By doing so, organisations have attempted to restore public confidence in their abilities and moral credibility—the impression that they care. Yet, community expectations about CE continue to be defined by apathy and adversity. Oliver (1991) contends that exclusion and adversity represent resistant forms of strategic behaviours. Community resistance may have a domino effect on others, further reducing the readily supply of reforms' supporters. This subsequently undermines reforms by reducing the commitment (Scott, 2013d) of the community to them.

In sum, examining the prevailing norms in WATSAN, this section has highlighted an important feature of the contextual environment for CE, adverse community expectations. The section has shown that these manifest as apathy and general adversity. These represent a potential source of ambiguities as they already contradict the letter (literal form) and spirit (intended form) of reforms. These inter-element ambiguities, as you may refer to them, affect how CE rules are interpreted and enforced. These findings suggest there is dissonance between what CE rules contend to do and expectations of them. This points to a misalignment of the regulative and normative elements of CE institutions in WATSAN. This is likely to further confound rather than reinforce CE.

5.4 Cultural Cognitive Institutional Framework and Processes for CE

This section examines the cultural-cognitive elements of institutions influencing civic engagement. Cultural-cognitive elements relate to common conceptions about the nature of reality that coordinates how actors relate one another and their environments (Scott, 2013a). The analysis explores the various symbols, relations, routines, and artefacts that capture how organisational and community actors interpret and internalise civic engagement in their interactions (Scott, 2003, 2013b). These play an important role in translating how formal rules and normative structures affect the lived experiences of civic engagement. Along with normative structures, cognitive elements constitute informal dimensions of institutions i.e. those that comprise of loose (and variable) precision, obligations and delegation of authority (Scott, 2013a)that nonetheless provide an important social scaffolding that regulates practical applications of regulative rules. Thus, analysis contributes to a large and growing body of literature assessing the effects of institutional reforms (for examples see Andrews, 2008; Andrews and Bategeka, 2013; Mizrahi and Tevet, 2014).

5.4.1 Cultural-Cognitive Relational Systems for CE

These are the inter-organisational and inter-personal relationships utilised by actors to communicate shared concerns in WATSAN (Scott, 2013b). These relationships are based on common identities and conceptions about CE, that manifest as cultural-cognitive symbols (see above). Cultural relations allow actors to define and locate their own preferences in a manner consistent with the common attributes of those they associate with. Organisationally, this is observed with the standardisation of employment attributes required for professions entrusted with CE duties as observed in section 5.3.1.

At the community level, the influence of interpersonal relationships on CE depends on the relative homogeneity of its individuals (Awortwi, 2012). That is, the more alike community members are, the more likely they are to share conceptions about CE and vice versa. Community homogeneity is a composite characteristic comprising of shared social, economic, political, and demographic attributes. Examples include levels of education, wealth, ethnicity and sense of belonging. These effectively define the social environment that individuals face, that nurtures their cultural cognitive dispositions (views and behaviours). Homogeneity regulates interactions by fostering the cultural cognitive systems of trust, common identities and reciprocity. These in turn reinforce further exchanges and interactions, affecting how community members relate to one another and to (external) organisational actors.

The facilitative role of homogeneity in CE has also been observed by organisational (Entwistle, 2010) and political studies (Pattie et al., 2003) which posit that there is a high propensity for multi-actor interactions where there are common grounds, for example of meaning, rationale,

backgrounds etc. And findings of this study suggest significant community homogeneity, in the case study sample, in the demographic attributes of schooling, length of residency, mode of access to WATSAN services, and perceptions about individual economic wellbeing (for details see Table 5.4). Table 5.4 reveals that an overwhelming proportion of interviewed community actors— 95%, 90%, and 82% respectively — had lived in the community for three or more years, had access to piped water, and had completed primary education as the highest level of schooling.

Table 5.4: Shared community attributes

Key Demographic Feature	Category	Frequency, %
Sex	Male	64
	Female	36
Age	Young Adults (18-34 years)	14
	Lower Middle-Aged Adults (35-44 years)	14
	Middle Aged Adults (45-54 years)	36
	Upper Middle-Aged Adults (55-64 years)	27
	The Elderly (65 years and above)	9
Schooling	Primary Education	82
	Secondary Education	14
	Technical or Vocational Training	5
Perceptive Assessment of Own Wellbeing	Good	14
	Bad	32
	Neither Good nor Bad	55
Length of Residency	Between Six Months and One Year	5
	Three Years or More	95
If member of a WATSAN users' group	Yes	36
	No	64
Main Source of Drinking Water	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour’s house/plot	55

Key Demographic Feature	Category	Frequency, %
	Piped into house/plot	35
	Community/privately managed water point/kiosk/tap	5
	Water vendor/truck	5
	Unimproved Pit Latrine	32
	Flush toilet in the house	27
Type of Toilet Used by Respondent's Household	Improved/Ventilated Pit Latrine	41
If Respondent Pays for at least one WATSAN service	Yes	100
	No	0

Total Number of Respondents, N =22
Source: Author's own based on fieldwork

Therefore, it is unsurprising that there is both a convergence and a divergence of conceptions about the meaning of CE within and across organisations and the community (see Figure 5.5). Almost three-fifths of organisational actors regard CE as an empowerment and a partnership building exercise, a normative value shared by less than a quarter of the community. Additionally, 1 in 5 organisations associate CE with the transfer of policy ownership in WATSAN to the public. Thus, collectively 3 out of 4 organisations associate CE with either partnerships or community ownership in WATSAN. This is reflective of characteristic institutional isomorphism, and suggestive of organisational actors repeating the official line on CE policy.



Figure 5.4: Shared understandings of meaning of civic engagement
Source: Author's own, based on fieldwork

In contrast, close to 1 in 5 community members do not know what CE means implying latent disconnect with the whole process and potential apathy. Further, among those with a visibly clear idea of CE, most regard it a strategy for co-optation wherein organisations are only interested in the resources the community have to offer: material and in-kind. This is indicative of rule ambiguity with gaps evident between rule statement and instantiation (enforcement and/or interpretation). It is nonetheless a feature characteristic of layered institutions where there is an uneasy coexistence of old and new rules.

5.4.2 Cultural Cognitive Routines for CE

Cultural cognitive routines for CE relate to patterned behavioural actions deployed by actors in individual or collective settings (Scott, 2013b). They result from the relationships between organisations and the community as well as the demands and expectations of underlying actors. Owing to the cross-cutting nature of CE, the routines followed are often demand driven and highly diverse. Organisationally, these involve measures to respond to the community's WATSAN queries and concerns, which maybe unique in nature or circumstances. Subsequently, organisational actors tailor their responses and conducts to meet specific interactive demands. The different

organisational actors involved (for example, hotline operators, Public Relations Officers, or local intermediaries) often find themselves adopting conciliatory approaches in such circumstances in effort to maintain the rapport and/or placate the client base. As front-line representatives of organisational structures, these actors exercise rule discretion (by virtue of legally and morally sanctioned authority) in on-the-spot decision-making. A hotline operator may, for instance, directly assign other organisational departments with tasks (say for example, the Billing Division with records' reconciliation, or maintenance with a repairs' job) in response to a client's concern.

Community actors occasionally lament the delegation of authority to front-line personnel that makes it difficult to know "who the boss is" and/or "gives everyone the power to make promises" (Interviews). Despite, *de jure* delegation, in practice there often exist limitations and tensions over what front-line personnel can do. Some of these are structural, caused by hierarchical/power rigidities, while some are capacity-driven. Thus, routine scripts are fallible "empty promises", which adversely affect relations between organisations and the community. As noted in Community Interview 13, "When one reports faults, DAWASCO tends to be slow to respond. [When] DAWASCO drag their feet, we end up with breeding grounds for mosquitoes."

Undeniably, the default demand-driven organisational routine is firefighting with an unintended consequence of organisational shortcomings in the provision of WATSAN. Listening and responding to the community's problems is essentially part of everyday CE. Problems with WATSAN service constitute the bulk of information shared with the authorities (see Table 5.1). For the community, these go hand in hand with organisational demands for material and in-kind contributions. As shown in Table 5.6, all community residents pay for WATSAN services. Coupled with their low levels of income, affordability is often a concern for them. Subsequently, feelings of marginalisation are prevalent. When these encounter non-response from formal organisations, the natural predilection is helplessness. "Non-response from service providers," says a committee member, "undermines the value of my committee's and communities' efforts and time spent in consultation" (Local Water Users' Committee Member2).

And failure to meet community's expectations from CE mobilises opposition to organised form of CE. Rather than reinforcing reforms, these facilitate the exploration of other participatory avenues (Dill, 2010a) that divert popular support away from reforms. Increased investment in alternative logics legitimises their existence bringing them into competition with formal structures. When faced with competing choices, consumers in other geographical areas are more likely to mimetically join up with change agents further enhancing the informal legitimacy of competing logics at the expense of formal reforms. The net result is often one of failure as formal

reforms are denied conducive environment to operate and that leads to signalling (Andrews, 2013).

5.4.3 Cultural Cognitive Artefacts for CE

Cultural cognitive artefacts for CE are objects CE that possess specific symbolic values (Scott, 2013b). These often overlap with their regulative and normative counterparts, examined earlier, which primarily aim to appeal to the cultural identities inherent in population. Multiple artefacts exist reflecting the generic role that CE plays in WATSAN— its institutional routines. Findings from this study, however, reveals no presence of other institutional artefacts beyond the regulative and normative kinds, examined previously.

5.4.4 Section Summary

As a whole, findings of this study reveal that remnants of resistant institutional expectations influence actors' perceptions of CE. Worryingly, formal understandings of CE appear not to be shared by the community. This poses challenges in the diffusion of CE as organisations and communities utilise seemingly divergent terms of reference (scripts). This is perhaps the biggest stumbling block in the institutionalisation of CE. The process appears to have stagnated on Lynn and Zucker's *objectification* (1996) or Greenwood et.al's *theorisation* phase (2002)—the development of a common meaning necessary for the adoption of CE beyond its point of origin.

5.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter sought to examine the institutional framework for civic engagement in WATSAN. More specifically, it tried to answer research questions 1, *how do institutional structures and processes influence Civic Engagement?* Analysis entailed a triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data based on desk reviews and fieldwork. A sociological perspective of historical institutionalism provided the basis of organisation and logical flow**.** This perspective reveals several unique observations about the case study, CE in WATSAN. Key among these is the difficulty (and possibly failure) of institutional reforms to align the regulative and non-regulative elements of institutions. Some of these, for example top-down control of CE, are historical in nature and reinforce norms and practices that undermine reforms. These explain the divergences between rule and practice which induce contradictory organisational behaviours.

Findings further suggest that extant institutions enable and constrain civic engagement by conferring rights as well as responsibilities, privileges as well as duties, and licences as well as mandates (Scott, 2013a, p. 64). These affect how actors interact with rules, determining the type and nature of engagement. Institutional effects impact the adoption or endorsement of civic engagement and thus their legitimacy. In their present form, a robust regulative framework exists alongside norms and cognitions that promote

contradictory or exploitative interpretation and enactment of rules. The contradictory potential of informal rules often manifests itself in instances where authority for CE has been delegated, aided by weak legal monitoring and enforcement of organisational actors. These tend to distort the distribution of rents from CE in ways that affect the type of engagement undertaken: resistant or complementary acquiescence (Oliver, 1991). Findings also indicate that passive and other resistant forms of engagement prevail in WATSAN. These are indicative of a gradual erosion of support for regulative reforms, as the returns from compliance are outweighed by engagement in other structures. Further attempts, at the study's conceptual stage, to distinguish institutional structures from agency appear unfounded.

Overall, findings suggest that institutions of the normative and cultural orientations explain the levels of civic engagement in WATSAN. Organisational and societal norms and relations inform how individual actors behave and attach meaning to civic engagement (Oliver, 1991). The nature of these norms (adverse or otherwise) explains an individual's likelihood to engage in collective or individual actions that seek to conform, defy or manipulate outcomes. Worryingly for the PSRs in WATSAN, formal understandings of CE appear not to be shared by the community. This poses challenges in the diffusion of CE as organisations and communities utilise seemingly divergent terms of reference (scripts). This represents a ready-made constituency of change actors to the reforms in WATSAN. As Andrews (2013) and Peters and Pierre (2016) suggest, further institutional changes in such contexts may not necessarily be a bad thing. Such changes are needed to ensure that the alignment of the three institutional pillars reflects contextual realities and leads to the achievement of desired goals. A realignment of the institutional order would affect the type and levels of civic engagement in ways that reinforce reforms.

CHAPTER SIX

THE INFLUENCE OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT ON SERVICE PROVISION IN WATSAN

As noted earlier, the aim of this research is to examine the role of civic engagement (CE) in the evolving systems for providing water and sanitation (WATSAN) in Tanzania. To that end, the third part of this research examines the influence of civic engagement in the provision of water and sanitation. Considering institutional actors' interactions with institutions for CE, this chapter presents findings and discussions relating to research question 2: *How does CE influence service provision in WATSAN?* To meet this objective, the research explores the institutional properties of ambiguity, power and agency to understand how CE influences service provision in WATSAN. The approach draws from the conceptualisation of CE as an institutional process (as shown in Table 2.4). This approach is used to describe the areas of WATSAN services influenced by CE and explain how community and organisational actors interact to influence outcomes in WATSAN. This chapter is structured in five sections.

Section 6.1 presents an introduction to the influences of CE on service provision in WATSAN. This helps identify three features of WATSAN services influenced by the engagement of citizens with the formal processes. Sections 6.2 to 6.4 explores the influence of CE on features of WATSAN services identified in Section 6.1. In these contexts, research considers how the institutionalisation of CE affects service provision by challenging the traditional role of the state and its relationships with the community in WATSAN. Such a refinement is particularly important in the context of NPM type reforms, such as those in WATSAN sector in Tanzania (URT, 2002; Lein and Tagseth, 2009), that focus on the economic value of institutional interactions. Section 6.5, the last section of the chapter, concludes by summarising its contributions to the literature on how institutional reforms influence service provision.

In the previous chapters, CE reforms were shown to be the result of a gradual process of incremental changes referred to by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) as layering. As discussed in Chapter 2, that challenged rather than displaced historically dominant institutions in WATSAN. These characteristics were shown to influence ambiguities in the institutional structures and process that influence CE (see Chapter 5). To test the influence of these institutional features for CE in WATSAN in Tanzania, this research explores how community and organisational actors interact within this framework of rules to influence service provision in WATSAN

6.1 Introduction

In this section, the study explores the perceptions of interviewees to identify three features of WATSAN services influenced by the engagement

of citizens with the formal processes. These are access to services, organisational accountability and cost recovery.

As shown in the review of institutional literature in chapter 2, despite facing the same set of institutions, different payoffs may be observed for the actors involved. These "distributional consequences" (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 8) reflect the differences in resource endowments, preferences and rule (including expectations) ambiguity, which are inherent in institutional arrangements. The previous chapter examined some of these differences through the lenses of the various carriers used to convey CE logics through time and across space in WATSAN. These included dissonances between community and organisations, in cognitive understandings of CE, normative expectations and regulative routines. Institutional literature, however, cautions us that carriers are themselves "never neutral modes of transmission" (Scott, 2013b, p. 94). That is because human-made conceptions and objects (for example, artefacts) can easily be altered in their instantiations, distorting the logics of the message being conveyed, leading to multiple outcomes. These qualitative institutional attributes are suggestive of the potential for variable degrees of expectation, agency and outcomes in CE.

These observations provide useful points of departure, anchoring the analysis that follows in this chapter. The chapter builds on these findings by exploring how community and organisational actors interact within this framework of rules to influence service provision in WATSAN. It is worth noting that Chapter 5 revealed the different elements and carriers structuring CE in WATSAN. Despite being comprehensive, attempts to mirror that approach in this chapter would be time-consuming and obscure the thesis's contribution to literature. Specificity is provided by observations about community perceptions on the aspects of WATSAN services influenced by CE (see Figure 6.1). Research findings from this section suggest that the accessibility of services, promotion of organisational accountability, and affordability of services were the dominant aspects of service provision identified by respondents as being influenced by CE in the case study area. This chapter presents discussions of how CE influences each one of these aspects of WATSAN services.

Figure 6.1: Community perceptions about aspects of services influenced by CE

Source: Author's based on fieldwork

6.2 Promotion of Access to Services

This section examines the influence of CE in promoting the accessibility of WATSAN services. This is done by exploring how WATSAN actors exploit ambiguities in reform and CE rules to influence access to potable water and sanitation. Findings suggest the influence of CE on improving access to WATSAN services is conditioned by a widespread reinterpretation of rules by actors to suit their own pressing needs. This conditions access to both potable water and sanitation. These are discussed in detail below, under the respective sub-headings.

Underlying the implementation of PSRs in Tanzania is the normative appeal to improve public services relative to some desired standards. In WATSAN, particularly in urban areas, such improvements focus on the expansion of service to underserved populations, most of whom reside in non-surveyed areas such as in the Kawe Mzimuni ward in Kinondoni local authority. Regulative elements in WATSAN suggest that service expansion is largely a capital development exercise, whose implementation has periodically been phased through the various sector development plans that have existed since 2006. Formal WATSAN policy specifies what this entails by assigning roles (delegation) and responsibilities (obligations) to actors in the sector, thus enhancing the formalisation of rules (Scott, 2013a).

