

RESEARCH ON POVERTY ALLEVIATION (REPOA)

The Research on poverty Alleviation (REPOA) is a not-for-profit Non-Governmental Organisation registered in Tanzania in November, 1994. Its overall objective is to deepen the understanding of causes, extent, nature, rate of change and means of combating poverty in Tanzania. The specific objectives focus on development of local research capacity, development of poverty research network, enhancing stakeholders' knowledge of poverty issues, contributing to policy and forging linkages between research(ers) and users. Since its establishment the Netherlands Government has generously supported REPOA.

REPOA RESEARCH REPORTS contain the edited and externally reviewed results of research financed by REPOA.

REPOA SPECIAL PAPERS contain the edited findings of commissioned studies in furtherance of REPOA's programmes for research, training and capacity building.

It is REPOA's policy that authors of Research Reports and special Papers are free to use material contained therein in other publications with REPOA's acknowledgement. Views expressed in the Research Reports and Special Paper are those of the authors alone and should not be attributed to REPOA.

Further information concerning REPOA can be obtained by writing to :
Research on Poverty Alleviation.
P. O. Box 33223, Dar es salaam, Tanzania.

Tel: 255-22-2700083; 0741-326 064

Fax: 255-22-2775738

Email: repa@repa.or.com

Website: www.repa.or.tz



The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services: The Case of Solid Waste Collection in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Summa Kaare

**RESEARCH ON POVERTY
ALLEVIATION**

**The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access
to Social Services: The Case of Solid Waste Collection in
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

**The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access
to Social Services: The Case of Solid Waste Collection in
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania**

Research Report No. 02.2

Suma Kaare

RESEARCH ON POVERTY ALLEVIATION



MKUKI NA NYOTA PUBLISHERS LTD
P. O. BOX 4246, DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA
www.mkukinanyota.com

Published for: Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA)
P.O. Box 33223, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
www.repoa.or.tz

by: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers Ltd
P. O. Box 4246, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

©REPOA, 2002

ISBN 9987-686-59-1

Table of Contents

ABBREVIATIONS.....	vii
ABSTRACT.....	viii
1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
2.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.....	1
2.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	2
2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS	2
2.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES	3
2.4 BACKGROUND TO THE PRIVATISATION OF REFUSE COLLECTION SERVICES IN TANZANIA	4
2.5 LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	7
2.5.1 <i>Contracting Out Model</i>	7
2.5.2 <i>Concession Model</i>	8
2.5.3 <i>Outright Sale</i>	11
2.6 PRIVATISATION OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN DAR ES SALAAM.....	11
3.0 ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS	12
3.1 THE POVERTY PHENOMENON OF THE STUDY AREAS	12
3.1.1 <i>Gendered Dimension of Poverty</i>	15
3.2 AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY OF SERVICE	16
3.3 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR POOR PERFORMANCE	22
3.3.1 <i>Lack of Involvement of Communities in Decision-making and Implementation of Concession Privatisation</i>	23
3.3.2 <i>Poor Conceptualisation of Problems of Solid Waste Management of Low Income Areas of Dar es Salaam</i>	26
3.3.3 <i>Weakness of Concession Method of Privatisation</i>	30
3.3.4 <i>Weakness in Institutional Capacity of Delegating Authority</i>	32
3.3.4.1 <i>Financial and Human Resources</i>	32
3.3.4.2 <i>Weak Legal Framework</i>	34
3.3.4.3 <i>Organisational Structure and Work Practices</i>	34
3.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE SITUATION	39
3.4.1 <i>Reorganisation of DCC</i>	39
3.4.2 <i>Strengthening Role of Street Government in the DCC Structure</i>	39
3.4.3 <i>Framework for Policy Formulation</i>	40
3.4.4 <i>Revisit the Concession Method of Privatisation</i>	40
4.0 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	42
TABLES	
Table 1: Profile of Study Streets	4
Table 2: Summary Poverty Indicators of the Sixteen Streets.....	15
Table 3: Status of Availability of Concessionaire Refuse Collection Service in the Sixteen Study Streets.....	17
Table 4: Type/form of Refuse Collection Service Commonly Used by Households in each Street.....	18

Table 5: Neighbourhood Observation	20
Table 6: Ranking of Common Risks to Well-being and Livelihoods	22
Table 7: Distribution of Type of Solid Waste Generated by Street	26
Table 8: Summary of Planned and Actual Refuse Collection Fees Paid by Businesses in Low-Income Areas.....	28
Table 9: Type of Business Activities, Expected and Actual Fee Paying Entities	30
Table 10: Summary of Capacity Indicators of Select Concessionaires	31
Table 11: Income and Expenditure Summary of Select Concessionaires	32
Table 12: Summary Information on Some Capacity Indicators of the Three Municipal Authorities in Dar es Salaam	34
FIGURES	
Figure 1: Historical Mapping of State of Cleanliness of Selected Assessment Streets	20
Figure 2: Cause and Effect of Minimal Performance of Contracting Out Providing Urban Poor with Refuse Collection Service.....	38
EXHIBIT	
Exhibit 1:	13
PICTURES	
Picture 1: Solid waste dumped in River N’gombe in Mkunduge Street	13
Picture 2: Solid waste stock piled behind residential houses in Mkunduge	13
Picture 3: Solid waste dumped close to residential houses in Mkunduge	14
INDICATORS	
Indicator 1: . Availability (physical access) of concessionaire provided refuse collection service in each of the sixteen streets.	17
Indicator 2: Poor household dependence or non dependence on concessionaire provided refuse collection and disposal service	18
Indicator 3: Area improvement (status of solid waste stocked piles and scattered solid waste) before and after the interventions	19
Indicator 4: Users perceptions on the usefulness and/or importance of concessionaire provided refuse collection service.	21
ANNEXES	
Annex 1: A Summary of Activities Carried Out in 16 Streets of Dar es Salaam	43
Annex 2: Historical Mapping of Environmental Condition before and after the Introduction of Contracting-out Refuse Collection Services	45
Annex 3: Summary of Factors Contributing to the Dismal Performance of Contracting Out Refuse Strategy in Improving Living Conditions	47
SERVICE PROVIDERS	44
MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES	44
REFERENCES	48

ABBREVIATIONS

AFC	African Construction Cooperative Society Limited
AGETIP	Agence d'Execution des Travaux d'Interet Public
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CVK	Chama cha Vijana Kimara
DCC	Dar es Salaam City Commission
DCC	Dar es Salaam City Council
EPM	Environmental Planning Management
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ILO	International Labour Organisation
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
KIWODET	Kinondoni Women Development Trust
MAWEMA	Mabibo Women Environmental Management Society
MPECO	M.P. Environmental Company Group
PEGRO	Pendelea Women Group Environmental Group
REPOA	Research on Poverty Alleviation
SDP	Sustainable Dar es Salaam Programme
SUPA	Semi Urban Planned Areas
SUUA	Semi Urban Unplanned Areas
UASU	Umoja wa Akina Mama Sitakishari Ukonga
UNDP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNHCS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)
UPA	Urban Planned Areas
UUA	Urban Unplanned Areas

ABSTRACT

A study to examine the role of privatisation in providing the urban poor access to essential social services was conducted in sixteen streets of Dar es Salaam classified as low-income areas. The study employed Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) approach whereby information was collected in consultation with population of sixteen administrative streets of Dar es Salaam over a period of five months. A triangulation method whereby information from the same sample area was collected using different techniques including household case study; focus group discussions (FGD); key informant interviews and neighbourhood observations was employed.

The study revealed that privatisation of delivery of solid waste collection services implemented by the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC), has had minimal impact in providing the low-income households of Dar es Salaam with refuse collection services. A large proportion of low-income households residing in unplanned areas of Dar es Salaam are not receiving the service and/or rely on informal refuse management systems. Reliance on informal refuse management systems in itself does not constitute a problem but rather it is the inability of the systems to cope with the demands of the ever-increasing solid waste generation characteristic of unplanned areas of Dar es Salaam.

The study identified a range of interrelated factors, which contribute to the minimal impact of concession privatisation in providing urban poor of Dar es Salaam with refuse collection and disposal services. The factors include lack of delegation of direct rights and legal obligations to the purchaser who is the service recipient; inadequate institutional and organisational capacity of both the DCC and the concessionaire, as well as the inadequacy of the concession as the preferred option for delivering refuse collection service to the urban poor.

The study makes such recommendations as: first, increased financial capacity of local authorities by hiving off high yield and cost effective tax source from the central government and transferring them to local government authorities. Secondly, strengthening the role of lower tiers of DCC (wards and street governments) in the management of solid waste management. Thirdly, improve the policy frameworks by involving service recipient representative institutions in decision making and implementation and explore workable pro poor policy delivery options including establishment of a single chain of service delivery system in which the households, informal service providers as well as formal service providers are networked into different forms of partnerships.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The study was intended to answer the question: Does the privatisation of solid waste collection service provide the urban poor of Tanzania access to this service? This study was intended to answer this question and its goal was to discover the conditions necessary for privatisation to provide urban poor of Tanzania access to basic social services such as solid waste collection. Social services in this study refer to services that are essential to a given society in line with agreed sets of collective values (Gordon, 1979). Privatisation as used in this study refers to transfer to the private sector institutions both profit and non-profit oriented of any activities and functions that have traditionally been done by the public sector institutions.

The research study area was Dar es Salaam, one of the fastest growing cities of Africa. Sixteen streets were selected on purpose for the study. A street represents the lowest political-administrative unit in Tanzania's local government structure. Secondary data obtained from the then Dar es Salaam City Commission (DCC) provided entry point to the selection of the sixteen sample streets. Qualitative methods were used to evaluate the extent to which privatisation through contracting out provision of solid waste collection services has enabled the urban poor of Dar es Salaam to access this service.

2.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Information gap exists in explaining the extent and conditions under which privatisation can better deliver social services such as solid waste to the urban poor. This is critical particularly at a time when governments of developing countries are considering privatisation as a solution to the problems of solid waste management. In this study, the urban poor are defined as those individuals with inadequate and unsustainable access to income and other resources necessary to meet basic needs including adequate access to food, potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing, time for community participation and social integration (Frankenberger 1996; 4). Existing information on the role of privatisation reveals experiences demonstrating the efficacy of the approach as an alternative to direct government provision of such services as solid waste management. Indeed, qualitative studies (Post, 1999; Doan, 1998; Lifset and Fernandez, 1998; Lee, 1997; Ohnesgoren, 1993; Walker, 1992; Bartone et al, 1990) support the argument that privatisation has played a pivotal role in improving delivery of social services in developing countries. These scholars used various performance indicators including physical and financial access to such services by populations previously denied such services. None of the studies above has attempted to provide a systematic assessment of the impact of privatisation on various socio-economic groups in the developing countries.

The information gap is explicit in Tanzania where existing studies have focused more on issues of efficiency and effectiveness of the privatisation option. Three studies have attempted to provide systematic assessments on efficacy of privatisation of solid waste collection services in Dar es Salaam but none has evaluated the impact of privatisation of solid waste collection services in Dar es Salaam on the various socio-economic groups specifically the urban poor. The studies include JICA (1996) Study Team which evaluated the problems of solid waste management in Dar es Salaam city and the potential of privatisation in addressing the problems; the Majani (2000) study which evaluated the efficacy of privatisation of solid waste management in Dar es Salaam in institutionalising Environmental Planning and Management; and the ILO (2001) study which evaluated the potential of privatisation of solid waste management in Dar es Salaam in providing the urban youths with employment opportunities. The problem with regard to privatisation of solid waste management by Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC) is the absence of systematic assessment of the extent to which the strategy has benefited the poor in terms of access to this service. Neither have there been any attempts to systematically assess the conditions necessary for privatisation to extend the service to the urban poor in other parts of Tanzania. Yet, the strategy is being sought and considered for replication by other urban authorities in Tanzania. More private service providers are being brought on board. At the time of the conduct of this study (January-June, 2001) the Kinondoni municipal council had given concession to a total of 4,837-service providers spread across its 17 wards (Kinondoni Municipal Council, 2001; 3).

2.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of this study was to conduct an exploratory descriptive assessment of the performance of concession privatisation adopted by the then Dar es Salaam City Commission (DCC), in extending solid waste collection service to the urban poor of Dar es Salaam. The study focused on those factors that hindered or facilitated concession model of privatisation as a strategy for providing the urban poor of Tanzania with solid waste collection services. The specific objectives were:

- (i) To explore the critical factors for privatisation to provide the urban poor of Tanzania with solid waste collection services; and
- (ii) To document the experiences of the privatisation of solid waste collection services of the Dar es Salaam city as lessons for other local authorities and researchers in other parts of Tanzania.

2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions included:

- (i) To what extent has concession privatisation adopted by the Dar es Salaam City Commission provided urban poor with solid waste collection service?

- (ii) What factors are responsible for the state of affairs?
- (iii) What needs to be done to reinforce or abate those factors?

2.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES

The study was undertaken between mid February 2001 and mid July 2001 and involved recruitment and training of research assistants and actual fieldwork. Initial data analysis was done during debriefing sessions.

Four research assistants were recruited and trained on Participatory Learning Action (PLA) tools as well as participatory data collection techniques. The training included development of study questionnaire and PLA tools relevant for each questionnaire.

The research field work was conducted using the Participatory Rapid Appraisal approach whereby through participatory processes, massive information is collected in consultation with population of the study area in a short period of time. Participatory Learning Action tools were used to facilitate participation of the respondents. These included free listing and ranking, matrix completion and institutional and historical mapping. The study employed a triangulation method whereby information from the same sample area was collected using different techniques including household case study; focus group discussions; key informant interviews and street walkabouts/observations. Separate topic guides were developed and used to lead the data collection exercise.

For purposes of data collection the research assistants were organised into two teams of two persons each plus one coordinator. Each team worked in one street per day. Data collection was done mostly in late afternoon from 3.00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m. Some focus group discussions were held in the mornings depending on the convenience of targeted groups. Subsequent mornings were used for debriefing sessions involving all researchers. Debriefing sessions were mainly used to identify gaps in collected data, gain initial insights as well as feedback on workability of research tools.

The study was carried out in sixteen streets of the Dar es Salaam city, classified as low-income areas (Table 1). Dar es Salaam city is one of the 25 administrative structures in the decentralised system of government in Tanzania. It covers an area of approximately 1350 square kilometres including eight islands and a population of approximately 3 million people (JICA, 1996). The urban poor who constitute more than 70 per cent of the total population of Dar es Salaam are geographically distributed in the three administrative municipal councils. These are subdivided into 38 administrative wards and 178 streets (Lugalla, 2000; DCC, 2001). The sampling frame included all 178 administrative streets of the Dar es Salaam City Council. Lack of detailed information on the profile

of each street with regard to various poverty indicators (basic services and utilities, sanitation and proportion of unplanned dwellings and low income households) necessitated the inclusion of all administrative streets into the study-sampling frame. A sampling interval was calculated to enable random selection of study streets (cluster). A total of 81 household case studies (51 women and 29 men) were held. Moreover, 25 focus group discussions (of between 6-8 people each) were held. Sixteen (16) neighbourhood observations and key informant interviews were conducted (Annex 1 a summary of distribution of field activities and respondents by street).

Table 1: Profile of Study Streets

Street	Ward	District	Area ward	Population per ward	Population density per ward (person/km ²)
*Barafu	Mburahati	Kinondoni	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Baruti	Kimara	Kinondoni	1.6	26,059	16,287
*Madenge	Buguruni	Ilala	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
*Chiwanda	Tandika	Temeke	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Gongolamboto	Ukonga	Ilala	42.2	73,141	1,733
Idrisa	Magomeni	Kinondoni	1.4	19,603	14,002
Kiburugwa	Mbagala	Temeke	26.0	115,758	4,452
Manzese Uzuri	Manzese	Kinondoni	3.5	91,560	26,160
Misheni	Mbagala Kuu	Temeke	3.2	50,622	15,819
Mogo	Kipawa	Ilala	10.1	70,890	7,019
*Msisiri	Mwananyamala	Kinondoni	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Mtongani	Kunduchi	Kinondoni	53.6	38,785	724
Mwongozo	Makaburini	Kinondoni	11.1	67,908	6,118
*Vijibweni	Vijibweni	Temeke	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Mkunduge	Tandale	Kinondoni	3.0	116,392	38,797
Yombo Vituka	Yombo	Temeke	17.1	51,782	3,028

Compiled by the author from various sources; JICA, 1996; 'Table 1-9 Classification of the Wards in the Study Area' JICA Report, 1996, p.1-27; Dar es Salaam City Council, 2001, List of Streets and Wards in Dar es Salaam City Council.

**Details on population per wards corresponding to these streets was not available.*

2.4 BACKGROUND TO THE PRIVATISATION OF REFUSE COLLECTION SERVICES IN TANZANIA

Prior to 1994, solid waste management in Dar es Salaam was a statutory responsibility of the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC). The DCC through its administrative machinery and budget had the responsibility of providing the service in accordance with the urban master plan (Majani, 2000; Kironde, 1995). The DCC responsibility of solid waste management was among between three departments health, works and planning. Refuse collection services were placed

under the Section of Preventive Services the health department. The Department of Works was responsible for maintenance of the solid waste collection trucks as well as the roads leading to the disposal sites or workshops. The Department of Planning was responsible for urban planning including setting aside land for construction of refuse treatment and disposal facilities. This fragmentation undermined the importance of solid waste management collection service compared to other activities of the DCC. Because of the low priority attached to it, the component had the smallest share of the total unit budget (JICA, 1996, pp.6-51). Refuse collection and disposal services received only 18 per cent of the total budget of health and social welfare unit (JICA, 1996, pp.1-26).

DCC performance in providing refuse collection service was good until early 1980s when the service collapsed all together. Evidence of the collapse included low solid waste collection rates compared to waste generated. Between 1989 and 1996, only 5 per cent of the 1,400 tones of waste generated per day were being collected (ILO, 2001; Majani, 2000, p.111; JICA 1996, p.6; SDP, 1994). Another indicator for poor performance was the disproportionate growth of the demand for refuse collection on DCC budget. Until 1995, the DCC budget for refuse collection was 20 times less than the actual amount needed to provide the service at the appropriate level. For example, the DCC had only 20 trucks and 1 skip truck when the actual requirement to meet the demand for refuse collection was 200 trucks (Baruti et al, 1992; Coffey, 199).

The collapse of the solid waste management in 1995 was further indicated by DCCs' failure to extend the service to the growing unplanned areas of Dar es Salaam. It should be noted that until 1995, refuse collection service of the DCC was limited to planned areas only (Halla, 1997; Armstrong, 1988). While few unplanned areas were obtaining the DCC refuse collection service through informal connections, more than 2.0 million people residing in these areas were left unserved (Majani, 2000, p.39; Misigaro, 1994).

The collapse of the refuse collection system in Dar es Salaam resulted in serious problems of unhygienic conditions in the city. These included large amounts of garbage dumped on open spaces, along streets and roads, at market places, and in the age systems drain (Majani, 2000, p.41; Ntukula; Lugalla 1997; Halla and Majani, 1999). Both the international donor community and the government of Tanzania attributed the collapse to the weakness of the urban planning and management system then in existence. Both the rigid standards and centralisation of solid waste collection and the disposal responsibilities by the DCC hierarchy were identified as major factors contributing to the collapse of the solid waste management system in Dar es Salaam (Majani, 2000, p.31). Rigid standards including lack of recognition of unplanned areas were considered outdated given the fact that these unplanned areas accommodated more than 70 per cent of the

population of Dar es Salaam. Against this background in 1992, the government of Tanzania with the support of international development partners introduced the Environmental Planning Management (EPM) as a framework for coordination of private, public sector and community partnerships in urban development planning and management including solid waste management (Kombe 1997).

The EPM introduced working groups to work as consultative frameworks for identification of priority environmental issues and solutions for addressing them. The working group for solid waste management identified both the inadequate funding and lack of community involvement in solid waste management as being critical issues (Majani, 2002; p.41). The working group identified participation of the private sector in solid waste management as the key solution to the budgetary problems of DCC. Concession was identified as the appropriate form of privatisation to be adopted by the Dar es Salaam City Council.

The working group developed Planning Frameworks for Solid Waste Management Master Plan spelling out goals, targets and strategies for the implementation of the privatisation of solid waste management in Dar es Salaam. Technical support from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) assisted the working group in the development of the Planning Frameworks for Solid Waste Management Master Plan (JICA, 1996, pp.6-49). As stated in the planning frameworks, the goals of privatising refuse collection and disposal services were to improve and sustain refuse collection and city cleaning services through cost sharing with communities. Other objectives of the privatisation of refuse collection services included providing equal access to refuse collection and city cleaning services to all city residents regardless of their income. Cross subsidisation was identified as the strategy for ensuring low-income groups had access to the privatised refuse collection services.

To facilitate equal access to refuse collection services by all city residents, the city was divided into four different service zones namely Urban Planned Areas (UPA), Semi Urban Planned Areas (SUPA), Urban Unplanned Areas (UUA) and Semi Urban Unplanned Areas (SUUA). The basis for classification of service zones included income levels of its residents/service user, level of solid waste generated per capita per day, conformity to town planning laws and the availability of the basic services (JICA, 1996, pp.8-2). Responsibility for solid waste provision for the four service zones was to be shared among the DCC and other non-government organisations. These factors determined the type of service and technology required for each service zone as well as the mode of financing the service provided. The DCC assumed responsibility for direct service provision in Urban Planned Areas specifically to government offices and buildings. Private companies with relatively high institutional capacity (financial and human)

resources were to cater for urban planned and high-income residential areas as well as the central business area. The Planning Frameworks for solid waste management remained silent on service providers for Unplanned Urban and Semi Urban Unplanned areas.

A tariff structure that segmented service users into subsidised and non-subsidised service areas was introduced. Highly subsidised collection fees were set for relatively low-income users' areas and market rates were set for high-income areas. Public financing without user- contribution was applied in government offices/buildings areas. Private financing was applied in both high and medium income residential areas as well as central business areas.

A phased approach was adopted in the implementation of privatisation of solid waste management in Dar es Salaam. Phase one started in 1994 targeting selected areas in central business (Urban Planned) and high-income semi planned urban areas. Lessons from this phase were to inform the two subsequent phases. Phase two was to extend the services to all central and high-income areas. Phase three was to extend the service to low income areas (Semi Unplanned Urban Areas). Contrary to the proposed phased approach, the second and third phases were implemented prior to completion of the first phase. Their implementation commenced at the time when experiences from the first phase were raising doubts on the effectiveness of privatisation in addressing problems of solid waste management in high-income as well as central business areas of Dar es Salaam.

2.5 LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Privatisation as used in this paper refers to transfer to private sector and civil society organisations of activities and functions that have traditionally been statutory responsibilities of public sector. The transfer can take different forms including contracting out, concession and outright sale (divestiture) and concession.

2.5.1 Contracting Out Model

Privatisation through contracting out involves a public institution paying a private sector or civil society institution to carry out functions or provide services on its behalf. The public institution that buys a service from private sector institutions becomes a purchaser (principal), while the private sector institutions that provide the service becomes a provider (agent). The model imposes rights and obligations on both parties - the purchaser and the provider. However, the service recipient who is intended to benefit from the purchaser-provider relationship has no direct responsibility. The exclusion of beneficiary of a service under the purchaser and provider relationship characteristic of contracting out owes its justification in representative systems of government. In such systems, representatives exercise the rights and obligations on behalf of service beneficiary, and their exclusion

from direct contractual obligations does not deny them any responsibility. When this model is applied to refuse collection and disposal services in Tanzania, the assumption is, the DCC a body of elected officials acts on behalf of the service recipient and hence it can purchase the service on their behalf.

The major strength of contracting out as a strategy for transferring responsibilities to private and civil society institutions, relates to lowering transaction costs. The competition among service providers for contracts from the purchaser motivates the former and ensures the recipient of efficient working practices. Consequently lower service production costs are achieved making the service accessible to the poor (Chandler, 1996; p.42). Contracting out introduces sustainable and cost effective forms of control in that, the contract rather than command through the law becomes a tool for enforcing compliance/performance (Boulding, 1990). Moreover, by delegating enforcement responsibility to those who are engaged in actual execution of the contract, the strategy removes delays associated with bureaucratic enforcements of contracts obtaining in governmental structures (Dia, 1996).

The major weakness of contracting out relates to the demands it puts on the purchaser. For contracting out the purchaser needs to have relatively good financial and organisational capacity to meet the contractual obligations. Equally true, the service beneficiary needs to have a sense of duty and responsibility to pay taxes that would enable the purchaser (government) meet its contractual obligations.

Governments that are strong in terms of financial, institutional and organisational capacities have adopted contracting out. These are mainly governments of countries in the developed world including United the Kingdom and the United States of America (UNESCAP, 2001; Majani, 2000). The model may, however, be difficult to pursue in developing countries where governments are weak in terms of revenue collection and also where the sense of duty on citizens is low (JICA, 1998, pp.5-12).

2.5.2 Concession Model

Privatisation in the form of concession involves a public institution authorising a private sector or civil society institution to deliver or perform the function on its behalf. The authorising public institution does not pay the agent for the service but rather passes on the responsibility to the service recipient or beneficiary. Unlike in contracting out model where the public institution purchases or pays the agent (service provider), under a concession model it is the service recipient who pays the agent directly. In this arrangement the purchaser is the service recipient and not the privatising public institution. Under the concession model the service recipient (purchaser) has no direct rights and legal obligations like in the contracting out model, because such rights had already been transferred to

the public institution. Thus, just like in the contracting out model, the public institution assumes full responsibility in determining the terms and conditions under which the concessionaire will deliver the service and the purchaser will pay for the service.