Regulatory rules see CE as an instrument whose utility lies in supporting investments in physical infrastructure in WATSAN. Rules prescribe desired features of CE which include reciprocal acts (for example contributions, both cash and in-kind, assessed separately below), behaviours, norms and values that help align the constitutive elements governing the sector. The evidence from chapter 5, however, suggests that

the rules in WATSAN are ambiguous. Further findings reveal that neither sectoral policies nor strategies (or plans for that matter) explicitly define objective and quantifiable goals for CE. According to the institutional literature, ambiguity makes rules amenable to varied interpretations by actors with divergent interests (Capoccia, 2016; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). This subsequently affects their application and the outcomes they produce. In the absence of quantifiable goals, actors reinterpret their payoffs from CE on the bases of their shared understandings (or problems), norms or other related formal specifications. These in essence then reflect their aspirations relative to their social realities. In WATSAN, these include access to water, sewerage, and other sanitation needs.

6.2.1 Access to Potable Water

This section examines the influence of CE on supplies of potable water in the Kawe Mzimuni ward in Kinondoni local authority. This is done by exploring how the reforms' institutional framework (examined in chapter 5) influences civic engagement in sanitation. At the time of field research, interviews conducted with some 22-community respondent syndicated that there was widespread availability of potable water in the Kawe Mzimuni ward in Kinondoni local authority. The interview revealed that 12 of the respondents (a little over half of community respondents) had access to piped water either in their own dwellings or from a neighbour's (for details see Figure 6.2). On the other hand, a third of those interviewed (i.e. seven respondents) said they accessed water from a nearby community owned facility. As opposed to that, two respondents used water from privately owned well/borehole, while one purchased water from private vendors. Respondents with access to piped water were beneficiaries of recent government spending on water infrastructure as part of the implementation of the sector's second strategic development programme.



Figure 6.2: Main sources of water supplies in community

Source: Author's based on fieldwork

On the surface, the Kawe Mzimuni ward in Kinondoni local authority seems an exception to most other impoverished informal urban settlements. Community residents in the area are, however, happy to explain how different things were as compared to the situation some five years earlier and in the process extol the role played by CE. "In the past, we used to have persistent disruptions to our supplies," says a participant, "We sometimes used to go for a week without a drop of water from our taps" (Community Interview 2).

Further results from the field suggest influences of CE in two reinforcing time periods: the past and present. The past in this context denotes the time since the start of current wave of WATSAN reforms and the introduction of a new water law, essentially the period 2002-2009. The present, on the other hand, represents developments in the period 2010-2012. Findings are discussed in detail below, under the respective sub-headings.

i. Past influence of CE on access to potable water

Interviews suggest that in the past considerably fewer people in the area had access to piped or community managed water, which tends to be treated and tested for quality and is considered acceptably potable by the sector regulator (EWURA, 2014b). Two-thirds (65%, see Table 5.4) of community respondents accessed water through private vendors or had to rely on the few others with connections to the main. Wealthier members of the community had alternative arrangements. These had private access to potable water either through own boreholes or the formal water mains, whose infrastructural coverage was limited. Either way, to access water one had to be able to pay considerable sums which had proved inhibitive to most in the community. In this regard, the following remark by an interviewee reveals people's struggles to make water bills affordable:

> Our neighbour used to provide us with water on a daily in return for small financial contributions towards his monthly service bill from DAWASCO. But the neighbourhood is mostly poor, and this led to erratic contributions. We felt guilty about this [erratic contributions], got together and asked our neighbour for assistance. He subsequently allowed us to fetch water free of charge for one day of the week, on Sundays only. (Community Interview 1)

Those with legal access to piped water from the mains, accessed water as per their contract with the utility company, DAWASCO. According to interviews, contracts then served as de facto platforms to engage with water authorities

> DAWASCO only acts on claims from customers it recognises. They often ask for your water account number when in dialogue. If you don't have one [an account number] they will listen but do nothing

> unless you are submitting a request for a new connection. (Community Interview 1).

The high costs of obtaining legal access to water then proceeded to exclude significant proportions of residents from engaging with WATSAN reforms. These contradicted the reforms' objective of "improving water and sanitation services in low incomes and peri-urban areas*"* (URT, 2002, p. 43). The then high costs of connection stemmed from historical under-investment in WATSAN by the state as it reformed its economy in the aftermath of significant downturn in the 1980s (see Chapter 4). Further interviews suggest that the initial high connection costs also resulted from WATSAN authorities' hasty interpretation and implementation of the sector's reforms. In addition to promoting CE, reforms in WATSAN also emphasise charging communities the full costs of operation and maintenance of services (URT, 2002). This is in itself an ambiguity as it contradicts other reform objectives of providing affordable services (pertinent as an estimated 10.7% of the population in Dar es Salaam (DAWASCO's main area of jurisdiction) lives under the poverty line (World Bank, 2015b, p. 48)), and the promotion of community participation in services (URT, 2002).

Faced with these dilemmas, DAWASCO, the utility company, failed to keep pace with the growth in population and settlements' developments in the case study area. Financial considerations took precedence in policy deliberations over CE and expansion of access. Despite high visibility in the country's commercial and de-facto administrative centre, WATSAN infrastructure in Kawe Mzimuni adversely suffered as DAWASCO failed to sufficiently expand its clientele to meet the costs of operations and maintenance (Community Interviews 4,5,9 and 12. This further hastened the decline of WATSAN services already affected by budget cuts. In some neighbourhoods, the water supply infrastructure went thirty years without maintenance (Community Interviews 3, 5, and 9). Yet as the area's population grew, so did the demands for piped connections. These demands provided additional incentives for the exploitation of ambiguities in WATSAN reforms by some unscrupulous actors, known as *Vishokas* (for details, see Box 6.1).

Box 6.1: Vishokas and the "theft" of water

Vishokas are individuals who enjoy some form of affiliation with DAWASCO either as employees, past employees or external contractors. These exploit their links to the provider to offer paid services to the community through among others: illegal tapping of (connections) the water mains (Kagenda, 2012), as intermediaries in facilitating applications for metered connections (Interviews), or addressing infrastructural faults and maintenance (Interviews), etc. *Vishokas* originated in the late 1980s as informal repairmen who provided quick fixes when the ageing and poorly maintained water infrastructure frequently broke down. Their ranks swelled

in the 1990s as civic service reforms saw the retrenchment of surplus labour. The term *Vishokas* directly translates to a small or tiny axe, in Kiswahili.

In 2013, DAWASCO suffered losses amounting to TZS 112 billion (approximately £37 million) (Msonsa, 2013). *Vishokas* are estimated to have accounted for more than half of these losses. DAWASCO regards *Vishokas* as thieves and for over ten years, has been engaged in a public campaign against them. This has included offers of monetary incentives for information leading to their arrest and threats of criminal proceedings against anyone associated with them (Msonsa, 2013). The campaign has sought to diminish the appeal of *Vishokas*. But these have remained relevant particularly as the costs of legal connections and use have remained high. Interviews suggest that *Vishokas* provide people with water (through illegal connections) at a fraction of the fees levied by DAWASCO. In addition, illegal connections tend not be metered and therefore not subject to the monthly use fees levied by DAWASCO. This further increases their appeal.

It has been alleged that *Vishokas* collude with formal DAWASCO employees, mainly those tasked with store or record keeping, to obtain the equipment used (Kombe et al., 2015). However, as PSRs have also included a strengthening of internal control processes, their scope for manoeuvres has also been increasingly curtailed. Some have resorted to stealing equipment from DAWASCO warehouses or in other public domains. Often, this has forced them to rely on used and/or faulty equipment, further eroding the validity of their promises to deliver (Interviews).

Realisation of the limited ability of *Vishokas* to make things "happen" has in turn shifted community attitudes against them. Findings suggest widespread recognition of their unreliability, potential for outright fraud, and inherent unsustainability of outcomes even where they succeed.

Ambiguous reform rules had conflicting effects on DAWASCO's strategic choices. They simultaneously raised the cost of: i) implementing them, and ii) not implementing them. On the one hand, enforcing WATSAN reforms meant giving preference to cost recovery, which increased both the administrative costs (as additional staff had to be hired, trained and monitored) and the benefits forgone (the opportunity cost) by excluding poorer citizens incapable of meeting the full cost of connections. The latter occurred through increased costs of monitoring against illegal connections (Community Interviews 3 and 17), and the revenues forgone through illegal connections. There was also a reputational cost, which survives today, as the provider was seen to actively promote the exclusion of the poor. Expressing how cruel DAWASCO are, an interviewee decries, "They [DAWASCO] still only care about money. They will cut you off if you are late to pay your bills by even a day. They are heartless(Community

Interview 9)" Capelos et al. (2015) observe that positive perceptions about an organisation enhance its reputation and trust levels among its customers facilitating engagement between them. Contrary to that, this study finds the polar opposite. The historical conduct of actors like DAWASCO is found to have had an adverse effect on CE and has undermined its legitimacy. On the other hand, a non-enforcement of reforms meant DAWASCO faced two substantial costs. Number one, it risked sanctions from the state stipulated by the reforms' legal framework (URT, 2014). This included disciplinary measures against its staff for insubordination under the auspices of the country's public service framework (URT, 2009f); financial penalties from the sector regulator, EWURA, for non-compliance (URT, 2001); or loss of its concessionary rights parallel to what happened to its predecessor, City Water Services (see de Waal et al., 2008; Pigeon, 2012). The second substantial costs DAWASCO faced were direct losses of revenue from recusing itself from the provision of WATSAN services. This would have meant a surrender of its monopoly in WATSAN, essentially increasing the market shares of *Vishokas* and other would-be actors.

These strategic options weighed heavily on the minds of DAWASCO's top leadership (Organisational Interviews). They led to inertia as uncertainty loomed large over the outcomes from the pursuit of either possible cause of action. The inertia was eventually resolved in favour of the first strategic option owing to the introduction of revised water laws in 2009 which affirmed the commitment of DAWASCO to reforms (URT, 2009g). However, the inertia had had its effects. It had constrained DAWASCO's ability to enforce rules in this period; damaged its reputation; and undermined its legitimacy within the community. Organisational inertia had also encouraged the creative reinterpretation by *Vishokas* of the very rules that governed WATSAN. *Vishokas* exploited the inability of DAWASCO (caused by administrative indecision) to illegally expand access to communities in the face of growing demands for services. *Vishokas* did so for private gains. The HI literature describes such behaviour as "parasitic"(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 24) and contend that it leads to institutional drift. Parasitic behaviours occur when individuals exploit reforms to behave in ways that contradict their spirit or intended purpose thus undermining them in the long run. Drift corresponds to when reforms remain the same but suffer from a change of impact owing to the failure to update and maintain them in response to changes in their social environment (Hacker et al., 2015). *Vishokas* relied on the very resources of DAWASCO (the supplies infrastructure, water and equipment) to create a parallel and competing system of service provision that further undermined the legitimacy of DAWASCO as a provider. This is what Ato Onoma(2010) refers to as the contradictory potential of institutions, which simultaneously enable activities that sustain and (unintentionally) those that undermine them.

Institutional drift has had profound effects on CE. It has created an environment (which still prevails today) in which some community

members preferred to engage with the informal *Vishokas* rather than the formal DAWASCO. An informant witnesses, "[Through *Vishokas*], It is easier to get things done quickly and cheaply. They [*Vishokas*] are hands-on people and [in contrast to DAWASCO] not desk technicians. There is no form filling or waiting, just results! "(Community Interview 6)

ii. Present influence of CE on access to potable water

It could, however, be said that the scale of service community experiences with *Vishokas* compounded the problems faced rather than solving them This was a poor community living in the most urbanised area of the country close to the ruling elites, yet was without access to a very basic social service. The community reported feeling "exploited" and "taken for granted" by everyone from the *Vishokas* and the service provider, to the politicians who promised the water at electoral campaigns. "We needed sufficient resources to enable swift and decisive resolution of matters collectively identified such as sewerage inadequacies in our neighbourhood," says a respondent, "[But] what we got were empty words and a waste of people's time" (Community Interview 5).

There were clamours for more sustainable arrangements, but the experiences had also provided them with much needed reflections of their social reality. Key among these were limits on the capacity of DAWASCO and/or the state to meet the community's WATSAN infrastructural needs. These led to generalised acceptance among civil and organisational actors of the need for innovation and possible external agency to improve supply services. A remark by a participant says it all:

> We had had enough of it [exploitation]…As a community we talked about mobilising efforts to drill more boreholes closer to residential areas to help reduce distances travelled during shortages; and the need for careful and considerate use of water to avoid misuse. (Community Interviews 2)

The innovation lay in self-provisioning of water outside formal administrative structures. However, this too needed capital resources beyond the immediate reach of the community. To attract financiers for their scheme, the community quickly realised the need to engage exposed members of society who could act on their behalf (Community Interviews 10,11 and 17). The community subsequently opted to make the drilling of local boreholes/deep wells a key feature of the agenda at the 2005 and 2006 local and national elections. For a participant," It was a simple case of us [the community] being realistic. We couldn't raise the money, nor could we get DAWASCO to help. We had to turn to our votes" (Community Interview 4).

In essence, the community resorted to electoral blackmail using the only effective tool at its disposal, which is votes. To minimise the chances of electoral exploitation, the community then pressed for the election of two of its long-term residents to the ticket of the locally most powerful party at

the time, CCM. This succeeded in the election of a local area chairman and a ward councillor who identified with the community's cause. In addition, the new councillor had also worked for both the government and a local non-governmental organisation prior to retiring and running for office. As a result, the councillor also brought with him his knowledge of key personnel and how to engage with the various actors occupying the local development landscape. From a position of financial helplessness, the community had now secured formal political leverage.

In 2007, the newly elected ward councillor for the area mobilised a collective "buy-in", from the various sub ward officials in the area, of his plans to support the community's application for borehole funding from the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF). The councillor proposed a trade-off scheme (effectively, an informal collusive agreement) to prevent unnecessary competition for financial resources among the sub wards (Interviews). Explaining the situation, a political actor says,

> The council views local budget plans as wish-lists. What this means is, they finance only what they consider to be the most pressing needs. It is not uncommon to receive money for only one budget item or none at all when you have asked for five. You have got to be smart and play them at their own game.

This would see the various sub wards align their infrastructural priorities and mutually endorse each other's applications for funding rather than simultaneously present distinct proposals to potential financiers. The feedback was positive, and the councillor proceeded to mobilise community engagement under the auspices of the mandatory participatory rural appraisal methods (in this case the regulative routines of O&OD, as shown in Chapter 5.2.3). The councillor jointly worked with the community to mobilise its mandatory counterpart effort, equivalent to five percent of the aggregate project value (TASAF, 2005; World Bank, 2016b), both in cash contributions and in-kind offering of manpower and voluntary offering of a project site. These efforts led to the construction of a borehole in the area in 2009, and the formation of a community management committee (a grassroots-based organisation, as presented in Chapter 5.2.1) to oversee routine operations of the borehole.

Therefore, through coordination by the ward councillor, the community in Kawe Mzimuni was able to innovate a solution to their supplies problem by utilising extant regulatory routines and relational regime to circumvent capacity constraints of the service provider. Such efforts succeeded in adhering to both the letter and intent of the regulatory regime by delivering outcomes independent of the institutional efforts of the authority designated to provide for them. Episodic demonstrations of innovative entrepreneurship of this kind are indicative of the ability of institutional actors to alter (through adaptation or adoption) their actions without undermining the legal legitimacy of dominant logics. Innovation involves an adaptation of rules relative to its environment in a manner that upholds

their contextual legitimacy. Theory suggests that the retention of an institution's contextual legitimacy reduces the scope of contestations over the meaning and effects of its rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), thus enhancing its stability. Recent studies in Political Science (Levitsky and Way, 2015; Slater, 2010)demonstrate that the survival of authoritarian regimes in some countries is influenced by the ability of their rulers to maintain their legitimacy through innovative means community innovation relied on its collective reflexive capability to realise the utility of CE that lay beyond the power of predetermined roles (that of the service provider being the dominant enabler of infrastructure) to produce a tangible outcome which with potential recursive effects on future engagement. Collective reflexivity demonstrated that creative interpretation of institutional rules is possible even in highly coercive political environments low on discretionary practice. Reflexivity allowed community actors to "imagine, evaluate[d] and contingently reconstruct" (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, cited in Scott, 2013b, p. 94) rules such that their desired outcomes could be delivered without compromising adherence to stipulated rules. With respect to potable water, the community's experiences from engaging with formal actors in WATSAN appears to have influenced their perceptions over the relative utility of CE "Dialogue and meetings do not necessarily," notes an interviewee, "bring water to our taps. You need money for this, as does DAWASCO. I think that's why the pipes are old and leaky" (Community Interview 1). A corollary of this can be seen in the community's shared understanding of CE as indicated in Figure 5.5. To the community, CE is effectively a platform for mobilisation of efforts, which utilises resident relations and resources.

Consequently, the community has found it difficult to reconcile these operational realities with its own economic realities (i.e. the inability to sustainably afford the monetary costs of water). To the community, the inadequacy of WATSAN infrastructure remains at the core of the limitations in service. This, coupled with relatively high incidence of poverty and inequality within the community (Kilama, 2016; World Bank, 2015b), imposes limits to the likelihood of success of CE (i.e. its perceived utility). Naturally then, it is understandable that this has led to variant motives for and indeed expectations of CE between the community and organisations tasked with implementing PSRs. To search for solutions, the community often prioritises beyond the intermediate shortcomings of DAWASCO (and the state). Indeed, this was explored in Chapter 5.4.3 as a feature of layered institutions, which allocates support for variant causes within the same institutional setup.