Transfer of refuse collection and disposal services in Dar es Salaam adopted a concession model. In this case the DCC authorised the concessionaire to provide solid waste collection and to collect requisite fees from designated communities. The DCC roles included identifying and giving concessions, defining terms and conditions of service including areas of service, period of time of concession, the billing system and the quality of service. The DCC was also responsible for providing enabling framework for the service provider to work including credit, equipments, legislation, monitoring and law enforcement (JICA, 1998, pp.5-12).

Concession as a model for transferring government responsibility to private sector and other non-governmental institutions is commonly experimented by governments that are weak in terms of financial and institutional capacity. In such countries privatisation is seen as a way of mobilising resources from the private sector by government. This explains why privatisation in form of concession has been the dominant approach adopted by financially and organisationally weak governments of the developing countries of Africa such as Tanzania (Majani, 2000).

Concession contract has weaknesses that tend to reduce its efficacy in providing the poor with intended benefits. One major weakness of concession model, relates to lack of delegation of direct rights and legal obligations to the beneficiary, who unlike in the contracting out model is also the purchaser (Horton and Farnham, 1999; p.85). This is a weakness because it denies the beneficiary who is the purchaser of the service the opportunity to determine the terms and conditions of service. It also does not give sense of self-regulation on the beneficiaries but rather relies on the delegating authority to enforce concession agreements. Self-regulation on the part of service beneficiary is critical for lowering transaction costs. It is contended that the absence of delegation of direct legal rights and obligations to the service recipient characteristic of concession agreements, generates high contractual enforcement costs (transaction costs) making the service inaccessible to the poor. Moreover, this lack of self-regulation generates irrational behaviour on the part of urban poor consequently increasing service provision costs of the provider (agent). This is because in principle the beneficiary who is the purchaser is not part of the agreement. As such the beneficiary does not feel obliged to respect the contract to which he is not a party.

Another weakness relates to monopoly that the concession gives to the service provider (agent). Under a concession agreement, the service provider is given

sole rights to render service as well as collect service charges from service users of designated concession area(s). The monopoly accorded to the service provider limits service users' freedom of choice necessary to stimulate competition and consequently efficient working operations of service providers (Chandler, 1996, p.42; Dia, 1996). Success stories of privatisation of delivery of services such as health in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia are associated with efficiency gains resulting from competitive prices offered to service users by competing private companies (Dia, 1996; Smale and Ruttan, 1994, p. 2).

Critics of concession privatisation further contend that for concession privatisation to deliver intended results it requires advanced level of institutional capacity on the part of the concessionaire to meet contractual obligations (Hirshmann, 1993). This requirement is hardly met in developing countries especially those in Africa. Quite often the private sector is weak and evolving thus finding it difficult to take active role in meeting contractual obligations without the delegating authority's (principal) support. This weakness forces private sector to employ inefficient working operations, which tend to raise transaction costs making the service inaccessible to the low-income populations.

Problems of weak institutional capacity in developing countries are also prevalent in the delegating authority. The experience from developing countries, reveal that quite often concessionaire contracts are implemented in situations of low levels of institutional capacity on the part of principal (Christiansen, 1998; Cohen 1992; Luke, 1990). The resource base of local authorities who are in many instances the delegating authority is too weak to enable them provide enabling framework necessary for efficient working of concessionaires (Gary and McCubbins, 1996). Cited cases of weak resource base include absence of incentives to stir up competition among service providers, and lack of monitoring and evaluation strategies (World Bank, 1997).

Other factors limiting the potential of concession privatisation in developing countries relate to their internal organisational configuration. Governments in developing countries though subscribing to decentralisation ideals remain centralised in practice. This centralisation places responsibilities for enforcement of contractual obligations at higher levels of government hierarchy. This reduces governments' (principal) ability to enforce contractual obligations critical for service provider to secure compliance of service users. The successes of contracting out health care delivery in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia is associated with appropriate organisational structures and programme design emanating from delegation of staff, budget and information to lower levels of local authorities (Dia, 1996). The importance of a strong information base at the service delivery point is underscored by the experiences of contracting out infrastructural project in Senegal. It is argued that a strong information management system enabled

the contracting authority to monitor and evaluate accordingly the performance of AGETIP in Senegal (Dia, 1996).

The argument for devolution of budget and enforcement responsibilities to lower levels of contracting authority as a critical condition for success of concessionaire method of privatisation, need to be extended to include the purchaser. Under a concession arrangement, the service user is the purchaser because s/he pays directly to the provider. Experience shows that quite often the organisational structures of privatising authorities do not provide opportunity for direct involvement of the purchaser in determining terms and conditions of service. Exclusionary structures have resulted into formation of strategies, which are flawed in design, and do not address the concerns of the purchaser. Cited are cases of local authorities setting collection fees without knowledge of residents needs and the type of responses which are required to meet their needs appropriately and comprehensively (Brown, 1992). Also cited are cases of local authorities setting entry standards for providers without proper knowledge on their socio-economic backgrounds.

The suggestion that a concession form of privatisation is appropriate for weak government systems is a flawed one because experience shows that for it to work it requires a sound resource base on the part of government. Weak financial base has been cited as the major cause of poor performance of the concession method. To the contrary, contracting out of public service delivery in developing countries has been implemented in situation of inadequate resources on the part of government. For a concession method to address problems of delivery of service to the poor, financial resources in form of subsidy are critical (Preker and Feachem, 1995). Evidence from other countries underscore the importance of incentives such as subsidies in inducing desired behaviour on the part of service providers. Cases are cited of subsidies being offered to service providers focusing on low-income areas where residents' ability to pay full cost for the service is low. In South Africa for example, subsidies have been provided to service providers in Soweto (Dia, 1996).

2.5.3 Outright Sale

Privatisation by outright sale refers to the process whereby a public institution sales its assets (movable and immovable) to a private sector or civil society institution. The public sector pursuing privatisation retains the role of enabler and regulator, and arbiter of other actors including government, private sector and civil society involved in the process (UNESCAP, 2001).

2.6 PRIVATISATION OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN DAR ES SALAAM

Privatisation of solid waste collection services in Dar es Salaam has taken the form of concession. In this case the private service provider referred to by the DCC as a contractor has been given monopoly to render service in a particular

area and to collect service charge from the solid waste generators on behalf of the DCC (Majani, 2000, p.114; JICA, 1996, pp.6-44). Thus the service provider assumes the role of an agent and the Dar es Salaam city authority becomes the principal. The role of the principal under concession privatisation is to provide an enabling framework including passing by laws that compel service users to pay for refuse collection services. The role include enforcing by laws through monitoring performance of service providers and the strategy as a whole as well as to provide incentives necessary for agents to fulfil their contractual obligations.

Based on the literature review, the analysis will focus on the extent to which the weaknesses of the concession form of privatisation contributed to the poor performance of the strategy in providing the urban poor of Dar es Salaam with refuse collection and disposal services.

3.0 ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

3.1 THE POVERTY PHENOMENON OF THE STUDY AREAS

The presentation of data on the poverty status of the sixteen study streets lends support to the secondary data, which characterise these streets as low-income areas. The research findings further show that, the impact of poverty is not evenly distributed in the sixteen streets and also between men and women.

As was indicated in the methodology, the sixteen streets sampled for the assessment were those streets classified as low-income areas by the Dar es Salaam City Council. Indicators used in the secondary data to classify the streets as low-income areas included: congestion or overcrowding of people per room, congestion of houses per square kilometre, poor sanitation depicted by higher ratio of people per latrine, blocked drains, filthy environment with overflowing pit latrines and poor housing (building materials: grass thatched roofs, mud floor and poor or no ventilation).

Validation of poverty status of the sixteen streets involved observation of visible poverty indicators through guided walkabouts. Results of the qualitative assessment of the sixteen assessment streets reveal that with the exception of one street (Mogo), the remaining fifteen streets are low-income areas as they exhibit characteristics of low-income areas as classified in secondary data obtained from the DCC. All the fifteen streets are unplanned with high population density per room; have high house density per square kilometer leaving no space between houses. Overflowing pit latrines, no or blocked drains were observed in all the sixteen streets (Table 2). Three streets Idrisa, Uzuri and Mkunduge are worse when compared to other streets. A quote from Mkunduge one of the most vulnerable streets expresses this better "*Huu sio mtaa wa kuishi ni kiyama*" [This is no place to live in but hell] (see pictures 1,2, and 3 in exhibit 1).

EXHIBIT 1:

Picture 1: Solid waste dumped in River N'gombe in Mkunduge Street



Picture 2: Solid waste stock piled behind residential houses in Mkunduge



Picture 3: Solid waste dumped close to residential houses in Mkunduge



The significance of habitat related factors relate to the influence they have on access (physical and financial) to solid waste collection services by the low-income groups. Unsanitary conditions generate water and airborne diseases. These tend to compromise health security of the residents and consequently their participation in livelihoods earning activities. Outbreak of cholera and communicable diseases was cited as one of the major consequences of uncollected solid waste in more than eight of the assessed streets.

Table 2: Summary Poverty Indicators of the Sixteen Streets

Street	Housing	Living Environ/ Sanitation	Cleanliness	Population Density per Room	Building Congestion
Barafu	Poor	Poor		High	High
Baruti	Poor (Concrete plastering but dilapidated; pole roofed leaking roofs; Toilet temporary high density 30-35 persons per pit)	Poor	Filthy stinking	High (6 persons)	High
Buguruni Madenge	Very Poor (More than 60% of houses mud walls, box roofs)	Very poor	Filthy stinking	High (6 persons)	High
Chiwanda-Tandika	Poor roofing iron sheets dilapidated; Mud floor Toilet density high (28 people per pit)	Poor	Unclean	High	High
Gongolamboto	Poor	No drainage	Clean	Highly congested	High
Idrisa	Poor	Poor	Filthy	High	High
Kiburugwa	Poor	Poor		High	High
Manzese Uzuri	Very Poor	Very Poor	Filthy stinking	Extremely High (9 Person)	High
Misheni	Poor	Poor		High	
Mogo	Poor (More than 80% of houses mud walls, box roofs; High pop density at least 35,000 people; 1280 houses; each house more than 7 households and each h/h 8 persons)	Poor	Okay	Extremely High (8 persons)	High
Msisiri	Mixed good for planned areas/poor unplanned areas				
Mtongani	Good	Good		Low	Low
Mwongozo	Poor	Good		High	High
Vijibweni	Poor	Poor		High (6 persons)	High
Mkunduge	Very Poor	Very poor	Filthy stinking	High	High
Yombo vituka	Poor (Congested area)	Poor		High	High

Source: Compiled by the author from field data

3.1.1 Gendered Dimension of Poverty

Gender differences surfaced particularly in relation to vulnerability to poverty and consequently access to solid waste collection services. Unreliable incomes,

over crowding in rented rooms and large number of dependants disproportionately affect women in all of the sixteen surveyed streets. For instance, of the 51 women household case studies conducted, 45 (88 per cent) relied on food vending (*mama lishe*) activities for their income. On the other hand only 5 (17 per cent) of the 29 men relied on food vending as major source of income. Reliance on informal food vending activities in itself does not constitute a problem but rather it is the generally below subsistence level incomes provided by this type of livelihood activity. Experience shows that income from informal activities is inadequate to cover shelter, education and health needs of its employees (Lugalla, 2000; Malyamkono and Bagachwa 1992). Seasonality of livelihoods earning activities of the informal sector also undermines its efficacy as a coping strategy against income insecurity for the poor households in these streets. Quite often food vending activities have had to stop during rainy seasons due to air borne and water borne diseases (cholera) caused by unsanitary conditions characteristic of these streets (Lugalla, 2000; Kaare, 1998; Kulaba, 1996). The data in this section shows that the proportion of medium and high income households in these streets is quite low to make any impact in cross subsidising services of low income households.

3.2 AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY OF SERVICE

To what extent does contracting out refuse collection services by the Dar es Salaam City Commission provide poor households with the service?

This question intended to assess the impact (outcomes) of concession privatisation by the DCC in providing the urban poor of Dar es Salaam with refuse collection and disposal service. Different impact assessment indicators were developed from secondary data to assess the status of refuse collection services and living environment of the sixteen study streets (ILO, 2001; Majani, 2000; JICA, 1999; Lugalla, 1996; Kironde, 1995; Kulaba, S., 1989; Ntukula, 1984). The indicators included:

- i) Availability (physical access) of concessionaire provided service in each of the sixteen streets;
- ii) Poor household dependence or non dependence on concessionaire provided refuse collection and disposal service;
- iii) Area improvement (i.e. status of waste piles; scattered solid waste) before and after the interventions;
- iv) Users perception on the performance of concessionaire provided refuse collection service; and
- v) Users perceptions on the quality of refuse collection service.