Institutional theory asserts that the reproduction and indeed diffusion of institutional logics depends on the strength of the coalitions mobilised (Gingrich, 2015; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Pierson, 2015). On this basis, the reforms' use of CE to improve the accessibility of potable water in Kawe Mzimuni appears to have been undermined by the failures in their designs. These failures stem from the inability to reconcile formal rules

with the contextual realities of the areas and populations of target. Policy designs for cost recovery contradict and undermine the promotion of CE as tool for expanding access to underserved populations. These ambiguities appear to have affected other areas of reforms, notably unclear reform goals.

At present, the reconciliation of ambiguities in formal WATSAN rules is mainly constrained by: lack of precision of formal rules; exploitation of rents through parasitic activities; actual realities of the limits of individual agency; and historical legacies of a heavily centralised public service (Bana and McCourt, 2006; Mutahaba, 2005). The net result is that while the community understands the importance of CE advocated by the state, its prescriptive text has failed to match popular desires. The extent to which the accretionary effects of rule ambiguities have not derailed PSRs in WATSAN lies in the failure of exploiting agents (for example, *Vishokas*) to operate beyond the periphery of the public service, and the collective strength of other PSR defenders to coercively constrain its diffusion through the use of legal mechanisms and sanctions.

In closing, further service improvements in the area occurred in 2011 when infrastructural funding was extended to Kawe Mzimuni as part of the US$951 million Water Sector Support Project, under the auspices of the National Water Sector Development Programme (2007-2014). Amidst competition from other equally in-need urban areas, it is probable that the community's historical struggles played a role in influencing organisational level decision-making to incorporate the area in this large-scale capital development project.

6.2.2 Access to Sanitation

Sanitation represents the hygienic promotion of health in the delivery (or lack of) of water services. It includes among others the treatment and disposal of wastewater and sewage. Some of the very basic aspects of sanitation include access to and utilisation of requisite physical infrastructure. Improving sanitation is often dependent on improving access to water as the latter facilitates the treatment, management and disposal of waste. The legislative framework in WATSAN mandates the provision of sewerage and sanitation to the utility company, DAWASCO (URT, 2002, 2009g).This section examines the influence of CE on the sanitation component of WATSAN. This is done by exploring how the reforms' institutional framework (the subject examined in chapter 5) influences civic engagement in sanitation. Findings of the study suggest that CE institutions offer a source of problems and solutions to the provisioning of sanitation services. These findings are discussed in detail below, under the respective sub-headings.

i. CE institutions as a source of problems in sanitation services

The case study area is a characteristic depiction of most urban residential areas in Tanzania. It consists of an eclectic mix of surveyed and unsurveyed

settlements, along with the formal infrastructure representative of either planimetric status. The result is an uncomfortable accommodation of residences and key relief structures including sewerage and drainages. It is common to find such a mix on the same residential block/street. Institutional drift, particularly during the economic decline of the 1980s, and subsequent financial constraints on the part of the city's administration have contributed to the status-quo (Gondwe, 1990; Pigeon, 2012).

Capacity deficiencies have constrained efforts to improve sanitation in response to growths in population and urbanisation. Although overall coverage has improved over the years as shown Table 6.1 changes have not been felt by most urban residents (TAWASANET, 2009).

Table 6.1: Estimated utilisation of sanitation facilities in urban Tanzania

	Classification			
Year	Improved	Shared	Other Unimproved	Open Defecation
1990	6%	6%	86%	2%
1995	11%	11%	76%	2%
2000	16%	16%	66%	2%
2005	21%	21%	56%	2%
2010	26%	26%	46%	2%
2015	31%	31%	36%	2%

Source*:* Collated by WHO and UNICEF (2015) from various nationally representative surveys and censuses

Deficiencies in organisational state provisioning of water in the community have also affected sanitation outcomes. The present research reveals that there are no sewerage facilities for collecting wastewater or surface runoffs (for example, rain and storm water). As one resident of the area confesses, "There is no sewerage and when it rains, it pours waste on our streets,". On top of that, deficiencies in zoning and planning laws serve to incentivise individual approaches to dealing with sanitation issues at the expense of CE. Consequently, piecemeal solutions abound which occasionally contrive to affect the very public space they seek to assist. For example, in the absence of a centralised sewage system, households rely on privately constructed and owned soak pits to temporarily collect and store excreta and other household wastewater. According to an official,

> Everyone has their own arrangement [for storage and removal of sewerage]. When you buy a plot [of land], you only buy the land. You have to make your plans for electricity, roads, water, sewerage etc. It is not like in the city centre [where there is centralised sewerage]." (A municipal council official)

Due to low incomes and an unwillingness to uphold local building codes on sanitation (an ambiguity in auxiliary rules that support WATSAN reforms), individual solutions of this kind are often poorly designed, constructed and maintained. Households often construct their soak pits in isolation, without even informing their neighbours. Sometimes, this leads to a contamination of underground water sources, often during the rainy season, as liquid waste seeps away through the ground and comes into contact with well water sources. Other times, individual soak pits overflow due to limited capacity (see Figure 6.3) and empty their waste into household compounds, or onto the streets, which according to interviews is common and at times deliberate feature).

Figure 6.3: Sewerage inadequacy in Kawe Mzimuni
Source: Author's based on fieldwork

Similar examples exist in the disposal of other domestic waste and surface runoffs. Individualised solutions of this kind constitute much of the sanitation infrastructure in Kawe Mzimuni. The net effect is a sanitation landscape that poorly mirrors that of potable water. In contrast to a partial existence of a formal infrastructural framework, the near absence of regulatory artefacts for sanitation forces the community to provide for itself. The historical absence of such infrastructure and/or organisational efforts to provide them has led the community to completely disassociate sanitation matters from the organisational provider. Interviews suggest that community perceptions about the efficacy of DAWASCO are influenced by the same historical institutional drift that initially affected the provision of potable water.

However, in contrast to the supply of water, DAWASCO has to date remained incapable of enforcing sanitation reforms in WATSAN. The company blames insufficient resources and ambiguities in other auxiliary institutions for its inability to uphold sanitation reforms. In the eyes of an official,

> Sewers are not supposed to be afterthoughts, unless you have a lot of money [which we don't]. They have to be planned from the beginning: their depths, width, thickness and connectivity to the rest of the system. For this, we [water authorities] need to work with the municipal, land, road and environmental authorities. But these guys [auxiliary authorities] are difficult to work with. People often build on unplanned lands without their knowledge, and they just let them [do that]. It is only when flooding occurs that they bother to consult us. (A DAWSCO Official)

The failure to coordinate the planning of sanitation efforts falls foul of Article 21 of the Water Supply and Sanitation Act (URT, 2009g), which calls on planning authorities to work with their water counterparts to coordinate the provision of sanitation services to non-served areas. This further perpetuates rule ambiguities, undermining their legitimacy in WATSAN.

Interviews held with WATSAN organisations point to the lack of a dedicated coordinating actor and an inadequate sharing of information, to explain the lack of collaboration. Scott (2013a) contends that in addition to being precise and open to scrutiny, the formality of rules is enhanced by the presence of third parties with the authority to manipulate sanctions and influence behaviours. In this context, sanitation laws (URT, 2009g) accord this responsibility to DAWASCO. It could be said that there is a conflict of interest as DAWASCO, cognisant of its own shortcomings, fails to uphold the letter of the law and in essence inflict self-punishment. The difficulties in coordinating efforts in sanitation are also not helped by the involvement of multiple stakeholders (in some cases exceeding five) each with disparate modes of working, interests and resources. This is in consonance with the public management literature which argues that the complexity of coordination challenges increases with the size of collaborative partnerships (Entwistle, 2010).

The failure of responsible authorities to coordinate sanitation efforts further entrenches historical perceptions of their conduct. The prevailing feeling is one of resignation as encapsulated by one actor's attempts to get the provider (DAWASCO) to drain an overflowing soak pit in his neighbourhood:

> They [DAWASCO] did not want to have anything to do with it. They told me if I could build it myself then I should be able to drain it myself. I couldn't believe what I just heard! ... I don't need them. I just pay them for the water. That is it! (Community Interview 6)

Related studies (e.g., Capelos et al., 2005) suggest that in addition to adversely affecting community perceptions of water authorities (i.e. their moral reputations, and rule ambiguities) have also affected their roles and relationships with the community. In sanitation health, ambiguities have subsequently affected the community's disposition to formal CE. In

contrast to the provision of water services, adverse organisational feedback on sanitation has led the community to speculate on reasons other than financial/technical wherewithal for lack of organisational agency. Organisational agency has been typified by a lack of will, with consequences for the provider's reputational components of efficacy and moral reliability (Capelos et al., 2015). Perceptions of a lack of will have exposed DAWASCO as "distant" and "ill-concerned" about the general welfare of the community (Community Interviews 8, 13, and 14). This has in turn made the community less empathetic to its capacity constraints. This has eroded the goodwill between the community and the provider, effectively amplifying the latter's shortcomings in sanitation. There is a heavy polarisation of opinion on the provider's institutional reputation in sanitation and water supplies. "It is pointless to ask me about my relationship with DAWASCO," a participant complains, "There is none [a relationship]. Can you not smell the stench? [in reference to an overflowing cesspit nearby] What is the point of associating with a company that is never there when you need it?" (Community Interview 17). Interviews further indicated that the community has subsequently grown reluctant to work with the organisational provider on sanitation.

Adverse perceptions on the moral reliability of the provider on sanitation have eroded its cultural-cognitive legitimacy leading to a creative reinterpretation of the institutional order. Despite the precision of dominant rules on CE in sanitation, the community has adopted different templates of action leading to the exclusion of a role for DAWASCO. This points to the contradictory potential of WATSAN reforms caused by ambiguities in its institutional framework (as shown in chapter 5). This has occurred within the confines of the regulatory framework wherein the community has resorted to acknowledging the existence of the provider in principle rather than in practice. This situation has materialised as the community has been happy to "invite" or "inform" (Community Interviews 7 and 15) DAWASCO on sanitation matters in their neighbourhoods but willing to work with the local authority instead. The community still "writes grievance letters" (Community Interview 10) to DAWASCO not in the hope of getting assistance rather in hope that DAWASCO would one day fulfil its legal obligations as per the client service charter (as discussed in Chapter 5) or contracts entered with individual customers.

ii. CE institutions as source of solutions in sanitation services

In the impasse caused by the failure of DAWASCO to act, the lower local area authority has assumed the role of an organisational provider despite its limited legal remit on the matter. The following remarks by two interviewees makes the tough moves taken more vivid:

> These streets are usually flooded with waste water and excrement in this weather [in reference to ongoing seasonal rains]. A house on my street was fined [levied by the municipal council on people who empty their cesspits onto the streets] two week ago, and the owner

> has since not stopped fuming... I am told that the fines are being used [by the municipal council] to pay the trucks you see [cesspit emptiers] to mop up the streets. (Community Interview 12)
>
> If it weren't for the council [Kinondoni Municipal Council] these roads would be impassable by now. They have been cleaning up rainwater all week. They have sent almost everyone here, the councillor, the WEO [ward executive officer], and the chairman to check on us. (Community Interview 15)

The failure by DAWASCO to act decisively on sanitation exercise has compelled other reform actors to act on its behalf to shore up the reforms. Concurring with what the above interviewees have to say, an official notes,

> Sometimes you have to step in where others fail. At the end of the day, it is we [the municipal council] who live with them [the community]. We have a legal responsibility and a moral duty to serve the people. That is why every community initiative passes through us. (A municipal council official)

The local authority has worked in close collaboration with the water users' management committee in carrying out its tasks (Community Interviews 3 and 16). The two have consulted on rule definition, monitoring of behaviour and the scale of sanctions. The overriding mission is deterrence of unwanted behaviour, but entrenched prioritisation of self-interests continues to confound the application of legal rules. For example, community interviews indicate that despite the local authority and the users' committee negotiating preferential rates for the removal of domestic and sewerage waste, which is TShs 500 (equivalent to £0.17) per refuse bag, and TShs. 60,000 (TShs. 100,000 equivalents to £20 -£33) per soak pit respectively, some community members (even those who can afford to pay) persist in flouting the code on waste disposal. Dialogue has been the preferred course of action; however, the prevailing attitude is reflected in the following remark, "…everyone has their own private arrangement so there is little to talk about" (Community Interview 19).

When dialogue has failed, interviews further suggest that, applications of sanctions have been unpopular. Allegations of corruption have at times been levelled at the local authority in the execution of its functions as a mediator in sanitation conflicts. Yet, in the absence of other formal regulatory bodies, the community has continued to rely on the local authority as both a mediator and an enabler of local sanitation matters. The remarks below by two interviewees are more telling:

> We know that there is corruption in the system [local authority], but not everyone is corrupt. We know who they are [non-corrupt local officials]. They have long been outstanding residents of this place. We know that they share and understand our sewerage concerns and are committed to make a difference. (Community Interview 6)

> Some of us are only interested in results. I am tired of taking my family to the hospital for malaria and diarrhoea [in reference to diseases associated with poor sewerage facilities in the area]. I am ready to work with anyone who can change this." (Community Interview 8).

Borrowing solutions from their experiences with potable water, the local users' committee has sought to reunite community efforts in sanitation through a reframing of the collective problem. Cognisant of the community's perceptions about the efficacy and moral reliability of the organisational provider, the committee has determined to divert community attention towards the lack of and affordability of sewerage infrastructure. Considerable effort has been made to reconstitute the role of the provider as a partner rather than a benefactor. Emphasis has been on the collective effects of a lack of sanitation infrastructure in the area. The on-going National Sanitation Campaign (URT and World Bank, 2012) has provided a platform for the re-engagement of the provider through the provision of sanitation health education. The theme for CE has changed from the idea of "helping the authorities to deliver" to "working with the authorities to help us" (Community Interviews 10 and 20). To facilitate this the committee has adopted a two-pronged strategy: repair community-provider relations; and a reinvigoration of communitarian spirit.

Attempts to repair community-provider relations have involved direct consultations with DAWASCO, with assistance from the local authority. According to interviews with service providers, on the part of DAWASCO, these have involved public shows of contrition over past behaviour, a reopening of communication channels that fell into disuse when the provider failed to respond to community concerns, and a design of easy to implement sanitation (quick-win) projects. These have led to the assignment of specially trained personnel to DAWASCO's help desks. Thus, the assignment of DAWASCO employees was intended to assist with the unblocking of roadside sewers, and increased visibility of the provider in the community.

6.2.3 Section Summary

This sub section has demonstrated how contradictions in the internal logic of CE reforms lead to contrasting outcomes in WATSAN. The contrasting outcomes are principally the result of ambiguities of reform rules and conduct of key reform actors, notably the utility provider, DAWASCO. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) contend that ambiguities lead to creative interpretation and reinterpretation of reforms. In the cases analysed here, (re)interpretations of rules have been made possible by the reflexive actions of individual actors. Such (re)interpretations can create distinctions between de-jure and de-facto roles of institutional actors, their positions and institutional order. The net effect is one of misaligned institutional logics which affects not only the formal nature (through the precision, obligation and delegation of rules) of an institution (in this case CE) but

also the purpose. Far from creating stability, creative (re)interpretation of institutional rules can also conflict with its very purpose. This is the case with individual provisioning of sanitation in Kawe Mzimuni. Institutions, however, have in-built stabilisation mechanisms which come into effect when a particular institutional order is undermined. The mediation roles assumed by the local area authority and the users' committee, are cases in point. Finally, the section's ability to link CE institutional outcomes to historical precedents (from years of chronic underinvestment in the sector, to organisational inertia by key actors) further reinforces Berger and Luckmann's assertion that "institutions always have a history" (1966, p. 72). These features are used to explain the influence of CE on the other subsequent aspects of service provision: *organisational accountability* and *cost recovery***,** themes which would be discussed in the subsequent sections below.

6.3 Promotion of Organisational Accountability

This section examines the influence of CE in promoting organisational accountability in WATSAN. This is done by exploring how the institutional framework (examined in chapter 5) influences the promotion of organisational accountability in WATSAN. In general field research indicates that the evidence is mixed. There are arguments both in favour and against the influence of CE on organisational accountability in WATSAN. Findings the present study are presented and discussed in detail below under the respective sub-headings.

As may be recalled, the literature presented in Chapter 2 associates accountability with the responsiveness of organisational actors to the legitimate interests of those affected by the former's decision-making, actions and practices (Jacobs and Schillemans, 2016; World Bank, 2015a). Accountability relates to the reciprocal actions of actors engaged in the regularised social activities and relations structured by institutions. Such actions enable the production and reproduction of institutional logics such as PSRs, which influences their diffusion. Literature suggests that accountability is a set of relationships among service provision actors consisting of five key elements (World Bank, 2003):

- Delegating—the understanding that a service will be provided;
- Financing—the supplying of resources necessary for the provision of services;
- Performing—the supply of the actual service;
- Informing—the obtaining of information about how the actions of service providers have contributed to service provision; and
- Enforcing—the ability to use sanctions to manipulate the behaviour of service provision actors. Included in enforcing are also rewards for good performance.

This section analyses respondents' views on the influence of CE on accountability in the context of the above sets of relationships. Analysis suggests that matters of performance and financing are identical to the already separate discussions on accessibility of services provided in chapter 6.2 and cost sharing dwelt in chapter 6 respectively. Accessibility of services and cost sharing are, therefore, omitted from the analysis that follows. Subsequently, analysis is divided into exploring the influence of CE on the following three elements of accountability: i) delegation of services, ii) informing about services, and iii) enforcing the delivery of services,

6.3.1 Influence of CE on the Accountability of Service Providers

As opposed to the role of CE in service provision, the policy framework in WATSAN provides specific prescriptions for the promotion of accountability to the public. According to the 2002 National Water Policy, public accountability of organisational providers entails, the: "delivery of reliable and adequate services" at all times; "fair treatment of the public in tariff setting"; and "fair treatment of the public in general" (URT, 2002, pp. 46-7).