Indicator 1: Availability (physical access) of concessionaire provided refuse collection service in each of the sixteen streets.

This indicator intended to measure physical access to this service by the urban poor. The study findings show that the urban poor of the assessed streets experience difficulties in accessing the service because the service has been inconsistent by either being present for a short while or never took off. As exhibited in Table 3, concessionaire provided refuse collection service was short lived in all but six streets (Chiwanda, Mogo, Gongo la Mbotu, Madenge, Msisiri, Mwongozo and Kimara Baruti). Densely populated streets such as Yombo Vituka, Buguruni-Madenge, Barafu, Idrisa and Vijibweni were most affected by problems of withdrawal of service providers. It is worth noting that the research findings on availability of concessionaire provided refuse collection service in the sixteen study areas contradict information from secondary data, which indicate existence of concessionaires in all the sixteen streets.

In those streets where concessionaire provided refuse collection service is available, the service is of poor quality, that is, unreliable/sporadic. With the exception of Mogo and Kimara Baruti, the service has been and still is sporadic ranging from once a week to once a month. In streets where service has been reliable like in Kimara Baruti, it is limited to those who are willing to pay.

Table 3: Status of Availability of Concessionaire Refuse Collection Service in the Sixteen Study Streets

Street	Concessionaire Service Provider
Barafu-Mburahati	was there for 2-3 months; withdrew because rejected by community
Kimara-Baruti	CBO
Buguruni Madenge	available but irregular
Chiwanda-Tandika	was there but left
Gongolamboto	available irregular
Idrisa	was there but worked for less than six months
Kiburugwa	operated for two weeks and withdrew
Manzese Uzuri	available but irregular
Mogo	CBO
Msisiri	available for planned section,
Mtongani	was there for three months only
Misheni	was available withdrew after six months
Mwongozo-Makuburi	available but irregular twice a week
Vijibweni	service provider allocated but served for two months and withdrew
Mkunduge	service provider allocated but rejected by community
Yombo vituka	was there but left after one month

Source: *Compiled by the author from triangulated field information*

Indicator 2: Poor household dependence or non dependence on concessionaire provided refuse collection and disposal service

Assessment of poor household dependence on concessionaire provided refuse collection and disposal service was another impact indicator used to measure the effect of this strategy on poor urban households. With the exception of Mogo, respondents in focus group discussions indicated heavy reliance on other types/forms of refuse collection services (Table 3). As shown in Table 4, reliance on concessionaire provided service was indicated in only one street, Mogo, while the others indicated reliance on other service providers including: pushcarts, viroba guys (men aged between 15-45 years old), dumping, burning and burying. Even where concessionaire provided service was the dominant mode of refuse disposal as in Mogo, other forms of refuse disposal including burning and dumping compliment it.

Table 4: Type/form of Refuse Collection Service Commonly Used by Households in each Street

Street	Concessionaire	Informal				
		Push carts	Viroba guys	Dumping	Burning	Burying
Barafu-Mburahati		√	√		√	
Kimara-Baruti				√		
Buguruni Madenge		√	√Open sewer			
Chiwanda-Tandika		√	√			√
Gongo la Mboto			√	√	√	
Idrisa						
Kiburugwa		√	√			
Manzese Uzuri		√	√	√		
Misheni-Mbagala		√	√	√		
Mogo		√			√	√
Msisiri		√	√	√		
Mtongani			√			√
Mwongozo-Makuburi			√			
Vijibweni				√Open pit		
Mkunduge				√		
Yombo vituka				√Open space; neighbours veranda		

Source: Compiled by the author from field data

Indicator 3: Area improvement (status of solid waste stocked piles and scattered solid waste) before and after the interventions

This indicator intended to measure the change in the status of solid waste and the general living environment (cleanliness) following the introduction of concessionaire provided refuse collection service.

Three sub-indicators including visibility of scattered and uncollected waste piled in open space/containers; perceptions of status of cleanliness before and after the intervention were developed to measure the extent to which contracting out refuse collection strategy has improved living conditions of the low-income populations of Dar es Salaam. Street walkabouts, focus group discussions, key informants interviews as well as household case studies were carried to map out the before, after and present situations.

Information triangulated from these various research tools indicate that the status of solid waste and living environment (cleanliness) has not changed for the better following the introduction of concessionaire service. However, some improvement has been observed in three streets (Gongo la Mboto, Mogo and Mtongani). The recorded state of cleanliness in these three streets was not a result of concessionaire service provider but rather a result of availability of other forms of refuse disposal including burying and burning. A quote from key informant in Mogo lends evidence to this assertion, "*Huu usafi unaouona hapa siyo sana kazi ya UASU. Nyingi za nyumba hizi wanatupa taka kwenye majalala ya kienyeji na wengine wanachoma moto.*" [UASU has not contributed much to the state of cleanliness being observed in this street. Many of these houses dump the refuse in available local dumping places and others burn them].

With regard to visibility of scattered and uncollected solid waste stocked in piles, all streets with the exception of two, Mogo and Gongo la Mboto, had problems of scattered solid waste, solid waste stoked in piles, waste dumped in drains or water streams, filthy smell and dirty surroundings. There are variations with regard to the extent of vulnerability to presence of scattered solid waste and poor living environment in the fourteen streets. Densely populated and overcrowded streets such as Kimara-Baruti, Idrisa, Kiburugwa, Manzese Uzuri, Msisiri and Mkunduge are the worst affected. Table 5 provides summary information obtained from neighbourhood observations of the sixteen streets.

The presence of scattered solid waste in the fourteen streets by itself does not provide sufficient evidence of the dismal performance of concessionaire model in improving living conditions of the low-income households. Other indicators such as historical mapping of before and after the situation of the living environment support this indicator (Figure 1 and Annex 2 for detailed summary of historical mapping of all the 16 streets).


Table 5: Neighbourhood Observation

Streets	Visible Scattered Solid Waste	Solid Waste in Piles	Dumping Places	Standing Water	Filthy Smell	Cleanliness Extremely Dirty
Barafu-Mburahati	✓	✓	✓			
Kimara-Baruti	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Buguruni Madenge	✓	✓	✓			
Chiwanda-Tandika	✓	✓			✓	
Gongo la Mboto						
Idrisa	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Kiburugwa	✓	✓				✓
Manzese Uzuri	✓				✓	✓
Misheni-Mbagala						
Mogo				✓		
Msisiri	✓	✓	✓			✓
Mtongani	✓	✓				
Mwongozo-Makuburi	✓	✓		✓		
Vijibweni	✓	✓				
Mkunduge	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Yombo vituka	✓	✓			✓	

Key: *Extremely dirty refers to stinking smell from rubbish stocked in piles, overflowing sewage, open drains blocked with rubbish*

As noted in Figure 1, there has been little improvement in the status of cleanliness of the fourteen streets after the introduction of the contracting out strategy.

Figure 1: Historical Mapping of State of Cleanliness of Selected Assessment Streets



Scores 1 – 4, in Figure 1 represent clean, fairly clean, dirty and extremely dirty respectively.

Indicator 4: Users perceptions on the usefulness and/or importance of concessionaire provided refuse collection service.

This indicator was intended to gather communities' perception on the importance of refuse collection service. This measure is related to the impact assessment in that it gives an indication on the value attached to the service as a response to a priority risk.

The importance of refuse collection services to households' well being was measured through ranking. Respondents were asked to identify in order of priority common risks to well being and livelihoods. Ranking of major risks to livelihoods positioned scattered and uncollected waste as second major cause to livelihoods risk (see Table 6). The respondents identified availability of refuse collection service as an important service in response to a priority risk. Respondents further demonstrated high level of understanding of the linkage between the four risks presented in Table 6. The table shows that uncollected and scattered solid waste ranked number two (B) in the matrix on community common risks. Note that water ranked number one (A) because, lack of water is a problem experienced by all the sixteen streets and their major form of access is through purchase from water vendors. This linkage between uncollected solid waste and health risks is better explained by a quote from women focus group discussion in Mburahati Barafu, "*Magonjwa hulipuka mara nyingi wakati wa mvua kwa sababu maji husomba uchafu na harufu mbaya hutanda kote.*" [Outbreak of diseases occurs mainly during the rainy season because water carries garbage and filthy smell spreads everywhere]. Scattered and uncollected solid waste were considered major causes of waterborne and vector-borne diseases experienced by them. Women in high entertainment streets (guest houses, bars and restaurants) such as Baruti, Mkunduge and Uzuri were more concerned with uncollected waste from bars and guest houses. Used condoms scattered in open rubbish piles can be seen. These women were scared that this type of waste was more dangerous as it exposed children scavengers to the risk of infection of HIV/AIDS.

Moreover, information from key informants and household case study is replete with statements from communities, expressing how uncollected solid waste was responsible for waterborne and vector-borne diseases experienced by them. In all the study streets rubbish represented by uncollected solid waste was identified as a risk to livelihoods and well-being.

Table 6: Ranking of Common Risks to Well-being and Livelihoods

Street	Clean Water	Solid Waste	Health/Disease	Unemployment
Barafu	4	3	2	1
Baruti	4	3	2	
Chiwanda	4	3	2	1
Gongo la Mboto	4	3	2	1
Idrisa	4	3		
Kiburugwa	1	4	3	2
Misheni-Mburahati				
Mkunduge	2	3	4	
Mogo	1	3	2	4
Msisisri	3	4	1	2
Mtongani	2	1	3	4
Mwongozo-Makuburi	4	2	3	
Uzuri	3	2	4	
Vijibweni	4	3	2	1
Yombo Vituka	3	4	2	1
Score	43	40	32	17
Rank	A	B	C	D

Key: 4=Most important; 1=Least important

Information presented in this section reveals that concessionaire provided refuse collection services by the DCC has had minimal impact in extending the service to the urban poor of Dar es Salaam. Using different impact assessment indicators, the study findings show that the service is only available on regular basis to only three of the sixteen study streets. In the remaining thirteen streets, the service was either irregular or short lived because majority of service providers have withdrawn their services. The study has further revealed that the majority of residents in the thirteen streets rely on informal refuse collection and disposal methods. With regard to living environment, the findings show that the living environment (poor sanitation, scattered solid waste, filthy conditions) has not improved. The study further reveals that the communities in the study streets perceive refuse collection service as an important response to the health problems caused by scattered and uncollected solid waste.

3.3 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR POOR PERFORMANCE

What factors are responsible for the minimal impact of concession privatisation in providing the urban poor with the service?

Respondents from the sixteen assessed streets identified a number of factors contributing to dismal performance of concession privatisation of refuse collection services strategy in providing the urban poor with access to refuse collection service. These include: weakness in the institutional and organisational capacity

of both DCC and concessionaires, lack of involvement of communities in the decision making and implementation of the strategy, mistrust on DCC and concessionaire by communities and poor infrastructure. Detailed account of quotation from the study corresponding to these factors is presented in Annex 3.

3.3.1 Lack of Involvement of Communities in Decision-making and Implementation of Concession Privatisation

We have argued in this paper that, involvement of service recipient in the decision-making and implementation is critical for concession privatisation to achieve the intended outcomes. This involvement is achieved through giving the service recipient direct legal rights and obligations in the whole process of decision-making and implementation. This imposes self-regulation on the recipients' part thus lowering enforcement costs and consequently making the service accessible to the low-income households. There are different ways in which such delegation can be achieved including transferring responsibilities for determining the process, plan and implementation to the targeted population through their own institutions. In practical sense, delegation of direct rights and legal obligations would mean allowing service recipient i.e. service purchaser the freedom to decide and enforce compliance on their decisions. Delegation of rights and obligations to service recipient, promotes self-regulation because it installs sense of community and duty on the service recipient (Boulding, 1990, p.25).

Research findings underscore the linkage between delegating direct rights and responsibilities to service recipient and the success of concessionaire privatisation in providing the urban poor with refuse collection service. It became apparent from the study that DCC failure to delegate direct legal rights and responsibilities to service recipient contributed to its dismal performance. The DCC did not delegate direct legal rights and obligation to the service users but instead, relied on use of legal action to secure compliance from service recipient. Consequently, the service recipient felt alienated and responded by not being co operative. A quote from Madenge explains this well, "*Sisi ndiyo tunaojua swala la uchafu na nini kifanyike. Sasa mtu atoke huko bila kusaidiana na mimi hawezi kufanikiwa, miradi yao hiyo ya mezani, wameipanga halafu wanatuletea huku, siyo rahisi kuikubali.*" *Key informant interview, Street Chair*" [We are the ones who know better and about the problem of uncleanliness and what is to be done. If someone comes here from wherever he does without my involvement, he cannot succeed. Their table planned projects, they plan them somewhere else, then impose them on us, we cannot accept them easily]. *The service purchasers' exit is exhibited by refusal to pay as well as collaboration with the concessionaire. Irrational behaviours of communities such as dumping waste in open spaces and drains are further indications of the recipients not being co operative.*

Research findings further demonstrate that only a small proportion of the targeted service recipients actually pay for the service. The proportion of households paying for refuse collection services was as low as between 25 per cent and 30 per cent in all survey streets. For instance in Mogo, eligible paying houses are 1,280, however, only 30 houses are paying. The collected amount is thus far below the amount required to meet service production costs. The problem of refusal to pay collection fees by the urban poor was related to poor service delivery by the concessionaire. The study findings show that the service recipients in the sixteen study streets are willing to pay for the service only if they receive value for money. A quote from Mwongozo explains the point: *“Sisi tuko tayari kulipia mradi tu huduma iwe bora na viwango viendane na uwezo wetu. Mbona vijana wa viroba tunawalipa?”* FGD Women, Mwongozo. [*We are ready to pay as long as the service is of good quality and the collection fees are consistent with our capability. Apparently, we are paying the informal refuse collectors*].

Failure to delegate rights and obligations to the service recipients by DCC was not accidental but rather a result of an exclusionary and elitist approach adopted in the designing of the privatisation strategy. As seen earlier, the EPM, which was a framework for involving key stakeholders in decision-making on matters relating to urban management, excluded local communities in the process. Paradoxically, despite mentioning the involvement and vague role of communities in the EPM, the local communities were never assigned any other responsibilities except paying user fees (Majani, 2000, p.200; ILO, 2001). This lack of involvement of communities in the conception stage, denied the DCC support from the local community in the implementation of the strategy. Further the consequences of not involving communities in EPM is underlined by Majani (2000, p.203), who contends that households in Dar es Salaam are reluctant to pay for refuse collection services for a number of reasons including lack of involvement of households in the decision making process.

Lack of involvement of the local communities in the design of the contracting out strategy, resulted into formulation of a strategy, which had serious flaws that limited its potential in responding to refuse collection problems of low-income areas of Dar es Salaam. The main flaws include: poor identification of institutional capacity needs of the service providers operating in low income areas; poor conception of the problems of solid waste management in low-income areas of Dar es Salaam, the socio-economic characteristics of low income areas and lack of thorough analysis of viability of a strategy during the planning stage. DCC formulated the strategy that was incompatible with the reality in the communities. For instance, while DCC set the refuse collection charge at TShs. 500 per household per month, the reality in the field forced service providers concessionaire to change it to TShs 500 per house (each house containing 7

households) per month. This amount represents a negotiated agreement between concessionaire and service purchasers.

Another factor responsible for the dismal performance of concession privatisation relates to institutional capacity of service providers operating in the low-income areas. Findings from this research show that irregularity of service was mainly a result of lack of equipments, trained staff and finances. A quote from HCS in Msisiri street echoes the point: “*Yupo mkandarasi ambaye kipindi fulani alianza kufanya kazi lakini baadae akakwama kutokana na kutokuwa na vifaa.*” [There is a service provider who at certain time started providing the service, but later stopped because of lack of equipments]. It is thus evident that higher institutional capacities in terms of finances and organisation is required for a service provider to deal with the waste effectively with low capacity institutions. A quote from Mkunduge tells it all: “Tazama hizo taka, wapika chips kibao, mama ntilie tele, wee unafikiri taka hii kweli itamalizwa na mkokoteni”. [Look at the amount of garbage! With so many chips and food vendors, do you think this problems will ever be solved with push carts? - KI Mkunduge]. The amount of solid waste generated in low-income areas is higher than that generated in high income and central business areas. For instance, Buguruni ward, a low-income area with an area of 6.2 Km² and a population of 127,305 persons, generates 112-kilograms per capital waste per year. Accordingly, the daily capacity requirement for removing this amount of waste from the area is 8 (eight) trucks of 6 to 8 m³ volume (Ilala Municipal Council, 2001). The research findings show that none of the service providers involved in the assessment streets possessed such equipments or finances to hire this number of trucks. To provide solid waste collection and disposal service to the level required, a service provider operating in Buguruni Madenge would need to carry at least 2-3 trips a day. At TShs. 25,000 per day per trip to hire a 7 (seven) ton truck, the service provider would have to pay TShs. 75,000 per day. This amount is substantial compared to the monthly collection fees of the service provider.

The type of waste generated in low-income areas is of low quality and cannot attract scavengers. Secondary data shows that scavengers play a great role in reducing collection load of refuse generated in high income and central business areas. As shown in Table 7 the type of solid waste generated in low-income areas include plastic bags, food remains, hard paper, bottles and cans. This type of waste tends to be heavy and hardly attracts the interests of scavengers making collection load for refuse collection in low-income areas higher than that of high-income areas. This type of refuse generated requires high technology and high institutional capacity on the part of the service providers.

Table 7: Distribution of Type of Solid Waste Generated by Street

Street	Socio-economic Status	Dominant Type of Waste Generated
Barafu		
Kimara-Baruti		
Chiwanda (Tandika)		Liquid water, plastic bags
Gongo la Mboto		
Idrisa		Plastic bags, used condoms, syringes, bottles, food remains, hard papers
Kiburugwa		Milk packets, coconut husks, bottles, papers, food remains and used condoms
Misheni-Mbagala	Poor	Food remains, plastic bags
Mkunduge	Poor/mixed	Food remains, plastic bags, used condoms
Mogo/Kiwalani	Poor, low income people	Charcoal ashes/food remnants, empty containers, plastic bags, drugs, syringes, bottles and papers
Msisiri		Plastic bottles, plastic bags [kondomu], cans
Mtongani		Plastic bags, food remains
Mwongozo-Makuburi		Plastic bags, bottles and food remains
Uzuri		Plastic bags, bottles, and used condoms
Vijibweni	Poor	Solid waste, plastic bags, food remnants
Yombo Vituka	Poor	Paper, plastic bags

Source: *Author's compilation*

3.3.2 Poor Conceptualisation of Problems of Solid Waste Management of Low Income Areas of Dar es Salaam

At the conceptual level, problems of solid waste management in low-income areas of Dar es Salaam were equated with those of high income and central business areas. Both (ILO, 2001) and (Majani, 2001) demonstrate how the same plan and approach used to introduce concessionaire refuse collection services to high income and central business areas were extended to low income areas without due regard of circumstances found in these areas. As demonstrated in this study, problems of refuse collection in low-income areas are multifaceted and are influenced by demographic and the socio-economic conditions obtained in these areas. Lack of thorough analysis of the impact of these factors on the strategy contributed to the dismal performance of the strategy.

The working group for solid waste management as well as the DCC made several assumptions concerning low-income areas of Dar es Salaam. For instance there was a strong belief that the low-income areas of Dar es Salaam contained a sizeable proportion of medium and high-income households necessary for cross subsidisation of service provision. Research findings demonstrate that there is a small proportion of medium and high-income households in these areas. Another

assumption was that the multitude of businesses in these areas would provide the service providers with adequate revenue to subsidise service provision to low-income households. A uniform rate of refuse collection was set for different categories of business by DCC (Table 8). Contrary to DCC's expectations, the type of businesses operating in these areas generates very low incomes that can hardly pay the refuse collection fees set by DCC. A quote from Kimangale, a service provider serving in Temeke summarises this: "*Ukiangalia biashara zenyewe unajiuliza hawa watu walitumia vigezo gani kupanga bei hizi? Hivi vibishara havitoi ziada kubwa ya kuweza kulipia viwango vikubwa vya uzoaji taka kama vilivyowekwa na manispaa. Pili kuna kodi nyingi sana hawa wenye biashara wadogowadogo wanapaswa walipe*". [The type of businesses operating in these areas do not yield much surplus to enable operators pay the high refuse collection fees set by the DCC. When you look at the businesses you wonder how the DCC arrived at these rates. Moreover, there are many other taxes that these small operators are required,] Temeke, Kimangale Enterprise, FGD with service providers]. Similar views were expressed by UASU a service provider for Mogo street, "*Unapokwenda kuongea na mfanyabiashara na wewe unaangalia hali, maana sisi pia ni wenyeji wa hapa na tunajuana*". [When you go out to collect the fees from the small business operations, you have to consider the actual situation, for we are also residents in this same street, we know each other].

Thus, business operators were failing to pay fees set by the DCC because they were unattainable. Consequently, service providers and business operators negotiated for fees lower than those set by DCC (Table 8). Even with negotiated rates, the service providers were collecting less than 25 per cent of the negotiated collection fees (Table 9). For instance a service provider in Manzese Uzuri, one of the streets with a large business/service sector than all the other assessment streets was able to collect only 7.1 (TShs. 205,000) per cent of the expected revenues (i.e. TShs 2.8 million) from businesses. It was evident from the research findings that several factors including poor environmental conditions contributed to weaknesses of the businesses operating in these areas.

Table 8: Summary of Planned and Actual Refuse Collection Fees Paid by Businesses in Low-Income Areas

Type of Business	DCC Set Fee TShs Monthly	Actual/negotiated Fees Paid
Guest house	10,000	5,000
Dispensary (domestic waste)	10,000	5,000
Furniture making	25,000 (same as for high income area)	5,000
General workshops	10,000 (same as in high income area)	3500-4000
Whole sale shops (general)	10,000	2500-4000
Retail shops (food and other items)	5,000	2500-3000 (Mogo)
Retail shops (other commodities without VAT registration)	5,000	2500-3000 (Mogo)
Groceries	10,000	5,000
Bar	10,000	2,500 (Mogo); 5,000 (Madenge); 5,000 (Makuburi)
Butcher	5,000	2500-3000
Pharmacy	10,000	3,000 (Misheni)
Markets	15,000 per trip (same as in medium and high income area)	3,500
Stalls (magenge)	2,000 per table (same as in medium and high income area)	500
Food vendor (mama ntilie)	500 (same as in income area)	100
Hair dressing saloon (licensed)	10,000	2500-3000
Tailor (licensed)	2,000	500-1000
Kerosene stations	5,000 (same as in medium and high income area)	2500
Charcoal stores	2,000	500-1000

Source: *Compiled by the author from different sources, Dar es Salaam City Commission, Refuse Collection Charge Rates, 1999; Field data February-June 2001*

Other assumptions relate to lack of appreciation of the role of the informal refuse management system(s) existent in these areas during the strategy design stage. The role of the informal refuse management systems was ignored from the preparation stages when a baseline survey on the refuse management status was conducted by JICA. In the baseline information report the role of the informal sector is mentioned but in passing and no effort was made to study existent systems and determine their place in the proposed intervention which was a serious omission in the JICA report. This study found that the informal refuse

management systems play an important role in the low-income areas. The omission thus meant that the role of informal refuse management systems was not recognised by the DCC despite their presence on the ground and as such, no attempts were made by the DCC to harmonise the working relationship of the two systems leading to conflict over domain control between informal and formal service providers.

The formal system has been perceived by both the actors in the informal refuse management system and their clients as an intrusion and violation of a social system that has found legitimacy in the communities. A quote from Kiburugwa echos the point: *“Sisi tulifikiri mkandarasi anakuja kuongezea nguvu kwenye uzoaji taka, matokeo tunaona anafanya kazi zilizokuwa zikifanywa na wenyeji,”* FGD, mixed group. [We thought the contractor was coming to compliment our efforts in refuse collection, to the contrary he is doing the work that was being done by the community members]. Such perceptions have made the formal refuse management systems unpopular compared to the informal refuse management systems. In almost all study streets where the concessionaires was not from within the street, the service provider failed to sustain social trust, as the community members perceive them as an imposition from the municipal authorities. This lack of trust on concessionaire was echoed in all streets except in Mogo and Kimara Baruti where the concessionaires are from within. A quote from Kiburugwa summarises the communities’ expectations from the strategy as well as their perception of service providers: *“Manispaa wanapotoa tenda waanze kwanza kuwasiliana na ofisi za mitaa kwa sababu sisi vijana tulioko huku mitaani inaweza kutusaidia hata kujipatia ajira. Siyo kama hivi, watu wanatoka pengine Kinondni au wapi sijui.”* [The municipal authorities should consult us before it gives out tenders. This is because we, the youth residing in this street, could get employment from the DCC. It should not be the way it is now where contractors are brought in from Kinondoni or other places where we do not know,” FGD, and mixed group].