Equally, the policy is also explicit on the expected reverse accountability of the public which includes their timely payment of user fees and rational use of WATSAN resources (URT, 2002). Policy also attempts to streamline a role for CE in facilitating accountability. It calls for the creation of enabling mechanisms—artefacts, for example users' committees and consumer consultative councils (see EWURA, Chapter 5). The available policy proposes a specific purpose for CE in mediating the flow of information between institutional actors through consultations and learning. Field evidence, however, portrays a mixed picture in the application of rules reflecting varied internalisation of PSR logics.

On the one hand, there is congruence among organisational actors over the perceived effectiveness of CE reforms in promoting accountability (as shown in Figure 6.4). At first glance, this finding maybe indicative of the potential bias caused by the nature of the research topic and the purposive sampling of organisational personnel working with communities.



Figure 6.4: Perceived effectiveness of CE in influencing the accountability of service providers in WATSAN

Source: Author's based on fieldwork

Officials on the frontline may have simply provided the researcher with an assessment that promotes their own work. However, a respondent validation exercise afterwards did not yield a different opinion. Therefore, these observations are considered valid—i.e. an accurate representation of organisational perceptions about the effectiveness of CE on their accountability.

On the other hand, perceptions from 22 community members appear to be more evenly spread. There are roughly as many respondents who are certain of the positive effectiveness of CE (9) as there are who are not (7 under the *somehow* and 2 under *don't know/unsure* response categories). Similarly, 5 members of the community were affirmative that CE reforms had not affected the accountability of service providers. The implications of these findings are discussed below in the context of CE's roles in the delegation of duties, informing of performance and enforcing organisational conduct in WATSAN.

Channels used to promote organisational accountability

This sub section considers the channels/ways through which CE is perceived to promote organisational accountability in WATSAN. It presents findings, discussions and implications of how actors explore CE to:

a) influence the ability to understand the key service provision objectives in WATSAN (delegating);

b) inform about the performance of organisational actors; and

c) enforce service provision rules in WATSAN.

a) Delegating

Interviews with organisational actors suggest that CE has enhanced decision making about the pursuit of collective objectives in WATSAN. In

this regard, CE is credited with enabling the sharing of information about the roles and responsibilities of different actors in the current institutional setup in WATSAN. According to an official, for many organisations, this information exchange has: "…enabled increased understanding of the national water policy. This has raised awareness of WATSAN challenges and improved understanding of the capacity of the state, how it works, and civil responsibilities" (TASAF Official 1);

Organisations have utilised various platforms to support this. In relation to that, another official states,

> We use the popular media in the country that is TV, Radio, and print media. For example, our work on user tariffs is always gazetted along with the rationale for supporting or rejecting each decision and consensus made. We also have road shows to disseminate information to the public using short plays. (EWURA CCC official)

Interviews with community actors, suggest that information on organisational conduct has raised the community's interest in reforms. The goals and strategies of service improvement have increasingly found themselves subjected to deliberations over their meaning in regular interactions. After ten years of reforms, interviews suggest a shift of public focus towards understanding how things are done rather than the way they are done. For example, an interview says,

> People use the service hotline to follow up on things all the time from requests for new connections to reported broken pipes. If there is a holdup, they want to know why and who to speak to [to resolve it]. (A DAWASCO official)

This is in harmony with Scott (2013c) contention that activities that enhance shared understandings of institutional rules promote the survival of institutions through a process of *objectification*. Familiarity with service provision goals and objectives as well as the expected roles of other actors enables the reconciliation of the community's own interests against those advanced by WATSAN reforms. Interviews indicate that the community has relied on several means to obtain information about the collective objective of reforms. Among others, these have included the attendance of community meetings, utilisation of DAWASCO's service hotline, consultations etc. As can be noted from the participants observation below, community actors have also drawn from experiences of others:

> We learn from others too on how to influence things. We have recently seen in Goba [another administrative ward in Kinondoni] how peaceful local protests can gain the attention of those in higher offices and pressure DAWASCO into hurrying up with repairs. (Community Interview 9)

The above has enabled the community to learn about what is possible (and what is not) and how. From an analytical perspective, the change in community focus is understandable given the inherent ambiguities of reforms discussed in this thesis. The generalised ambiguity of reform rules (as discussed in chapter 5) have affected the establishment of a common consensus on reforms among both community and organisational actors. A common consensus about the delegation of functions in WATSAN has allowed the community to monitor and evaluate organisational conduct relative to stated objectives. This in turn has reinforced reforms through the provision of feedback. Interviews have shown that community feedback is a regular feature of CE. It is communicated through the various channels examined in the previous chapter including community or individual meetings, written letters, phone conversations etc.

Community feedback provides organisations with insights into the former's adopted cognitive scripts. Community feedback has been instrumental in facilitating various forms of learning as organisational behaviours and choices have been reconstituted. Speaking in favour of engagement, two officials noted that CE had,

> "… allowed us to provide swift and focused responses." (A municipal council official)
>
> "… facilitated increased and timely exchanges of operationally relevant information." (A DAWASCO official)

b) Informing

Interviews conducted with relevant officials demonstrate that in addition to enhancing delegation, formal CE processes have also promoted exchanges of information about how the actions of reform actors deliver services in WATSAN. The interviews further suggest that different organisations have used different means to attain this. For state authorities (local and national) and DAWASCO community meetings have been the preferred arrangement for informing the community. An official has this to say on this,

> They [community meetings] provide opportunities for questions and answers with the people. People tend to remember more the issues raised in face to face meetings than those in the newspaper or radio. In addition, they also tend raise unanticipated issues of relevance. They [unanticipated issues] put us on the spot, but we often we arrive at meaningful solutions. (A municipal official)

In contrast, quasi and non-state organisations have relied more on other media, for example, newspapers, radio and television to inform the public about their performances (Interviews with organisational actors).

Information has enhanced organisational accountability by promoting increased scrutiny of WATSAN services. Scrutiny has increased the public focus on organisational behaviours and conduct. Interviews with community and organisational actors suggest that scrutiny is informed by

the community's knowledge about delegated responsibilities in WATSAN. Both civil society and individual community members have at various times carried out organisational scrutiny in WATSAN. There is a general feeling among organisational actors of being under the spotlight:

> The upcoming review of the [national] sanitation campaign promises to be interesting. We have been told to account for every cent spent. All over the country local health management committees and civil society groups are continually monitoring the budget and activities, ensuring that resources are allocated and spent as intended. (A ministry of health and social welfare official).

Researchers from public institutions have also capitalised on improved community awareness in WATSAN to inform policy.

The role of participatory research

Field Interviews suggest that community views on the performance of WATSAN institutions have been instrumental in the design and recent adoption of, among others:

- the water sector laws in 2009 (some seven years since the introduction of reform policy) (URT, 2009g); and
- the 2012 national sanitation campaign (URT and World Bank, 2012).

Interviews with organisational actors suggest that enhanced public understanding of WATSAN reforms has helped highlight gaps in delivery and alert authorities to instances of institutional drift in WATSAN. Public opinions, such as those expressed in the 2007 *Views of the People* report (Research and Analysis Working Group, 2007), have hastened monitoring and (re)evaluations of service provision in WATSAN. The 2007 *Views of the People* report presented popular perceptions about implementation of the country's then policy blueprint, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). The report was issued by the influential Research and Analysis Working Group (R&AWG). The report argued that WATSAN policy reforms had led to no discernible changes in the quality and quantity of water supplies to some 70% and 49% of the national population, respectively (Research and Analysis Working Group, 2007, p. 39).

How the report influenced subsequent reform action was simple. Between 2005 and 2012, the R&AWG wielded considerable influence on government policy owing to its composition, role and close relations with the state and the donor community. The report's authors were a non-paid consortium of distinguished and prominent members of the academia, civil society, policy and development community (URT, 2012b). R&AWG was chaired by the Director of the Poverty Eradication Division, then part of the country's Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Affairs (URT, 2012b). R&AWG exclusively provided periodic monitoring and

assessment of the country's then policy blueprint, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) (Utz and Moon, 2008).

In advancing community views on the performance of WATSAN reforms, the R&AWG exhibited what the HI literature refers to as "mutualistic tendencies"(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 24). The R&AWG exploited the same reform ambiguities in WATSAN that had led to institutional drift to reinforce the reforms. Rather than act to compromise the effectiveness of reforms, as the *Vishokas* or DAWASCO (through indecision) had done, the R&AWG violated the letter of reforms to support and sustain its spirit (intended form). The group exploited its unique position, as credible actors on the periphery of reforms, to influence a re-interpretation of reform rules in a manner that reinforced the reform process. This was facilitated by the participatory researches it conducted, and the subsequent communication of research findings to key decision makers. To give impetus to popular concerns on the delivery of WATSAN reforms, van den Berg et al. (2009) observe that R&AWG advised for the creation of a parallel WATSAN specific working group to lobby the government. This came into effect in early 2008 (World Bank, 2013b).

Findings from the field suggest that community feedback has inspired other recent formal efforts aimed at resolving ambiguities in WATSAN reforms, for example the adoption of the government's Big Results Now (BRN) delivery methodology in 2013 (URT, 2016), but these are beyond the scope of this study. The introduction of the CE inspired water sector laws and the national sanitation campaign (NSC), in 2009 and 2012 respectively, galvanised the legal and popular support for reforms. On the one hand, law reforms confer substantial legal mandates to DAWASCO and other water authorities in the management and administration of WATSAN services. These include the abilities to prosecute people adversely interfering with their work, and levy fines to deter non-compliance (URT, 2009g). On the other hand, the sanitation campaign has sought to revise public perceptions about key reform actors (URT 2009. The campaign's launch saw the then popular president— Jakaya Kikwete, approval ratings of 80% (Afrobarometer, 2014)—make a direct appeal to the public to work with DAWASCO and other authorities for the success of the campaign (Kumar, 2015).

Interviews conducted with community members indicate that the NSC has seen the temporary reassignment of public health officials to work with the municipal council, DAWASCO and EWURA to provide sanitation health education to communities. An interviewee, for example, states,

> The last training, we had was on how to treat water and store it safely. It [the training] was conducted by a doctor [an official of the ministry of health] but he was being assisted by the WEO [a local authority official] and the area manager from DAWASCO who kept reminding us to boil tap water before drinking it. (Community Interview 2)

The success of the NSC has been anchored on its collaborative approach to CE (Interviews). In this instance, high setup costs have reinforced the coercive application of rules for organisations, effectively increasing the returns accrued from toeing the official line. Interviews credit this change of organisational behaviours to the active involvement of the country's president in the NSC. To ensure successful implementation, the campaign has since 2013 been closely monitored by a presidential delivery bureau (Kumar, 2015). This has in turn raised the stakes for organisational incompetence, compelling them to abide by the reforms.

Overall, findings reveal that to organisational actors, the key to capitalising on CE inspired community feedback has been the gradual construction of collaborative relationships. Speaking of such collaboration metaphorically, an official observed,

> The community is like a mirror. We may not like the image very much, but it is who we are. You need to make an effort if you want to look good in the mirror. This is essentially what we are doing now. We are working with the mirror to improve to our image. (A DAWASCO Official)

Some WATSAN organisations have sought to utilise close community relationships to elicit reciprocal compliance with rules. This has benefitted from organisational trade-offs wherein application of key regulatory features has been deliberately altered to accommodate practical realities of the institutional environment. Resource-strapped organisations, in particular, have had to cede formal authority as providers of certain services to provide openings for mobilised community efforts to act. This has occurred through both formal and informal means.

Formally, both state and civil society organisations have adopted citizen-based Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) to monitor and report their financial performances. This has necessitated revisions to internal regulations on information handling and sharing to improve financial transparency. Most local authorities (including Kinondoni Municipal Council) have had to alter their regulative routines to support the change in cultural-cognitive scripts. According to a key organisational actor, in recent years, the council has "Trained and supported [the] training of accountants and civil actors on PETS… [and] regular[ised] PETS… [in] the local oversight framework" (Haki Maji Official).

Other notable alterations of organisational codes include the institutionalisation of Client Service Charters (See Chapter 5) and consumer review boxes at service outlets. Informal means have included among others DAWASCO's selective silence on community provisioning of boreholes despite being able to exercise discretionary powers over their ownership and management. Trade-offs have been instrumental in providing primacy to community agency, which has in turn empowered communities. In the words of an official,

> Providing communities with room for manoeuvre has succeeded in creating partners in WATSAN. We nowadays collaborate with communities not only in oversight of services but also in capital development. It is now common practice for WATSAN infrastructure to be jointly constructed with communities through in-kind or monetary contributions. Engagement has provided voice with communities now openly demanding and calling for improvements in WATSAN. (A municipal council official)

c) Enforcing

CE processes have also promoted organisational accountability by enhancing the enforcement of service provision rules in WATSAN. CE has been used to promote acceptable behaviours and discourage undesired ones. The mechanisms of influence have been informal, primarily utilising the practice of naming to manipulate behaviours. This is explored in detail below:

Naming

Interviews with community actors suggest the disclosure of identities of guilty parties is a common tactic employed by both the community and DAWASCO to hold each other accountable. DAWASCO employs the tactic to deter "water theft" (Interviews) and also to denounce its own members of staff implicated in wrong-doing. Naming often occurs in posters posted to public place such as bus stops, and noticeboards. Posters take the format of police wanted signs and include "a portrait of the perpetrator, their names, address, ethnicity, wrong-doing, names of collaborators and the prison sentence or fine levied against them" (A DAWASCO official). Occasionally, DAWASCO publishes such posters in national newspapers and/or television.

Naming tactics are also used by DAWASCO to expose its defaulting customers (outstanding debtors). Popularly referred to as *Wadaiwa Sugu*, this involves the publishing of names of customers with substantially outstanding bills. The names are compiled into a list, disaggregated by the address of an outstanding debtor, the sums owed, and duration of debt. These are then posted on noticeboards. In instances involving large sums or popular personalities, names of clients could be published in national newspapers.

The community uses naming to inform the authorities of corrupt practices by community members, DAWASCO employees and the unscrupulous *Vishokas.* Community interviews suggest that the community does this both anonymously and non-anonymously via the service hotline, by dropping names of culprits in the customer feedback and suggestion boxes in DAWASCO's offices, lodging of formal complaints, and seldom through posted mail.

Both DAWASCO and the community acknowledge that naming is an effective practice in influencing behaviours. "It[naming] is a great embarrassment," says an interviewee, "that no one, even criminals deserve. It completely destroys your reputation. If you get your posted even by mistake, no-one will ever get to know the truth. It just destroys a person" (Community Interview 9)

However, there are allegations that the tactic has been deliberately misused at times to settle scores. Citing an example of such incident, an official recall:

> A few years ago, there was a case of a two quarrelling neighbours who unknowingly passed on the names of one another to us [DAWASCO] as water thieves. Needless to say, both ended up in the dock, for wasting our time. (A DAWASCO official)

Findings of a misuse of the system are suggestive of past ambiguities in its administration when the names of accused used to be published in the public without verification. Interviews suggest that a more thorough validation process is now in existence.

Despite the potential for abuse, findings suggest that naming has proved an invaluable tactic in enhancing service provision in WATSAN. Naming has increased rule compliance and helped DAWASCO recover resources necessary for meeting the costs of operations and maintenance.

6.3.2 Negative Perceptions on the Influence of CE on the Accountability of Service Providers

As indicated Figure 6.4 given earlier, more than half of all community actors hold alternative views on the influence of CE on accountability. Of these, seven expressed reserved endorsement of the utility of CE, while five offered flat denials of its influence i.e. that it has no influence at all OR that its influence is not productive. Differences in experiences between organisational and community reflect the degree to which the same set of institutions constrain and empower different actors. For the reserved community assessors of CE, these differences reflect divergent expectations and contested understandings of the meaning of accountability. Such differences are a consequence of both the path-dependent institutionalisation of PSR logics (as examined above) and the imprecision over the institutionalisation of accountability. The example of the consumer hotline, provided above, mirrors the general responses of many in the community.

Existing WATSAN policy provides specific guidance over how to use CE to effect provider accountability. However, such specificity is not evident in its clarification of accountability. For example, despite the water policy committing service providers to "reliable and adequate service" (URT, 2002, p. 46), it still remains unclear over what it means by "adequate" or indeed the dimension of service it refers. A case in point is the non-

provision of sewerage services by DAWASCO in Kawe Mzimuni. Yet, the provision for subjective assessment of accountability has made it possible for DAWASCO to consider itself responsive to community needs. The dimensionality of service in particular has provided a carte-blanche to the various institutional actors. As illustrated in Figure 6.4, despite sharing the same institutional environment (rules, actors, service), indicators of institutionalisation can vary with consequences on the legitimacy of rules. To explain, the absence of clear rules on the leverage of CE on accountability has introduced ambiguity in how the concept is conveyed by and to both organisational and community actors. It is unclear whether by service, the policy refers to outcomes, outputs or processes (Boyne et al., 2010). This has consequences over how accountability is instantiated, monitored and assessed.

For instance, it is plausible that the non-provisioning of sewerage facilities informed perceptions of accountability differently. On the one hand, DAWASCO may have interpreted their responses to community concerns on sewerage—through for example "increased community education and information sharing" (Interviews)—as constitutive of process accountability. On the other hand, community actors who raised such concerns may have had in mind tangible demonstrations of results, as opposed to the tokenistic responses received. The prevalence of divergent logics on accountability is a source of equally divergent effects on institutional actors. For organisations, there is a sense of satisfaction at meeting professional obligations. For the community, these are a constant source of consternation:

> The non-response from service providers even when we have provided them with feedback on community needs…threatens to undermine the value of my committee's and communities' efforts and time spent in consultation. (Community Interview 7)

> There is zero innate accountability. Service providers often have to be reminded of their responsibilities by the public or local authority leadership for them to act. If they are not reminded, they do nothing! (Community Interview 12).