Table 9: Type of Business Activities, Expected and Actual Fee Paying Entities

Economic Activity	Quantity	Expected Revenues per Month	Number Paying	Actual revenues
Shops (food & others)	66	2,640,000	20	80,000
Pharmacies	12	36,000	3	9,000
Stalls	30	15,000	15	7,500
Kiosks	8	4,000	3	1,500
Tailors	15	15,000	5	5,000
Butchers	6	15,000	3	7,500
Vituo vya chips	30	15,000	10	5,000
Hair saloons	18	45,000	10	25,000
Sawing mills (25,000 per month)	4	20,000	4	20,000
Whole sale shops	3	7,500	1	2,500
Stationery	2	10,000	2	10,000
Hardware shop (25,000 per month)	3	15,000	2	10,000
Furniture making workshops	8	20,000	5	12,500
Restaurants	10	25,000	4	10,000
Total		2,882,500		205,500

Source: *Author's compilation*

3.3.3 Weakness of Concession Method of Privatisation

As seen in the literature review, concession as a method of privatising refuse collection and disposal services has fundamental weaknesses that limit its potential to generate intended outcomes. One of the weaknesses is monopoly that a concession gives to the service provider (agent). The monopoly denies service users freedom of choice necessary to stimulate competition and consequently efficient working operations. The study findings lend support to the problems of monopoly accorded to private providers. Under the current concession arrangement, a single service provider is given concession to provide service to all streets in a ward. For instance Monoko Enterprise who was to provide service in Manzese was to cover five streets of different area coverage. This means that the service users had to keep up with the service provider despite the quality of service provided. As it happened with Uzuri and Mkunduge streets, in 1999 Monoko failed to secure agreement with communities on service charge rates and withdrew the service from the area. Since then the two streets have never had a replacement concessionaire service provider. It should be noted, however, that the effects of Monoko's withdrawal are not much felt because the informal service providers somehow fill in the gap.

Another weakness is the advanced capacity required on the part of service provider to meet clients' expectations. Research findings reveal that none of the service providers interviewed in this study had the level of capacity required to

meet contractual obligations (Table 10). Of the 7 (seven) concessionaires interviewed in this study only one (MPECO) had the required capacity in terms of equipments and organisational set-up to meet the demands of the area allocated to them. All the remaining concessionaires rely on hired equipments, which tend to make their service production costs higher than the revenues collected. Even for concessionaires with relatively high institutional capacity such as MPECO, are able to sustain their activities from other sources including direct transfers (payments) from municipal authorities for provision of other services such as street cleaning.

Table 10: Summary of Capacity Indicators of Select Concessionaires

	Categorisation	Equipments	Own	Hire	Staff	Other activities	Streets served	Households
Kimangale	Private Company	2 trucks (7 tonnes) 6 pushcarts		√	11	**	4 (Chang'ombe)	5000
UASU (1999)	CBO	1 trailer		√	6-20*	**		4500
PEGRO	Private Company							
CVK	CBO							
MAWEMA (1997)	CBO	Trucks		√				
AFC		Pushcarts			21*		6	7000
MPECO	Private company	6 (7ton trucks) 2 tractors 4 other cars 12 pushcarts 5 trailers	√ √ √ √ √		20 *** 80*	**	Ilala-only 2 are low income	8000
KIWODET (1998)	CBO	7 Pushcarts 4 W/barrow 6 spades, 6 rakes, 6 hoes	√ √ √		21++		2	8760

Key:

* Labourers, ** Clearing Street, ***Permanent, ++Members

Source: Compiled by the author from FGD interviews with contractors

The Income and Expenditure Summary of two concessionaires, provided in Table 11, show financial problems experienced by them. Information presented in Table 11, reveals that MAWEMA's income from collection charges is less than what the CBO needs for delivery of better services. This explains the decision to opt for irregular services as a way of reducing costs of service delivery.

Table 11: Income and Expenditure Summary of Select Concessionaires (MAWEMA)

	Total houses to be served	Rate TShs	Income TShs
	8760	1000	8,760,000
25% of total house to be Served	2190	1000	2,190,000
Expenditure			
<i>Hiring of vehicle</i>	2 trips per day x 6 streets x 2 times a week x 4 per month	30,000	2,880,000
<i>Dumping fees</i>	2 trips day x 6 streetsx 2 times a week x 4 per month	800	76,800
<i>Labourers</i>	21 labourers x 30 days	1,000	630,000
	Total Expenditure		3,586,800

Source: Compiled by the author from FGD interviews with contractors

3.3.4 Weakness in Institutional Capacity of Delegating Authority

Another critical factor for success of concession privatisation, relates to the capacity of the delegating authority (i.e. principal) to enforce contractual obligations. Research findings show that, weak institutional capacity of DCC (principal) contributed to the dismal performance of privatisation in providing the urban poor of Dar es Salaam with this essential service. Specifically five elements of institutional capacity are discussed including resources, organisational structures, legal framework, management processes and policy.

3.3.4.1 Financial and Human Resources

This study has revealed that the Dar es Salaam City Council and its municipal councils are not adequately resourced to enforce contractual obligations such as monitoring of the performance of concessionaire, raising public awareness and enforcing the law relating to payment of refuse collection charges. Indication of weak institutional capacity (i.e. equipments) experienced by municipal authorities of Dar es Salaam is presented in Table 12. The extent of weak resource base of municipal authorities is demonstrated by the situation in Temeke. The department of solid waste management in Temeke Municipal council receives only 20 per cent of the municipals' budget (recurrent) shared between health, solid and liquid waste services. The department has seven technical personnel, eight trucks and one car, motorcycles and radio calls. These resources constitute a very small fraction compared to the area and the population to be served. The department serves an area of 109.6 km² spread across 67 streets. The seven technical staff of Temeke municipal authority is inadequate to effectively supervise and monitor activities of concessionaire who provided service (JICA, 1996, pp.1-27). Apart

from supervision functions, the solid waste department of the Temeke municipal has responsibility to provide directly through its own budget and staff refuse collection services to more than 50 per cent of its total area. The council directly collects 58 per cent of the total waste generated in the area (Temeke Council, 2000). Problems of financial and human resources are not limited to Temeke alone municipal but are also experienced by other municipal councils.

Weak resource base experienced by the three municipal councils has rendered them ineffective in supervising the service providers as well as meeting other contractual obligations. Discussions with solid waste management officials in Temeke showed that patrol activities were not done enough because of lack of resources. Inadequate supervision and monitoring of concessionaire by the DCC was identified by respondents in all study streets as one of the factors contributing to poor quality service. In all streets, community members did not know which institution(s) was responsible for monitoring the activities of service providers. The officials in Ilala, further, cited lack of finances as the major factor constraining them from carrying out patrol as well as awareness creation campaigns.

Inadequate financial resources experienced by three municipal councils of Dar es Salaam has hindered them from providing service providers with incentives to promote and reinforce desired behaviours. Availability of financial incentives such as credit and subsidies offered to service providers targeting low-income areas is essential if the privatisation strategy is to be successful. The absence of financial incentives such as credit and subsidy as is the case with Dar es Salaam City Councils has compounded institutional capacity problems of service providers. The service providers (concessionaires) demonstrated a need for credit and subsidy from the contracting authorities. Indeed the success of UASU, a CBO providing services at Mogo Street, was facilitated by an institutional support it obtained from the Ilala municipal authority. The Ilala municipal council accorded UASU subsidy to facilitate transportation of waste to dumping area at Vingunguti. A subsidised price of TShs 7000 per trip compared to the market rate of between TShs 25,000 and 30,000 enables UASU to collect for disposal a large proportion of refuse generated in the area. More support to UASU was given in form of contract that involved transfer of payments from the municipal authority to the service provider. In this respect UASU was given a street cleaning contract, which was paid for by the Ilala Municipal Council. It should be noted that the decision by DCC to accord UASU subsidy was motivated by political factors rather than concern for community's well-being. The streets served by UASU are adjacent to the main road to Dar es Salaam International Airport. Visibility of such streets makes them critical for the image of the city.

Table 12: Summary Information on Some Capacity Indicators of the Three Municipal Authorities in Dar es Salaam

Municipal	Area Km ²	Population 1996	Wards	Streets	Number Contractors	Staff	Equipment
Temeke	109.6	577510	11	67	9	7	8 trucks 1 car
Ilala	93.7	477353	5	20	5	83	6 Dumpsite trucks 2 tractors 1 compactor 6 trailers 1 patrol car
Kinondoni	236.8	1128001	22	89	4,837	29*	5 trucks 1 car Radio calls

Source: Compiled by the author from information obtained from interviews with officials of solid waste departments of Temeke, Kinondoni and Ilala.

*Includes health officers of each ward

3.3.4.2 Weak Legal Framework

Absence of an enabling legal framework was cited as another factor contributing to poor performance of service providers. Discussions with service providers (concessionaires) cited municipal councils' failure to enact and enforce by laws on refuse collection charges as the major factor preventing them from getting communities support in respect to fee payment. A quote from an FGD interview with service providers explains: "*Udhaifu wa Manispaa katika kutunga sheria ya malipo, unawapa jeuri wananchi wasiotaka kuchangia malipo, wengi wa wasiolipa ni wale wanaojua kuwa hakuna sheria ya kuwabana*". [Weakness of the DCC in passing by laws on payment of refuse collection fees, has been exploited by residents who refuse to pay service hte fee, the majority of those who do not pay are aware of the legal loop-hole].

3.3.4.3 Organisational Structure and Work Practices

Institutional and organisational arrangements of the Dar es Salaam City Council have been identified as critical factors contributing to weak financial base of the municipal authorities. The organisational structures and work practices of the Dar es Salaam City Council are not supportive of the concession privatisation strategy because it places responsibilities for enforcement of contractual obligations at higher levels of the local government hierarchy. The higher levels are not only removed from where action is but suffer serious problems of resource shortage. This centralisation tendency has made the DCC ineffective in enforcing its contractual obligations. In the organisation structure of DCC, the division of power, authority and responsibilities between the four tiers is such that, the DCC, which is the highest body, has power to raise revenue and to coordinate and oversee activities of all other tiers. The municipal council, which is the

second tier, also has power to raise certain types of revenue, and coordinates activities of all implementing agents in its area of jurisdiction.

A ward is the third level, it is the administrative link between the municipal council and the street governments, the implementing agents in the DCC organisational hierarchy. A ward is managed by a ward development committee comprising all street leaders and chaired by a councillor of the respective ward. The ward executive officer is an extension staff of the municipal council and secretary to the ward development committee responsible for implementing councils' decisions in all streets in the ward. A street government is the fourth and lowest level in the hierarchy. It is the actual implementation body and is responsible for maintaining peace and order in the street, relay government policies pass on directives to the communities, maintains record of street residents and handling complaints and resolve conflicts at the street level. The DCC, the municipal council and as the street government are elected bodies. There is another tier, which although not recognised by the Local Government Amended Act of 1999, continues to play a pivotal role of acting as a channel for organising community action in the governance system of Tanzania. This is the ten cell unit consisting 10 households (ten-cell unit), each with its own elected leader (*balozi wa shina*), and with between 60-120 people in each group. However, since the ten-cell unit is a structure of the ruling party (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi*), its importance diminishes in areas where the ruling party does not have a strong hold.

The above organisational structure of the DCC has several weaknesses. These limit its effectiveness in providing an enabling framework for a pro-poor privatisation strategy. The most critical weakness in the organisational structure of the DCC is the omission of the street government from its organogram. This is a serious anomaly when it comes to resource allocation. Since the organogram is a framework for allocation of organisation's resource and planning of activities, non-inclusion of the street governments from the organogram of the Dar es Salaam City Council has meant exclusion from the City Councils' plans and budget. Information on distribution of Dar es Salaam City Council budget among its various hierarchical levels was not available making it difficult to make any meaningful conclusions. However, chairperson of street governments of all sixteen assessment streets confirmed that they did not have budgets allocated to them.

Furthermore, there is some level of duplication of functions between the two higher tiers, DCC and municipal council, especially in the area of tax collection. From the perspective of the taxpayer, this is double taxation and an exploitative system that generates hatred towards the government. While in principle the tax sources for the DCC are different from those of the municipal councils, the targeted taxpayer is the same. The issue of double and multiple taxes was noted

as one of the major cause for non-payment of refuse collection charges by communities in all the sixteen streets. A quote from Mogo street, underscores the point *“Tatizo la uchafu hapa sokoni ni mikodi mingi na matumizi mabaya ya fedha tunazotoa. Wakandarasi walikuja tukakataa kutoa hela kwa sababu kila siku tunatoa shilingi mia (100) city ambayo zamani walikuwa wanasema hiyo hela ni kwa ajili ya kufagia, kuzoa taka na huduma za vyoo. Sasa mkandarasi anasema anakusanya kwa niaba ya manispaa tutalipa kodi ngapi? Mama ee zamani za mkoloni tulilipa kodi moja tuu ya kichwa na huduma ilikuwa bwelele,”* FGD men Market Operators. [Too many taxes and misuse of the money we pay are the major factors contributing to problems of solid waste in this market. Concessionaires came and we refused to pay collection fees because we have been paying TShs. 100 per day, which initially they claimed, was for market cleaning, refuse collection and toilets. Now the service provider is saying s/he is collecting on behalf of the municipal council, how many taxes are we going to pay? Mom, during colonial period we used to pay only one tax (head tax) and the services were many]. Service providers associated double taxation with poor performance of businesses in regards to payment of refuse collection charges. It was highlighted during focus group discussions with service providers in Temeke municipal council that a business proprietor in Temeke municipal council has to pay more than six different taxes, these include: business license fee, city service levy, income tax, refuse collection levy, sales tax and insurance service levy. It was pointed out that too many taxes reduced peoples’ willingness to pay any new taxes such as refuse collection charges.

Another weakness of the organisational structure of the DCC is the extent of centralisation of authority over decision-making and finances. The case of management of solid waste helps to illustrate the point. Although each of the three municipal councils of Dar es Salaam have their own solid waste management department, authority over decisions relating to financing of solid waste management is retained by the Dar es Salaam City Council. Also, donor support such as ILO training programme for concessionaires and UNDP capacity building programmes are managed by the DCC. During focus group discussions with service providers they indicated that they were getting support from DCC and not the municipal councils.


The same tendency towards centralisation is reflected in the relationship between municipal council and its lower tiers, ward and street governments. Results from this study reveal that the municipal council is running the show. Focus group discussions with ward executive officers reiterated the point that they do not have any role to play in the management of concessionaires. For instance, the majority of chairpersons of street governments were also not aware of the presence of concessionaires in their areas of jurisdiction. This centralisation of solid waste management responsibilities by the municipal council has rendered

it ineffective in supervising and monitoring the performance of concessionaires. It has also alienated street governments from activities of the concessionaires because they consider them an imposition by the central administration of the municipal council. A quote from the chairperson of Madenge street government summarises: “*Sisi ndiyo tunaowajua hawa wananchi, sasa mtu atoke huko bila kusaidiana na mimi hawezi kufanikiwa*” [*We are the ones who know people here, success of any intervention brought in this area will require my assistance. Without my involvement nothing will succeed*]. Clearly, lack of support from street chairperson has contributed to poor performance by the service providers specifically in fee collection. From the study findings, relatively good performance in service provision can be observed in those streets where there is close working relationship between the service provider and the street chairpersons as in Mogo.

This section has identified factors responsible for the minimal impact of concession privatisation in providing the urban poor with refuse collection service. From the users’ perspective the factors include: irregularity of the service, unethical behaviour of service providers, lack of trust in service providers by community members to mention a few. The factors identified by users were analysed using the conceptual framework presented in the literature review. Three major interrelated factors are responsible for the minimal impact of contracting out refuse collection services in providing the urban poor with the service. These include: the absence of delegation of direct rights and legal obligations to the service recipient; and weak institutional and organisational capacity of both the contracting authority and the concessionaire method of privatisation.

These factors are presented in summary in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Cause and Effect of Minimal Performance of Contracting Out Providing Urban Poor with Refuse Collection Service



3.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE SITUATION

What needs to be done to mitigate those factors responsible for minimal performance of concession privatisation in providing lurban poor access to this social service?

Several recommendations were given by respondents to make the strategy work as raised in the analysis. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

3.4.1 *Reorganisation of DCC*

As was found in this study the current structure of the DCC is embedded with duplication of roles and responsibilities between the two higher tiers, the DCC and the municipal council. Both the DCC and municipal councils have mandates to collect taxes and service charges from the same sources. During the assessment period, municipal officials complained of unequal distribution of taxation responsibility between DCC and municipal councils as well as between DCC and the central government. They argued that the large majority of taxes allocated to municipal councils are of minor yield, and cost-ineffective in collection and a source of irritation to tax payers. Secondary data further suggests that municipal councils are responsible for administration of less than 20 per cent of the total of 60 different revenue sources allocated to the DCC (Ndibalema et al, 2001). The Ministry of Finance made the same observation in 1996 (MoF, 1996, p.88). What is required, therefore, is to revisit the structure and harmonise roles and responsibilities of the two tiers to remove duplication. Moreover, the DCC seems to have an overly control over donor resources earmarked for solid waste management. Further research is needed to examine the prospects and problems of a four-tier structure as it relates to the implementation of the pro-poor policies such as urban environmental management.

3.4.2 *Strengthening Role of Street Government in the DCC Structure*

The street governments whose mandate is to implement the municipal council's policies, does not appear in the organisation structure of the DCC neither does it have a budget. While it is true that the street government has a representation in the ward development committee, the study findings show that this level is the most uninformed tier of the DCC. Respondents in all streets, suggested for an increased role of street governments and communities in the management of solid waste services. The demands were made on the belief that street governments and communities are more knowledgeable and competent to judge on what is good for them. As to how this could be achieved, respondents proposed the municipal council to establish a protocol of solid waste management and then transfer its responsibilities for implementation including selection of concessionaire and implementation to street governments and communities. Increasing the role of street governments may not be a viable solution in streets

where the residents are highly divided on political party ideologies as in Kiburugwa. In such circumstances attempts could be made to identify and strengthen those institutions that have social legitimacy (acceptance).

3.4.3 Framework for Policy Formulation

The study has shown that there were serious flaws in the institutional framework and process by which the concession privatisation strategy was designed. The EPM and the working group for solid waste management remain to be elitist with little or no involvement with communities. A call was made for extending direct rights and legal obligations to service recipients. Service recipients felt that if they are asked to pay for the service they should be involved in decision-making in matters relating to design and implementation of privatisation of refuse collection services. Communities indicated that involvement of service users in the design and implementation of contracting refuse collection strategy was seen as essential for community's acceptance of the obligations imposed on them. Also community involvement was seen essential for community's ownership of the strategy and monitoring of the performance. Indeed, community involvement was cited as a critical factor for good performance of concessionaire (service provider) in Mogo Street. The working group model of the DCC may not be sufficient for extending community involvement in decision-making and implementation. At policy level, a multi-stakeholder working group for each municipal council seems to be plausible. Local knowledge through participatory processes could be harnessed to develop modalities by which municipal working groups are to function.

3.4.4 Revisit the Concession Method of Privatisation


It is argued that the concession method of privatisation is viable in situations of strong institutional capacity on both principal and agents. Neither the DCC nor service providers have requisite institutional nor organisational capacities required for this method of privatisation. Respondents suggested for a contract method, that is, DCC pays a service provider) as a viable method of privatisation of refuse collection services in Dar es Salaam. A quote from Kiburugwa helps to echo the point "*Jiji walipie gharama ya uzoaji taka kwani kodi ya maendeleo tunalipa ya nini.*" [DCC should pay for refuse collection service, what is the purpose of the development levy that we pay?" FGD mixed group].

The idea of getting DCC directly financing solid waste services provision in low income areas is a sound one given weaknesses of the present concession system. However, for this to work it may require a reform of the financial relationship between central and local government authorities. The local government authorities of Tanzania are highly dependent on funding from the central government. In doing so the central government has reserved for itself

responsibility for collection and retention of revenues from high yield tax bases. This has left local governments with very few, low yield and high administration cost tax bases such as development levy, property tax and building permit tax. A policy issue to address this situation requires reforming the financial relationship between the DCC and the central government represented by the Tanzania Revenue Authority.

It is important to note that the problems of solid waste management for low-income areas of Dar es Salaam are complex and may require a combination of strategies and institutional frameworks. These problems are compounded by socio-economic and demographic conditions obtained in these areas. The system of solid waste management relevant for low-income areas of Dar es Salaam would have to address critical issues of, waste collection and disposal, cost effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The study has shown that there exists two systems, informal and formal, of waste management in low-income areas of Dar es Salaam. At the moment the two systems are competing instead of complementing each other. Recommendations from the sixteen streets emphasise synergy between the two management systems. From the study findings it is clear that the communities are proposing for a single chain of service delivery system in which the households, informal service providers, formal service providers as well as municipal authorities are networked into different forms of partnerships (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Proposed Network of Solid Waste Management Service Delivery



As was suggested from Mogo and Kiburugwa streets, the informal system could be strengthened to address the problems of primary collection, that is, from households to collection points), while contract method could be appropriate for secondary collection, that is, from collection points to the official dumping sites). With regard to informal systems, it was further suggested that emphasis be placed on those methods, which rely on sustainable compliance enforcements arrangements that foster community action.

4.0 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This research has revealed areas that need further research. It is thus recommended that further research be carried in the following subjects:

- In-depth study into the social organisation of low-income areas and potential for community action.
- Development and/or validation of existing indicators for assessing the impact of privatisation in providing low-income households with refuse collection services.
- Potential of participatory waste management strategy drawing lessons from successful experiences in Tanzania or any other developing countries with conditions similar to those obtained in Dar es Salaam.
- Problems and prospects of multiple layered organisation structures in delivering pro-poor policies.
- Potential of local (street based) non-public institutions in facilitating community action for sustainable solid waste management.
- Community involvement in decision making and implementation of workable options for solid waste management

ANNEXES

Annex 1: A Summary of Activities Carried Out in 16 Streets of Dar es Salaam

Street	Case Study Households		Focus Group Discussions	Key Informant Interview	Remarks
FIRST ROUND FIELD VISITS					
Idrisa	4F	3M	2 (Women + Youths)	WEO + SC	
Uzuri	4F	2M	2 (Women + Men)	WEO + SC	
Barafu	3F	2M	2 (Women + CBO)	SC	
Baruti	5F	1M	2 (Women + Youths)	WEO + SC	
Mkunduge	4F	3M	2(Women + Men)	WEO	
Mwongozo	2F	1M	1 (Women)	WEO + SC	
Msisiri	2F	1M	1 (Youths)	SC	
Mtongani	3F	2M	None	SC	The visit coincided with another research which started on a previous day
SECOND ROUND FIELD VISITS					
Madenge	4F	2M	2 (Women + men)	WEO + SC	
Mogo	3F	3M	2 (Men + CBO)	WEO + SC	
Gongolamboto	4F	3M	2 (Women + Men)	Street leader*	
Misheni	-	-	1 (Men & Women together)	WEO + SC	The community insisted that they should speak as one
Kiburugwa	4F	3M	2 (Women + men)	SC	
Yombo	2F	1M	1 (Men & Women together)	SC	
Chiwanda	5F	1M	2 (men + women)	SC + Ward treasurer	
vijibweni	2F	1M	1 (Men & Women together)	SC	

Key: F: Female; M: Male; WEO: Ward Executive Officer; SC: Street Chairperson.

NB: In all streets neighbourhood observation/guided transect walks were also carried out.

SERVICE PROVIDERS

Three focus group discussions were carried out for service providers (one for each municipality).

Temeke Kimangele, Pegro, Omari Madenga Co. Ltd.

Ilala UWASU, PMJ

Kinondoni KIWODET, MAWEMA (others showed up but declined to be interviewed on service issues because the municipal authorities had already re-advertised their positions).

MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES

Interviews/discussions were carried out with municipal personnel responsible for supervising collection of solid waste. In all the three municipalities, the head of the waste management department was interviewed.

Temeke: Mr. T. Lyimo

Ilala: Mr. S. Bubegwa

Kinondoni: Mr. K. Mvano

Annex 2: Historical Mapping of Environmental Condition before and after the Introduction of Contracting-out Refuse Collection Services

Street	Pre-contracting		Post-contracting
	1960s –1970s	1980 – early 1990s	1996-2000
Idrisa	Very clean: low population; planned area; availability of service from the local government authority.	Poor: due to lack of capacity by the DCC; increased population, squatter areas, and increased production of non-degradable waste.	Still poor in unplanned areas; better in planned areas: operation of a contractor for eight months, later, use of youths and family initiative.
Uzuri	Very clean, no pollution; refuse collection by DCC.	Very dirty especially due to population increase and inadequate DCC services and absence of local dumping places.	Clean at the time when the contractor operated: now, very dirty due to absence of waste collection services.
Barafu	No DCC service in the area.	Clean: population still low; the area was planned and availability of land for digging refuse pits.	Not so clean: increased population; emergence of and congestion in squatter areas; lack of collection points and contractor operated only for six months.
Baruti	Clean: low population and availability of areas for digging refuse pits.	Clean: a group of women provided the service in places like the markets and other commercial areas	Not clean: population increase; the current contractor has a very poor coverage.
Buguruni - Madenge	There was no service.	Dirty as population increased.	Extremely dirty: there is sometimes individual service providers at a small fee; there was a contractor whose service was very poor and is now in a tension with the municipal authorities in court.
Mkunduge	Clean: each house had dust-bins; availability of areas for digging pits. The water in Ng'ombe River was clean then.	The area became dirty with the growing population and congestion of houses.	Extremely dirty: very high populations and lack of refuse and waste collection services. The contractor allocated to the area has never operated for no agreement has been reached on the cost with the local communities.
Msisiri	The area was clean: low population density and DCC services.	Became dirty due to: population growth in the area and increased rate of poverty.	Conditions are poor due to the irregularity of service provision, that is, poor services by the contractor.
Mwongozo	Clean because of: low population density and plenty of land for digging pits.	Fairly clean: with an influx of more people, the level of cleanliness deteriorated.	Dirty because of: lack of adequate refuse collection services; population growth which is unproportional to the services.
Mtongani	No information.	Clean due to low population.	Some areas are fairly clean while others are not. the contractor has stopped providing services.