Divergence in the indicators of accountability affects its cognitive reception. Not knowing what and indeed how organisational providers are supposed to respond to their needs promotes confusion in the community. This is exemplified by three out of ten community actors being indifferent to the effect on CE on accountability. These actors found it difficult to assess the responsiveness of DAWASCO due to its haphazard application. Indicative of that are the following remarks by two participants:

> The response from providers has been arbitrary and rather selective. For instance, on the one hand DAWASCO have been slow, if responded at all, to address reported cases of faulty water meters, while on the other, they have been quick to disconnect water

> services for non-prompt payment of monthly service fees. (Community Interview 4)
>
> DAWASCO do not conduct enough site visits. I think they are still stuck in out-dated institutional mentality that consumer opinions do not matter much save for when it is about payment of user fees/tariffs or feedback on status of infrastructure. (Community Interview 5)

6.3.3 Section Conclusions

This section has sought to examine the influence of CE in promoting organisational accountability in WATSAN. Analysis in support of the influence of CE has been presented using insights from the 2004 World Development Report (World Bank, 2003). The analysis has also considered counter-arguments to the influence of CE on organisational accountability. In short, the evidence is mixed although 20 out of 34 respondents (see Figure 6.4) indicated that CE has influenced organisational accountability. A further clarification of these figures reveals why this is the case. Perceptions among organisational actors are heavily skewed towards accentuating the effectiveness of CE on organisational accountability. The situation is evenly split among community actors. On the surface, these figures are suggestive of ambiguous understandings of the concept of accountability among respondents. The in-depth presentation and discussion of findings in this section locates this ambiguity within the wider context of this research.

The ambiguity of accountability rules has affected attempts to institutionalise PSRs in WATSAN. They have facilitated a juncture between regulative and cultural-cognitive elements of PSRs. This has occurred as the community's understanding of the notion of accountability has differed from those of organisational actors. Accountability in particular has proved to be a malleable concept, easily adopted to serve one's needs. This finding resonates with the World Bank's (2017) assessment of policy environments defined by a discontinuous commitment to long term goals. Whilst CE has still taken place, this has often been under the guise of reconfigured frames that are dependent on individualistic benefits rather than collective ones leading to experiences of organisational inertia unless compelled into action, a case in point. The failure to clarify and specify policy has led to the perpetuation of varied logics across the institutional space. This has affected its objectification (Scott, 2013d; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996) leading to the embeddedness of variable beliefs in the routines and artefacts employed for its diffusion. This is exactly what happens when a community expresses concern for lack of sewerage, only for the organisational provider to respond with requests for talks. The net effect is a complete misalignment of the logics of accountability in all its institutional dimensions (Scott, 2013a): from its basis of compliance and order to the effect and mode of legitimacy.

The misalignment of institutional logics has made it difficult to discern whether organisational and community actors speak of the same thing in relation to accountability. Externalities (notably, organisational resource endowments) have also undeniably played a role in this creative reinterpretation of rules. It is plausible that high path-dependent setup and coordination costs have forced organisations to adopt a unique variant of the concept as exemplified by perception differences between organisational and some community respondents as shown in Figure 6.4. After all, these are liable to face conditional modes of funding, in which objective evaluations of organisational accountability maybe costly. Thus, the incentives are there to create conditions for the manipulation of existing rules.

Further, the ability of organisational actors to exercise discretion on accountability is evidence of the amount of institutional power they possess (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Manipulation of such power has allowed them to alter the discourse on accountability despite its codification by policy (Pierson, 2015). Organisations have subsequently capitalised to alter the preferences by revising conceptions of what is desirable, available to other organisational actors. The result is the series of seemingly coordinated organisational responses on the influence of CE on accountability. In essence, this is another channel through which path-dependent behaviours have locked-in long run outcomes (given that official policy has been in place since 2002) and contributed to sub optimal outcomes (Pierson, 2000; Thelen and Mahoney, 2015).

On the other hand, this creative interpretation of rules may just be a patterned feature of human behaviour or historical traditions. The relative discretion afforded to community actors (owing to a lack of sanction) affords them the opportunity to shift the goalposts. But sanctions, albeit indirect, do exist for such deviant behaviour as evidenced by the emotional conflicts endured when service providers choose not to respond. Irrespective of the dimension of service, the observed lack of services, particularly sewerage, is sufficient evidence of a lack of organisational accountability in WATSAN. This on its own is affecting the cultural support for PSRs and its components necessary for their institutionalisation.

Gaps in rule clarity further contribute to the erosion of legitimacy as the message conveyed varies from reality or indeed the collective desires of those it affects. If left undeterred, organisational failure to meet community needs could itself spiral into alternate path-dependent sequences, creating parallel institutions of accountability. The realisation of such an outcome would create competition for institutional legitimacy affecting coalitional support for CE logics, principally its “collaborative” effects experienced by organisational actors.

6.4 Promotion of Cost Recovery

Cost recovery in urban WATSAN services is considered essential to the delivery of policy goals (URT, 2002). Cost recovery constitutes the financing component of accountability relationships (World Bank, 2003), wherein the financial obligations of service users to organisational providers are used as proxies of their commitment to the co-production of services. Cost recovery is a relatively new feature in the Tanzanian WATSAN landscape. It was introduced by the NPM influenced PSR reforms in the early 1990s and it marks a departure from free provisioning of water that had defined services in urban areas (Pigeon, 2012; URT, 1991). The adoption of the measure has been influenced by the Dublin Principles, part of the so called international best practices in WATSAN (Doering, 2005).

This section examines the influence of CE in promoting cost recovery in WATSAN. This is important because the sustainability of WATSAN services (and hence reforms) depends, among other things, on the level of tariffs (prices) levied (Monstadt and Schramm, 2017). Current policies (URT, 2002) contend that there are two ways in which civic engagement can influence tariffs in WATSAN: a) assisting in their determination (setting tariff), and b) promoting their payments (compliance). This section presents findings and discussions of the influence of civic engagement (CE) on these two variables of the affordability equation.

6.4.1 Tariff Setting

Findings garnered from various interviews suggest that there is a limited engagement of citizens in the determination of service tariffs in WATSAN. Instead, a functional approach prevails in the setting of user tariffs in WATSAN. Talking about the limited role of clients in setting tariffs, an official has this to say:

> It is illogical to ask the public about what prices to charge. Buyers [the public] simply should not set the price. It is textbook economics. They [the public] do not know how much it costs to harvest, treat, transport or distribute water. Even if they do, it would be in their interest to charge themselves nothing. (A DAWASCO official)

In practice, tariff setting usually involves technocrats working in isolation to arrive at economically viable volumetric prices. These are then reviewed by the sector's regulator, EWURA, in collaboration with the Tanzania Consumer Forum (TCF, which also includes civil society groups) for their reflectivity of policy values including affordability. The provider, TCF and EWURA subsequently communicate their deliberations to the general public through different means including public noticeboards and free organisational periodicals effectively opening up the debate and space for community agency. In practice, even though these stages do occur, there is often relatively little CE of tariffs' deliberations. As can be seen in Figure

6.5 below, only three out 19 community actors reported to have participated on tariff setting.



Figure 6.5: Participation in design of cost-sharing scheme
Source: Author's based on fieldwork

Although it is unfeasible to ask a bill payer to set the price, low levels of CE in the design of cost sharing schemes can also be explained by ambiguities in rule prescriptions. Rule ambiguities empower the organisational provider at the expense of the community. The failure to mobilise mass community participation in such an important stage in cost recovery is somehow a feature of policy design. Policy ambiguities have accorded implementing organisations substantial degrees of freedom in the interpretation and instantiation of public awareness in setting tariffs. This has succeeded in diluting the meaning of awareness as institutional logics are transported across the various relational systems in WATSAN. Despite its headlining of CE, extant policy offers little guidance on its specifics. In practice, public awareness connotes exchanges of information. This, while an essential component of CE, is a tokenistic measure that often falls short of empowering citizens due to its external locus of control (Cornwall, 2008b). That is, by design, the creation of awareness does not compel organisational actors to act on people's views (Pretty, 1995). There are no official guidelines on how to communicate tariff proposals to the public (Interviews). Tariff proposals shared with the public are occasionally laden with technical jargon requiring erudite knowledge to decode, not widely found in the community. "It is hard to have an opinion," says a participant, "on something [service tariffs] you don't understand" (Community Interview 8).

Community actors, finding it difficult to comprehend conveyed messages, have found themselves excluded from engaging by organisational manipulation of information. Privately, there is implicit organisational admission of the abuse of power through the provision of information requiring "additional assistance in interpreting" (EWURA Official). The organisational manipulation of tariff setting mechanisms has succeeded in altering the discourse over who is eligible to participate. This can be observed from the remark below:

> Authorities only listen to wealthy or other influential people, and not to the poor. DAWASCO only listens to its fee-paying customers as they are the ones it legally recognizes. These are also likely to be the wealthier members of society. Poor people [like us] exist under the radar and have to cope with challenges in WATSAN largely on their own or in some cases assistance of the wealthy. (Community Interview 17)

The privileging of the voice of some members of community over others, has seemingly legitimised contracted consumers in CE. Since the monopoly provider only collects fees from owners of piped connections, this is tantamount to marginalisation (and exclusion) of the voice of the vast majority with alternative access to services (see section 6.2). Notably, this has created a path-dependent lock-in reluctance to engage with organisational actors on the basis of the constraining effects of conditions placed on agency. Commenting on this, a participant says,

> I try to avoid them [organisational providers] even though I have a piped connection. I feel that my opinion only mattered to them when I used to be a regular fee-paying customer. I am now retired with no steady income. Sometimes, my bills go unpaid for a long time and their only response is to cut off my supplies. I have been their customer for over three decades, where is the loyalty in that? (Community Interview 12)

Organisational marginalisation of significant proportions of the community has, however, met with resistance. Some community members have drawn on the mixed accountability of the provider as a basis for response. They have sought to integrate theoretical understandings of awareness (i.e. exchange of information) with prescriptions for roles and responsibilities of institutional actors. To them, engaging to acquire awareness of proposed tariffs provides another platform for airing auxiliary grievances:

> You cannot pick and choose your opportunities. My sole concern is the lack of communal cesspits. I tell them that every time I meet them even when the subject is on something else. If I pay for something, you have to deliver it. (Community Interview 5).

The coexistence of conflicting community objectifications (i.e. understandings) of awareness dilutes collective support for organisations responsible for mediating interactions with service providers. These

organisations derive their popular mandates from shared cognitive logics, enabling them to represent coherent messages that reflect the views of majority. Such organisations then leverage cultural support in deliberating proposed tariffs with organisational providers. Subsequently, apathetical attitudes to engagement and the reengineering of the awareness debate, constrains the validity of their efforts, leading to sub-optimal outcomes:

> …in the event community consultations fail to articulate a consensus, the council exercises discretionary legal powers to argue for the lowest common denominator on behalf of communities in question. When employing discretionary powers, we seek to represent the public based on existing realities by factoring in the incidence of poverty and vulnerability (which directly affects general affordability and access), comparative best practices (a technical analysis of assets, costs, liabilities, client bases, and revenue projections based on similar scales and operating environment elsewhere). (EWURA CCC Official)

In addition to producing sub optimal outcomes, the community's failure to collectively engage with the process of determining user tariffs upsets the balance of power in favour of organisations. The lack of consensuses on whether to participate or not, allows the capture of concerns of the numerically inferior, providing avenues for discretionary organisational behaviour. This exposes the process to elite capture, potentially handling the initiative to organisational providers. The net results are tariffs that many find excessive and unaffordable. Paradoxically, these sub optimal outcomes have occurred even when mediating organisations have been able to prevent the full realisation of the provider's proposed tariffs. A remark by an official shed a light on this,

> Despite mass publicity in the local media for the latest use rates proposals, there was little input from consumer forums and the sector regulator. But this did not stop EWURA from rejecting them [tariff revision proposals]. This has reduced our array of options leaving mostly the use of name and shame campaigns, and the resource intensive debt recovery - which often leads to additional tensions with our customers due to its vigour. (DAWASCO Official).

6.4.2 Cost Compliance

Interviews conducted with members of the community suggest that despite low levels (and influence) of CE in setting tariffs, there is relatively high community awareness of the practice of cost sharing. For many, this is a reflection of the changing times in society wherein the contextual realities of having to pay to receive services (a key feature of reforms) inform the community's understanding of its role in WATSAN. What an interviewee says is more expressive:

> Consultations, meetings, surveys etc. are all just talk! But water is real and if you want it, you have to pay for it! It is all business like these days. There are no negotiations [about settling bills]. (Community Interview 4)

The exercise of a monopoly by DAWASCO has further helped convey a common message on cost sharing. The provider has wielded coercive discretion to inform and deter behaviours. Community members seeking access to piped water access have been signed up to formal service contracts stipulating expected financial obligations. User fees have been indexed to volumes used. The provider has also strengthened monitoring of use by investing in flow meters and inspections (readings) thereof. Improved monitoring has also been accompanied by a strengthened sanctioning regime. Across the community there are tales of organisational zealousness in enforcing rules on costs. "DAWASCO are only interested in collecting service fees and disconnecting supplies," a participant complains, "…they are often quick to disconnect water services for non-prompt payment of the monthly service fees" (Community Interview 10).

There has been a spill-over of institutional effects beyond metered consumers. Members with alternate sources including those sharing connections with others have had to pay their share of costs to registered owners. DAWASCO has also selectively invoked the letter of the policy to absolve itself of financial responsibilities for the maintenance of community owned boreholes. Allowing the community to operate and maintain a source of water has provided it with a sense of ownership. This has subsequently infused normative values over what it means to own water. Poor communities have felt empowered as they have been provided with formal recognition through their local management committees. This has imbued a commitment to responsible proprietorship that has had to be learnt from DAWASCO rather ironically. This has facilitated an inadvertent community institutionalisation of valuable components of PSR logics based on increasing commitments. Scott (2013d) contends that increasing the level of an actors' commitment to institutional rules increases the cost of pursuing alternative ways of working, thus reducing the likelihood of actors reneging on rules.

Therefore, by exercising its regulatory powers to cede resource ownership, the provider has been able to expand its institutional power by inducing preference changing investments in the community (Pierson, 2015). Possession of historical know-how of resource ownership and management has made DAWASCO the de-facto repository of such knowledge for the community. This has effectively guaranteed continued dependence by the community as it looks for guidance on how to sustain its own acquired power.

Organisational trade-offs on cost sharing has enabled the mobilisation of cultural legitimacy for these logics. The practice enjoys wide community support and comprehensibility despite misgivings on the severity of rates

charged. For many, paying for services symbolises ownership, providing them with entitlements to make claims on organisational actors:

> I happily pay my bills because I know water is expensive and the state as a provider is limited. Ujamaa taught us to be responsible citizens, and this is my way of doing so… We simply cannot let the government do everything by itself. As honest and responsible citizens, we have to contribute. (Community Interview 6)

The normative appeal of ownership in turn creates path-dependent lock-in effects for the stable reproduction of culturally legitimate PSR practices such as CE.

6.5 Chapter Summary

The objective of this chapter was to examine the influence of civic engagement (CE) in the provision of WATSAN. To meet this objective, the research explored the institutional properties of ambiguity, power and agency to understand how CE influences service provision in WATSAN. One research question was set to explore the influence of CE in service provision in WATSAN**. More specifically, the second research question was:** *How does CE influence service provision in WATSAN?* To answer that question, the study has adopted a historical institutionalism (HI) approach that considers the influence of historical antecedents on the institutional structures and processes for civic engagement. This approach enabled the exploration of how the institutional properties of ambiguity, power and agency influence service provision in WATSAN. The overall finding suggests that powerful actors exploit ambiguities in CE rules to advance their interests. The analysis considered how CE empowers the community to influence service outcomes in their favour and on occasions the actions of powerful formal organisations. This has helped us gain a deeper understanding of the political and practical complexities involved in the administration of CE.

Adopting a qualitative approach, this chapter has confirmed a number of observations in civic engagement (CE) which have already been presented and debated by authors of public service reforms (PSR) in other contexts. Nevertheless, there are also a number of areas where this research presents new evidences (especially in the case of WATSAN in Tanzania) which improve our understanding about and provide new insights into the role of civic engagement in WATSAN in Tanzania.