Continues on the following page...

The Role of Privatisation in Providing the Urban Poor Access to Social Services

Street	Pre-contracting		Post-contracting
	1960s –1970s	1980 – early 1990s	1996-2000
Mogo	No information.	Not very clean due to increased influx of people and increased construction of houses.	Clean: the contractor, UASU, has proved to be efficient and has good working relationships with the local people and the street government, hires youths from the area.
Gongo la-Mboto	Fairly good: due to DCC services .	Dirty: because the service stopped.	Dirty except for areas adjusent to the road; cholera outbreaks are not uncommon in the area.
Chiwanda	Clean: DCC provided the service.	Poor: DCC stopped the services; less space for rubbish pits.	When the contractor was operative, the area was clean, but since he withdrew the place has become dirty.
Vijibweni			
Mishieni-Mburahati			
Kiburugwa	Clean due to free services by Cesspit.		
Mwongozo Makuburi, Yombo	Clean: less population density; and adequate space for dumping refuse etc.	Clean due to city services and plenty of land for digging pits for refuse.	Not vey clean: the service is no longer reliable; service mostly provided by individuals at a small fee and sometimes on a volunteer basis.

Annex 3: Summary of Factors Contributing to the Dismal Performance of Contracting Out Refuse Strategy in Improving Living Conditions

Street	Institutional /Organizational Capacity among Contractors	Poor Design of the Strategy	Community Involvement in Deciding Fees and Mode of Payment	Infrastructure	Service Coverage	Respondent
Idrisa	The contractor had no working equipments, relied on hired ones.	Irregularity of service and poor recording.	No involvement.	Accessible through roads except in unplanned areas.	Planned areas only.	CSH (Man) CSH(Woman) Street leader FGD-Women
Uzuri	No information	Irregular services	No involvement.	Most parts are not accessible, an unplanned area.	Services to commercial areas and high income earners.	FGD -Men
Barafu	Contractor does not possess working equipments, relies on hiring.	No records, Irregular services.	Involved in deciding fees but not mode of payment.	A larger part is accessible by road.	Contractor collected refuse from one collection point. Uses youths to collect from households.	FGD - Women Street leader MBADECO CSH (Man)
Baruti	Inadequate trucks to collect refuse from collection points.	Not regular.	No involvement.	Narrow roads.	Service to commercial areas only.	Ten-cell leader CSH-Woman FGD-Women
Mkundugu	Contractor never showed up in the area.	Not applicable.	Not applicable.	Established road-network most of it is covered by petty-traders.	Not applicable.	CSH-Woman CSH - Man Monica
Msisiri	Insufficient trucks and other tools.	Not regular.	No involvement.	Accessible mainly during dry season.	Each visit a different part is covered.	FGD-Youths
M/ngozo	Insufficient trucks and other tools	Not regular.	No involvement.	Accessible except in the rainy season.	Cover all accessible collection points.	FGD-Women CSH-Woman CSH-Man
M/ngani	Personnel are unethical, they use abusive language. Insufficient working equipments.	Irregular services.	No involvement.	Good accessibility.	Only part of the whole area known as Mtongani Pwani.	CSH-Woman CSH-Man

Key:
 CSH - Case Study Households; FGD - Focus Group Discussion
 M/ngozo - Mwongozo; M/ngani - Mtongani

REFERENCES

- Armstrong, A. "Master Plan for Dar es Salaam, Tanzania" *Habitat International*, 11 (2): 1987, pp.133-145.
- Bartone, C. et al. *Toward Environmental Strategies for Cities: Policy Considerations for Urban Environmental Management in developing Countries*, No. 18. Washington, D.C, World Bank, 1994.
- Boulding, K. *Three Faces of Power*, Newbury Park, California DCC: Sage, 1990.
- Chandler, J.A. *Local Government Today*, Manchester:, Manchester University Press, 1996.
- Christiansen, P. F. "Performance and Divestment of State-Owned Enterprises in Ghana." *Public Administration and Development*, 18(3), 1998, pp.281-93.
- Cohen, J. M. "Foreign Advisors and Capacity Building: The Case of Kenya," *Public Administration and Development*, 12(5), 1992, pp.493-510.
- Coffey, M. "Sustainable Cities Programme Report on Solid Waste management Volume One Solid waste Collection," unpublished report, 1992.
- Cointreau-Levine, S. *Private Sector Participation in Municipal Solid Waste services in Developing Countries*, Newbury Park, California:, Sage, 1994.
- Dar es Salaam City Commission, 'Mikakati ya Kuwahusisha Wananchi katika Kutoa Huduma ya Uzoaji Takataka Na Usafi katika Jiji la Dar es Salaam', unpublished material, 1998.
- , "Orodha ya Wakandarasi wa Kuzoa Taka Kanda ya Kinondoni Mpaka Tarehe 30 November," Unpublished material, 1999.
- , "Vifaa Walivyonavyo Wakandarasi," unpublished material, 2000.
- Dia, M. "Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions." *Directions in Development*, Washington, D.C:, The World Bank, 1996.
- Dietrich, M. "Transaction costs and Revenues" *Transaction Costs, Markets and Hierarchies* in C, Pitelis (ed), Oxford, Blackwell, 1993.
- Doan, P. "Institutionalising Household Waste Collection: The Urban Environmental Management Project in Cote d'Ivoire". *Habitat International*. Vol. 22, No. 1, 1989, pp.27-39.

- Fenwick, J. *Managing Local Government*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1995.
- Frankernberger, T.R. "Measuring Household Livelihood Security: An Approach for Reducing Absolute Poverty," Paper prepared for the Applied Anthropology Meetings, March 27-30, 1996, Baltimore.
- Gary, C. W., and M. D. McCubbins, "Structure and Policy: The Institutional Determinants of Policy Outcomes," Department of Political Science, California, University of San Diego, 1996.
- Gordon, C. "A Framework for implementing Human Service Programmes: How Hard Will It Be?," *Public Policy*, 27: 1979, pp.387-435.
- Hirschmann, D. "Institutional Development in the Era of Economic Policy Reform: Concerns, Contradictions, and Illustrations from Malawi," *Public Administration and Development*, 13(2): 1993, pp.113-28.
- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), "The Study on the Solid Waste Management for Dar es Salaam City in the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam:" *Progress Report (2)*, Dar es Salaam City Commission, August, 1996.
- Kaare, S. K. "Public Policy Performance in Developing Countries: Urban Housing Policy with Special Reference to the National Sites and Services and Squatter Upgrading in Tanzania," A Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Canberra, 1998.
- Kirango, S. "Senior Health Environmental Management Officer Dar es Salaam City Commission," Discussion held on Privatisation of Refuse Collection by the Dar es Salaam City Commission, 2000.
- Kironde, J. M. L. "*The Governance of Waste Management in Africa Cities: The case of Dar es Salaam*," Dar es Salaam, Ardhi Institute, 1995.
- Kizito, Nkwabi. Health Environmental Officer in the Solid and Liquid Waste, and Pollution Control Unit, Dar es Salaam City Commission 'Discussions held between Mr. Kizito and the Principal Researcher, 1999.
- Kombe, W, (ed), "Participatory Environmental Planning and Management: Is SDP Making It?" in Kombe W and V. Kreibich, 1997, *Decentralised Development and Prospects for Planning in Africa*, N.P., University of Dortmund, 1997.

- Kulaba, S. "Local Government and the Management of Urban Services in Tanzania," in R. Stren and R.R. White, (eds), *African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid Urban Growth*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
- Lee, Y. "The Privatisation of Solid Waste Infrastructure and Services in Asia," *Third World Planning Review*, 19(2), 1997, pp.139-161.
- Lifset R., and Fernandez L. "The Search for Best Practices in Urban Solid Waste Management Services in Developing Countries", Internet Conference, 1997/1998. Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environment. Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) 1998.
- Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), "Reform Agenda," unpublished paper, Prime Ministers Office, Dar es Salaam 1998.
- Lugalla, J. "The Social Context of Management of Environmental Pollution in Dar es Salaam City in Tanzania," A Research Report submitted to the International Development Research Council (IDRC), 1996.
- Magnus, C. "Managing the Sustainable Development of Dar es Salaam," *Solid Waste Collection*, Vol. I, UNCHS/SDP, Consultant's Report, 1992.
- Moore, M. "Good Government Introduction," *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 24(1), 1993, pp.1-6.
- Munishi, G. "Health Services Delivery in Tanzania: Some Qualitative Differences Between Government and Non-Government Primary Health Care Units," Paper Presented at Seminar on State versus NGOs in Provision of Services in Eastern Africa, 22-24 July, Dar es Salaam: Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, 1992.
- Mushi, S. S.; J, Semboja, and O. Therkildsen. "Issues of Service Provision in the 1990s in Eastern Africa," Paper Presented at Seminar on State versus NGOs in Provision of Services in Eastern Africa, 22-24 July, Dar es Salaam: Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, 1992.
- Ndibalema, N.; D. Constantine; L. Kajigili; T.P, Kaare; S.K., Luzunya and M. Samia, "The Existing Financial Relationship between Central and Local Government in Tanzania: Potential for Workable Devolution," unpublished essay for Public Administration Course, Institute of Finance Management, 2001.
- Ntukula, M. "Social Problems of Squatters: A Case Study of Kinondoni-Moscow Dar es Salaam," unpublished B.A Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, 1984.

- Ohnesgoren, F. "Sorting Out Waste" *Public Management*, 75, 1993, pp.9-12.
- Olowu. D and P. Smoke, "Determinants of Success in African Local Governments: An Overview," *Public Administration and Development* 12(1): 1992, pp.1-17.
- Palumbo, D.J, (ed), *The Politics of Programme Evaluation*, Newbury Park: Sage, 1987.
- Post, J. "The Problems and Potentials of Privatising Solid Waste Management in Kumasi, Ghana" *Habitat International*. Vol. 23, No. 2: 1999, pp.201-215.
- Preker, A.S., and Feachem, R. G. A, Market Mechanisms and the Health Sector in Central and Eastern Europe, World Bank Technical Paper Number 293, 1995.
- SDP, *Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project: Progress Report* 1994, Dar es Salaam, 1994.
- Self, P. Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice, Basingstoke:, Macmillan Press Limited, 1993.
- Semboja, J and N. S Therkildsen, Service Provision under Stress in East Africa: The State, NGOs and People's Organisations in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, Copenhagen, Centre for Development Research, 1995.
- Smale, M. and V.M. Ruttan, "Cultural Endowments, Institutional Renovation and Technical Innovation: The Groupements NAAM of Yalenga, Burkina Faso" Unpublished Paper, Economic Development Centre, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1994.
- Temeke Municipal Council, "Temeke Municipality and Contractors: Takataka Tones Collected in 1999 and 2000", unpublished material from the Temeke Municipal Council's, Solid Waste Department, 2002.
- Therkildsen, O. "Primary Education and Local Government: Who Decides, Pays and Benefits?" Paper prepared for the workshop on 'Quality and Equity Issues in Tanzanian Education Policy and Practice: Insights from Research'. 15-16 December, Dar es Salaam, 1993.
- UNDP. *United Nations Development Programme, 1992: The Urban Environment in Developing Countries*, New York:, UNDP, 1992.
- UNDP. "Dar es Salaam City Council, Managing Sustainable Growth and Development of Dar es Salaam," UNDP and Habitat URT/90/033, 1992.

- UNHCS. *Environmental Guidelines for Settlements Planning and Management: Institutionalising Environmental Planning and Management for Settlements Development*: Nairobi:, United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1987.
- Walker, J; J. Vasant; G. Brantly and R. Johnson, “Private Participation in Indonesia: Water Supply and Waste Management”, *Urban India* 12: 1992, pp.92-130.
- W, and V. Kreibich, *Decentralised Development and Prospects for Planning in Africa*, N.P., University of Dortmund, 1997.
- World Bank. *Focus on Poverty: A Report by the Task Force of the World Bank*, Washington DC: World Bank, 1985.
- . *World Development Report, The State in a Changing World*, New York:, Oxford University Press, 1997.
- World Bank, *Better Urban Services: Finding the Right Incentives*, Washington, D. C: World Bank, 1995.