The PSR literature often informs us more of what works or not. The literature pays little attention to the notion of *"how to improve and sustain performance under present and foreseeable economic, administrative and political conditions"* (Ole Therkildsen (2000, p. 70), my emphasis). This research, however, responds directly to this position. It confirms partly what we know from other published research and its contribution to the field is to provide empirically grounded observations and analysis about how to improve and sustain PSRs that is currently lacking. The chapter

provides an analysis that intends to work with the grain and context in WATSAN in Tanzania. The analysis is context specific and sensitive to the cultural and contextual environment within which reforms are implemented

6.5.1 Summary of Key Research Findings

Using field interviews and insights on the contradictory potential of institutions, this chapter examined the influence of civic engagement (CE) in the provision of WATSAN. CE has been shown to influence service provision in three ways by promoting: i) access to services, ii) organisational accountability, iii) cost recovery. Literature contends that these three mechanisms help define accountability structures in service provision (World Bank, 2003), which is a key objective of most reforms including those in WATSAN. Findings the present study suggested that CE influences service provision in diffuse ways, some of which reinforce and some of which undermine reforms in WATSAN. These have been made possible by ambiguities in the institutional frameworks for CE and service provision in WATSAN. More specifically, it was found that CE has had the following influences in service provision:

6.5.1.1 Promotion of access to services

- Findings reveal that CE has improved access to potable water in the case study area. This has, however, occurred as an unintended consequence of the failure of formal CE processes. Ambiguities in the formal CE processes have facilitated their creative reinterpretation through process of community reflexivity. This has catalysed collective action by the community that has improved access to potable water in the case study area. The agency of a key actor, the ward councillor, has also been shown to be instrumental in the exploitation of these ambiguities for collective community gains. Community agency exhibits what Mahoney and Thelen (2010) refer to as mutualistic behaviours by creatively exploiting the inability of the utility provider, DAWASCO, to produce outcomes that improve access to potable water—a key objective of WATSAN reforms (URT, 2002). The results show this to have occurred by accident rather than design. Thus, by attempting to enhance the community's own group benefits, self-provisioning has inadvertently resulted into outcomes that benefit even those beyond the community. Literature contends that outcomes of this sort reinforce the popular support for reforms as actors become invested in consolidating them (Scott, 2013d; Thelen, 2004). Nonetheless, these outcomes pose a challenge for the sustainability of formal CE processes as positive results have been shown to occur irrespective of a role for formal actors. Thus, despite enhancing greater outcomes in WATSAN, successful mobilisation of self-provisioning is likely to undermine formal CE in the long run.

- This research found that CE has not been very influential in promoting access to sanitation in the case study area. However, this has not been without caveats. Findings suggest that the CE institutional framework in WATSAN has provided both problems and solutions in sanitation. As a source of problems, ambiguities in CE rules have contributed to the failure to coordinate advance planning of sewerage facilities by the relevant authorities. As a source of solutions, ambiguities in CE rules have promoted collaborations with the local authority that provide stop-gap solutions to sewerage problems. These paradoxical outcomes are a hallmark of ambiguous reform rules (Onoma, 2010). These undermine the long-term support for reforms by distorting the distribution of resources from civic engagement. As a source of problems, they deny services to the community while as a source of solutions they lead to unsustainable service outcomes. Either way, such outcomes do less to endear formal CE processes to the community

6.5.1.2 Promotion of organisational accountability

- Findings reveal that CE promotes organisational accountability by enhancing community understanding of the goals of service provision in WATSAN. This has subsequently improved the community's engagement in other channels of accountability, for example informing and enforcing service rules. This aligns with Entwistle (2010)contentions that that a shared understanding of collective objectives enhances the effectiveness of collaborative efforts. This occurs through the reduction of contests over goals and a pooling of efforts. In this instance, a shared understanding of WATSAN's goals increases the awareness of roles and responsibilities of actors. This in turn helps the effectiveness of performance monitoring and evaluations.
- Results show that CE promotes organisational accountability by enhancing exchanges of information about the performance of organisational actors in WATSAN. Information has led to scrutiny by key actors who have in turn been able to exercise agency to influence organisational conduct in WATSAN. This is indeed one of the key messages of the 2017 World Development Report which contends that increased scrutiny by social actors helps realign the incentives of service providers in ways that improve public services (World Bank, 2017).
- The research reveals that CE promotes organisational accountability by enhancing the enforcement of service provision rules in WATSAN. Naming, a tactic of CE, has been used to promote acceptable behaviours, and discourage undesired ones by both community and organisational actors. This finding contrasts Joseph Aldy's observations of the limited influence of naming on making

states adhere to their international climate commitments (Aldy, 2014). The author associates the failure of naming to influence behaviours with its lack of punitive sanctions such as penalties. Yet, as the findings of this study suggest, in WATSAN, naming is often accompanied or follows other more punitive sanctions such as prison sentences. Further, interviews associate naming with a loss of reputation, which as Capelos et al. (2015) observe, adversely influences the attitude of community actors towards an organisation. Perhaps, it is these forces at play in WATSAN that are rendering naming an effective mechanism of accountability.

6.5.1.3 Promotion of cost recovery

- The research shows that CE does not promote cost recovery through the setting of service tariffs. This is probably because of excessive organisational steering of tariff setting processes, pervasive esotericism and the sheer difficulties of negotiating an acceptable price with a buyer of services (the community). As one of the means through which organisational actors exercise their authority in WATSAN, this finding is in grain with the HI literature's assertion that powerful actors act to resist the siphoning of power (Pierson, 2015). The ability to set prices represents one of the few levers of agenda control still solely in the hands of organisational actors. It encapsulates the distributional consequences of institutions because "all forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because "*organisation is the mobilisation of bias*" (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 69, my italics for emphasis). Using an HI approach, this study has highlighted the specific contexts in which such distortion occurs—through burdening the process with esoteric jargon. This is indeed a vivid illustration of the old adage *power begets power*. In this instance, organisational providers (the utility provider and sector regulator) collude to exploit the inherent ambiguities in WATSAN reforms (which have given them the roles of both an implementer and an enforcer of the behaviours of others) to maintain their relative power over the community. By doing so, organisational actors increase their institutional power by: i) denying the transfer of key resources (decision making) to the community, and ii) using CE as an illusion to alter the political and social discourse on costs in WATSAN. As argued by Pierson(2015), these two are means through which power indeed begets power.
- The study indicates that CE promotes cost recovery by enhancing cost compliance. Data collected via interviews in particular suggest that despite low levels (and influence) of CE in setting tariffs, there is high community awareness of the need to comply with cost rules. These findings corroborate those of the vast institutional literature on the coercive effects of regulatory rules to manipulate behaviours

(Scott, 2013a). According to the findings, the sanctions for non-payment include: the disconnection from service, the levying of fines and interest, criminal prosecution and/or naming. By promoting compliance with the rules on cost recovery, the findings reveal that the formal sanctioning regimes in WATSAN are effective and that the choice of CE for communicating sanctions has been effective.

The findings of this chapter can be used to inform and enrich the discussion on the influence of civic engagement in service provision in WATSAN in Tanzania. These findings directly contribute to the public service reforms (PSR) and civic engagement (CE) literatures, one of the main target areas of the study.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONTRIBUTIONS TO LITERATURE, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The aim of this research is to examine the role of civic engagement (CE) in the evolving systems for providing water and sanitation (WATSAN) services in Tanzania. The study is premised on the understanding of CE as a feature of institutional reforms in WATSAN intent on improving public service performance. The study has focused on institutional structures and processes for CE; explored the historical foundations of the sector's public service institutions; and examined the influence of institutional structures and processes on CE. It has achieved this by: mapping the institutional structures in place for CE, then exploring the array of institutional carriers used to convey CE reform logics across the three elements of WATSAN institutions targeted by the reforms. It has also examined how reform sponsored interactions between actors and institutions influence service provision in WATSAN. While employing quantitative analysis of secondary data to examine the cultural-cognitive determinants of CE, this study has not emphasised statistical approaches to examining the role of CE.

Rather, it provides an in-depth, qualitatively rich analysis of how reform actors (the government, public services, and community) interact under a complex framework of formal and informal rules that defines the post-reforms WATSAN landscape in Tanzania. This approach aids an understanding of the political and practical complexities involved in the administration of public service reforms (PSRs). Since detailed conclusions of the research findings have been presented at the end of the respective chapters, this concluding chapter focuses on the contributions this research makes to the PSR literature, and the literature on historical institutionalism (HI). The section concludes by suggesting a number of policy recommendations and their feasibility. It then proposes areas for further research.

7.1. Contributions to Literature and Theory

This research makes a contribution in three important areas:

a) To the PSRs literature by exploring the role of the historical antecedents in shaping the contextual environment for reforms in Tanzania;
b) To the PSR literature and literature on historical institutionalism (HI) by adopting a historical sociological understanding of PSRs that caters for the presence of the informal (normative and cultural cognitive) components of institutions; and
c) To the PSR literature and literature on CE by exploring CE reforms as a process, thus focusing on how reform actors engage

with formal and informal rules to attain reform objectives. This provides a deeper understanding of the political and practical complexities involved in the administration of CE.

7.1.1 Contributions to the PSR Literature

Much of the scholarship on PSRs has been evaluative in nature, inductively assessing observed outcomes relative to stated objectives/targets. Assessments have largely been quantitative. That is in part driven by operational needs of financial sponsors of such reforms,(for example, the World Bank) to keep track (and justify) their loan portfolios (Andrews, 2013; Pollitt, 2015). In doing so, the literature has also sought to explain reform performance by, for example, establishing success and failure factors (Bunse and Fritz, 2012). This has enabled general theorisation of which reform measures work and under what circumstances (Andrews, 2013). Yet, the PSR literature has remained superficially theoretical (Pollitt, 2015) as empirical accounts of how reforms work have been minimal and devoid of key data on the capabilities (or content) required to make reforms work (Fritz, 2015). Some authors, for example Pollitt (2013), contend that this is the result of unintended consequences of the very nature or design of reforms, which include: a) deficiencies in the design of monitoring and evaluation structures for reforms, and b) short-lived political interest and engagement in reforms. In response to these acknowledged gaps in the literature, this study has undertaken an empirical exploration of PSRs that have been pursued with relatively sustained interest or "a history of reforms" (Bunse and Fritz, 2012, p. 18).

There are several analyses of WATSAN related PSRs in Tanzania, for example Rasmussen and Reinholdt's (2009) blanket assessment of resource management reforms in rural areas; Cleaver and Toner's (2006) evaluation of community resource ownership; or Dill's (2010b) examination of collaboration in service provision. Each of these studies provides explanations for what works in reforms, yet none offers a process tracing of the contents or contexts of reforms. This study offers a unique contribution to the PSR literature by considering the contributory role of history in shaping reform features, behaviours, interactions and outcomes in WATSAN. A historical institutional analysis of PSRs, in chapter 4, informs the responses to the study's three main research questions aimed at examining the role of CE in the provision of WATSAN in Tanzania. Such a contribution directly answers Brian Dill's (2010a, p. 42) call for increased "historical and sociological" grounding of development policy scholarship. The study also indirectly complements Andrews'(2013) consideration of the contextual factors of reforms through its archival analysis of the origin of normative and cultural-cognitive elements of reforms.

The adoption of a historical institutionalist perspective to reforms further clarifies some of the under-theorised yet much lauded observations about PSRs in the developing world. For example, despite renewed enthusiasm for the analysis of the contexts in which PSRs operate (Huxley et al., 2016),

policy research has continued to be based on implicit assumptions about the norms and behaviours of reform actors. By underscoring the importance of understanding the historical origins of policy problems and contexts, this study makes a direct contribution to the PSR literature.

For example, in response to research question 1, *How do institutional structures and processes influence CE in WATSAN?* findings reveal that many of the rule ambiguities and contradictions defining the current reform context in WATSAN in Tanzania are the result of path-dependent effects. One such ambiguity is the dissonance between the de jure and de facto administration of decentralisation of CE analysed in Chapter 5. Analysis of the institutional structures reveals that the reluctance of higher-level government authorities to defer practical discretion over CE to the community and other organisational actors is reflective of the state's historical tendencies to control polity. That was examined in Chapter 4. The findings indicate that past historical experiences do not only affect the design of formal institutions but also the informal ones. This has profound consequences (mainly adverse) on the effectiveness of reforms particularly as history continues to shape the cognitive understandings of reform actors (both organisational and community) further exposing the ambiguities in PSR rules to varied (re)interpretations.

In response to research question 2, *How does civic engagement influence service provision in WATSAN?* Chapter 6 further shows that some ambiguities lead to behaviours that contradict either the letter or the rule of reforms with consequences on service provision. In some instances, such as in the use of CE to influence access to potable water, historical analysis reveals the exploitation of rule ambiguities by unscrupulous actors (*Vishokas)* to defraud the community and the water utility company, DAWASCO. On the other hand, analysis also reveals that powerful actors such as DAWASCO can strategically act—by placating and accommodating actors (Oliver, 1991)—on historical ambiguities to enrich the spirit of reforms and enhance service provision.

It is heartening to learn that this study is not alone in responding to the methodological call to arms issued by Dill (2010a). A recent post-colonial critique of the translation of technological ideals and planning models in WATSAN in Dar es Salaam by Monstadt and Schramm (2017), a case in point. Monstadt and Schramm (2017) identify the importance of creativity and adaptation of formal actors in understanding planning models. Unlike the current study, their method does not allow them to examine in detail the institutional ambiguities and tensions of the situation. Nonetheless, this growing wealth of historically grounded research further enhances the resource base necessary for effective policymaking and the design of PSRs.

Conclusions on how the study's key findings relate contribute tothe PSR literature are presented in section 7.2.1 below.

7.1.2. Contributions to the Literatures on PSR and on Historical Institutionalism

Historical Institutional (HI) analyses tend to focus on the regulative structures and processes of PSRs (Bedock, 2014; Immergut, 2006). Often, this has been at the expense of the role of individual actors involved in the interactions giving rise to institutional outcomes. This has resulted in it being criticised as logically micro-deficient, "deterministic", or "mechanistic" (Schmidt, 2011, p. 4). Several proponents of the HI approach (Hall, 2010; Streeck, 2015) have at different times called for an expanded understanding of historical institutions beyond their regulative mechanisms. In recent years, an increasing number of studies have responded to this challenge as arguments over the salience of institutional contexts for reforms (its operational environment) have gained currency in explanations of institutional reforms and stability (Andrews, 2013; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2015). Examples include, Sheingate (2010) and Onoma (2010)'s focus on the normative elements of institutional reforms in US House of Representatives; and on land policy reforms in Kenya, respectively. These studies distinguish themselves from the wider HI literature by their consideration of what Streeck (1997) refers to as the sociological underlay of historical institutions.

Yet, none of the PSR and HI studies reviewed offers a micro-foundational account of the way in which reform actors interact with formal and informal rules. This research fills this gap by exploring how the cultural-cognitive elements of PSRs influence CE in WATSAN in Tanzania. This approach allows the investigation of how macro level policies and laws affect individual behaviours (the micro-level). Findings reveal that ambiguous CE rules have led to divergent understandings of CE between organisational and community actors. This subsequently affects how actors engage with one another. In relation to that statistical analysis in chapter 5 reveals generally low levels of CE and where the community engages with the formal authorities, this mostly tends to be in pursuit of individual benefits only—i.e. individual activism (Pattie et al., 2003). Thus, rather than encouraging pluralism, micro-level analysis reveals that, among others, the ambiguity of rules undermines collective CE in WATSAN.

This highlights the scope and limits of individual agency in influencing reforms, which enables inferences to be drawn on how formal reform rules and norms interact with individual behaviours to procure the outcomes currently evident in WATSAN. This finding is believed to be unique because there is not an existing HI account explaining how individual actors relate to macro-level structures in WATSAN in Tanzania. It contributes to the HI literature by offering practical evidence of the theorised behaviours of institutional actors. Conclusions on how the key findings contribute to the PSR and HI literature are presented in section 7.2.2 below.

7.1.3 Contributions to the PSR Literature and Literature on CE

The reform literature is conspicuous for its audit-like emphasis on quantifying outcomes (Ashworth et al., 2010). Analyses often focus on how reform measures or instruments (for example, regulation, strategic planning or collaboration) introduced as inputs, alter the performance of public organisations. Such analyses of reform tend to be conducted under implicit assumptions that reforms are easily adaptable, and only consider alternative explanations in the event when intended outcomes are not met. Notable exceptions include efforts by Delbridge and Edwards (2008; 2013) and Mizrahi and Tevet (2014), who both consider the adoption of reforms as a process. Therefore, the PSR literature often informs us more of what works or not, rather than in the words of Ole Therkildsen (2000, p. 70) "*how to improve and sustain performance under present and foreseeable economic, administrative and political conditions"* (my italics for emphasis).

This analytical oversight is also shared by most studies on civic engagement (CE), participation or citizenship. A good number of such studies focus on explaining: why citizens engage (Baker, 2013; Lowndes et al., 2006), and adopting descriptive typologies for types of engagement observed (Cornwall, 2008b; Ekman and Amnå, 2012). These studies focus less on the type of relationships that exist and emerge between civic actors and public services. Studies analysing the global South often approach CE from a Citizenship perspective and attempt to tie the concept with wider considerations of democracy (Cleaver and Toner, 2006; Cornwall et al., 2011). Thus even when the role of CE is considered in public-private partnerships (Crook and Joseph, 2006), the explanatory lenses focus more on equitable (re)distribution of services/resources than on how such setups ensure the production of the service in the first place. Consequently, these analyses often eschew the evolution of more hybrid relations between communities and public services influenced by internationally dominant policy discourses. This is all the more surprising as the empirical evidence documenting complex CE relationships mounts for the global North (Clarke et al., 2007; Needham, 2008).

These omissions contribute to the failure to adequately capture the unique behaviours of citizens and their relations with public services influenced by their historical pasts and other spatially-variant contextual factors. Despite the wealth of literature on CE, analyses of CE and other PSR instruments, many of Biswas's (2001) concerns still resonate: over-specification (according greater weight to the legal definition of CE; and oversimplification) overlooking the contextual environment necessary for successful implementation. Andrews (2013) contends that such an oversight has the potential to undermine reforms.

This study responds to this challenge by exploring CE reforms as a process. The research focuses on how reform actors engage with formal and informal rules to attain reform objectives. This provides a deeper understanding of the political and practical complexities involved in the

adoption and administration of CE. These nuanced details provide context to observed realities of CE vis-à-vis its intended contributions to reforms. To analyse CE reforms as a process, the study was guided by research question 2, How *does civic engagement influence service provision in WATSAN?* Findings reveal that CE influences service provision in multiple ways, for example by enhancing: access to services, accountability of actors and cost sharing. Influence is shown to rely on the agency of key actors to mobilise and articulate institutional responses to community WATSAN concerns highlighted in CE processes. Conclusions on the study's key findings in response to research question 2 are presented in section 7.2.3 below.

7.2 Conclusions on Key Research Findings

This study concludes that, overall, civic engagement (CE) plays a minimal role in the evolving systems for providing WATSAN in Tanzania. This role is undermined by ambiguities in the institutional frameworks and processes for CE (Research Objective 1) which in turn produce mixed effects in how CE influences service provision in WATSAN (Research Objective 2). The prevalence of ambiguities suggests that not enough collective attention has been paid on how to make CE or wider reforms in WATSAN more effective. Stakeholders, particularly the state, need to review the institutions for CE in a bid to resolve these ambiguities through improved specificity, clarity and resources that will improve attainment of common objectives in WATSAN. This would improve the definition of formal rules around which informal practices coalesce. This section presents conclusions to the key findings of this study in relation to the research contribution identified in section 7.1 above.

7.2.1 The Role of History in Shaping the Contextual Environment for Reforms

Through process tracing and a mapping of CE's institutional carriers and elements, this study found that many of the ambiguities (and subsequently contradictions) in CE have their roots in history. The findings reveal imprints of local history on specific features of reforms, for example, formal laws and organisational practices. These are likely to be the result of:

- Substantial setup costs given the durability of the pre-reform regime relative to the reform's era;
- Learning effects as reforms had to engage (initially, at least) with a civil service wedded to conduct and practices shaped by pre-reform rules and environment—for example, emphasis on toeing the party line rather than professionalism; low discipline; and general dereliction of duty

The findings suggest that CE in WATSAN has been part of wider public service reforms in Tanzania that have occurred endogenously through a process of institutional layering (as discussed in Chapter 4). Layering has seen the introduction of new rules alongside historically dominant ones, some of which directly contradict reforms—for example, decentralisation or administrative coordination of CE (as discussed in Chapter 5). This confluence of rules has been a source of ambiguities affecting the design of CE rules. These ambiguities have subsequently provided historically powerful actors with the discretion on how to influence which and how rules are interpreted and enforced (or not) in practice.

The findings suggest that historical experiences with a form of socialism, *Ujamaa,* predisposes the community to engage in parallel structures that while promote service provision; create competition for the existing formal structures in WATSAN. Examples include: the use of partisan interlocutors to mediate conflicts in WATSAN (addressed in Chapter 5, in response to research question1); and self-provisioning of sanitation services (addressed in Chapter 6, in response to research question 2). Paradoxically, findings also reveal an exploitation of these historically infused values by organisational actors in attempts to mobilise the community. Often, there is confusion as the public is left wondering which rules to apply, who to listen to and under what circumstances to act. Thus, rather than reinforcing CE reforms, evidence suggests that historical antecedents are undermining the engagement of the community with the formal processes in WATSAN. These findings contribute to the PSR literature by underscoring the surviving effects of historical antecedents on institutional actors and reform environments.

7.2.2 Influence of Institutional Frameworks and Processes on Civic Engagement

The adoption of a historical sociological perspective allowed the investigation of how macro level policies and laws affect individual behaviours (the micro-level). This highlighted the scope and limits of individual agency in influencing reforms, and enabled inferences to be drawn on how formal reform rules and norms interact with individual behaviours to produce the outcomes currently evident in WATSAN. Findings in response to research question 1**,** *How do institutional structures and processes influence civic engagement in WATSAN?* indicate that the institutional framework for CE in WATSAN consists of both formal (regulative structures, for example policy and legislation) and informal rules. Informal rules have to do with normative and cultural-cognitive ones, for example norms, values, and common understandings. Together these affect how the community engages with organisational actors and with each other. The information contained by these rules is conveyed to the community by different carriers. However, as Scott (2013b, p. 94) cautions, carriers are themselves "never neutral modes of transmission" and the multiplicity of carriers and institutional elements contributes to the

ambiguity of rules already affected by parallel historical rules in WATSAN.

The findings suggest that ambiguities are sometimes exploited to benefit a few actors vested with legal authority in WATSAN. In such instances, ambiguities give rise to personal rather than collective outcomes. As community and organisations do not live in a vacuum, information about such practices then becomes widely shared thereby affecting perceptions about reforms. Thus, despite the presence of an elaborate organisational framework, organisational conduct is generally perceived to be counterproductive against not only the letter of the law, but also the normative expectations of the community. These norms and expectations inform perceptions about the relative gains from reforms, and with it the agency of both organisations and the community actors. These subsequently affect popular endorsement of CE reforms. By considering the structure of PSR institutions beyond macro-level policy and legislation, this study makes a unique contribution to the PSR and HI literature by offering an empirical account of how individual and collective actors interact with macro-level structures for CE in WATSAN.

7.2.3 Influence of Civic Engagement on Service Provision

As indicated earlier, partly, this research has attempted to address research question 2**,** *how does civic engagement influence service provision in WATSAN?* By exploring CE reforms as a process. The analysis focuses on how reform actors engage with formal and informal rules to attain reform objectives. As a whole, the findings suggest that the main reform objective in WATSAN is to improve service provision. CE is employed as an instrument to support this through the promotion of access to service, organisational accountability and cost recovery. However, because of the prevalence of ambiguities and their exploitations, the evidence on the influence of CE on service provision is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, centrally organised CE has succeeded in enhancing community accountability. CE has seen increased flows of information between providers, local authorities and the community. This has been instrumental in increasing awareness about consumer rights and responsibilities which have improved compliance with reforms. In some cases, CE has also led to efforts by higher authorities to improve services. Noticeably, this has occurred despite reported low levels of CE in another key area of reform, the design of cost sharing.

On the other hand, despite implementing CE reforms for over a decade, tangible gains in water and sanitation services remain limited. Despite high community enthusiasm and focus, CE has failed to improve access to sewerage in the case study area. Where service improvements have occurred, particularly in water supplies, progress has been made outside the formal participatory spaces, involving minimal to no contribution from formal reform implementers. This finding corresponds to the World Bank's (2017) observation of the inadequacy of formal CE processes in most

developing countries. These findings can be interpreted in principally two ways:

i. Improvements to water supplies have occurred irrespective of formal CE. They have been made possible by other instruments of reforms such as the promotion of auxiliary actors working directly with communities.

ii. Equally, it can be argued that despite formal CE being largely tokenistic and consultative, there have been spill-over effects that have led to self-mobilisation by the community. This contention is supported by findings suggesting that some community collective action has been influenced by shared awareness of the formal provider's capacity constraints. Realisations that engagement with the service provider would not yield desired outcomes prompted the community to innovate in ways that complemented existing laws.

Overall, the evidence suggests a shared recognition among WATSAN actors that capital expenditure is key to procuring tangible outcomes in WATSAN. That is, CE plays a supportive rather than an attributive role. This is reflected in the expectations about CE's role shared by the community and organisational actors. Yet, community feedback is suggestive of unmet expectations. Despite controlling information flows through CE, authorities in WATSAN appear incapable of responding to community needs. This has adversely affected the likelihood of future community engagement. This is in itself paradoxical as CE reforms aim to strengthen inclusion and accountability rather than apathy or competing solutions. This has potential consequences on the legitimacy of reforms in the medium and long term as it undermines their acceptability and/or desirability. Therefore, by viewing CE reforms as process, this study has enabled a deeper understanding of the political and practical complexities involved in the adoption and administration of CE. These findings are important if we are to learn about, in the words of Ole Therkildsen, again, "*how to improve and sustain performance under present and foreseeable economic, administrative and political conditions"*(2000, p. 20).

7.3 Policy Implications and Feasibility

This study does not offer a blueprint for designing and executing public service reforms. Rather, it identifies a number of issues in civic engagement reforms that warrant consideration from state and non-state actors seeking to improve public service provision in WATSAN in Tanzania and the effectiveness of civic engagement. In light of the research questions, this study offers a series of recommendations along with suggestions of their likely feasibility.

7.3.1 Improve the Design of Formal Regulative Rules

In response to the first research question; *How do institutional structures and processes influence CE in WATSAN,* findings suggest that the

institutional structures and processes both enable and constrain CE. The institutional framework has been shown to include comprehensive pronouncement of the regulative elements such as policies and legislation. But it is relatively light on its consideration of the less formal, normative and cultural-cognitive elements of CE. This has been revealed to be both a source and a consequence of ambiguities in the design of formal CE rules.

To address this, concerted efforts are needed to improve the design of formal rules as these provide general guidance on what to achieve, how and occasionally when to achieve it. Improving the design of policy and laws would resolve rule ambiguities or at worst minimise them. As this study has intimated, this could be done by:

i. A careful (re)examination of the history of the problems that policy designers seek to address is required. This is will enable an identification of the variables and contexts that could possibly confound policy solutions. The design of WATSAN reforms appears to have overlooked key contextual factors (for example, prioritising improvements to the financial capacities of key implementing actors such as DAWASCO) that would have enabled them to respond better to demands from the community.

ii. There is also a need for an examination of the history of potential solutions. Most policy reforms seek to change the rules of engagement to influence new or desired behaviours. Yet, as this study has shown, institutions do not exist in a vacuum. There are likely to be records of how similar interventions have unfolded in the past. Learning from history will in principle inform reform designers of what works, how, why and under what circumstances. Consequently, this will help fine-tune the content of reform rules in a manner that enhances their legitimacy in both the normative and cultural-cognitive elements of institutions, necessary for their sustainability.

   Nonetheless, lessons from history need to be approached with care, particularly in cases of success, so as to avoid emulating outcomes that may have become irrelevant over time. Such dynamically inconsistent outcomes may be inefficient or ineffective because of changes in the contextual environment of policy reforms. For example, changes in political contexts, solutions that worked in a single-party system may not necessarily work in a competitive multi-party democracy. In demographics such as urbanisation, it may be difficult to use tactics used to mobilise rural populations on urban ones.

iii. Decoupling the contents of reforms into smaller, simpler and more manageable components is worth considering. This will in principle enhance both the clarity of reform rules and their specificity (i.e. their focus). Most reform designs tend to seek a multifaceted

approach to policy problems. In practice, this often means that they attempt to address a multitude of sometimes loosely related policy concerns.

At times, the design of reforms gets superseded by international best practices dominating contemporary policy discourse. In WATSAN, these were NPM (which emphasised on efficiency, operationalised by cost recovery) and democratic principles (which focused on social justice and inclusion, operationalised by CE). These multiple fads impose considerable (and at times conflicting) demands on the legal prescriptions of reforms. An example revealed by the study was the use of CE as a platform for cost sharing, or the presence of a multi-layered regulative landscape for CE. Rather than enhancing clarity, these created room for multiple actors to claim responsibility (and exploit ambiguities in authority) for reforms (as discussed in Chapter 5). This led to coordination challenges which further constrained the ability and delegation of authority to enforce rules.

7.3.2 Prioritise the Definition of Key Actors

One of the key challenges facing the institutionalisation of CE in WATSAN in Tanzania is the multiplicity of actors involved in CE. This includes the service provider (DAWASCO), the local authorities, the respective ministries for water, sanitation, and local governments. While this multiplicity of actors may not appear as pronounced in the case study area, nationally there are more than 167 local government authorities as well as more than 28 urban water authorities (utility providers). Thus, from a national perspective, the number of key organisational actors for CE in WATSAN stands in excess of 200. In addition, there exist more than 50,000 formally registered civil society groups. In the absence of clear definition and demarcation of roles and responsibilities in rules, understandings of CE and coordination of efforts are substantially compromised.

This study recommends that in addition to improving the design of reforms, much attention needs to be paid to defining the key actors, their intended roles and crucially, a legally sanctioned and objective third party actor to enforce the rules on roles. This will enhance the effectiveness of reforms by increasing compliance to rules. Further, owing to the problems of coordinating reforms evidenced by the study, it is recommended that reforms only focus on a handful of key organisational actors. Here, an important balance needs to be struck between the pursuit of organisational inclusivity and effective coordination of reforms. Ideally reforms should also seek to adequately resource these actors to enable them to carry out their intended mandates. This is will enhance the delegation of responsibilities and minimise unnecessary organisational competition for resources.

7.3.3 Adopt a Results-Oriented Approach to Reforms

In relation to research question 2, *How does CE influence service provision in WATSAN,* findings from the study reveal that CE influences service provision by influencing the processes of service. Yet, this influence is mixed. While the influence is prevalent in some processes, it is less so in others. The key implication of this finding is that the lack of definitive evidence about the influence of CE is a consequence of the reforms overlooking a more results-based approach for CE. A results-based approach to reform would focus on establishing quantitative benchmarks and targets to levels of CE that would minimise ambiguities in the interpretation of reform objectives. This would enhance monitoring and evaluation of reforms and eliminate the observed practice of "shifting the goalposts" that seems prevalent in WATSAN in Tanzania.

Further a result-based approach to reforms would also galvanise the pursuit of other related reforms. Findings suggest that ultimately what people in the Kinondoni local authority area want are much needed services rather than "words". These very sentiments are suggestive of the "shifting of goalposts" by organisational actors who exploit CE to mask shortcomings in their abilities to deliver ill-defined goals and objectives in WATSAN.

7.3.4 A Better Reconciliation of Civic Engagement with the Needs for Cost Recovery and to Expand Services

The evidence in response to research question 2 suggests that the organisational need for cost recovery is having an adverse effect on civic engagement. The emphasis on collecting revenues is subverting CE through instilling a belief that the legitimacy of a citizen to engage with the authorities is conditioned by their ability to pay. This subsequently discourages engagement with formal actors particularly among the poor. But as CE is meant to be an inclusive process, this study recommends that a careful review of needs to be conducted on how best to balance the needs of collecting revenues with "empowering communities and promoting broad based grassroots participation"(URT, 2005b, p. 3) in WATSAN. As part of findings have suggested, the practices of cost recovery and CE are not mutually exclusive. Thus, a careful review of related approaches has the potential to increase their complementarities. The findings suggest that there two ways of achieving this balance: one, through public education and enhanced transparency of cost structures and the collection process; and two, the adoption of more flexible payment schemes for those unable of making instant payments.

7.4 Avenues for Future Research

The interviews and analysis of secondary data carried out in this work bring to the fore a number of interesting avenues for future research:

- This research has treated the community as a homogenous group in analysis. This was a conscious decision based on the small size of

the interview sample which was later endorsed by findings in chapter 5. However, communities often exhibit considerable heterogeneity on key attributes such as age, incomes, schooling, sex, and ethnicities. As the quantitative analysis attempting to address research question 2 shows, heterogeneity affects the interests and preferences of actors. These in turn affect how institutional rules structure their behaviours. Yet, the historical institutional literature has continued to focus on macro structures (Schmidt, 2011) and even when a micro perspective has been considered as in the case of this study, implicit assumptions have discounted the effect of community heterogeneity on the influence of rules on behaviours. Large sample research is therefore needed to differentiate the potential effects of community heterogeneity on formal institutions.

- Despite the best efforts of this study, much of historical institutionalism continues to focus on explaining the effects of macro structures including policy, legislation and systems. Despite the best efforts of this study, it could not capture all the micro-foundations of civic engagement in WATSAN in Tanzania. Added to that, HI research on the institutional microstructures of norms, values and cultures would enhance theorisations of the agency of actors.
- There is a need for more robust quantitative studies to complement the theoretical propositions of the existing historical institutionalism literature which have been predominantly qualitative. This study has attempted to bridge this methodological gap, but it too has remained predisposed to qualitative methods. One way of responding to this methodological call to arms will be to integrate quantitative methods within the wider context of process tracing approaches already applicable in historical institutionalism. Recent attempts by Lieberman (2015) and Zhu (2016) offer insights into how this could be done.

Instead of evaluating the role of civic engagement in WATSAN in Tanzania using strictly quantitative methods, this study has responded to a gap in the academic literature for theoretically informed micro-level empirical studies, taking PSRs such as CE as the case. This has been done by providing an in-depth, qualitative, rich description of PSRs, CE and interactions between civic and organisational actors defining the provision of WATSAN services in the Kinondoni local authority area in Tanzania. This has been done to improve existing knowledge about PSRs that will eventually help us to better understand the political and practical complexities involved in the administration of PSRs, CE and WATSAN in general.

Summarising the research, the findings indicated that civic engagement (CE) plays a minimal role in the evolving systems for WATSAN in

Tanzania. This role is undermined by ambiguities in the institutional frameworks and processes for CE which in turn produce mixed effects in how CE influences service provision in WATSAN. The prevalence of ambiguities suggests that not enough collective attention has been paid on how to make CE or wider reforms in WATSAN more effective. Stakeholders, particularly the state, need to review the institutions for CE in a bid to resolve these ambiguities through improved specificity, clarity and resources that will improve attainment of common objectives in WATSAN.

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Appendices

Appendix 1.1: Participants' Information Sheet

An Institutional Account of Public Service Reforms:
A case study of Civic Engagement in Water and Sanitation in Tanzania

Participant Information Sheet

You are being invited to take part in this research study. Before you decide to take part, it is important that you understand why the research is being conducted and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and feel free to ask questions if there is anything that is not clear.

What is the purpose of the study?

This aim of this study is to examine the role of civic engagement in the evolving systems for providing water and sanitation in Tanzania. It focuses on interactions between citizens and formal institutions in the sector and examines the influence of civic engagement on service provision in WATSAN in Tanzania. The study maps civic engagement in the water sector; examines policy processes involved in managing civic engagement and service delivery; and analyses the response of the government and public to constraints on state capacity.

What will happen if you take part?

Having read this information sheet, you will have an opportunity to ask any question you may have about the research project. If you are willing to participate, I would like to conduct a face-to-face interview lasting approximately one hour. Your participation will be on a confidential basis and you are free to withdraw at any stage. I will provide a copy of the 'interview questions' one week in advance of our meeting.

What areas will be covered in this research?

Policy Processes and Institutions
(*civic engagement actors in the water sector; rules, material conditions and community attributes affecting civic engagement, patterns of interactions*); and

The Influence on Policy Outcomes
(*state capacity, service delivery, and policy options*).

Policy on confidentiality

- All information collected during the project will be kept strictly confidential.
- Your views will be treated in strictest confidence and your comments will not be attributed to you in research outputs.
- Confidentiality will not be assured where the nondisclosure of information would be ethically unviable (e.g. causing direct harm to individuals). This situation would be extremely rare.

Why have you been chosen?

You are being invited to take part in this study because of your role in the water sector, either as a water consumer; or a government official; or a service provider; or an active politician; or a representative of non-governmental organisation/civil society; or a donor, in Tanzania.

Contact for further information

If you need any further information, please contact Mr. Jamal BabuMsami, the PhD researcher. He can be contacted at the Centre for Urban and Public Policy, University of Bristol, 8 Priory Road, Bristol BS8 1TZ.

Tel: +255 713/788 946500 or email jm12190@bristol.ac.uk

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Appendix 1.2: Sample Interview Schedule for Water Users/Citizens

An Institutional Account of Public Service Reforms: A case study of Civic Engagement in Water and Sanitation in Tanzania

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE- 3

Summary:

The aim of this study is to examine the role of civic engagement in the evolving systems for providing water and sanitation in Tanzania. It focuses on interactions between citizens and formal institutions in the sector and examines the influence of civic engagement on service provision in WATSAN in Tanzania. The study maps civic engagement in the water sector; examines policy processes involved in managing civic engagement and service delivery; and analyses the response of the government and public to constraints on state capacity.

This is a semi structured questionnaire and contains two sections:

i. **Policy Processes and Institutions** (*civic engagement actors in the water sector, rules, material conditions and community attributes affecting civic engagement, patterns of interactions*); and

ii. **The Influence on Policy Outcomes** (*state capacity, service*

delivery, and policy options).

All responses will be treated as strictly confidential. Only the aggregated information will be reported.

I. Policy Processes and Institutions

Respondent Profile and Community Attributes

Here are a few questions about you.

1. How old are you?
   _____

2. What is the level of your formal education?
   _____

[Code: None….1, Primary….2, Secondary….3, Tertiary/Higher….4, Technical/Vocational….5]

3. How would you describe your present economic/living conditions?
   _____

[Code: Very Bad….1, Fairly Bad….2, Neither Good nor Bad….3, Fairly Good….4, very Good….5]

4. How would you describe present economic/living conditions of those around you (your community)?
   _____

[Code: Very Bad….1, Fairly Bad….2, Neither Good nor Bad….3, Fairly Good….4, very Good….5]

5. How long have you lived in this area?
   _____

[Code: Less than six months...1, Six months or more but less than a year...2, One year or more but less than three years....3, Three years or more...4]

6. Are you a member of water management committee/user association in your area? _____

   a. If yes, how long have you been a member?
      _____

b. If no, why are you not a member?

_____

The Government of Tanzania through the National Water Policy has adopted a demand-driven approach to the water sector putting ordinary people and communities at the heart of development.

Based on your experience, please tell us which of the following participatory instruments you have come across in the water sector? (Please use the diagram and tag the most important instrument(s) for Questions 7 and 8. You can tag an instrument more than once)

Sensitization ……01	Consultations……..03
Community Education ……..02	Discussions……04
Other (Specify)……05	

Selected sample from the water sector institutional mapping in Tanzania.

7. Which of these participatory instruments are employed in policy making in the water sector? (Please tag '7' the *THREE* most important instruments)

8. Which of these participatory instruments have proved effective in policy delivery in the water sector? (Please tag '8' the *THREE* most important instruments)

Actors/Participants

There are numerous actors (e.g multilateral and bilateral donor agencies; service providers; local and international NGOs; civil society; political etc.) actively involved in the water sector in Tanzania. Based on your experiences,

9. Which actors play an influential role in setting development priorities in the water sector? (Please tag '9' the *THREE* most important actors).

10. Which actors work with ordinary people like you the most in the water sector? (Please tag '10' the *THREE* most important actors)

(Please use the diagram and tag the most important actors for Questions 9 and 10. You can tag an actor more than once)

Material Conditions

11. What is your main source of drinking water?

_____

[Code: Piped into house/plot….1, Well/borehole….2, Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot….3, Community/privately managed water point/kiosk/tap…..4, Surface Water: lake/dam/river/stream/pond….5, Water vendor/truck…6, Other(Specify)_____]

12. What type of toilet does your household use?

_____

[Code: Flush toilet in the house…1, Improved/Ventilated Pit Latrine…2, Unimproved Pit Latrine…3, No toilet/use the bush/field…4, Other (Specify)_____]

13. How do you dispose of domestic waste?

_____

[Code: We bury it…1, We take it to a public collection site…2, Someone collects it from our house….3, We just dump it somewhere….4, Other (Specify)_____]

14. Do you pay for any of the above services?

_____

a. If yes, how affordable are the payments?
_____

b. If no, why not?
_____

Rules

15. The on-going local government reform emphasises bottom-up planning and citizens' participation as key elements for good governance. Based on your experiences, what do you think has been the impact of local government reforms on civic engagement in the water sector ?_____

_____

Informality of rules in civic engagement in the water sector

Village, local or central government officials are part of the society. This may create informal attachments/relationships with us. Some may live next door to us, be our friends, or even be related to us.

16. In your experience, how do informal relationships such as knowing someone in a higher office or even bribing someone help in dealing with the authorities in the water sector in Tanzania?_____
_____

17. What challenges are there in using informal relationships to engage the public in the water sector?
_____

Patterns of Interactions

18. Have you ever been in touch with members of your community/WUA to talk about water issues/problems in this area?
_____

a. If yes, what did you talk about?
_____

19. Have you ever been in touch with members of your community/WUA to talk about sanitation/sewerage issues/problems in this area?

    _____

    a. If yes, what did you talk about?

       _____

20. Have you ever been in touch with other non-community members such as the village/local/central government; NGOs; the water company; or religious groups etc., to talk about water issues/problems in this area?_____

    a. If yes, what did you talk about?

       _____

II. Influence on Policy Outcomes

State Capacity

21. Have you ever received any feedback on water and sanitation matters in your area from the authorities?_____

    _____

    _____

22. Cost sharing through cash or in-kind contributions has been one the ways in which the authorities have sought to finance service delivery in the water sector. Do you approve of this?

    _____

    a. If yes, in what ways?

       _____

    b. If no, why not?

       _____

23. Have you ever been consulted by the authorities in the design of cost sharing schemes in the water sector?

    _____

24. In your experience, how does active civic engagement help with civic compliance of policy and legislation in the water sector in Tanzania? _____

25. The 2002 National Water Policy emphasizes on the need for greater accountability of service providers to the public. Has this been achieved?

    _____

    a. If yes, in what ways?

b. If no, why not?

_____

26. Do you think the authorities listen to ordinary people like you when it comes to water issues in your area?

_____

a. If yes, in what ways?

_____

b. If no, why not?

_____

Policy Option

27. If you are given the opportunity, what would you change to make civic engagement in the water sector more effective?

_____

_____

************Thank you for your time *************

Appendix 1.3: Interview Consent Form

Participant Copy ☐
Researcher Copy ☐

Participant Consent Form

Title of the Study: **An Institutional Account of Public Service Reforms: A case study of Civic Engagement in Water and Sanitation in Tanzania**

PhD Student Researcher: Jamal Babu Msami

Please tick box:

Have you read the information sheet?	?
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions about the project?	?
I have understood the policy on confidentiality?	?
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the project at any time, without giving reason?	?
Do you agree to participate voluntarily, as an interviewee, in the project?	?
Do you agree to allow the researcher to record (audio) the interview?	?

Name of the participant	Signature	Date

Name of the researcher	Signature	Date

Contact for further information

Should you need any further information, please contact my supervisor Dr Sarah Ayres at the School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol, 8 Priory Road, Bristol BS8 1TZ, United Kingdom.
Tel. +44 (0)117 954 6762, email: sarah.ayres@bristol.ac.uk

Appendix 1.4: Key Data on Case Study Location: Kawe Ward

Table A.1: Summary of Key Indicators for the case study area (2002-2012)

Indicator	Dar es Salaam Region		Kinondoni Municipality		Kawe Ward	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Area (square kilometres)	1,800		531		15.5	
Population Size, Growth and Distribution						
Total Population	4,364,541		1,775,049		67,115	
Male	2,125,786	48.7	860,802	40.5	32,426	48.3
Female	2,238,755	51.3	914,247	40.8	34,689	51.7
Average Intercensal Population Growth Rate (2002-2012)		5.6		5.1		4.9
Population Density (population per km^2)	2377		3273		4330	
Age and Sex Profile						
Youth (0-17 years)	1,648,653	37.8				
Male	792,617	37.3				

Indicator	Dar es Salaam Region		Kinondoni Municipality		Kawe Ward	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Female	856,036	38.2				
Working Age Population (15-64 years)	2,893,355	66.3				
Male	1,400,829	65.9				
Female	1,492,526	66.7				
Elderly Population (60+ years)	151,812	3.5				
Male	79,541	3.7				
Female	72,271	3.2				
Age Dependency Ratio		50.8		50.4		50.4
Household Composition						
Total Number of Households	1,083,381		441,240		16,779	
Male Headed Households		65.2		64.7		63.8

Indicator	Dar es Salaam Region		Kinondoni Municipality		Kawe Ward	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Female Headed Households		34.8		35.3		36.2
Average Household Size	3.9		3.9		3.6	
Average Household Size Headed by Male	2.9		2.9		2.9	
Average Household Size Headed by Female	5.8		5.8		5.7	
Literacy and Education						
Adult Literacy Rate (15 years and above)		96.8		97.6		97.3
Schooling						
Attending		29.0		28.6		29.8
Drop Out		5.1		5.1		5.0
Completed		60.7		62.2		61.4
Never Attended		5.2		4.0		3.8
Poverty, Inequality, Employment and Economic Activities						

Indicator	Dar es Salaam Region		Kinondoni Municipality		Kawe Ward	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Poverty Headcount (% of poor below national poverty line)		4.1		4.0		4.0
Inequality (Gini Coefficient)		0.35		0.36		0.35
Employed		51.6		52.9		54
Unemployed		6.5		7.1		6.8
Home Maintenance (cooking, hygiene, caring)		17.0		16.8		15.9
Full Time Students		22.0		20.5		21.0
Unable to Work		2.9		2.8		2.3
Water and Sanitation						
Improved Sources of Drinking Water		78.9		70.2		
Unimproved sources of Drinking Water		21.2		29.9		
Improved Sanitation		89.3		88.9		

Indicator	Dar es Salaam Region		Kinondoni Municipality		Kawe Ward	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Unimproved Sanitation		10.8		11.0		
Solid waste generated (tonnes per day)			1223.6		62	

Source: (NBS and OCGS (2016); NBS (2014); NBS and OCGS (2013); NBS and ICF Macro (2011))

Appendix 1.5: List and Basic Characteristics of Participating Interviewees

Table A.2: List of Community Interviewees

Interviewee Code	Sex	Age Group	Highest Level of Education	Own Wellbeing	Length of Residency	If member of a WATSAN users' group	Main Source of Drinking Water	Type of Toilet Used by Respondent's Household	If Respondent Pays for at least one WATSAN service
Community Interview 1	Male	Middle Aged Adults (45-54 years)	Technical or Vocational Training	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Improved/ Ventilated Pit Latrine	Yes
Community Interview 2	Male	Middle Aged Adults (45-54 years)	Primary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	No	Community/privately managed water point/kiosk/tap	Flush toilet in the house	Yes
Community Interview 3	Male	Middle Aged Adults (45-54 years)	Primary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Unimproved Pit Latrine	Yes
Community Interview 4	Male	Upper Middle-Aged Adults (55-64 years)	Primary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Unimproved Pit Latrine	Yes

	Interviewee Code	Sex	Age Group	Highest Level of Education	Own Wellbeing	Length of Residency	If member of a WATSAN users' group	Main Source of Drinking Water	Type of Toilet Used by Respondent's Household	If Respondent Pays for at least one WATSAN service
5	Community Interview 5	Male	Upper Middle-Aged Adults (55-64 years)	Primary Education	Bad	Three Years or More	No	Water vendor/truck	Unimproved Pit Latrine	Yes
6	Community Interview 6	Male	Lower Middle-Aged Adults (35-44 years)	Primary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped into house/plot	Improved/Ventilated Pit Latrine	Yes
7	Community Interview 7	Female	Middle Aged Adults (45-54 years)	Primary Education	Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped into house/plot	Flush toilet in the house	Yes
8	Community Interview 8	Male	Young Adults (18-34 years)	Secondary Education	Good	Three Years or More	Yes	Piped into house/plot	Improved/Ventilated Pit Latrine	Yes
9	Community Interview 9	Female	Young Adults (18-34 years)	Primary Education	Bad	Between Six Months and One Year	No	Piped into house/plot	Flush toilet in the house	Yes
10	Community Interview 10	Female	Young Adults (18-34 years)	Primary Education	Bad	Three Years or More	Yes	Piped into house/plot	Unimproved Pit Latrine	Yes
11	Community Interview 11	Female	The Elderly (65 years and above)	Primary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped into house/plot	Improved/Ventilated Pit Latrine	Yes
12	Community Interview 12	Male	Upper Middle-Aged Adults (55-64 years)	Primary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	Yes	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Unimproved Pit Latrine	Yes

	Interviewee Code	Sex	Age Group	Highest Level of Education	Own Wellbeing	Length of Residency	If member of a WATSAN users' group	Main Source of Drinking Water	Type of Toilet Used by Respondent's Household	If Respondent Pays for at least one WATSAN service
13	Community Interview 13	Male	The Elderly (65 years and above)	Primary Education	Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped into house/plot	Flush toilet in the house	Yes
14	Community Interview 14	Male	Middle Aged Adults (45-54 years)	Primary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Unimproved Pit Latrine	Yes
15	Community Interview 15	Male	Lower Middle-Aged Adults (35-44 years)	Primary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Flush toilet in the house	Yes
16	Community Interview 16	Male	Lower Middle-Aged Adults (35-44 years)	Secondary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Improved/Ventilated Pit Latrine	Yes
17	Community Interview 17	Female	Upper Middle-Aged Adults (55-64 years)	Secondary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	No	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Improved/Ventilated Pit Latrine	Yes
18	Community Interview 18	Male	Upper Middle-Aged Adults (55-64 years)	Primary Education	Bad	Three Years or More	Yes	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Improved/Ventilated Pit Latrine	Yes
19	Community Interview 19	Female	Middle Aged Adults (45-54 years)	Primary Education	Neither Good nor Bad	Three Years or More	Yes	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Unimproved Pit Latrine	Yes
20	Local Water Users' Committee Member 1	Female	Middle Aged Adults (45-54 years)	Primary Education	Good	Three Years or More	Yes	Piped into house/plot	Flush toilet in the house	Yes

	Interviewee Code	Sex	Age Group	Highest Level of Education	Own Wellbeing	Length of Residency	If member of a WATSAN users' group	Main Source of Drinking Water	Type of Toilet Used by Respondent's Household	If Respondent Pays for at least one WATSAN service
21	Local Water Users' Committee Member 2	Male	Middle Aged Adults (45-54 years)	Primary Education	Bad	Three Years or More	Yes	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Improved/Ventilated Pit Latrine	Yes
22	A local political Actor	Female	Upper Middle-Aged Adults (55-64 years)	Primary Education	Good	Three Years or More	Yes	Piped/well/borehole in neighbour's house/plot	Improved/Ventilated Pit Latrine	Yes

Source: Author's Sample

AN INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PUBLIC SERVICE REFORMS

A Case Study of Civic Engagement in Water and Sanitation in Tanzania

This book examines the role of civic engagement in the evolving systems for providing water and sanitation in Tanzania. It draws on the literatures on public service reforms, civic engagement and historical institutionalism to provide an in-depth, qualitative, rich discussion of public service reforms, civic engagement and the interactions between civic and organisational actors in defining the provision of water and sanitation services in the case study area. Findings reveal that, overall, civic engagement is constrained by rule ambiguities in the institutional frameworks and processes in water and sanitation in Tanzania. These suggest that not enough collective attention has been paid to the conditions required to make civic engagement or wider reforms in water and sanitation more effective. The study recommends that policy stakeholders, particularly the state, review the institutions for civic engagement to resolve these ambiguities through improved specificity, clarity and resources necessary to make civic engagement work.

Dr. Jamal Msami has been involved in policy research and design for over ten years. He currently heads REPOA's directorate of strategic research focusing on natural resources; governance and social policy; and industrialization, employment and enterprise development. He has publications in the fields of public service reforms, industrial and trade policies. He is currently working on youth unemployment; political settlements and revenue bargains; patterns of primitive accumulation in Tanzania; and a review of trade competitiveness and diversification policies and practices in Tanzania. He maintains an active interest in comparative historical analyses, new institutionalism, and applied social policy. He holds a Ph.D in Social Policy from the University of Bristol, England.